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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
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Following in the tradition of studies of categorization in everyday life, this dissertation
focuses on the specific case of sets of categories. The concept of the "contrast set," developed
by cognitive anthropologists in the 1950s, is the central focus of analysis. Canonical examples
of everyday life contrast sets include alphabets, identification numbers, standard pitches,
and the elements of geographical categorizations. This dissertation focuses on the design
issues surrounding the deliberate, conscious construction of such sets (rather than on
contrast sets which are natural or emergent). The chapters focus respectively on the creation
of contrast sets; the way contrast sets are used as labels for other contrast sets; the use of
rules, principles, and set topologies in this labeling process; the standardization and
institutionalization of contrast sets; the way in which people justify, legitimate, and attempt
to change standardized contrast sets; and the ways people learn about unfamiliar contrast
sets. 
The dissertation uses the method of pattern analysis. It identifies and describes
abstract social forms, gives numerous concrete examples of each form, and includes sixty
images. The goal is to understand a recurrent type of human activity that affects and
structures many everyday life experiences. The dissertation is practically oriented as well,
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Think of how you organize the collections of things in your home. How do you
arrange your music collection, the books on your bookshelves, the food in your fridge and
pantry, and the clothing in your dressers and closets?
I think that all of us have regular principles for organizing such collections. Usually
this involves sorting them into groups or categories, and keeping everything in each group
together. Thus we have a sock drawer, and an underwear drawer, and a rack for our shoes,
and a closet where shirts hang on hangers. We can arrange our music into jazz, classical,
rock, and world music, and we may keep novels on one shelf, travel books on another, and
cookbooks all together in our kitchen.
There are always alternative ways to sort. I have a bookshelf which is divided into the
three categories of "books I like," "books that are OK," and "books that I would be happy to
get rid of." A restaurant I know in Prague has a purely decorative bookshelf, where the books
are sorted by color. Some used book stores sort by type of binding. At scholarly conferences,
one encounters books sorted by publisher. 
Sometimes things fall in between categories. Is this red, or orange? Hardcover or
softcover? Is this rock, or world music? Or both, and what then? Should this go with the
shirts I hang up, or the shirts I keep in the drawer? These ambiguous cases remind us that
our classifications are imperfect. Encountered in a bad mood, such ambiguity can nearly
make us swear off using any kind of sorting system at all.
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If we have something that can be arranged in a more or less linear order, a whole new
range of possibilities opens up. Instead of grouping our books into categories, we can sort
them sequentially. We can arrange books by size, or alphabetically by author's last name, or
by Library of Congress call number. We can organize our CDs by title, or by the last time we
listened to them.
Whatever organizing principle we use varies in its "shareability" with other people.
Some organizing principles are practically innate and inescapable, such as the segregation of
trash in a taboo location. Others are based on widely standardized knowledge that other
people immediately understand, such as alphabetical order. Others are more idiosyncratic
but easily explainable, such as the organization of most peoples' pantry shelves. Some,
though, are so deeply based on subjective experience that they are impenetrable to outsiders. 
Thus, for example, the Library of Congress system for arranging books is a widely
shared standard, as is the expectation that in an unfamiliar American kitchen you may well
find eggs in the refrigerator door, vegetables in the lower bins and the garbage under the
sink. Your friends may not know which is your sock drawer, but they can guess that you
probably have one, instead of mixing socks with, say, belts. Anyone familiar with alphabetical
order, and with the way music stores sort titles, can easily grasp how you organize your CDs
if you have them grouped by genre or sorted alphabetically by artist. No one else, however,
can easily know which books you like best, or what music you played most recently.
 Once an organizing principle is set, it makes good sense to follow it. And especially if
other people are sharing your stuff — say, if you are managing a store or a library — it is
essential that your users understand your organizing principles, or at least have the
opportunity to learn them, since if users know how things are organized, they waste less time
looking for them. Even if your organizing principle is known only to you, you still want to
follow it, so that you (as user) can retrieve something tomorrow that you put away last
month — not by remembering it specifically, but by remembering the principle. It is such a
bother when things get lost in the system — misshelved in a bookstore or library, or just a
sock that found its way into the pajamas drawer — and it reminds us how helpful category
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systems are. (Is it just me that feels a pang of guilt in the supermarket when I put that
unneeded extra can of peeled tomatoes back on the peanut butter shelf, because I am in too
much of a hurry to find the canned tomato section again?) 
Think of the last time you moved into a new house or apartment. When you stocked
the pantry for the first time, you were (perhaps without much deliberate reflection)
designing a partitioning system for the domain of food, so that a bag of pasta now belongs on
one shelf and a can of artichoke hearts on another. Meanwhile, you were (perhaps
unconsciously) coming up with names for each of the rooms in your home. Ideally, you want
everyone in the household to agree on these partitioning principles and names. In defining
the class of provisions that belong on a particular shelf, or the name of a room, your role is
that of a cognitive designer: someone who creates the terms in which an entire group of
people will think.
This book is about that process of cognitive design, and more specifically, about the
cases where we design sets of categories and labels, a set being a collection of two or more
things. Designing and labeling sets of categories is something that humans do not only in
organizing our music collection or our kitchen shelves, but also when we divide Africa into
countries or a book into chapters, assign area codes to telephone lines, number the spaces in
a parking lot or the highway system of an entire country, come up with a conventional way of
measuring speed, design a set of banknotes, organize a supermarket, create a set of size
grades for apples or T-shirts, or invent an alphabet.
By focusing on sets of categories, this study distinguishes itself from scholarly works
on the more general phenomenon of categorization. Scholars from several disciplines have
studied categorization very intensively over the past few decades. Many interesting and
important books have appeared. While categorization scholarship has developed the term
"contrast set" to label the phenomenon of sets of categories within a particular semantic
domain, few scholars have lingered long over this concept. Most studies of categorization
mention sets of categories only in passing (if at all). This book is different: it brings the idea
of a set of categories or labels into the spotlight.
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This book also focuses particularly on contrast sets that have been deliberately
created by human beings, rather than on those that have emerged in a tacit or unplanned
fashion. It focuses on the design choices involved in making these sets, rather than the way
they are stored or represented in our minds. 
Chapters 2 through 4 discuss the more linguistic and semantic aspect of creating
contrast sets: respectively, partitioning domains, labeling those partitions, and developing
systematic labeling principles. Chapters 5 through 7 discuss the way in which contrast sets
become norms and conventions to which an entire community or society is committed.
Chapter 5 focuses on the basic steps in the standardization of contrast sets, chapter 6 on
people's beliefs about why particular contrast sets became norms, and chapter 7 on the
process of socialization and resocialization for those who are "strangers" to a particular
contrast set. The theme of "cognitive design," the idea that human beings like you and me
created and continue to create our cognitive conventions, will run throughout the book, and I
will return more specifically to it at the end.
1.2 Background and methods
For the past sixteen years I have worked each summer in the travel industry, first
writing travel guidebooks, then guiding group tours, and also planning group tours. I have
had the chance to travel a lot myself and also to watch many other people travel. This book
was written in Reykjavík, Iceland, where I have lived since 2001. I have also lived or spent
extended time in Rochester (N.Y.), Boston, California, New Jersey, Seattle, Britain, Russia,
China, and New Zealand. Many of the examples in this book come from these experiences,
and I would have had a harder time writing the book without them.
As an undergraduate in college, I knew already that I was interested in the themes
covered in this book. At the time I felt that linguistics was the best match for them. During
my four years in a linguistics department, from 1988 to 1992, the pendulum had swung
towards formalist and "innatist" approaches to linguistics, inspired by Chomsky and
evolutionary psychology. This style of linguistics was a poor fit with my interests in
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standardization, writing systems, planning, and what many linguists at the time might have
thought of as "all that social and cultural stuff." 
However, I did manage to be allowed to earn credits studying type design, writing
systems, and language standardization, as well as individual languages such as Icelandic,
German, Polish and Chinese. In a writing class, I wrote a paper on the development of the
American telephone area code system, a paper which is an ancestor of this book's sections on
labeling and mapping. For one semester I worked for the sociologist Stanley Lieberson on the
study of first-naming practices that was eventually published as A matter of taste.1 I also
worked as a researcher and editor for the Let's Go travel guidebooks, where in between my
regular work I concerned myself with questions like how to typeset non-Roman scripts and
how to refer to telephone numbers in a standard way.
After spending one semester in a graduate program in linguistics, I decided that it
would be easier to stay true to my interests by studying under Eviatar Zerubavel in the
Rutgers sociology department. While I was skeptical that sociology could be an ideal home
for my concerns, I was attracted by the unusual mixture of expertise in standardization and
semiotics among the "cognitive sociologists" at Rutgers. Indeed, cognitive sociology has
helped me find theories and contexts in which the interests that I brought from linguistics
have more meaning.
I still find the study of language thrilling, and I feel that those who call themselves
linguists should embrace the widest possible definition of their field rather than excluding
subject after subject as "not really about language proper." The more linguistics excludes, the
smaller the range of phenomena it is able to explain, and the less interesting it becomes.
Linguistics would do well to embrace the flexibility of a discipline like sociology.
Although this book is a study in the sociology of cognition, I have deliberately tried to
take a perspective in it that I would call "general social-scientific." The analytical lens used in
chapters two through four borrows heavily from semantics, semiotics, pragmatics, and the
1 Stanley Lieberson, A matter of taste: how names, fashions, and culture change (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2000).
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anthropology of language and communication. Chapters five through seven rely more on
perspectives borrowed from sociology, economics, and the history of technology. The book
also borrows lenses from the worlds of cognitive science, philosophy, planning, and design.
In dealing with a topic that involves both cognition and planning, this book resembles many
works on language planning: indeed the division between chapters 2-4 and chapters 5-7
corresponds roughly to the distinction that language planning scholars draw between
"corpus planning" (planning the internal design of a norm) and "status planning" (planning
the social status of a norm; see section 5.1).
The most common way of writing about contrast sets, or about any cognitive
convention or social norm or standard, is to tell the history of an individual norm.
Middleton's book on the history of the thermometer and the temperature scale and Georges
Ifrah's book on the history of numbers are fine examples.2 Focusing one's attention topically,
on a single norm, is immediately appealing to readers' natural curiosity about the origin of
norms. One can write such a history with a greater or lesser degree of sociological, historical,
or technological sophistication. In 1984 Otis Dudley Duncan lamented that the scholarly
world was still lacking studies of standardization (and particularly measurement) which were
as broad and as sociologically informed as they could be.3
There has been much progress since Duncan made this comment, but there are still
many topics left to explore. Scholarly books on standards continue to come out — on, for
example, the history and anthropology of numbers, the seven-day week, and the fixing of the
standard meter.4 Meanwhile, trade publishers have brought out a series of popular and
2 W. E. Knowles Middleton, A history of the thermometer and its use in meteorology (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1966); Georges Ifrah, The universal history of numbers: from prehistory to the
invention of the computer (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2000).
3 Otis Dudley Duncan, Notes on social measurement: historical and critical (New York: Russell Sage
Foundation, 1984), p. 13. More recently, Wendy Nelson Espeland and Mitchell L. Stevens in
"Commensuration as a social process," Annual Review of Sociology 24 (1998): 313-343, have also
called for more attention to measurement, although they are more specifically interested in those cases
where a single measure is applied to diverse domains.
4 Georges Ifrah, The universal history of numbers: from prehistory to the invention of the computer
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2000); Thomas Crump, The anthropology of numbers (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990); Eviatar Zerubavel, The seven day circle: the history and meaning
of the week (New York: Free Press, 1985); Ken Alder, The measure of all things: the seven-year
odyssey and hidden error that transformed the world (New York: Free Press, 2002).
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semipopular books on standards and on the microhistory of science and technology in
general, perhaps encouraged by the success of Dava Sobel's Longitude.5 We can now read for
pleasure about the development of musical temperament, the standardization of the meter,
and the poetic beauty of the Beaufort scale6 — as well as the history of European porcelain
manufacture, the role of the codfish in exploration and discovery, the importance of salt and
pencils, and many other such fundamental topics that have been retrieved from the historical
rubbish heap of everyday life and served up in attractive and entertaining formats.
Still, there are many standards which lack good histories, and I myself expected that,
if I were to write a book-length study in this area, I would focus on a single case of cognitive
standardization. There are many fine candidates. For example, we lack a good history of the
Unicode worldwide computer character set standard. Duncan called for a study of pitch
standardization. The politically delicate topic of geographical boundaries is worth much
more exploration. And someone ought to research out the real story of the worldwide
development of the typewriter keyboard and report back to us on it.
One can, of course, use methods other than historical analysis to study individual
cognitive conventions and standards. As a graduate student, I used logistic regression to
analyze worldwide changes in the rule of the road, and qualitative interviews to learn about
pitch standardization and the experience of having absolute ("perfect") pitch. 
What I was encouraged and ultimately convinced to do, though, was to write an
overview of certain theoretical principles which apply to many cases of cognitive
standardization. After all, as I was reminded, even the most successful studies of single
contrast sets (or single standards or conventions) give off the slightly dusty air of the
collector and have the slightly auxiliary flavor of numismatic or onomastic research. So I
have focused analytically on the general theme of the contrast set, and have presented it as an
5 Dava Sobel, Longitude: the true story of a lone genius who solved the greatest scientific problem of
his time (New York: Walker, 1995).
6 Stuart Isacoff, Temperament: the idea that solved music's greatest riddle (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 2001); Denis Guedj, The measure of the world: a novel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2001); Scott Huler, Defining the wind: the Beaufort scales, and how a nineteenth-century admiral
turned science into poetry (New York: Crown, 2004).
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abstract topic that is relevant to dozens of areas of human social endeavor dispersed over
fields like communication, education, science, architecture, and design.
Choosing this route meant accepting much more imperfection than I ideally wanted.
This book covers a lot of ground and borrows from many different fields and disciplines.
Nobody could possibly be an expert on all of the examples, concepts, and themes mentioned.
There was never any chance of my fully "succeeding" at the project.7 I cannot ever be
comprehensive. I have to admit, as Duncan did in his book on measurement, that what you
are reading here is at some level just "notes."8
Surely I do a few themes and examples an injustice through my amateurish treatment
of them. But I have tried to be expert in, at least, the way I have linked examples and patterns
from many different intellectual areas which "belong" to many different scholarly disciplines.
For example, I have used the example of musical pitch standardization at a number of points
in the book. I would never try to pass this book off as a significant contribution to the history
of pitch standardization. Rather, this book's value is that it links the analytical structure of
pitch standardization to that of analogous phenomena from completely different areas of
everyday life (such as clothing sizing), thus placing pitch standardization's particularities in a
much more general context. 
The method used here is the theme-driven analysis of everyday life examples. While
quite different from the quantitative, qualitative or even historical methods most common in
the social sciences, this is a method which all linguists know and use, and which now has a
tradition of its own in sociology.9 In this sort of scholarly work, the contribution to
7 I sympathize with Georges Ifrah's comments in the preface to his Universal history of numbers, p.
xix: "What I had set out to do was manifestly mad. The topic sat at the junction of all fields of
knowledge and constituted an immense universe of human intellectual evolution. It covered a field so
rich and huge that no single person could hope to grasp it alone." Ifrah's book is much more ambitious
than this one, but some of the same issues apply. I wish that Ifrah had read, for example, Erving
Goffman, whose work might have reassured him that the ubiquity of a topic is not a barrier to a concise
and interesting treatment of it.
8 Duncan, Notes on social measurement, p. 13.
9 Two classic examples of such studies are Eviatar Zerubavel, The fine line: making distinctions in
everyday life (New York: Free Press, 1991); Erving Goffman, The presentation of self in everyday life
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959). For commentary on the methodology specifically, see Eviatar
Zerubavel, "If Simmel were a fieldworker: on formal sociological theory and analytical field research,"
Symbolic Interaction 3, 2 (1980): 25-33, and Eviatar Zerubavel, "Generally speaking: the logics and
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knowledge lies in the way the examples are decontextualized and reassembled to
demonstrate a pattern and thus a certain analytic point about society.10 Rather than being
convinced by correlation coefficients and levels of significance, the reader must be convinced
by the author's skill at marshaling analytically comparable phenomena from diverse areas of
daily life and explaining them in a way that the reader finds persuasive — just as a linguist
demonstrates patterns in language by marshaling enough data to allow the reader to see the
formal similarity of disparate examples. 
The success of this method hinges on the way the examples are gathered. Since the
data are everywhere, the researcher must look at the everyday world with notepad in hand,
voraciously observing and analyzing, with their attention tuned to a particular theme. Their
choice of examples will always be open to the charge of selectivity, but a sufficiently broad
and compelling range of examples makes it likely that the pattern observed is genuine and
important.
The focus on themes and patterns links this book to the tradition of formal sociology,
a method of analysis generally traced to Georg Simmel.11 In this book, the social form under
investigation is that of contrast sets and contrast set design. Social forms are patterns of
social interaction viewed as independent of their specific instantiations, and as divorced from
any particular place or time. For example, from the concrete phenomena of dinner parties,
school cafeterias, restaurants, breakfast noodle shops, and takeout pizza shops, we might
focus on the relationship between those who prepare food and those who eat it, or on the
process of people eating together. These two forms or patterns manifest themselves in each
of the concrete situations involved. Although Simmel's conceptualization of social form is not
fully exact, the common feature of sociology in the formal or Simmelian tradition is that it
mechanics of social pattern analysis," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American
Sociological Association, San Francisco, August 2004. See also Kristen Purcell, "Leveling the playing
field: constructing parity in the modern world" (Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University, 2001), pp. 7-9.
10 On decontextualization, see Eviatar Zerubavel, Time maps: collective memory and the social shape
of the past (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), pp. 8-10.
11 Georg Simmel, "The problem of sociology," in Georg Simmel on individuality and social forms,
edited by Donald N. Levine, pp. 23-35 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971 [1908]). For a brief
critical summary of the idea of social forms, see Lewis A. Coser, Masters of sociological thought (2nd
ed., New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), pp. 179-182.
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picks out abstract similarities between diverse concrete contexts, which might not be
immediately obvious to those focused on the analysis of one single concrete phenomenon at a
time.
This book's use of examples collected from a wide range of spheres of daily life also
links it to the rich social-science tradition of studying the "cement" of society and the rules of
everyday life. I have chosen throughout to highlight the mundane12 rather than the
extraordinary in our world. I have focused throughout on the "socially standardized and
standardizing, 'seen but unnoticed,' expected, background features of everyday scenes."13
Typical of studies of everyday life is that everyone is already familiar with what you are
talking about, but has never thought about it carefully before. Like Erving Goffman, my goal
is to succeed not by having "brought new facts to light or revealed information which was
previously unknown, but [rather by having] made clear what was previously unclear, pointed
to the significance of things which had been regarded as of little or no consequence, and
disentangled what was previously an indiscriminate muddle."14
I have tried to write with the expectation that my readers, if they are specialists in one
area I cover, will be beginners in others. Thus I have tried to reference easily accessible and
introductory discussions of the topics I touch on, for those interested in further reading.
These references are in footnotes and also in the example list at the end of the book.
I have also tried to make this book accessible to the enquiring lay reader. It is my
perhaps naive hope that the book might interest anyone who is professionally concerned
with the phenomena that I most frequently use as examples, and that they may thereby
discover how their area of concern can be analytically tied to many others. I am thinking here
of type designers, usability designers, graphic and "information" designers, architects, urban
planners, tourism officials, travel guidebook editors, transport managers, wayfinding
specialists, standards administrators, coinage administrators, telephone numbering plan
12 See Wayne H. Brekhus, "A mundane manifesto," Journal of mundane behavior 1 (2000), at
http://www.mundanebehavior.org/issues/v1n1/brekhus.htm.
13 Harold Garfinkel, Studies in ethnomethodology (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 36.
14 Tom Burns, Erving Goffman (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 6.
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administrators, public administrators in general, database designers, reading teachers,
anyone involved with musical notation and pitch, linguists and anthropologists who are
involved in language planning activities, and the historians of topics such as the alphabet or
the metric system. All these people are either creators, consumers, or chroniclers of
conventional contrast sets. I particularly hope that this book might encourage and help the
authors of histories of specific contrast sets and standards to place them in a sociological and
formal context.
While I have mainly taken an objective and descriptive approach, I have not shied
away from making value judgements about different contrast set design options when they
flow naturally out of my analysis. The line between prescription and description is very thin,
and this is particularly true when the subject is planning and design.15 When I prescribe, I do
so with full awareness that my prescriptive statements' value are limited by my own
knowledge and by the the social and technical conditions of the years 2003 to 2005.
Despite my willingness to prescribe, this is not a how-to book on information design
along the lines of those put out by Edward Tufte or the Society for Environmental Graphic
Design (among many others).16 Rather it is an exposition of the linguistic and sociological
principles which underlie the practical act of designing contrast sets. Most information
design books talk about how to arrange images on paper — I focus instead about how to
arrange concepts before they ever get onto paper. I have very little experience in the
craftsmanship of information design, but I can illuminate the underlying principles of
contrast set design in a way that craftsmen might not have the patience for.
An important inspiration for this book has been a modest and light-hearted sense of
injustice. We often background everyday categorization and labeling conventions, rarely
making them a lengthy focus of discourse (see further section 6.2). Linguists, for example,
15 See Einar Haugen, "Linguistics and language planning," in his The ecology of language: essays by
Einar Haugen, pp. 159-190 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), pp. 159-161.
16 See, for example, Edward Tufte, Envisioning information (Cheshire, Conn.: Graphics Press, 1990),
and The visual display of quantitative information (Cheshire, Conn.: Graphics Press, 1983); Gail
Deibler Finke, You are here: graphics that direct, explain, & entertain (Cincinnati: ST Publications,
1999); Elements & total concept of urban signage design (Tokyo: Graphic-sha, 1989).
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tend to dismiss writing systems as derivative phenomena and their study as an endeavor of
marginal scholarly value. Social scientists' concrete examples of social facts and institutions
(to take just one theoretical concept) often tend towards grand, barely definable phenomena
like "science" and "capitalism" instead of very simple and graspable things like the typewriter
keyboard or the Fahrenheit scale.17 In 1993, I worked as a computer programmer on a project
directed by Western economists trying to privatize Russian government holdings. The
prevailing view was that if free markets could only be created, new social norms and
institutions would arise automatically and spontaneously, which implies that considering the
details of such norms would be a waste of time.18 I watched this dogmatic conviction get in
the way of sensible progress in the management of crucial practical public adminstration
issues like telephone renumbering, taxi fare regulation, and the reliability of the Russian
postal system.19
The media frequently mention contrast sets — briefly and breezily. The weekly
Economist magazine sometimes recognizes their importance, but rarely goes into depth.
Almost never do the media convey the message that people have written about them
seriously. My distinct sense is that standardized contrast sets matter a lot in peoples' daily
lives, but rarely enjoy our focused attention. For the next couple hundred pages at least, I'd
like to let them take the center stage they deserve.
1.3 The thematic organization of this book
You may think of this book as having two general themes (which run throughout the
book) and four chapter contexts (which are associated with particular chapters). 
17 See, for example, Douglass C. North, Institutions, institutional change and economic performance
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
18 See Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski, The tragedy of Russia's reforms: market bolshevism
against democracy (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), p. 302. (There are several
other books on the same events.)
19 Similarly, one of the unforeseen problems that Iraqis faced after the American occupation in 2003
was a shortage of small banknotes so severe that a single 10,000 dinar note was "worth" only 7,500
dinars of small bills. See Edmund L. Andrews, "Iraqis scramble for scarce small bills," New York
Times, 21 June 2003, p. A10. 
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The two general themes are contrast sets and design. This book focuses on the
intersection of these two themes. Most fundamentally, this book is about contrast sets. It
basically provides a definition of them and a description of the way they are used. The book
narrows this field by focusing on the design of contrast sets (and of things connected to
them). 
The four chapter contexts are linguistic categorization (chapter 2); semiotics and
signification (chapters 3-4); standardization and convention (chapters 5-6); and socialization
(chapter 7).
The four chapter contexts give us different angles from which to view the themes of
contrast sets and design. In each case, I try to introduce the essential concepts of the chapter
context and refer to the major existing literature on it. However, my purpose is never to give
an exhaustive overview of the chapter context, but rather to give just enough information to
allow me to explain how that context intersects with the world of contrast sets and contrast
set design. 
My main goal has been to apply the existing theories in these four contexts to the
example of contrast set design. In each of the four contexts, previous scholarship has
generally overlooked contrast sets and set design. In some cases, though, I have tried to
amplify or extend the existing theory, based on the evidence and examples I introduce from
the area of contrast sets and set design. 
I also sometimes illustrate the chapter context with examples that do not have to do
with contrast sets (for example, lexical and onomastic examples in chapters 2-4, and
examples of standardization in chapters 5-7). I do this when these examples help explain the
theory of the chapter context in a particularly effective way. This also serves as a reminder
that there is much more to each chapter context than contrast sets. Contrast sets are only one
example of classification, of labeling and mapping, of standardization, and of primary and
cross-cultural socialization.
A helpful metaphor for the book might be to imagine that the two general themes are
like a cruise ship, and the four chapter contexts are the islands that it stops at. Only part of
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the life of the island is displayed in the interaction between the cruise passengers and the
locals. There is much more to the island than just what one can see from the pier —
hinterlands, private life, and its history and future. There are also islands that the cruise does
not visit — the cruise operator could only fit four into the schedule.
The design of contrast sets is one example of the much more general, indeed utterly
unencompassable phenomenon of cognitive design. I use the term "cognitive design" to
mean the design of institutions, tools, procedures, and environments in whose terms people
are supposed to think, or which presuppose a certain way of thinking. I never really address
the entire potential breadth of this field, but the conclusion tries to open the themes of the
book in that direction.
1.4 Contrast sets and the lexicon
Ferdinand de Saussure proposed that the study of language was only one part of a
much more general "science which studies the role of signs as part of social life."20 Scholars
in the field of semiotics have been working since in the direction of carrying out Saussure's
vision.21 This book is, in part, intended as a contribution to this project.
In focusing on contrast sets, I have, as Saussure suggested, deliberately decided to
explore a part of the world of signs which sits just outside the realm of language and the
lexicon. The lexicon is the collection of words in a language, and in this section I begin to
discuss the relationship between contrast sets and the lexicon, and to clarify the considerable
differences between them. 
20 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in general linguistics, trans. Roy Harris (London: Duckworth, 1983
[1916]), p. [33].
21 Winfried Nöth's Handbook of semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990) is a
tremendously wide-ranging and erudite encyclopedia of semiotic scholarship and a great resource for
further thought on the themes treated in this book.
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Contrast sets and the lexicon have in common not only that they both signify and
represent, but that both categorize reality and that both are social norms. Both contrast sets
and the lexicon partition semantic domains into concepts and label them with words or other
signs. And both contrast sets and the lexicon are social facts that involve conventionalized
and standardized coordination throughout society.
But it is quite difficult to construct theories or scientific generalizations which hold
across the awesome vastness and complexity of a language's lexicon. On the contrary, a
relatively simple model of classification, labeling, conventionalization and socialization
suffices to discuss contrast sets. This model, which has been called the "coding model,"22
indeed underlies the theory of the partitioning and labeling of domains laid out in chapters 2
and 3. It falls woefully short as a theory of the lexicon. Although it is easy and attractive to
think of the lexicon as a sort of wire-mesh colander or printer's type-case in which all of our
perceptions flow through or are sorted into different squares of a giant "matrix of
perception"23 — those squares corresponding to all the concepts and words in our language —
those who have hoped to reduce the lexicon to a few simple models have usually failed. John
Lyons comments that "Most authors who have written recently on the subject of semantic
fields [i.e., domains] have conceded that the majority of lexical fields are not so neatly
structured or as clearly separated one from another as [some people] originally suggested."24
Umberto Eco has described how many people (most famously, John Wilkins) have been
tripped up by this same hope that the lexicon would be more simply structured.25 In fact, the
lexicon is too complicated to be easily sorted into neatly ordered little boxes. It is a haunted-
house of gray areas, unexpected turns and passageways, incomplete parallelisms, and other
such problems.
22 See Nikolas Coupland and Adam Jaworski, "Code," in The Routledge companion to semiotics and
linguistics, edited by Paul Cobley, pp. 170-172 (London: Routledge, 2001), and Umberto Eco, A theory
of semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), pp. 36-38 (definition of code) and 48-150
(theory of coding).
23 This metaphor is from Ernst Pawel, The nightmare of reason: a life of Franz Kafka (London: Collins
Harvill, 1988), p. 22.
24 John Lyons, Semantics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 1: 267.
25 Umberto Eco, The search for the perfect language (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 238-259; see also
Eco, A theory of semiotics, pp. 75-76.
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 The contrast sets that I discuss in this book almost make metaphors of matrices or
sorting-boxes literal. Contrast sets have simpler structures than the lexicon. Their members'
attributes vary along a restricted set of dimensions — sometimes along a single scale. There
are often clear gaps between the different members of a contrast set. They thus make for a
more encompassable and less controversial topic of study. And since the design of contrast
sets is much more under human control than the design of the lexicon, studying contrast sets
has considerable practical as well as scholarly value.
Despite the differences between contrast sets and the lexicon, I will often refer to
parallel literature on the lexicon when I am discussing the relevance to contrast sets of a
concept that has already been applied to language. The lexicon thereby assumes the role of
the ogre in the basement throughout the book: it is always vaguely present, and I briefly
unlock the unruly language beast from its cage when I can use a lexical example to illustrate a
point in an especially effective way. I give the literature on language planning special
attention, since language planning (unlike most of linguistics) explicitly concerns itself with
matters of cognitive design.
Throughout this book, the reader might want to keep in mind that some scholars
have suggested that the lexicon is the only semiotic system that is of any more than trivial
interest, which would imply that that studying contrast sets is a pointless, inconsequential
endeavor. Roland Barthes stated this position quite strongly:
Saussure, followed in this by the main semiologists, thought that linguistics merely formed a
part of the general science of signs. Now it is far from certain that in the social life of today
there are to be found any extensive systems of signs outside human language. Semiology has so
far concerned itself with codes of no more than slight interest, such as the Highway Code; the
moment we go on to systems where the sociological significance is more than superficial, we
are once more confronted with language.26
This statement implies that the only semiotic system of any sociological significance
is language itself. While the reader will have to be the ultimate judge of whether there exist
semiotic systems besides language which are of considerable sociological interest, this book
is intended as good evidence that there are. Indeed, I would suggest that contrast sets
26 Roland Barthes, Elements of semiology (New York: Hill and Wang, 1968), pp. 9-10.
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illustrate certain principles of categorization and signification in a much more clear and
effective way than does the lexicon.
Some might argue that it is too easy, indeed a sort of cop-out, to lay out the rather
simple theory behind contrast sets rather than engaging the complexity of the lexicon.
Similarly, the reasoning behind Barthes' comment may have been "since the lexicon is so
complicated, it must be sociologically significant, and since those other semiotic systems are
so simple, they must not be significant." I would argue that the internal complexity of the
system has nothing really to do with its social significance. Contrast sets can be very simple
and very socially significant at the same time. And as a relatively understudied part of the
world of signs, one book on contrast sets perhaps adds more value than one more book on
the lexicon, and brings us one step closer to making Saussure's vision a reality.
1.5 The workshop metaphor
Imagine a workshop which makes wooden furniture, such as chairs and tables. The
workshop has workers, who design and make the furniture, and customers, who buy it. Raw
materials (like pine or maple), tools, and supplies (like screws and glue) come into the
workshop. The workers' labor transforms these raw materials into saleable products. The
nature of the raw materials constrains, to some extent, the nature of the products (one can do
things with pine that one cannot do with maple or with steel, and vice versa). The traditions
of the workshop, and the traditional needs of its customers, also dictate how the raw material
is worked. Only a limited number of the possible products that could be made from them are
actually created. To explain why the workshop produces the products it does, one must tell
both the story of the raw materials, and of the workshop itself.
This book uses a "workshop" metaphor to structure its explanation of contrast set
design.27 The creation of a contrast set (or the way it is labeled or ordered) is seen as a
process of working raw material, in only one of the many possible ways it could be worked.
The raw material involved is what I will call "domains," and the fundamental nature of each
27 In a similar way, Alessandro Duranti uses a canvas-and-paint metaphor for language in Linguistic
anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 334.
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domain at the point when it "arrives" in the workshop places limitations on the type of
contrast set that can be created in that domain. Within the bounds of those constraints, the
ultimate decision about how to shape a contrast set is up to those who staff the workshop
(the contrast set designers), and those "customers" who judge their products (the users who
choose whether to actually use a contrast set or not).
The organization of a collection of books or music, the creation of geographical
categories, the numbering of a highway system, the size grading of apples, the invention of an
alphabet, and the rest of the examples of contrast set design dealt with in this book can all, in
slightly different ways, be fit into the metaphor of the workshop. This way of seeing contrast
sets looks at them as constructions which are built by humans working within the limits of
the raw material we are given, the goals which we are trying to achieve, and the traditions of
construction that we already know. Although it is not quite the same thing as "social
constructionism," it does emphasize the human role in the authorship of the world.
At the same time, this book does try to discover something about the contents of our
toolkit, and about the raw material that we have to work with. The building blocks of contrast
sets — such as perceptual and sensory domains, the ability to categorize and to label,
ordering, spatial metaphor, and boundaries and focal points, as well as the basic patterns of
standardization and institutionalization in societies — seem to be inescapable facts about
how the natural world and our cognitive relation to it work. Thus our investigation of
contrast sets can indeed allow us to deduce something about the properties of the natural
world.
This book does not, however, assume that everything about how contrast sets work
can be predicted from an understanding of the natural world and the natural constraints on
our cognitive apparatus. Quite the opposite. The perspective that I assume is that human
ingenuity, and the cooperative creation of norms and social conventions, is part of the story
of who we are and the shared cognitive world we have built. In architecture, in literature, in
our cognitive life and I would say in language to a great extent as well, we design the world
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with a limited toolkit but a fairly open-ended set of possibilities.28 We design the world, and
choose what is possible, at the same time as our choices are constrained by our environment
and our biological endowment.29 Just as the characteristics of pine, or teak, or birch, only
constrain, and do not determine, the furniture that can be made from them, most familiar
contrast sets are conventional norms rather than performances from a universal inner script.
28 Note that some linguists prefer to evaluate whether a sentence is normal or not rather than whether
it is grammatical or not. See, for example, D. Alan Cruse, Lexical semantics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986), pp. 11-12.
29 This perspective is worked out at greater length by Michael Tomasello, The cultural origins of
human cognition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 11, and in section 2.0 of Stephen C.
Levinson, "Language and mind: let's get the issues straight!", in Language in mind: advances in the
study of language and thought, edited by Dedre Gentner and Susan Goldin-Meadow, pp. 25-46
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003).
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2 Contrast Sets
Everybody who has taught or taken a class has at some point struggled with the issue
of grading.1 There are, of course, plenty of schools and even universities which refuse to sort
their students into discrete categories of achievement and pride themselves on issuing only
written evaluations. But most schools in the world seem to have decided that grading is
practical, even if it demands evil compromises, approximations, and oversimplifications. The
grade-point average calculated at the end of a term is usually a mean which can have a
practically infinite number of values. But the grade for each individual piece of work is
usually chosen from a small set of perhaps no more than a dozen possibilities. These might
be called A, A-, B+, B (and so forth), or Exceptional, High Pass, Pass, and Fail, or 5, 4, 3, 2,
and 1. Both the categories and the labels vary from one system to another, but the common
theme is that teachers have to choose one and only one of these categories for each piece of
work. Most teachers, once they have gotten the hang of the system, stop asking why it is the
way it is and just use it.
This book asks why, and asks why for all kinds of conventional sets, not just grading
systems. When and why were these sets created? Who chose the divisions, and were these
divisions natural or conventional? How are they labeled? How and why are these systems
perpetuated? Why do they sometimes vary from place to place? 
This chapter focuses on the semantic question of how the entities and categories in a
contrast set are created. Because creating contrast sets involves acts of categorization and
partition, this chapter builds on existing studies of categorization in the social sciences and
especially in cognitive science and linguistics. Much of that literature focuses on the nature of
categories that already exist in the mind. This chapter is different from most in its focus on
the process of creating and designing new sets of categories, although Nelson Goodman's
1 A starting point for the study of grading conventions is Mark W. Durm, "An A is not an A is not an A:
A history of grading," Educational Forum 57 (1993): 294–297. See also Marita Moll, "The history of
grading in three minutes," Canadian Teachers' Foundation press release, 30 July 1998, http://www.ctf-
fce.ca/en/press/1998/PR30.HTM (December 2004).
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outline of a "theory of notation" is one item in the existing literature that does takes an
approach relatively close to that in this chapter.2
2.1 The contrast set
Image 2.1 shows one octave from a piano keyboard.
There are twelve keys in each octave. When trying to
understand categorization it is good to try to think of things
without their usual labels, so imagine labeling the keys with
the numbers 1 through 12. Each key is different; the key
labeled 1 does not give the same sound as the key labeled 3. Each note has also a sort of
equivalence to all the others; all twelve keys are all passable examples of the concept "piano
key." So it is possible to use the expression "key #1 and other
piano keys," and equally well, to substitute any of the other
eleven keys in place of key #1 in this expression. 
Image 2.2 shows a number of other similar sets. Thus we
have the different numerals in the Maya writing system, the
different states of Australia, the months of the year, a collection
of different fruits, the keys on a calculator keyboard, the letters
of the alphabet, and the grades in a typical American grading
system. Common to each of these sets is a general notion, and
various examples of it. The general notions are numerals, states,
months, fruits, keys, letters, and grades. These general notions
have been called hyperonyms or superordinate terms. The
examples of these general notions are specific, individual
numerals, states, months, fruits, keys, letters, or grades. These
2 Nelson Goodman, Languages of art: an approach to a theory of symbols (London: Oxford Unversity
Press, 1969 [1968]), chapter IV ("The theory of notation," pp. 127-173). I would sooner call his chapter




examples can be called hyponyms or subordinate terms.3 A good test of whether two things
have a subordinate-superordinate relationship is to ask whether one can use them in an
expression of the form X and other Ys, such as "key #1 and other piano keys," "Queensland
and other states," "mangoes and other fruits," "8 and other integers," or "B+ and other
grades."4
Since the 1950s a special term has been used
in semantics and linguistic anthropology for the set
of hyponyms "under" a given hyperonym: a
contrast set. Charles Frake is responsible for the
classic description of the contrast set — or at least
one that is clearly written and has been read by
thousands of students.5 Frake demonstrated the
principles of the contrast set using the set of
sandwiches, whose members include hamburgers,
cheeseburgers, hot dogs, and ham-and-cheese
sandwiches.
Contrast sets are the main theme of this
book, but I focus on particular types of contrast
sets. I am most interested in contrast sets which are artificial rather than natural, consciously
created rather than emergent, created as ensembles rather than piecemeal, and at least
potentially redesignable rather than fixed for all time. For example, I will be much more
interested in "B+ and other grades" and "C# and other piano keys" than in "hamburgers and
other sandwiches" or "running and other actions." 
3 On hyponyms and hyperonyms see D. A. Cruse, Lexical semantics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1986), pp. 88-92; John Lyons, Semantics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 1:
291-295.
4 On this formula see Cruse, Lexical semantics, p. 91, and Lyons, Semantics, 1: 292-293.
5 Charles O. Frake, "The ethnographic study of cognitive systems," in Stephen A. Tyler, ed., Cognitive
anthropology (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1969 [1962]), pp. 28-41. See also Lyons,
Semantics, 1: 287-290, and Doede Nauta, The meaning of information (The Hague: Mouton, 1972),
pp. 179-180.
Examples of the "X and other Ys" formula
the eighth floor and other floors of a building
m and other letters of the alphabet
C sharp and other notes on the musical scale
440 hertz and other audible pitches
my parking space and all the other parking spaces 
in the lot
section 23D and all the other sections of the 
parking lot
my parking space and all the other parking spaces 
in section 23D
30° south 150° east and other geographical points 
within Australia
Bolivia and other countries in the world
35 kilometers per hour and other speeds
the sound of a trombone and other musical 
timbres
cream cheese and other dairy products
limes and other fruits
halibut and other fish
Jan and other speakers of Scandinavian languages
Jan and other speakers of Norwegian
Norwegian and other Scandinavian languages
Norwegian and other Indo-European languages
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The term "contrast set" carries within it the reminder that all members of the set
belong together — they are a set — but they are all distinct from each other — they contrast.
To define any member of the set, using the superordinate term as a base, you need to
highlight that contrast by writing the definition to exclude all the other members of the set.
But you do not need to say anything about anything that is not a member of the set. As Frake
put it, "In writing rules for classifying hamburgers I must say something about hot dogs,
whereas I can ignore rainbows."6
The members of a contrast set contrast, but at the same time they fulfill the same role.
We express this by saying that the relation between members of a contrast set is
paradigmatic. Within the same syntactic construction, one can at least conceive of
substituting one member of a set of paradigmatically related entities for another: thus a
grade report showing that you got a B+ could equally well (if you had performed differently)
read A, B-, or C+in place of B+.7 (See further section 2.11.)
We usually give the members of a contrast set names or labels, which are the subject
of chapters 3 and 4. The first three piano keys in the octave, for example, are often labeled C,
C#, and D. But each member of the set exists prior to and separately from its label. So it is
possible to refer to the key called D not by its label, but by saying that "it is the white key in
between the group of 2 black keys on the piano." When thinking about the creation of
contrast sets, it often helps to try to think of them in this sort of pre-labeled state.
2.2 Behind the contrast set: the domain
It is usually possible to think of the members of a contrast set as distributed
throughout some kind of literal or metaphorical space, which existed before the set itself
came into being, and in which each member of the contrast set occupies a particular place.
Thus the fifty American states divide up the land-mass of the United States just as the twelve
months divide up the time-span of the year. A, A-, B+, B, and the other student grades divide
6 Frake, "The ethnographic study of cognitive systems," p. 33.
7 On paradigms see Lyons, Semantics, vol. 1, pp. 240-243; Alessandro Duranti, Linguistic
anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 164-166; Ferdinand de Saussure,
Course in general linguistics (Roy Harris, trans., London: Duckworth, 1983), pp. [170]-[175].
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up the entire universe of possible student performance. Piano keys divide up the piano
keyboard, while each of the set of musical pitches that they produce occupies a particular
spot in the range of audible frequency. Our terms for colors occupy particular points in the
field of possible colors, and each parking space occupies a particular spot in the parking lot.
It is hard to choose what word to use to label this space that lurks behind the contrast
set.8 So far I have used space, universe, mass, span, field, and range to convey the sense of
this concept. Two different traditions in twentieth-century linguistics have used this idea.
Their terminology differs. The first tradition, more European and philosophically oriented,
preferred the term semantic field.9 The more recent, more Californian tradition of cognitive
linguistics uses the term domain,10 which I have chosen for this book too.
I use the word instantiation to describe these individual points within the domain.11
The process of creating a contrast set in a given domain involves organizing those
instantiations into different categories. There are several distinct methods of doing this,
which are described in more detail below.
The relationship between contrast sets and their members parallels that between
domains and their instantiations. In both cases the X and other Ys formula applies, and
domains can be considered hyperonyms and their instantiations hyponyms. (Indeed, as I
explain below, a contrast set can itself be thought of as a particular type of domain, and its
8 For example, Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan Leigh Star in Sorting things out: classification and its
consequences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), pp. 10-11 struggled with what to call the idea of the
domain without any clear resolution. They variously use the terms world, any object addressed by the
system, and the world it [a contrast set] describes. 
9 On this first tradition of semantic field theory see John Lyons, Semantics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1977), vol. 1, ch. 8 (pp. 230-269); Richard E. Grandy, "In defense of semantic fields,"
in New directions in semantics, edited by Ernest Lepore, pp. 259-280 (London: Academic Press,
1987); Eva Feder Kittay, Metaphor: its cognitive force and linguistic structure (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1987), ch. 6 ("Semantic field theory," pp. 214-257); Adrienne Lehrer, Semantic fields and lexical
structure (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1974), esp. ch. 2 ("Semantic fields," pp. 15-45); Stephen
Ullmann, The principles of semantics (2nd ed., Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957), pp. 152-170, 309-313.
10 John R. Taylor, who also uses the word domain, defines it at length on pages 84-85 of Linguistic
categorization: prototypes in linguistic theory (2nd ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). A fuller
account (which is referenced by Taylor as his source for the term) is Ronald Langacker, Foundations of
cognitive grammar (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987-1991), 1: 147-154 (section 4.1, "Types of
domains"). In chapter 7 of Taylor's new textbook Cognitive grammar (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002), which I have not fully been able to review, he appears to use a somewhat different
terminology.
11 On the idea of instantiations see Langacker, Foundations of cognitive grammar, 2: 55-64 (sections
2.2.1-2.2.3).
§ 2.2 25
members as instantiations of that domain; but the converse is not true, so that not all
domains can be thought of as contrast sets.)
These pairs of terms — contrast set and contrast set member, domain and
instantation, hyperonym and hyponym — are themselves examples of the somewhat broader
and very fundamental semantic notion of, on the one hand, an abstract "thing" or "category,"
and, on the other, the various real-life entities which can count as an example of that thing. A
diverse selection of terminology for this pair of notions is available to us, of which Charles
Sanders Peirce's "type" and "token" are probably the best known pair.12 Rudolf Carnap used
"design" and "event,"13 Douglas Hofstadter prefers "class" and "instance,"14 and scholars of
database design have used "entity type" and "entity occurrence."15
A key difference between contrast sets and domains is that, while contrast sets always
consist of distinct entities, many domains (such as those involving time and space) are
continuous. In a continuous domain there are an infinite number of points,16 and it is
possible to mathematically pinpoint each of those points using a scale or a coordinate
system. Thus the landmass of Australia can be considered a domain, the infinite number of
points in Australia are all its instantiations, and Australia's internal borders partition the
domain into a contrast set of seven different territories and tell us which instantiations
belong to which member of the contrast set. Or, consider the year a domain. The infinite
number of moments within a year are instantiations, and the "boundaries" between the
months create a contrast set which separates those instantiations into twelve distinct groups.
12 Charles Sanders Peirce, The collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1933), volume 4, section 537.
13 Rudolf Carnap, Introduction to semantics and formalization of logic (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1959), pp. 5-8.
14 Douglas R. Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach: an eternal golden braid (New York: Basic Books, 1979),
pp. 351-354.
15 Thomas Connolly and Carolyn Begg, Database systems: a practical approach to design,
implementation, and management (3rd edition, Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education, 2002), pp. 331-
332.
16 Nauta, in The meaning of information, p. 180, argues that the idea of a continuous domain with an
infinite number of points is actually a mathematical idealization and "should be conceived of as just a
way of expressing that the nuances in question have a fine structure that surpasses man's
discrimination capacity."
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However, I also use the term domain to refer to collections of entities — of individual
things — which lack the simple continuity of space or time. The entities in these collections
are distinct, are usually finite in number, and do not shade into each other to form a
continuum. Examples of such collections are all the books or CDs on your shelves, all the
sheep in New Zealand, all the pieces of fruit in the supermarket, or all the students in a class.
I call these collective domains and use the word instantiation for the individual entities
within the collection when I am talking about the collection as a domain. (But they may also
be thought of as the members of a contrast set, and I do in fact present them that way at
times.) Creating a new contrast set within a collective domain involves, of course, sorting all
of these instantiations into different categories. For example, the collective domain of New
Zealand citizens could be sorted according to whether they were born on the North Island,
the South Island, or elsewhere. Or, if an earthquake mixed up all the fruit in the
supermarket, you could easily sort it back into order, helped by the fact that different fruits
are naturally distinct from one another, and that ambiguous hybrids do not usually make it
into the store. In either case, the result of the sorting process is a collective domain which has
been sifted through the matrix of a particular contrast set so that each instantiation is
associated with a single member of that set (as long as one manages to handle any
ambiguous cases). A slightly different example is the scene when Harry Potter arrives at the
mythical Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and Wizardry. His very first experience, before even
eating, is the sorting ceremony where each new student is assigned to one of the four houses
of Gryffindor, Hufflepuff, Ravenclaw, and Slytherin.17 In this case, the instantiations of the
collective domain (the students) do not already possess the characteristics that they are
sorted on; instilling those characteristics in them is rather a part of the partitioning process.
With the addition of the concepts of domain and instantiation to our arsenal, we may
fine-tune the X and other Ys formula so that it better captures the crucial elements of any
given hyponym-hyperonym relation. One can rewrite the term Y as "Ps in Q", yielding X and
other Ps in Q, where P is the name for a type of instantiation within the domain Q, and X is
17 J. K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the philosopher's stone (London: Bloomsbury, 1997), chapter 7.
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an example of such an instantiation.18 Fitting a hyponym-hyperonym relation into this
formula does not mean coming up with one unique, correct, analysis of that relation, but is
simply a shorthand means of expressing or representing one distinct way of thinking about
that relation (some such way of thinking is usually present in any given analytical "take").
Thus we can emphasize how a contrast set partitions a continuous domain by thinking about
"Belgium and other countries in Europe" or "B+ and other levels of student performance,"
but we may equally well emphasize how the same contrast set forms a collective domain by
discussing "Belgium and other members of the European Union" or "B+ and other grades in
the standard American grading system." Meanwhile we may emphasize the individual
instantiations in a continuous domain by discussing, for example, "30° south 150° east and
other geographical points within Australia," or the individual instantiations in a collective
domain by referring to "this mango and all the other individual fruits in the supermarket
produce section."
The concept of a taxonomy builds on the concept of the domain. In taxonomies, some
members of a contrast set are themselves domains which "govern" contrast sets of their own.
Thus New York is not only one of the fifty states of the USA, it is itself divided into sixty-two
counties, which are themselves each subdivided into towns. "Swede" is not only one of the
different classifications of "Scandinavian"; the set of Swedes is itself a collective domain
which could be divided into contrast sets of different kinds of Swedes. This hierarchy of
contrast sets is the defining feature of a taxonomy.19 Taxonomies favor specific labeling
styles, which are discussed in chapters 3 and 4.
2.3 The spatial metaphor for the domain
Some domains are actual, physical spaces, like Australia or a parking lot. In these
cases it is not metaphorical at all to use the language of spatial relations to describe them.
18 In this formula, P and Q correspond respectively to the terms attribute and domain in the relational
database model. See Connolly and Begg, Database systems, p. 72.
19 On the idea of taxonomy see Frake, "The ethnographic study of cognitive systems," pp. 33-36; the
extended discussion by Cruse, Lexical semantics, pp. 136-196 (who distinguishes between taxonomies,
meronymies, and "non-branching hierarchies"); Paul Kay, "Taxonomy and semantic contrast,"
Language 47 (1971): 866-887.
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But we also speak, for example, of all the points "within" the domain of color, and we might
talk about two people whose Norwegian dialects are very "close" to each other. This comes so
naturally to us that we barely notice that the domain of color does not really occupy a space
(although it comes close to it when we see a rainbow or the spectrum projected by a prism)
and that the "closeness" of dialects has to do with something other than their physical
location in terms of latitude and longitude. When we talk about non-spatial domains in
spatial terms, our language is actually mediated through a spatial metaphor. This spatial
metaphor also extends to contrast sets which are formed out of that domain.
These spatial metaphors are common in everyday speech, and they are well-known to
scholars. Indeed, there is wide agreement not only that we use spatial language as a basis for
reasoning and thinking about non-spatial domains, but that it is difficult or impossible to
think about many non-spatial domains without a spatial metaphor.20 This book takes it for
granted that the same analytical language can be used to generalize about both literally
spatial and metaphorically spatial domains, so it is best to lay the facts about the metaphor
out clearly on the table.
Each spatial metaphor for a domain has a particular structure or topology. (Literally
spatial domains have particular topologies too.) The most common domain topologies are
linear and circular, but there are also planes, dyads, matrices, solids, tree-forms, networks,
and multidimensional spaces. There can easily be more than one possible metaphorical
topology for any contrast set. For example, we can conceive of the seven days of the week or
the twelve hours on the clock face as a linear sequence with a definite beginning and end, or
as a circular sequence that "wraps around."21
20 For more on the spatial metaphor of the domain see Eviatar Zerubavel, The fine line: making
distinctions in everyday life (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. 15-18; Taylor, Linguistic categorization,
pp. 84-85; Ray Jackendoff, "Semantics and cognition," in The handbook of contemporary semantic
theory, edited by Shalom Lappin, pp. 539-559 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), section 9 (pp. 554-557); the
discussion of "spatial thinking about nonspatial matters" in Alexander W. Siegel and Sheldon H. White,
"The development of spatial representations of large-scale environments," Advances in child
development and behavior 10 (1975): 9-55, pp. 47-48; and Barbara Tversky, "Remembering spaces," in
The Oxford handbook of memory, edited by Endel Tulving and Fergus I. M. Craik, pp. 363-378
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 364. In studies of metaphor, spatial metaphors are often
lumped under the title "States Are Locations."
21 On linear and circular conceptions of time see Eviatar Zerubavel, The seven day circle: the history
and meaning of the week (New York: Free Press, 1985), pp. 83-86.
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Contrast sets and domains that easily admit of a linear topology include time,
number,22 pitch and audible frequency, color, and many measurement standards including
mass, distance, and temperature as well as grading standards like those for eggs, students,
and military personnel.23 In some atypical contrast sets which consist of only two items (such
as left and right or clockwise and counterclockwise), the sense of a line or scale disappears
leaving one with only the contrast between the two poles. These sets can be called called
binary or dyadic rather than linear.
Circular metaphors are common for time (months in the year, days in the week, and
hours in the day), color (since the two ends of the spectrum can be joined), and pitch names
(which cycle with every octave or as part of the "circle of fifths").24 Actually, any finite linear
domain or contrast set can be forced into a circular form.25 A number of domains and
contrast sets have a literally circular form, such as compass direction, time zones, and the set
of constellations used in astrology.
Literally planar domains include parking lots and two-dimensional geographical
space. The Munsell color chart (used, for example, to illustrate the diagrams in Berlin and
Kay's Basic color terms) is a planar metaphor for the domain of color.
Three-dimensional or solid topologies describe actual spaces in which the vertical
element is important (such as a tall building), as well as metaphorical spaces such as the
color solid (yet another way of representing the domain of color). And there is no reason why
domains cannot be metaphorically modeled in more than three dimensions (difficult
material for a mental image, but easy enough to conceptualize mathematically). 
Spatial metaphors based on simple linear, planar, or three-dimensional topologies
are relatively simple to apply, and it takes little mental stretching to manipulate them. These
22 On the linear metaphors behind number and basic arithmetic see George Lakoff and Rafael E. Núñez,
Where mathematics comes from: how the embodied mind brings mathematics into being (New York:
Basic Books, 2000), pp. 71-73.
23 On linear metaphors for sets of terms which differ in degree of a certain quality see Cruse, Lexical
semantics, pp. 187-189, 192-195.
24 On circular domains in general see Cruse, Lexical semantics, pp. 189-191.
25 See the numerous examples of circularly presented contrast sets illustrated in Jessica Helfand,
Reinventing the wheel (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2002).
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topologies can be applied to domains where all the instantiations of the domain uniformly
possess a scalable quality (or qualities) so that each instantiation of the domain can be
pinpointed mathematically by a value on the scale (or set of values on multiple scales). We
can easily visualize scales in space (most of us explicitly learned to do so in algebra class and
commanded the technique intuitively long before), so we can easily visualize scalable
domains. 
There are also many domains which are difficult to describe in terms of one, two, or
three dimensions but for which spatial notions of "closeness" and "boundaries" still seem to
make sense. In these cases, applying a spatial metaphor is more of a stretch, but still a
reasonable one.
For example, in the case of collective domains like a book or music collection, there is
no real space behind the set of entities — they are just a bunch of things. Still, though, we can
speak of passing "from" jazz "through" bop "to" rock, of two books being in the same "area,"
or of Episcopalians being "close" to Anglicans without having to explain ourselves at length.
We can make it easier to discuss "closeness" or "internal boundaries" in a collective domain if
we project it into some n-dimensional space, which we can do by focusing on selected
attributes of each entity and graphing them accordingly. Thus we can only think of true
"boundaries" between the different sections of our music collection if we have focused on
some sortable or scalable aspect of each entity in the collection, such as media, size, artist's
name, date, genre, and so forth. Similarly, the existence of a conventional order for the letters
of the alphabet makes it easy to use a linear metaphor for them. So when we use a spatial
metaphor for domains composed of entities alone, we are often not only speaking
metaphorically, but also assuming the use of some sort of conventional organizing principle
that grants the domain a topology and shape.
A slightly different method can be used with the elements of biological classifications.
Fruit, for example, presents itself as a multitude of disconnected species such as apples,
gooseberries, rambutans, and black sapotes. We can certainly expect to be understood if we
say that apples are relatively "close" to being pears. But it is difficult to come up with a simple
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spatial metaphor which allows us to project the different species of fruit into space and
imagine this visually. However, the more complex visual metaphor of a "family tree" perhaps
does a good job of capturing the difference in the degree of relationship between, say, apples
and pears, versus apples and rambutans.26 Similarly, linguists have for decades had to decide
whether the best way to visually represent the relationships within a family of languages is
with a tree chart or with a two-dimensional isogloss map, both of which misrepresent reality
in different ways.27
In other cases of collective domains and contrast sets, the spatial metaphor applies
much more loosely because one cannot easily project the domain into a manageable number
of dimensions. It is, for example, very difficult to imagine a topology for the domain behind
the contrast set of all potential letterforms and graphic symbols (punctuation, numerals, and
so forth). The concept of domain still seems to be valid (the X and other Ys test makes sense
— the letter A and other graphic forms — and one can easily imagine points in the domain
which have not been conventionalized), as does the idea of a spatial metaphor (it seems to
make sense to say that the comma is "close" to being a period). However, coming up with a
set of measurable, spatially projectable attributes of each letterform is unworkable. Many
letterforms are characterized not only by their degree of a particular quality but by whether
they possess it at all; in other words, not every member of the set can be measured in the
same terms. Douglas Hofstadter came up against this problem when he attempted to draw a
map of his intellectual interests,28 and spatial metaphors of the lexicon or of the World Wide
Web seem to founder on the same issue. That does not, however, stop us from discussing
such domains in spatial terms.
26 On tree metaphors for distance see Eviatar Zerubavel, Time maps: collective memory and the social
shape of the past (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), pp. 63-81.
27 A classic discussion of tree and "wave" diagrams is Leonard Bloomfield, Language (London: George
Allen & Unwin, 1935 [1933]), section 18.10 (pp. 311-318). An entry point into more recent debate on the
issue is Robert L. Rankin, "The comparative method," pp. 183-212 of Brian D. Joseph and Richard D.
Janda, ed., The handbook of historical linguistics (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2003), section 3 (pp.
185-86).
28 Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach, p. 370.
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2.4 Partitioning by boundary and focal point
When people are asked to think about the ways we create contrast sets within
domains, the first style of partitioning they think of is usually partitioning by boundary, and
the first examples they think of are usually things like the fifty American states or the twelve
months of the year. Partition by boundary involves laying down linear divisions in a two-
dimensional domain or cut points in a one-dimensional domain, and considering each
distinct "area" between those boundaries as a set member. In a collective domain, boundaries
are not laid down in the domain itself but rather act on selected attributes of each of the
entities in the domain.
Fixing focal points29 is another way of partitioning a domain into a contrast set, by
building up each member of the set around a specific point in the domain. Typically, each
focal point is a prototype30 or best example of the member of the contrast set that it is
associated with. This point often represents the most typical or salient instantiation within
that contrast set member. When the members of a contrast set formed by focal point usually
have clearly defined prototypes, they may lack clearly defined boundaries. 
Creating contrast sets by focal point is
what we do in large parking lots when we put
signs on lampposts to help people remember
where they parked their cars. Image 2.3, a
photograph of the smoking area in the train
station of Shizuoka, Japan, is another good
example of a category created by focal point in
29 My choice of the term focal point is inspired by Thomas C. Schelling, The strategy of conflict
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 54-58. Schelling used focal point to mean a point
within a domain which constitutes the solution to a coordination problem (particularly for problems
whose solution can be arbitrarily chosen since solving the problem is more important than the nature
of the solution). I use focal point to mean a point within a domain which constitutes a member of a
contrast set formed out of that domain. My use of the term is thus closer to the meaning of "prototype"
in linguistic categorization, but focal points in my terms are also often focal points in Schelling's terms.




two dimensional space. (An aquarium marks the focal point of the smoking area, and also
gives smokers something to look at.) When an ice-cream maker chooses exactly which 52
flavors they will have on sale in their store, they are also creating focal points, in a continuum
of possible flavors which has a much more complex metaphorical topology; similarly, the
choice of the symbols of our alphabet, or any other writing system, involves a choice of focal
points out of the virtually infinite variation of possible two-dimensional graphic symbols. In
a simple linear topology, the set of standard pitches used in Western music is created out of
the one-dimensional domain of audible frequency: the first focal point is laid down, by
conventional agreement, at 440 Hz (which we label as A above middle C), and the
conventions of equal temperament fix the focal points of all the other standard pitches
relative to this fundamental focal point.31
A collective domain for which it is difficult to imagine a continuous topology (and
which therefore cannot be partitioned easily by boundary) may be partitioned by grouping all
the entities in the domain around focal points or prototypes. Thus supermarkets put apples,
pears, lemons, and bananas with other apples, pears, lemons, and bananas, and may well
then put the lemons near the limes, oranges, and grapefruits. Meanwhile, birdwatchers
anxious to identify the bird they just saw can check in a book to see which known species it
seems most like.
Contrast set members created by focal point tend to be relatively flexible. That means
that we do not have to have an instantiation that is exactly right, exactly on prototype, in
order to be able to consider it a good representative of the contrast set member. We do,
however, have to get near enough, and how near is a matter of judgement. 439 Hz is near
enough to 440 to count as a decent example of A above middle C, but since the next standard
focal point below 440 is 415 Hz, 425 Hz would be an unacceptably ambiguous A. The
smokers in the Japanese photograph did not feel that they had to press right up against the
bullseye center of the smoking area, but none of them chose to stand far away over by the
31 For a short but fine analytical discussion of tuning and temperament see Crump, The anthropology
of numbers, p. 105-107.
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platform edge. You can hear your favorite station even if your radio is not tuned to the very
center of its transmission frequency. A capital A can still be a capital A even if the vertical
strokes do not quite meet at the top. If a recipe calls for one cup of flour, it is not necessary to
level the flour precisely in order to bake a successful cake, but using half a cup would not do.
And there are many types of chocolate ice cream. I will use the term tolerance to refer to this
(variable) degree of flexibility around a prototype.32 Within this tolerance, we conventionally
consider specific instantiations of a domain equivalent, substitutable, or within a threshold
degree of similarity to each other. Those designers who oversee the display of contrast sets,
such as signage or type designers, must have a feel for the tolerance of any focal points
involved.33
In contrast, contrast sets which are defined by boundaries can be made to behave in
an intolerant, on-and-off, disjunct and mutually exclusive fashion where it is always very
clear whether a given instantiation of the domain is an example of a particular member of a
contrast set. In these cases, one speaks less often of "good" or "bad" examples. Thus we can
say exactly where Czechia begins and Slovakia ends. (In fact, though, even the members of
contrast sets defined by boundary may contain focal points, or things like them; thus the
capital cities of Czechia and Slovakia respectively are focal points of a sort.)
We can borrow the prefix allo- from linguistics (which uses terms such as allophone
and allomorph to describe different versions of the same phoneme or morpheme) and use
the term allovariants to refer to instantiations whose differences we overlook because we
have lumped them under the same contrast set member.34 
A special way of using boundaries to create a contrast set in a domain is the creation
of a scale unit,35 such as "one degree Celsius" in the domain of temperature or "one mile per
32 The term "tolerance" is widely used in this sense in engineering. One linguist has suggested the terms
"pragmatic slack" and "pragmatic halo" for a version of this concept in a slightly different context; see
Peter Lasersohn, "Pragmatic halos," Language 75 (1999): 522-551.
33 For an example of design advice intended specifically to sensitize readers to prototype tolerance, see
Otl Aicher and Martin Krampen, Zeichensysteme der visuellen Kommunikation: Handbuch für
Designer, Architekten, Planer, Organisatoren (Stuttgart: Alexander Koch, 1977), pp. 9-10.
34 On allovariation see Zerubavel, The fine line, p. 16.
35 There is a vast literature on scaling and measurement and on the history of individual scales. A basic
introductory text is Warren S. Torgerson, Theory and methods of scaling (New York: John Wiley &
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hour" in the domain of speed. While this may seem, at first glance, to have only a little in
common with other methods of set creation, there are extensive formal similarities between
the creation of scale units and other types of partitioning, involving issues of labeling,
naturalness, iconicity, and precision. Scale units are consciously designed, and they fulfill the
X and other Ys test, so that we can speak of "plus six and other degrees of temperature in the
Celsius scale" or "one hundred baht and other amounts of money in the Thai monetary
system." One can create scale units only in linear domains. To create a scale unit, one settles
conventionally on a specific range of that domain which constitutes the base unit of the scale
— for example, how much "one degree Celsius" will actually be. However, scale units are, as
partitions of domains go, particularly artificial, and interpreting scales as contrast sets does
occasionally feel somewhat forced (see further section 2.6).
No review of boundary and focal-point partitioning would be complete without
mentioning that there is a long debate in linguistics and cognitive science about whether
human minds represent the meaning of concepts in a bounded and essentialist, or focal and
prototypical fashion — or both.36 Regardless of the true nature of human conceptual storage,
at a practical level we can create categories using either approach — and we do.37 There are,
however, specific tradeoffs involved in the choice between boundary and focal-point
approaches.
There are times when we need clear boundaries between contrast set members. For
instance, the rules of student grading pretty much force teachers to assign student work to
one category or another. Computers, in particular, tend to cope better with disjunct category
Sons, 1958), chapter 2 ("The Nature of Measurement", pp. 13-40). Sociological approaches to
measurement include Otis Dudley Duncan, Notes on social measurement: historical and critical (New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984) and Witold Kula, Measures and men (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1986 [1970]); on the idea of the scale unit specifically also see Crump, The
anthropology of numbers, pp. 76-78. For a review of theories of measurement, see José A. Díez, "A
hundred years of numbers. An historical introduction to measurement theory," Studies in History and
Philosophy of Science 28 (1997): 167-181, 237-265.
36 Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence, ed., Concepts: core readings (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), is
a collection of key articles, with a good introductory chapter, that makes an excellent introduction to
this debate. Another good summary is Taylor, Linguistic categorization, chapters 2-3 (pp. 21-58).
37 Paul Starr also makes this point in "Social categories and claims in the liberal state," Social research
59 (1992): 263-295, p. 280.
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systems where there is no ambiguity at all, and interacting with computer programs often
requires precise clarity: after all, get one letter wrong in an Internet address or filename and
you might as well have typed something entirely different. And most geographical
taxonomies demand hard boundaries, so that it is clear where, say, Thailand ends and
Cambodia begins. This style of categorization is sometimes called the classical or Aristotelian
approach. A hard-boundary approach to creating contrast sets is useful in any context which
requires an unambiguous answer to the question of what contrast set a particular
instantiation belongs to.38 
Unfortunately the laying down of strict boundaries results over and over in what we
could call the categorical paradox, where two instantiations on either "side" of a boundary
are closer to each other than two instantiations at opposite "ends" of a single member of the
contrast set.39 Thus when converting the four-point grading system common in American
universities into letter grades — as professors commonly do when averaging grades at the
end of the semester — a 3.17 and a 3.49 might earn you a B whereas a 3.51 would get you a
B+, despite being only one-sixteenth as different from 3.49 as 3.17 is. A Polish writer speaks
of how, in the divided political atmosphere of 1954, Warsaw felt closer to Beijing than to
Vienna or to West Berlin.40 In a case like the Auschwitz "selection," where concentration
camp arrivals were partitioned between forced labor and the gas chambers, the categorical
paradox involved was not simply a matter of Bs and B-pluses but of life and death. 
The advantage of focal-point approaches is that the transition between contrast set
members may be left fuzzy, so that there is no absolute point at which an instantiation stops
belonging with that contrast set member and starts belonging with another. Transitional
instantiations which are ambiguous between two contrast set members may possibly be
considered to belong to both. Although such an approach can be maddeningly irresolute, it
can also have great practical and moral advantages if a designer sees reason to avoid allowing
38 Again, Paul Starr makes this same point in "Social categories and claims in the liberal state," p. 280.
39 On the categorical paradox see Zerubavel, The fine line, pp. 24-32.
40 Jan Kott, Still alive: an autobiographical essay (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 213.
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the composition of a contrast set to conclusively dictate the way an instantiation should be
treated, preferring to explicitly assign final judgement on such matters to the contrast set's
users.
The tradeoff between the two partitioning styles is that the classical approach is
usually more practical, but the focal point approach is usually more honest. A contrast set
designer needs to keep in mind that if contrast sets are created around focal points, serious
questions of how to deal with ambiguity may arise. But when contrast sets are created by
boundary, challenges to the fairness and appropriateness of the system will always arise in
cases where a categorical paradox has been created.41 
In either case, one needs to be prepared to
take the consequences. Many legal and political
conflicts in society are fights about the design and
interpretation of contrast sets: arguments about
what member of a set a particular instantiation
belongs or belonged to ("I was in the intersection
before the light turned red, Officer"); struggles
between a "hard" and "fuzzy" interpretation of a boundary ("Hungarians in Slovakia are
Slovak citizens, but shouldn't they have the right to primary education in their own
language?"); uncertainty over the degree of tolerance around a prototype (do you have to
stop at the blue stop sign in Image 2.4?); disagreement about the assumption of disjunctness
between the contrast sets in a domain ("But I am Asian and Hispanic! Should I mark both, or
'Other'?"); or complaints that a contrast set does not exhaustively partition a domain ("My
category isn't listed and there's no 'Other' for me to mark"). Particular social groups may
have an interest in particular ways of partitioning a domain. The choices one faces in creating
a contrast set have real political consequences. A careful contrast set designer thinks through
what those consequences will be.
41 A recent newspaper article tells the story of a group of artists who have set themselves the task of
challenging international boundaries and other conventional contrast sets: Elizabeth Bard, "How to




Characterizing any given contrast set or domain with the terminology and analysis I
give requires answering several different questions. Is it a contrast set or a domain? A
continuous or collective domain? Does it involve categorization by boundary or by focal
point? Is its topology linear, planar, or something else? There often appears to be more than
one right answer to such questions, for the reason that it is very easy to transform contrast
sets and domains from one type to another. These transformations do not generally change
the entities or instantiations themselves, but rather the way we think of them, the context we
view them in, or the role or function they play. For example, the members of a contrast set
may have boundaries and focal points at the same time. 
The same collection of entities can constitute both a contrast set and a collective
domain, depending on whether it is looked at as material that is already organized into a set
of entities, or that can be partitioned further. For example, the letters of the English alphabet
are a contrast set formed out of the domain of potential letterform, whose instantiations are
individual shapes. But they can also be seen as a set of twenty-six entities ripe for further
partitioning, in which case they take on the role of a collective domain, which might be
grouped (for example) into a contrast set consisting of two members, "vowels" and
"consonants." 
This means that creation of any contrast set by any means creates a new collection of
entities which may take on the role of a collective domain. In this process, the members of a
contrast set are no longer the products of partition, but are reanalyzed as primitives in a
domain consisting of the collection of the members of the set (no longer paying attention to
the fact that those members were created by partitioning a more fundamental domain). This
new collection of entities can itself, if we wish, be grouped into contrast sets. Thus the seven
days of the week can be thought of as a contrast set formed out of the continuous domain of
time, whose instantiations are individual moments, but they can also be seen as a set of seven
entities (Monday and the other days of the week), in the process disregarding the fact that
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Monday is made up of an infinite number of individual moments in time. This collective
domain of seven entities could then be partitioned (for example) into a contrast set
consisting of two members, "weekdays" and "weekend days," in which case the entities being
grouped would be days (like Monday or Saturday), not individual moments in time. (Equally
well and simultaneously, though, one could consider "weekday time" and "weekend time" as
direct partitions of the domain of time, whose instantiations are individual moments.) 
Conversely, one can say that the instantiations of any collective domain form a
contrast set. Thus while our first instinct might be to consider a flock of geese or the
collection of people living on Barbados as as a collective domain, we can also see it as a
contrast set by emphasizing the individuality of each of its members.
An entity may be an instantiation of several different domains at the same time, or a
member of of several different contrast sets at the same time, especially within a taxonomy.
Thus Monday is one of the days of the week at the same time as it is one of the weekdays, A is
a vowel at the same time as it is a letter of the alphabet, C is a white key at the same time as it
is one of the keys in the piano octave, and the city of New Brunswick is in Middlesex County,
New Jersey, U.S.A.
The definition of a scale unit tends to induce focal points along that scale, even
though scale units are precisely bounded regions. For example, standards of measurement or
value often give rise to focal points in a linear continuum. The creators of the euro (the
European currency) chose to have coins and bills of denominations 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50 cents, 1,
2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, and 500 euros. These focal points are a joint product of the size of
the scale unit and the convention of base-10 numbering, and it is these amounts — not, for
example, 25 cents or 47 euros — that have now become standard reference points in peoples'
minds all over Europe. In the American scale of liquid measurement, one often sees
measuring devices and recipe instructions phrased in whole multiples, or quarters or halves,
of standard units such as teaspoons, tablespoons, ounces, and cups, while we rarely see
references to, say, 1/6 of a cup, let alone 13/79 of a cup. (For more similar examples, see
section 2.8.)
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We often change our view of a collective domain after coming up with a standard way
to order or present the entities in the collection (a process discussed in full in section 4.5).
The positioning of the elements of our writing system in a linear or two-dimensional
topology (by means of alphabetical order and keyboard layout respectively) are the most
familiar examples. These representations create a new domain for a set of entities that may,
as in the case of letterform, have been created out of a domain with an entirely different
topology. Within the new domain, one can discuss spatial relations quasi-continuous terms,
recognizing the existence of contiguous units like "ABCDEF" or "QWERTYUIOP" and being
able to say that "A is next to B" or that one goes "over W in proceeding from Q to E."
The grouping of a collection of entities, though it is often thought of as a physical
sorting process, often depends instead on the creation of abstract boundaries or focal points
in the domain of an attribute in whose terms each entity is measured, so that the partition of
a collective domain actually proceeds via the partition of a "proxy" continuous domain.
Consider the size and quality grading of eggs, or apples, or other kinds of food. We visualize
this as physically moving eggs into bins labeled with the names of the members of a contrast
set like "Medium," "Large," "Extra Large," and "Jumbo." However, we cannot do this without
defining certain measurable attributes of an egg as relevant, and choosing precise points
within this new (and continuous) domain of measurement to break the categories at; what
we have really done is to partition the domain of "egg size" with boundaries which
unambiguously define what a "Jumbo" egg is. Another example, in which our assumptions
typically work in reverse, is that while we normally think of the classification of telephone
code areas as a partitioning of two-dimensional space by boundary (as the map in the front of
the telephone book suggests), if we step in closer we see that in practice the crucial act of
classifying is the assignment of each individual customer telephone line to a particular area
code (a process of grouping a collection of entities). The same is true for the division of North
American commercial radio station call names into three zones beginning with W, K, and C;
the act of individual assignment coexists with a sense of the location of the boundaries of the
zone.
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These two examples are meant to draw attention to the way that we often switch back
and forth between a discontinuous view of the individuality of the entities which form a
collection, and a continuous view of a domain in which those entities can be measured. If
each entity has a measurable attribute in domain X (say, eggs in the domain of egg size or
radio stations in the domain of North America), the "granularity" of each entity can be made
to recede from our view. The salience of the entities as a collection of individuals starts to
give way to an image of the domain X, in which boundaries or focal points create a partition.
(It may be that when the number of entities in a collection is large, one is more likely to focus
on continuous attribute domains rather than on the entities as individuals.)
This relationship between a collective domain of entities, and the continuous domain
of values of an attribute of those entities, is a special case of the phenomenon of linked
domains, which are discussed in detail in section 2.9. When two domains are linked, a
partition in one domain induces a partition in another domain (which may be of another
type). For example, the collection of people who live in Europe is a collective domain, while
the landmass of Europe is a two-dimensional continuous domain, but since every member of
the first domain (more or less) lives at one point in the second domain, the domains are
linked. A partition in either domain induces a de facto partition in the other; if we divide
Europe into two parts, one north of the fifty-fifth parallel and one south, we induce a
partition in the set of European residents as well. 
2.5 Discerned or constructed?
Are contrast sets created by human beings, or delivered to us by the natural world?
The debate is very old and much ink has been spilled over it. The issue is usually phrased as a
puzzle — whether the "categories" of the world exist "out there" in the domain, or only once
we "see" and create them. The implication is that only one of these answers could be true.
 There are dozens of scholars lined up on both sides of the debate — or at least,
scholars tend to emphasize one side or another at a time. For example, on the "constructed"
side of the argument, Benedict Anderson has convinced many scholars to believe that all
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"communities" are "imagined," Eviatar Zerubavel titles a section "The Social Construction of
Discontinuity," and Claude Lévi-Strauss tells us that humans have an inner drive to classify
the world, a "demand for order" which gives classifying "a value of its own" — but that the
contrast sets we make in response to these drives are conventions that could have been
chosen differently.42 On the "discerned" side of the debate, Karl Deutsch emphasizes the
natural and circumstantial constraints on the formation of human communities, Brent Berlin
observes that in the area of plant and animal taxonomy, humans "do not construct order,
they discern it," and Paul Kay and Willard Kempton caution against falling for the idea that
human systems of partitioning a domain "vary without constraint."43 
In keeping with the practical and functional approach of this book, the point of view
taken here is that within the context of set design, the puzzle metaphor for this question is
inappropriate, neither the "constructed" nor "discerned" views is universally correct, and
trying to "resolve" the debate between them is pointless. The degree of "constructedness"
versus "discernedness" varies from contrast set to contrast set. There are, simply put, some
domains in which we discern sets and others in which we create them. Many domains arrive
only partly determined, with a certain amount of wiggle room — incompleteness which
leaves the final partitioning up to the designer.44
Some contrast sets are relatively more universal and objective and "discerned," such
as the difference between humans and orangutans or men and women, or the different floors
of a skyscraper. Others are relatively more individual and subjective and "constructed," such
as the distinction within the domain of the books I own between the books I like, the books I
don't mind, and the books I want to get rid of. 
42 Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism
(Rev. ed., London: Verso, 1991); Zerubavel, The fine line, pp. 74-75; Claude Lévi-Strauss, The savage
mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 9-10.
43 Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and social communication (2d ed., Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), pp. 78-
79; Brent Berlin, Ethnobiological classification (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 8;
Paul Kay and Willett Kempton, "What is the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis?" American Anthropologist 86
(1984): 65-79, p. 66.
44 This "both-and" position is defended at length, in a related arena, by Rebecca Bryant, Discovery and
decision: exploring the metaphysics and epistemology of scientific classification (London: Associated
University Presses, 2000), who argues that "classification involves … both discovery and decision
making" (p. 116).
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And most contrast sets are to some degree social and intersubjective — that is,
shaped by a community rather than by nature or an individual. For example, the boundaries
between neighboring counties in a featureless landscape in America's Midwest did not exist
before the surveyors and settlers arrived in the 1800s, and we would forget them quickly
without the county offices, mapmakers, and "Welcome To" signs which perpetuate these
partitions. Even those contrast sets which appear very universal can be spotlit or highlighted
differently by different communities, so that the difference between men and women or
humans and orangutans may matter more or less in different times and places. Even those
contrast sets which appear very individual may be influenced by socially conventional tastes,
so that you can predict to some extent what books I like by knowing what community I
belong to.
Although Midwestern American county boundaries were deliberately and consciously
laid out, other partitioning systems constructed by particular social groups arise without any
deliberate design of the set as a whole. For example, although the sets of local supermarket
chains, commercial automobile manufacturers, national flags and fonts on my computer
form contrast sets, they were not deliberately constructed as a complete ensemble. The term
emergent describes such contrast sets. They were created by human beings, but through the
aggregation of many individual decisions, not a conscious strategy of set design. The
different types of sandwiches that Frake discussed are another example of an emergent
contrast set. Like many lexical distinctions, this contrast set is largely conventional and
social, but it was created and maintained by the collective, tacit action of millions of people —
not by a sandwich definition reformer, a government sandwich standardization committee,
or a company that gained a monopoly on world sandwich production and forced us all to
think in terms of its focal sandwich types. (On emergent standards, see section 5.1.) 
There are no universal answers to the questions of whether a given contrast set was
"constructed" or "discerned." The degree of influence that we have over the process of
contrast set construction varies from contrast set to contrast set, and also depends on the
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breadth of our conception of who "we" are. We have to answer these questions on a case-by-
case basis taking into account the individual circumstances of each contrast set.
Because this is a book about set design, and design is an activity where human beings
consciously shape something beyond themselves, I do not spend very much time discussing
the origin of those sets in which one cannot trace much deliberate human authorship or
constructedness. For example, the set of focal points in the domain of color is certainly not
very plannable or designable, and is apparently to a large extent naturally determined by the
physiology of the human eye,45 and the cultural variation in color terms is more of an
emergent phenomenon than a consciously planned one. The set of basic color categories is a
good and interesting example of a contrast set, but a practical design problem it is not
(although there are other color-related sets that are plannable, such as those chosen by
crayon manufacturers). Emergent and naturally determined sets may be theoretically
interesting, but the only practically designable aspect of them is (sometimes) the way they
are labeled. There is little point in discussing how to design things that we have no control
over whatsoever.
But there are many, many other contrast sets whose human authorship is
unambiguous (even if the degree of that authorship is less than full), whose form can be
modified (or could have been), and whose creators are identifiable. There are also plenty of
contrast sets which have not yet been created but will be. It is the process of constructing
these contrast sets that this book aims to discuss in a scholarly and practically useful way.
In doing so, this book focuses on what happens to domains once they "arrive" into the
workshop from the natural or external world, and come into the hands of a cognitive
designer who will partition, shape, and order them. If contrast sets were always "discerned,"
the cognitive designer would not have any choices about what to do with a domain once it
45 Universal color clustering tendencies were posited by Brent Berlin and Paul Kay, Basic color terms
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969) and demonstrated in Paul Kay and Terry Regier,
"Resolving the question of color naming universals," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
100 (2003): 9085-9089. The argument that these clusters correspond to physiological constraints is
set forth classically in Paul Kay and Chad K. McDaniel, "The linguistic significance of the meanings of
basic color terms," Language 54 (1978): 610-646, also reprinted in Alex Byrne and David R. Hilbert,
ed., Readings on color (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 2: 399-441. This hypothesis is still somewhat
controversial, but it seems that the controversy has to do with the degree of determination involved.
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arrived in this metaphorical workshop but would simply follow the nature of the material. In
fact, though, the workshop is the scene of constant choice about how to act within the wiggle
room that the nature of a domain allows, and it is that process which I focus on.
That does not mean I am not interested in the nature of the raw material. Indeed, in
defining terms like boundary, focal point, scale unit, and superordinate, I put forth
hypotheses of a sort. These are analytic hypotheses — claims to have perceived fundamental
building blocks of the contrast sets that we use in society, building blocks which can be used
to understand the process of set formation in any given domain. By trying to identify the
building blocks of contrast sets, my goal is not so much to put forth a theory of what a
contrast set "really" is. I do not view contrast sets like some syntacticians think of sentences,
whose "true reality" is the diagram we draw to analyze them, or like physicists think of
chemicals or materials, whose "true reality" is their molecular or atomic structure. A domain
is a sort of raw material, an unplowed field, or an opportunity, and these building blocks are
a sort of tool kit by which people and societies make use of this material. This book
investigates less the unchanging nature of reality, than how we choose to change and shape
it.
2.6 Features and featurelessness
At the moment when a domain arrives into the workshop from the natural or external
world, and comes into the hands of those who will work with it further, it has a certain
degree of internal diversity and natural partitioning. Some domains arrive with sets, or at
least distinctions, already built into them. Others come to us without any differentiation
whatsoever. 
The differentiation that exists may be stark and obvious, or it may require some work
to discern. Imagine being handed three sheets of paper. One is entirely blank. Another is
covered with vaguely perceptible but not immediately identifiable figures. A third is ruled
into numbered squares. The contrast between these three images is the same as the contrast
between a domain which arrives on our doorstep completely featureless, with considerable
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(but as yet undiscerned) internal differentiation, or with a plainly obvious preexisting set of
partitions (labeled to boot).
The color spectrum as it appears to someone with normal vision, or a completed
multi-story building as an interior designer first perceives it, are domains which arrive with
robust internal differentiation. So are the letters of the alphabet as they present themselves
to a child learner, as well as the streets and houses in an urban landscape, which are clearly
distinct entities and different from one another. The domains of height, temperature
measurement, or wind speed have considerably fewer features (though they still have some).
The radio spectrum, before stations began to broadcast in it, was homogenous and
featureless, as is the sort of landscape that one sees at sea or in the polar regions.46 In such
domains, one point looks exactly like another, and it is only with the help of scales and
measuring devices (latitude and longitude and a GPS receiver, for example) that we can
introduce some sort of differentiation into what we see. In these domains the creation of
contrast sets is a particularly artificial and conventional act. 
Domains with a low degree of internal differentiation can be called "featureless"
domains. The words "feature," "featureless," and "featurelessness," with their geographical
flavor, are quite appropriate tags for the idea of an undifferentiated domain. Domains are
spaces, or at least metaphorical spaces, so we can liken an unpartitioned but internally
diverse domain to an unknown but internally diverse landscape. Just as explorers may
perceive and name the salient features in a landscape, set designers may discern the
preexisting groups, focal points, and boundaries — the metaphorical peaks and valleys — in a
domain. Once discerned, these features can be labeled. Indeed, sometimes we know what has
been discerned only by checking to see what has been named.
Very often, speaking of "the degree of internal differentiation of a domain" simply
means saying how easily human perceptual abilities can sense the variation in the domain. In
some domains it is easier to sense differences than in others. (Ability in a particular domain
46 For another example, see the Ziggy cartoon reproduced on p. 223 of Marvin Levine, "You-are-here
maps: psychological considerations," Environment and Behavior 14 (1982): 221-237.
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also varies from person to person, depending both on natural ability and on training. Some
people, for example, can remember and reproduce particular musical pitches, but most can
say little more about two randomly presented pitches than that one is "higher" than the
other. Most people in industrial western countries learn to tell the difference between the
letters of the alphabet, but not all. Without training, our ability to partition a domain is often
limited to the ability to perceive a polarity and to perceive relative position along that
polarity.)
Some scales are so poorly differentiated that even with training, humans make very
little progress beyond the ability to order instantiations in terms of "more" or "less."
(Compare how while driving across a featureless, unfamiliar, or darkened landscape on a
monotonous expressway, one cannot always say where one is, but one does know one is
proceeding in the direction of one's destination.) A fine example of this is the domain of the
speed of moving objects. While we humans can look at two moving objects and say that one
is going faster than the next, we are terrible at saying (for example) that one is going X
kilometers per hour and the other Y. This seems so obvious that we do not find it
remarkable. But think again: why should it be the case that we can quite confidently look at
two pieces of colored paper and say that one is red and the other is green, but we are virtually
helpless in the domain of speed? Why is it that if we were called into court to testify about a
hit-and-run accident, we could say fairly precisely what color the car was but only very
vaguely what speed it was going at? Why is it that while (for example) we can learn to
distinguish unfamiliar birds, tastes, or alphabets, and sometimes even pitches, we cannot
learn to distinguish different speeds?
The reason is that there are no natural peaks and valleys in the domain of speed
which register in our minds. It is, for human beings at least, an especially featureless domain.
There are no natural borders or focal points. Unlike with color, the structure of our
perceptual apparatus give no focal points in that domain to hang any natural sense of
contrast onto. And experience does not differentiate the domain any further. We need
instruments, such as speedometers and radar guns, to measure speed and to "see" or
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"elaborate" the differences between different speeds. Tellingly, the contrast set that we divide
the universe of speed into is entirely an artificial one, based on multiples of conventional
units, like kilometers per hour or meters per second. 
Another interesting example is the domain of wind speed, which has a little bit more
natural diversity. We can use the degree of discomfort or property damage different wind
speeds cause to lend the different parts of the domain character, contrast, and identity.
Indeed, prose descriptions of the perceptual effects of wind speed are the basis of the
categories in the Beaufort scale of wind measurement.47 With some practice, one can begin to
be able to "place" one's perceptual experience of the wind at a particular point in the scale of
wind speed even without a wind meter — though perhaps not with the precision that we use
in, say, telling the letter i from the letter j. Thus, weather station manager Grímur Gíslason
from Blönduós in northern Iceland, finally retiring at the age of 92, is quoted as saying: "I
always say I've never used a wind meter. I just use my nose. One develops a feeling for this.
For example, it was never Force 8 in October, except once, late in the month."48 However, his
pride and the journalist's attention show how uncommon the ability is. The domain of
temperature also has natural, perceptible focal points such as the freezing point of water or
the point at which we can be comfortable in only a T-shirt. But we still cannot "see" the
members of a more precise contrast set such as the Fahrenheit scale without a thermometer.
One cannot tell, and probably cannot learn to tell, exactly what temperature it is on the
Fahrenheit scale to the nearest degree.
Many scholars have hoped to be able to measure the degree of internal differentiation
in a given domain. One possible focus of measurement would be to characterize the overall
homogeneity of an entire domain, just as one can say that a landscape is relatively
monotonous or not, or that the domain of the speed of moving objects is featureless, but that
47 For a popular treatment of the Beaufort scale see Scott Huler, Defining the wind: the Beaufort
scales, and how a nineteenth-century admiral turned science into poetry (New York: Crown, 2004).
48 "Ég segi alltaf að ég hafi aldrei haft vindmæli. Ég hef sagst taka vindinn á nefinu á mér. Maður hefur
tilfinningu fyrir þessu. Það var til dæmis aldrei hvasst í október, nema einu sinni, seint í mánuðinum."
— From "Tek vindinn á nefinu á mér," Fréttablaðið (Reykjavík), 2 November 2003, p. 4. My
translation.
§ 2.6 49
of temperature or wind speed slightly less so. Another desirable mathematical measure
would rate the similarity between any two different instantiations of a domain, by saying
that, for example, the Portuguese are linguistically more similar to the Spanish than either
are to the Moroccans. A third goal would be to be able to mathematically define which
instantiations of a domain are most salient and stand out most as potential focal points or
cut points in a domain, so that a classically proportioned red bell pepper rates higher than a
"misshapen" one. Such measurements would have practical value for contrast set designers,
because they would suggest how to group instantiations, draw boundaries, and put breaks in
domains.
All of these measurement challenges have proven unexpectedly difficult. The degree
of differentiation in a domain is still most often subjectively judged, and finding the
partitions and breaking points in a domain usually remains more designer's art than science.
There are, however, some basic mathematical strategies that one can follow.49
The simplest is to measure all the instantiations of a domain in terms of one or more
continuous measures, graph all the resulting points, and use the graph as a visual guide to
grouping the instantiations according to the way the dots cluster. It is difficult to make such
judgements visually in three dimensions and almost impossible in four or more, but the
process of multidimensional scaling can help reduce multiple qualities to a two-dimensional
scale or at least a scale with fewer dimensions than the original.50 
Measuring the degree of distinctiveness of two instantiations is particularly
challenging when the domain they belong to does not have an obvious underlying scale. We
all know that E and F are more similar than E and O, but how can we capture that difference
in some mathematical or systematic way? A feature or componential analysis of each
instantiation creates a scale by summing a series of (usually) binary oppositions, which rate
each instantiation in terms of the presence or absence of a certain feature. Thus, linguists
49 A good but now out-of-date review article is Robert R. Sokal, "Classification: purposes, principles,
progress, prospects," Science 185 (1974): 1115-1123.
50 On multidimensional scaling see Zerubavel, The fine line, p. 129n91; also Torgerson, Theory and
methods of scaling, pp. 37-40.
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generally group speech sounds in terms of "distinctive features," while historical linguists
have sometimes used a controversial procedure called lexicostatistics to measure the
relatedness of languages. This technique samples a standard set of 200 meanings from each
language, sees which are cognates and which are not, and from these results works out a
crude mathematical measure of similarity.51 
Another method, which avoids the creation of scales, is to ask a large number of
people to subjectively rate the similarity of particular pairs or the fitness of any particular
instantiation as a representative of a superordinate category, as Brent Berlin and Paul Kay
did with color52 and Eleanor Rosch did with different types of furniture.53 One can also
measure how often two entities get confused with each other. Roger Shepard developed
mathematical techniques to derive spatial representations from such similarity judgements
and confusion frequencies, a method somewhat akin to multidimensional scaling in its
ability to make data easier to visualize.54
A dialectologist's isogloss map may help us to "see" the boundaries between two
languages in space — say, Polish and Ukrainian55 — by visually representing the "border" as a
thick bundle of lines on the map, just as more closely grouped lines on a contour map show
where elevations rapidly change between regions of flatness and homogeneity. An isogloss
map by itself does not establish a mathematical scale on which we can measure "how Polish"
or "how Ukrainian" any particular person's speech is, though we could artificially construct
51 For an overview and bibliography on lexicostatistics, see Paul Black and Joseph Kruskal,
"Comparative lexicostatistics: a brief history and bibliography of key works,"
www.ntu.edu.au/education/langs/ielex/bibliog.html (October 2003); for a sharp and concise critique
of the method see Lyle Campbell, Historical linguistics: an introduction (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1998), pp. 177-186.
52 Brent Berlin and Paul Kay, Basic color terms: their universality and evolution (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1969).
53 See Taylor, Linguistic categorization, pp. 43-44.
54 For a nontechnical discussion see Roger N. Shepard, "A funny thing happened on the way to the
formulation: how I came to frame mental laws in abstract spaces," in Psychologists defying the crowd:
stories of those who battled the establishment and won, edited by Robert J. Sternberg, pp. 215-237
(Washington: American Psychological Association, 2003), p. 226.
55 A classic discussion of dialect geography is Bloomfield, Language, chapter 19 (pp. 321-345); sample
isogloss maps are illustrated on pp. 316 and 326.
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such a scale out of the dialect features that the isoglosses track, and even try to use it to set
precise grouping boundaries.
The nature of the spatial metaphor in which one grounds one's definition of similarity
is an important consideration when evaluating measurement techniques. Tree metaphors of
domains, for example, cannot easily be mapped into two dimensions, suggest a somewhat
different metaphorical vocabulary of distance and closeness, and demand special techniques
for the measuring of similarity.56
All these methods are time-consuming and mathematically complex. Most contrast
set design proceeds without using them. Many fine scholars have neither the patience nor the
aptitude to apply them. Thus sociolinguist Heinz Kloss, after introducing the concept of the
natural distance between two standard languages, confessed that he had no answers to the
question of how to measure it.57 Brent Berlin created an interesting diagrammatical
technique to convey a rough sense of the degree of distinctiveness of biological taxa, but
complains that "no quantitative scale has been developed in terms of which perceptual
distance can be given a numeric value."58 
One case where mathematical techniques of judging and ensuring similarity have
been used to help create the members of a consciously designed contrast set is in drug
naming, where confusion between one entity and another can have serious consequences.59
However, in many other domains, the complexity of measurement is so great that designers
prefer to use their own eye, experience, and intuitive feel to partition a domain. Although this
might seem like a less "objective" way to proceed, in fact the mathematical measurement of
similarity within a domain is not entirely objective either since it depends on which qualities
we select to measure. If a designer's intuitive sense of the optimum partition of a domain is
able to take multiple factors and qualities into account at the same time, it may actually be
56 On measuring distance in tree structures see James E. Corter, Tree models of similarity and
association (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 1996).
57 Heinz Kloss, Die Entwicklung neuer germanischer Kultursprachen seit 1800 (2nd ed., Düsseldorf:
Pädagogischer Verlag Schwann, 1978), p. 63 ff. ("Wie mißt man den Abstand?").
58 Berlin, Ethnobiological classification, pp. 36-51, esp. p. 49.
59 Bruce L. Lambert, "Computer assisted decision analysis in drug naming," http://www.hc-
sc.gc.ca/hpfb-dgpsa/bgtd-dpbtg/b_lambert_e.html (March 2004).
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more useful than any mathematical strategy. The next section explores some of the decisions
the designer must make during the process of partition. 
2.7 Acts of partition
The central act of creating a contrast set is the designer's decision to partition a
domain in a particular way. This section focuses on four different aspects of the partitioning
process: taking account of natural differentiation in the domain, choosing between boundary
and focal point approaches to partition, deciding where to place those boundaries or focal
points, and choosing the "perceptual focus" of a partition.
In domains which arrive with a high degree of internal diversity and variation, but
without absolutely specified breaking points, the designer's task is often to decide which
preexisting partitions to focus on (rather than to create them from scratch). In such cases,
there is still quite a bit of room for arbitrary, conventional choice, because there are many
different ways of focusing on what divisions are most salient in a given landscape. Like
cookbook recipes, preexisting partitions are not always strict and precise, but can also be
loose guidelines of which you need to follow only the broad outlines. Thus, for example, the
creation of telephone code areas generally attempts to keep single cities, towns, and other
aggregations of people together in a single code area, but this is not an absolute requirement.
In relatively featureless and homogenous domains, the designer's task is more often
to create partitions from scratch which may have no basis in the domain. These partitions
may be arbitrary and conventional. Thus, for example, the eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century division of the American frontier into a grid system, taking little account of the
landscape or any other preexisting features, is an example of partitioning without regard to
the "pre-arrival" differentiation of the domain. World time zones are clearly inspired by the
24-hour timekeeping system, and the twelve-month system by the cycles of the moon, but
both of these classifications by boundary also have a strongly conventional aspect. So do
other many geographical classifications such as the boundaries between voting districts,
between lots in a new development, or between many of the countries in Africa.
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In continuous domains, the designer must choose between boundary and focal-point
methods of partitioning. For example, imagine that you have to divide a cafe (or any other
spatial domain) into smoking and non-smoking areas. You can define the areas by boundary
(with a real or imaginary line on the floor) or by focal point (as in the Japanese train station
photo); you can also use a third strategy, grouping entities in a linked collective domain (by
designating certain tables or rooms in a restaurant as smoking or non). Similarly, color is a
domain where we can, if we choose, classify by boundary (metaphorically taking a knife to
the color solid or the planar topology of a Munsell chart), by focal point (by defining a best
exemplar of each color), or by grouping a linked collection of entities (say, the different
colors that the crayon box presents us with or that the houses in our town are painted).
The advantages and disadvantages of boundary and focal-point partitioning are
discussed in section 2.4. Consider, as a real-life example, the structure of the contrast sets
that we use to communicate location within a city. Japan uses a very straightfoward
boundary-based partitioning style, with urban areas divided into city blocks (banchi 番地).
Each block has a number, and the houses within each block have their own series of numbers
in turn. A corollary of this system is a lessened focus on streets and other transport corridors
which often lack names.60 A somewhat similar system was also used, exceptionally, in at least
one medieval European town.61 Europeans and Americans, meanwhile, have created in each
of their cities a contrast set of "streets" partitioned, by boundary, out of the domain of all of
the transit corridors in the city.62 These streets are named, and the set of houses along a given
street are numbered to form a further level of the taxonomy (even buildings that do not
directly front on a street are assigned to a street by the numbering system). In everyday
60 On the closely connected issue of marking corridors versus marking destinations in wayfinding
signage, see Phil Baines and Catherine Dixon, Signs: lettering in the environment (London: Lawrence
King, 2003), p. 46.
61 This was Mannheim (Germany). See Pierre Lavedan, "Préface," in Les numérotages des maisons de
Paris du XVe siècle à nos jours, by Jeanne Pronteau (Paris: Ville de Paris, Commission des Travaux
Historiques, 1966), p. 10.
62 The partition of this domain mainly follows natural breaks, with acute angles signifying the boundary
between two entities, although Europeans often partition single corridors into two "streets," so that
Canongate and High Street in Edinburgh are "different" even though a pedestrian or driver notices no
break as they proceed over the dividing point between the two.
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practice, however, people commonly express location without using these reference systems,
simply saying that a destination is "near" a particular landmark. And in some cases, a quasi-
standardized set of focal points within a city exists, so that in Venice, natives often give
wayfinding references from the nearest church. (The finite contrast set of Venetian churches
and their locations is one of the easiest reference systems to master in a city whose land
corridors have little salience.63 ) Similarly, residents of Florence used to give references in
terms of focal points around the city, until the introduction of street names in 1785 and
house numbers in 1808 marked a shift to standard European path-based reference.64
Once the method of partition is settled on and natural divisions in the domain taken
into account, the designer may have a lot of freedom to choose the boundaries or focal points
in the domain. Consider, for example, the fact that nothing precisely determined the
placement of the boundaries between Hungary and Romania (at the Treaty of Trianon in
1919), between the months of the year (which could well differ from the current system in
number and length), between the time zones in the United States, or between the different
privilege levels of a frequent flyer program I belong to (which is divided into Bronze, Silver,
and Gold depending on the number of miles flown). Consider as well the question of which
day (such as January 1 or March 25) we should consider the beginning of a year. Even when
there are preexisting breaks in the domain, they may still permit the designer a considerable
amount of wiggle room to make an entirely conventional decision.
When simple scalable domains of measurement are
partitioned into contrast sets, the crucial conventional choice
is the size of the unit. Thus the Fahrenheit and Celsius scales
measure the same concept, but the size of each degree is
different. The same is true for the measurement of distance
(in inches or centimeters) or speed (in miles per hour or
63 According to Dominic Beddow, The illustrated Venice map (London: Magnetic North/Draughtsman,
1997) there are 75 squares in Venice named after (presumably adjacent) parish churches.




kilometers per hour). Grading systems for students vary similarly in the number and size of
the units. In designing relief maps cartographers must choose what cutpoints to use in
dividing the continuous domain of altitude into different categories,65 and indeed they face
the same problem when defining any other system of "isolines" (e.g. of temperature or
barometric pressure).66 In all these examples the size of the units is fairly arbitrary and
conventional and bears little relationship to any "natural" breaks in the domain (although the
Fahrenheit and Celsius scales are both based on the use of relatively round numbers of units
— 180 and 100 — to partition the space in between two natural focal points, the freezing and
boiling points of water).67 Similarly, the numerical heat intensity scale (0 to 5) on the electric
oven controls in Image 2.5 is basically arbitrary and idiosyncratic and not correlated with any
preexisting, objective or intersubjective features in the domain of heat intensity (the scale for
my new rangetop runs from zero to three, not five). Although the choice of a scale unit may
seem to be a fairly innocuous matter of convention, it can have real consequences, as I noted
on a recent plane trip. The airline accepted multiple currencies, but not wanting to deal with
coins smaller than certain units, priced its drinks at rounded-off levels: one pound, one euro,
or one dollar got you a non-alcoholic beverage. This meant that a can of soda cost almost
twice as much in British currency than in American — due entirely to the variation in the size
of conventional scale units.68
In domains that involve focal points, the designer's task is to choose where those focal
points are located. Thus Western musicians' fairly recent decision to standardize twelve
equally spaced pitches per octave off a base of 440 Hz,69 Turks' convention of distinguishing
between dotted i and undotted ı (symbols whose differences, in handwriting at least, English-
65 Eduard Imhof, Cartographic relief presentation (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1982 [1965]), chapter 8,
section B ("The vertical intervals between contour lines," pp. 113-126).
66 On the history of the concept of isoline see Arthur H. Robinson, Early thematic mapping in the
history of cartography (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 46, 49, 60, 84-85, 210.
67 W.E. Knowles Middleton, A history of the thermometer and its use in meteorology (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1966).
68 Noted on an Icelandair flight in spring 2004.
69 See Llewellyn Southworth Lloyd, "Standard pitch," Grove's dictionary of music and musicians, 5th
ed. (1954), 6: 788-803.
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speakers would tend to ignore), and the Icelandic dairy industry's convention of producing
one only kind of milk "between" whole and skim, with a fat percentage of 1.5% (instead of the
dual focal points of 1% and 2% typical in the United States), are all choices of a set of focal
points within a relatively featureless domain and could easily have been designed otherwise.
Likert scales, so widely used in survey research, saddle respondents with the sometimes
difficult task of deciding that their feelings about a particular subject are most similar to one
of an arbitrary number of focal points, thus likening, for example, their degree of job
satisfaction to one of the five prototypes {very satisfied, satisfied, neither satisfied nor
dissatisfied, dissatisfied, very dissatisfied}.
Underlying the issues of partitioning style and partition location is the designer's
choice of a perceptual focus of partition within the domain. By perceptual focus of partition I
mean something quite different from focal point: a focus of attention on an attribute of the
instantiations of the domain whose differences are considered a reasonable basis for creating
a partition. Sometimes the focus is obvious from the nature of the task, but very often it is
not.
Consider, as an analogy, the way we tend to perceive or pick out only a subset of the
features in a landscape. After all, many cultures name valleys before slopes and mountain
peaks before saddles, and an explorer is more likely to focus on fords or portages depending
on whether they are traveling by foot (and thus more interested in passages from land to
land) or by canoe (water to water).
Two of the best examples of focus in deliberate partitioning are highly political ones.
In the United States, many legislative districts are redesigned after every census, and the
question of what basis to use in determining them has been extremely controversial. Districts
must be contiguous. Within that constraint, the choice is of whether to define a district so
that geographical population aggregations stay together; so that people with similar
socioeconomic characteristics stay together; or so that people who tend to vote for a
particular political party stay together. While my first instinct is to say that the first method
is the most "natural," it is possible to argue that other methods are equally so, and indeed
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many districts now have extraordinarily contorted shapes on the map. The verb
gerrymander refers to the act of defining voting districts in a way which is in the political
interest of specific groups.70 The example of racial classification in America is also a question
of what salient natural features in a domain should be picked out as a basis for practical
classification. Although on the face of it, racial classification appears to be about defining
boundaries or focal points in the domain of skin color and other physical features, the debate
about whether "Hispanic" is a valid racial classification points up the fact that no one is really
sure whether race should be about physical features or ethnic origins. These examples
remind us that the creation of contrast sets is not simply a trivial matter of convention but
can also have tremendous political ramifications.71
Or take, for example, expressways. Americans label expressway exits. Israelis label
intersections rather than exits.72 In America the intersection of two expressways has two
labels (the exit numbers off each expressway respectively), but in Israel it has only one (the
intersection name). This means that the labeling used for American expressway systems
refers to contrast sets consisting of all the exits off a given expressway. But Israeli expressway
labeling refers to a contrast set consisting of all the expressway intersections in the country.
This shows a slightly different perceptual focus on what is most salient about a highway
system. The same issue comes up in the question of whether those subway "stations" where it
is possible to connect between two different lines should receive two names (for the stations
on each line) or one name (reflecting the ability to connect). The Moscow subway system
resolves this with one name at some intersections (e.g. Paveletskaya) and with two names at
others (e.g. Krasnopresnenskaya/Barrikadnaya). 
70 A recent treatment of gerrymandering is Mark Monmonier, Bushmanders & bullwinkles: how
politicians manipulate electronic maps and census data to win elections (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2001).
71 On this theme see Paul Starr, "Social categories and claims in the liberal state," Social research 59
(1992): 263-295, pp. 274-278.
72 See Atlas ha-zahav: kol ha-kvishim veha-rehovot be-Israel [The golden atlas: all Israel's roads and
streets] (4th ed., Tel Aviv: Mapa, 2004). In fact, Israelis do sometimes label exits, and Americans do
sometimes label intersections in exceptional circumstances. (An intersection in Rochester, N.Y. which
was notorious for traffic jams and complicated lane changes until it was reconstructed in the late 1980s
is still referred to, except in the most formal registers, as the "Can of Worms.") It is not an either-or
decision: Germans label both exits (with numbers) and major intersections (with names).
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Shifting perceptual focus causes similarity judgements to shift in many other
everyday-life domains. In partitioning the alphabet, we can foreground the similarity
between A and a (they are the "same letter") or between A and B (they are both upper case).
In music, we can foreground the similarity between A above middle C and A below middle C
(they are the "same note") or between A above middle C and B above middle C (they are in
the same octave). In thinking about political boundaries, we can focus on the similarity
between Turkish Cyprus and Turkey proper (they are the "same country") or between
Turkish Cyprus and Greek Cyprus (they are on the same island). In organizing the ice cream
shelf in the supermarket, one can focus on the similarity between low-fat vanilla and all-
natural vanilla (they are the same flavor) or between all-natural vanilla and all-natural
chocolate (they are both all-natural).
Indeed, the decision to partition a continuous domain by boundary, focal point, or by
reference to a linked collective domain can be seen as a type of perceptual focusing. Thus, in
the example of location reference within a city, the contrast between the focal-point
technique of using a nearby landmark and the boundary technique of defining streets or city
blocks involves differing styles of focusing — on churches, corridors, or city blocks — as seed
material for creating contrast sets.
A final issue is whether a partition should be exhaustive or not. One can always create
an "other" category, which is a sort of extra category for those instantiations of a domain
which do not fit with the "regular" members of the contrast set. Some might consider the
creation of "other" categories a cop-out. Indeed, new hires at the McKinsey business
consultancy firm are drilled in the company dogma of creating "MECE" or "mutually
exclusive, collectively exhaustive" partitions, with no less than three and no more than five
members, in their reports and analyses.73 However, "other" categories can also serve as safety
valves in the many cases in which an instantiation of a domain does not easily fit into an
73 Ethan M. Rasiel, The McKinsey way: using the techniques of the world's top strategic consultants to
help you and your business (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1999). On the principle, see Barbara Minto, The
Minto pyramid principle: logic in writing, thinking, and problem solving (London: Minto
International, 1996), p. 80.
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accepted or convenient partition of that domain. Some may feel that "other" categories
thereby reduce the analytical power or statistical validity of a set of distinctions, but others
might say that one sometimes wants to highlight just the most important categorical
distinctions in a domain, or that the frequent use of an "other" category is a useful red flag
that calls attention to the problematicity of a partition meant to be exhaustive.
The multitude of design options available reminds us that there are usually many
ways of creating contrast sets out of any given domain, and that designers must therefore
prepare themselves for criticism of their choices. Though the raw material may be universal,
and the designers individual, the normative traditions of the contrast set design workshop
are profoundly social.74 Some partitioning choices are "natural," and some are the product of
particular designers' individual character, but many are determined by community standards
which vary from place to place, from time to time, from culture to culture, and from
subculture to subculture. 
2.8 Changing the domain to match the contrast
set
If a set designer creates partitions within a domain that are not fully supported by the
natural features within the domain, the set designer may choose to artificially intensify and
strengthen the apparent naturalness of these partitions and to make them more distinct or
salient. Alternatively, the set designer may also try to smooth out certain internal distinctions
within a domain, removing features or obscuring distinctions that the designer considers
inconvenient. Here the role of the designer and the workshop goes beyond the creation of a
set of categories, to the attempt to modify the way people perceive the domain. In some
cases, the designer is not personally in charge of changing the domain to match the contrast
set, but only puts in motion a process that others complete.
Perhaps the most obvious way of making the domain match the contrast set is to
mark newly created partition lines. The lane markings on roads, the yellow line we wait
74 For an exposition of this point with reference to the more general phenomenon of categorization see
Zerubavel, The fine line, pp. 61-70.
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behind at passport control, and the cordons that
mark the line up to the airport check-in counter
were all placed in a landscape that did not
naturally have these boundaries. Immigration
formalities, welcome signs, and other trappings of
crossing a political border, the airplane pilot's
announcement of the new local time when we
cross from one time zone to another, and graduation ceremonies are examples of "rites of
passage" that lend reality to a distinction that may have little natural foundation.75 Image 2.6,
showing two views of the same bicycle lane near Ernst-Reuter-Platz in Berlin, demonstrates
how paint and color were used to intensify the reality of a category that was not fully
specified by the natural landscape.76 Eviatar Zerubavel has collected a number of similar
examples of "polarization" and the construction of discontinuity in a domain.77
In other contrast sets (particularly those formed by focal point, where there are no
partition lines to mark), the designer may strengthen the identity and distinctiveness of
particular set members so that they stand out better against the others. There are many such
cases in the domain of letterform. Thus the crosses that computer programmers put on their
zeroes to distinguish them from Os, or the way we might emphasize the points of the Z in the
call number PZ3 to make it clear we do not mean P23, involve developing and extending the
distinctiveness between two members of a contrast set (O and 0 or Z and 2) in a way that
adds something extra to our everyday, unmarked, conception of these entities.78 (Indeed,
75 On rites of passage see Zerubavel, The fine line, pp. 18-20; Arnold Van Gennep, The rites of passage
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960 [1908]).
76 For further examples of lane and pavement markings see Phil Baines and Catherine Dixon, Signs:
lettering in the environment (London: Lawrence King, 2003), pp. 62-65.
77 Zerubavel, The fine line, pp. 39-47, 74-80.
78 In writing systems there are many other examples of conventionalized categories which, because they
"approach each other" too often, have to be deliberately "polarized" and distinguished from each other.
In Europe, where the handwritten form of the numeral 1 "approaches" the form of a 7, one outfits the 7
with a cross to make up for its lack of Abstand from the 1. The Cyrillic letters ш and т (equivalent to
Roman sh and t) are quite distinct in normal printed form, but are more similar in italics (ш,т) and
practically identical in handwriting where they are typically made more distinctive by adding a bar
below (ш) or above (т) the letter. Similarly, in cases where we are not sure of the original vertical
orientation of what we are reading, we add underlines so that we can properly interpret the difference
between the numbers 6 and 9. The general idea is that we may exaggerate or even add characteristic
Image 2.6 (077)
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zeroes and Os seem ill designed for the purpose of being distinct, but they are so entrenched
in tradition that we prefer to strengthen their distinctiveness in contexts where they might be
confused, rather than redesigning them altogether.)
We see the same pattern in the development of standard languages. A particular
person's speech forms an instantiation within the domain of all the languages which people
speak.79 When we deem certain varieties of speech as "standard" — standard Polish, for
example — we choose one usually idealized instantiation in this domain as a focal point. The
location of this focal point normally has some degree of conventionality, and the boundaries
surrounding the other instantiations of the domain that we might group with it are normally
to some degree ambiguous. Thus what we consider "Polish" is an aggregation of speech acts
which are grammatically similar enough to allow us to lump them in a single category around
the focal point of standard Polish. Just as we consider only musical pitches that are at or near
the focal point of a standard category to be "well-tuned," we think of dialects of Polish that
are "close" to the standard as "normal" Polish. At its limits, Polish shades into what is
normally called Belarussian, Ukrainian, or Slovak instead.
Some standard languages — Norwegian, Danish, and Swedish are good examples —
are so similar that there seems to be little natural reason to recognize them as separate focal
points within the domain. Indeed, it would have been perfectly possible to establish one
single standard written language in Scandinavia rather than three. Instead, as part of the
development of three distinctive senses of national identity, a deliberate process of
strengthening magnified the differences that did exist between them, and outfitted each of
the three standards with distinctive spelling, lexicon, grammar, literary traditions,
vocabulary, and even alphabetical orders. For example, deliberate efforts eliminated
Danicisms from the two competing versions of standard Norwegian.80 
features of a letter, or of any other member of a contrast set, when we are afraid it might be mistaken
for another.
79 Dafydd Gibbon has used the term "language variety space" to metaphorically envision the domain of
all the different versions of language that a particular group of people speak. See http://coral.lili.uni-
bielefeld.de/Classes/Winter96/Dialects/dialects/node29.html (March 2004).
80 Einar Haugen, "Language planning in modern Norway," pp. 134-136, and "The Scandinavian
languages as cultural artifacts," pp. 280-282, both in The ecology of language: essays by Einar
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Sociolinguist Heinz Kloss, writing about these processes of language standardization,
developed a pair of concepts and terms which are applicable to many more domains than
simply that of language.81 Both in German and English, Kloss referred to the natural
differentiation between two languages such as Polish and Slovak as their Abstand (distance,
spacing, or offset) and the process of deliberately intensifying or strengthening that
differentiation as Ausbau. One can loosely translate Kloss's Ausbau as "strengthening" or
"intensifying."82 Kloss used these terms as adjectives to characterize particular standard
languages as "Abstand languages" (those whose identity was naturally distinct from the time
it entered the workshop) and "Ausbau languages" (those whose identity was created through
conscious and deliberate effort).
Of the many other examples of strengthening and Ausbau in language
standardization, consider the deliberate development of Urdu and Hindi as separate
standards after 1837 (when Urdu replaced Persian in the administration of northern India)
and 1947 (when Pakistan became independent),83 and of Serbian and Croatian after 1991.
Note that there are also plenty of examples where strengthening failed to occur or to succeed:
the descendants of Scots speakers in southern Scotland, and Occitan speakers in southern
France, now generally read, write, and indeed speak standard English and French, since the
effort to establish a fully functional separate standard did not take root. 
The development of standards of measurement provides many good examples of
strengthening. Many domains of measurement have an internal diversity that is quite
difficult for humans to perceive, and in these domains the creation of contrast sets is a
particularly artificial and conventional act due entirely to the efforts of the workshop. It is
thus only the markings on thermometers or speedometers that suggest to us that the contrast
Haugen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972).
81 Heinz Kloss, "'Abstand languages' and 'Ausbau languages,'" Anthropological linguistics 9,7 (1967):
29-41; Kloss, Die Entwicklung neuer germanischer Kultursprachen seit 1800, pp. 23-30.
82 In German the word Ausbau most commonly refers to the completion of part of the interior of a
building, such as the "finishing" of an unfinished basement or garage, but it may also mean something
closer to "elaboration," "extension," or "development."
83 See Christopher R. King, One language, two scripts: the Hindi movement in nineteenth century
North India (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 7-11.
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sets used in temperature and speed measurement are really real. The difference between, say,
medium-large, large and jumbo eggs might be difficult to perceive if they were not sold in
differently colored, labeled, and priced boxes which occupy different bins in the
supermarket.
Strengthening is particularly difficult in measurement domains such as speed,
because contrast sets formed by scale units have very weak boundaries (in fact they can only
barely be considered contrast sets at all). We can, of course, measure the speeds of passing
cars in kilometers an hour, round off to the nearest whole number (as the actual speeds
range along the infinity of points in the continuum), and consider that we are sorting the
passing cars into groups of all cars going at 78, 79, 80, 81, 82 kilometers per hour and so
forth. But the cars going 78 kilometers per hour have precious little in common with each
other, and very little less in common with those going 79. It takes a great deal of
strengthening and support for this set of measurement categories — public consciousness-
raising, signposting, speeding-ticket-issuance, and even sometimes the installation of speed
limiters or alarms or tachographs — to get people to treat the idea of 81 kilometers per hour
as "illegal" in a way that 79 is not. (Even where this is done the authorities typically give a
little bit of leeway in their interpretations when it comes to making an official decision to
write someone a ticket.) It is hard to get people to see the world in terms of a contrast set
which has so little relation to natural features in the domain, just as it is hard to judge one's
level of drunkenness in terms of the measuring scales used by the law and the police without
the help provided by rules of thumb that use familiar entities such as a single beer or a glass
of wine.
Instead of trying to intensify boundaries, an alternative strengthening strategy for
contrast sets is to try to draw attention away from anything which might potentially call into
question previously made partitions. Consider, for example, the stigmatization of a
"transitional" dialect that is halfway in between, say, Polish and Belarussian.84 Instead of
84 See the ironic discussion of "Polesian" identity in Anne Applebaum, Between east and west: across
the borderlands of Europe (New York: Pantheon, 1994), pp. 181-183.
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exaggerating the typical by strengthening focal points and boundaries, this reverse strategy
taboos the liminal and ambiguous areas in between the prototypes of the members of a
contrast set.85
In all these cases of strengthening, the goal is to get people to focus on each
instantiation's position in a contrast set, rather than its position in the domain. If a
consciously created contrast set is to succeed, its users must be made more aware of an
instantiation's taxonomic status within the set than its location within the domain (in the
terms used in section 3.5, they must understand it structurally rather than descriptively). As
Anne Applebaum explains, having national borders means getting villagers to say "We are
Polish" or "We are Ukrainian" rather than just saying "We are from here."86 In the same way,
an instrument such as the piano, which is only able to produce a fixed set of standardized
pitches, removes the performer's ability to keep in mind the rest of the spectrum of pitches,
since they fall in between the standard foci. 
Of course, just as we can introduce or exaggerate distinctions in a domain which
arrive with little internal differentiation, we can also try to ignore or smooth over distinctions
within a domain when those distinctions are inconvenient for some reason — most
commonly, because they cut across a region of the domain that we have defned as
constituting a single contrast set member. This is a frequent strategy in dealing with the
domain of ethnicity in imperial and other multi-ethnic political entities such as Austria-
Hungary, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, or Iraq.87 
The process of strengthening is something that takes place within a society, not
within nature. The effects of strengthening could disappear and be forgotten should the
85 On the stigmatization of liminality as a polarization strategy see Zerubavel, The fine line, pp. 45, 72-
74.
86 Applebaum, Between east and west, pp. xi-xii. Note that in some Slavic languages it is particularly
easy to focus on the locale within the domain, as these languages have deictic attributive adjectives that
translate into English roughly as "here-ish" and "us-ish," and can syntactically substitute for adjectives
of national identity such as "Polish."
87 One discussion of this phenomenon (though certainly not the most in-depth one or the last word on
the subject) is in Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Civil wars: from L.A. to Bosnia (New York: New Press,
1994), pp. 107-108, 134. On the general phenomenon of "ignoring intracluster differences," see
Zerubavel, The fine line, pp. 16-17.
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society, and the world within which it exists, disappear. However, strengthening accumulates
in a domain, so that strengthening that took place in a society ancestral to our own may now
appear external, with Norwegian now seeming as natural a category as German. The
fascinating thing, then, about how domains are reworked to match the contrast sets created
in them is that the actions of the workshop change the way that the domain and the natural
world present themselves to future designers.88 Contrast sets are examples of phenomena
which "bite back,"89 in that structure affects human agents, who in turn affect that
structure.90 Contrast sets are derivative representations of a reality that we then use them to
change.
Regardless of whether it is selected out of natural variation or created through
strengthening, easily perceivable differentiation within a given domain is important and
useful. It allows us to manipulate and work with the contrast sets that we create in that
domain, and thus to do things like read, play music, and do arithmetic. The easier it is to see
the difference between the members of a contrast set in a domain, the higher the likelihood
that a human being will be able to train themselves to classify an instantiation of that domain
under one of the members of that contrast set, without having to use special instrumentation
or other outside devices to intensify meager contrasts. It is precisely the distinctiveness of the
letters of the alphabet, and our ability to perceive that distinctiveness, that allows us to learn
to read. It is precisely the distinctiveness of the different standard pitches based on A=440,
and the fact that well-tuned musical instruments produce and present a featured landscape
of sound consisting of these standardized pitches and not the intervening, tabooed, nonfocal
88 Lest the reader think this is a statement in support of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, let me clarify. The
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is that the structure of a grammar and lexicon unconsciously affects the way
people think about the world (see Kay and Kempton, "What is the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis?", p. 66).
My point (a less controversial one, I think) is that we use the structure of deliberately created contrast
sets to change our experience of the domains in which they were created.
89 On the idea of technologies which change the terms of the world they were built for, see Edward
Tenner's two books Why things bite back: technology and the revenge of unintended consequences
(New York: Knopf, 1996) and Our own devices: the past and future of body technology (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 2003).
90 For a readable, recent summary of the two-way interaction between structure and agency see William
H. Sewell, Jr., "A theory of structure: duality, agency, and transformation," American Journal of
Sociology 98 (1992): 1-29.
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ones, that allows some people to develop absolute pitch.91 To those of us who do not have
absolute pitch, the domain of pitch is one in which we can only perhaps tell that pitches are
"higher" or "lower" than one another. The domain of pitch is a good example of how, without
the ability to perceive the features in a domain, we are as helpless as an illiterate person
trying to read the newspaper.
How contrast sets change the "presentation" of a domain
You have probably heard the truism that there is very little blue food. It is an example
of how, in any given context, we do not experience all instantiations of a domain with equal
frequency. Some instantations present themselves more often than others. Red and brown
show up on our plate more often than blue. By instantiations "presenting themselves," I
mean that they make an appearance in the world that human beings can perceive. When x
and the other letters of the alphabet appear in the newspaper, they are also "presenting
themselves." The letter x is one conventionalized focal point in the continuous domain of
graphic form. There is a huge, multidimensional, basically infinite range of potential
letterforms in the world, most of which we do not see. We have settled on only a few of these
instantiations as ones which our society will recognize as "letters."
Designing a contrast set
in a given domain can actually
change the way that the
instantiations of that domain present to us. This occurs particularly when the production or
creation of those instantiations is under our control, and particularly in contrast sets formed
by focal point where we cannot experience an "overview" of all the points in the domain at
91 Absolute pitch "must be learned from exposure to music containing fixed pitches," say Richard
Parncutt and Daniel J. Levitin, "Absolute pitch," in New Grove dictionary of music and musicians,
edited by Stanley Sadie, 1: 37-39 (2nd ed., London: Macmillan, 2001). Though I have never seen the
truth of this statement explicitly demonstrated, recent work on absolute pitch has confirmed other
hypotheses that would seem to be logically dependent on it, so it is very difficult to imagine that it
could be untrue. Also see Daniel J. Levitin, "Absolute pitch: self-reference and human memory,"
International journal of computing anticipatory systems 4 (1999): 255-266, section 2.1; and Daniel J.
Levitin, "Memory for musical attributes," in Music, cognition and computerized sound: an




one time. Thus the standardization of musical pitch, or of the forms of the alphabet, makes it
less likely that we will produce and thus experience pitches or letterforms which are "in
between" those we have designated as standard focal points. Only in spheres like doodling
and graphic design do we produce letterlike symbols that are not letters. If a string ensemble
is in tune and using standard tonality, they will normally choose to produce instantiations of
the domain of pitch which are close to those focal points, and we will never hear frequencies
very far from those that are deemed focal. Image 2.7 shows an idealized view of the
distribution of frequencies produced by a string ensemble tuned to A=440 Hz.92 Indeed, such
widespread clumping around standardized instantiations helps people to perceive the
identity of contrast set members and thus, for example, to learn to read, or to develop
absolute pitch.
It is important to emphasize that this process takes place when contrast sets
standardize our behavior as producers of the instantiations of a domain. In a store, where
human beings are in charge of setting prices, the vast majority of them may be 1/100 or
5/100 less than a full major monetary division (e.g. $1.99). Consider as well how hotels
structure their renovation budgets around whether it will lift them up into the next "star"
category or not.
If human beings are not in
charge or not fully in charge of
producing the instantiations of that
domain, conventional focal points will
not be able to influence the
presentation of the domain, or at least
not as much. For example, the results
from the New York Marathon in Image 2.8 show spikes in the normal distribution of
finishing times at just under 3, 3½, 4, 4½, and 5 hours, showing how people set their goals
92 Successive frequencies in equal temperament are related by ratio (the twelfth root of two), which is
why the intervals between the standard focal points widen towards the right on the chart.
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relative to these purely mathematical and conventional boundaries: "a 4:02 runner pushes
for a 3:57; a 5:03 is pulled by 4:58."93 This effect, though significant, was rather weak, since
people are not fully in control of their exact finishing time in a race. (The longstanding
question of whether people have the ability to postpone their deaths until just after a
birthday or major holiday is similar, with birthdays serving as a sort of boundary in the
domain of the year.94)
Changes in the presentation of a domain often have the effect of tabooing the
instantiations that are liminal, non-focal, or "in between" those that we have conventionally
designated. This tabooing or polarizing process strengthens a contrast set by drawing users'
general attention away from those instantiations which are most threatening to it. This is
why we consider pitches of 425 Hz "out of tune," and why teachers mark down penmanship
students for "improperly" formed letters. We do this partly because we want to instill the
conventional focal points we have formed in these domains into the heads of those we are
socializing. If we do it well enough, they will come to share the taboo, and to forget the
conventionality of the contrast set.
The full range of the domain behind such reinforced focal points and fortified
boundaries is still available to us should we choose to see it, use it, or imagine it.95
Periodically, and not without some effort, we rediscover the marginal, the liminal, and the
tabooed spaces in between our focal points, and at the same time realize the conventionality
of our contrast sets. We can always find a tailor to make our clothing in sizes other than
small, medium, and large, we can ask at a restaurant for a non-standard portion size as a
favor, and listening to an elephant call or to birdsong acquaints us with beings who do not
respect humans' socially conventional focal points of pitch. In the world of letterform,
Douglas Hofstadter has shown that "no letter is an island" and that one can easily draw
93 Hubert B. Herring, "Mind over muscle," New York Times, 19 November 1995, section 4, p. 2. The
original data is available at http://www.nycmarathon.org (March 2004).
94 A special collection of articles on this question, including a review of past research, appears in
Psychosomatic Medicine 66 (2004): 372-386.
95 For a demonstration of the ability to see "past" conventional breaks in the partition of the domain of
color see Kay and Kempton, "What is the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis?", pp. 73-74.
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liminal, ambiguous letterforms: A can merge into H, or h into k,96 and it is possible to read
the same handwritten scrawl as either month or mouth.97 Such ambiguous instantiations of a
domain can be assigned to either of two members of a contrast set depending on "how we
look at them," just as we can interpret the outline of a Necker cube as pointing in either
direction.
There are also a number of domains which are not subject to this strengthening
effect. In these domains, despite the construction of conventional contrast sets, all
instantiations continue to present themselves to us (in certain contexts) with the same or at
most only partly reduced frequency. Thus, even though there are focal points of color (and
these do influence what colors the Crayola crayon company chooses to produce for their
smallest, 8-color crayon sets), out in the "real world" we still commonly see many
instantiations of color that are not near these focal points — outside the context of food, of
course. In domains such as the speed of cars, the unit measurement of speed in kilometers or
miles per hour creates such a weak contrast set that it does not cause a "digital"
representation of speeds of exactly (say) 32, 33, and 34 miles or kilometers per hour; the
speeds of cars continue to vary in an analog way along every point in the entire continuum.
(Of course, the speed limit on the expressway surely causes the distribution of the points at
which people drive to bunch together at somewhere in the neighborhood of that limit.)
However, even in continuous domains in which we have defined a mathematical
scale, we tend to focus on round numbers in that scale as breaking points or significant
milestones, although we know they are totally artificial. Thus we might say "I'll stop after
we've gotten to 300 kilometers" or "I missed being born in the 1960s by two weeks," or write
books about "fifteenth-century Italy." No matter how many times we were told that the
96 Donald E. Knuth, "The concept of a Meta-Font," Visible Language 16 (1982): 3-27; Knuth, "Lessons
learned from Metafont," Visible Language 19 (1985): 34-53; Douglas R. Hofstadter, "Meta-Font,
metamathematics, and metaphysics: comments on Donald Knuth's 'The concept of a Meta-Font,'"
Visible Language 16 (1982): 309-338, esp. p. 331; Hofstadter, Metamagical themas: questing for the
essence of mind and pattern (New York: Basic Books, 1985), pp. 243-244. See also Geoffrey Sampson,
"Is roman type an open-ended system? A response to Douglas Hofstadter," Visible Language 17
(1983): 410-412; Hofstadter's reply to Sampson, Visible Language 17 (1983): 413-416, and Johanna
Drucker, The alphabetic labyrinth (London: Thames & Hudson, 1995), p. 282.
97 For more similar examples see Goodman, Languages of art, pp. 137-139.
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twenty-first century actually began on January 1, 2001, we all agreed that "the fun is when
the calendar goes from one-nine-nine-nine to two-zero-zero-zero."98 The publicity
surrounding the breaking of the four-minute mile is another example of the feeling that there
is a real difference between things on one side of such points and the other.
Sometimes we playfully make reference
to the fact that we have conventionally limited
the presentation of certain domains, by
making reference to the instantiations that we
have excluded. A musician may play a deliberately out-of-tune note for comic effect.
Comedian John Cleese is noted for his ability to speak in nonsense syllables.99 Image 2.9
shows a motif used on the plastic bags given out by Hugendubel, a major German bookstore
chain. The shapes look like they could be members of the contrast set of standard
letterforms, but on closer inspection, we see they are not — they are nothing more than
"phantom members." Consider as well the psychedelic song from the Easy Rider soundtrack
which speaks of a forest where the leaves of the trees break the light into colors "that no one
knows the names of."100 The theme here is the persistent human fantasy that, like straying
into Shangri-La, we might someday discover yet another member of a familiar contrast set —
a city, or planet, or color that is part of a set we already are familiar with, but which we did
not know about before.101 In domains which are not exhaustively partitioned, we may actually
be able to make such dreams come true by, for example, creating a totally new flavor of ice
cream or designing the graphic symbol for a new currency such as the euro. But in
completely partitioned domains which we can envision in their entirety, we can only
fantasize about new contrast set members, imagining the experience of someday discovering
98 Edwin McDowell, "Dec. 31, 1999: Dressed up, but with no place to go?", New York Times, 18
December 1995, p. A1.
99 John Cleese, interview with Terry Gross on National Public Radio, 1990,
http://www.npr.org/rundowns/rundown.php?prgId=13&prgDate=29-Jun-2001 (October 2004).
100 The Byrds, "Wasn't born to follow," from The notorious Byrd brothers (New York: Columbia
Records, 1968).
101 For a literary example of this fantasy see H. P. Lovecraft, "The color out of space," in The annotated
H. P. Lovecraft, pp. 57-100 (New York: Dell, 1997).
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on the map a hidden kingdom in a remote mountain valley, or another European country
that we never noticed before.
Discussing the topic of strengthening brings up the opposition of "digital" and
"analog," which has a tremendously long history in measurement, electronics, computing,
philosophy, and the social sciences as well.102 The creation of contrast sets, particularly by
boundary, can be thought of as shaping a domain's continuous, analog variation into a set of
discrete, digital categories. Increasing digitization lends an increasingly "jerky," "convulsive,"
and "staccato"103 feeling to our images of motion through a domain, in which there is more
and more contrast between the experience of the borders between contrast set members and
the spaces in between those borders. Thus progressing through an unpartitioned, fully
analog continuum feels like driving along a smooth expressway, crossing the weak
boundaries created by scale units feels like driving over warning strips, crossing pitch foci as
one moves through the domain of audible frequency feels like driving over speed bumps, and
traveling through a maximally digitized domain might be likened to running hurdles in a foot
race. Meanwhile, the metaphor of the "basin of attraction," frequently used in the discussion
of digital phenomena, represents the strengthening process by suggesting a visual image in
which instantiations "migrate" away from the boundaries and towards the focal point of a
contrast set member.
2.9 Contrast sets in linked domains
Creating a contrast set becomes more complicated when one finds that one is creating
a set not just in one domain, but also in another, through links that connect the
instantiations of one domain to the instantiations of the other domain. One's best efforts at
creating a partition that makes sense in one domain may completely fail to accord with the
natural breaks in domains it is linked to.
102 For a useful multidisciplinary review of the history of the digital/analog opposition, see Ellie Epp,
"The analog/digital distinction in the philosophy of mind," M.A. thesis, Simon Fraser University, 1993
(available at http://www.sfu.ca/~elfreda/theory/analog/analog0.html). See also Zerubavel, The fine
line, pp. 34, 60, 134n2; Anthony Wilden, The rules are no game (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1987), pp. 222-225. 
103 These terms come from Zerubavel, The fine line, pp. 34, 70.
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An easy place to see this happen is in the problem of grading students' scores on a
"curve" (which often means simply that the professor is reserving for themselves the
determination of the connection between performance and grading label). Say that there are
fifty students, and that their "raw" scores are numerical and could theoretically range from 0
to 100, though in practice they actually range from 40 to 98. Say then that each student must
be assigned a grade from the seven-member set {A, B+, B, C+, C, D, F} — note that some
universities, such as Rutgers, do not have "minus" grades. How should one proceed? One
could divide the range from 0 to 100 into seven parts, label each part with one of the seven
grades, and give every student the grade of that part of the range that their raw score falls
into. Or, one could plot the distribution of the raw scores and notice a clump of scores
around 95 (call those As) and another clump around 88 (call those B-pluses). The first
approach is a partition of the quasi-continuous range of raw scores; the second is a partition
of the collection of students. Each student is linked to a particular point on that range; to put
it another way, the domain of students is linked to the domain of raw scores. 
The first approach would cause problems if (say) you chose a cut point of 70 for one
of the partitions, but found that there was a clump of scores at 69.5, 70, 70, 70.5, 71, 71, 71.5,
and 72 (with the nearest scores on either side of the clump being 62 and 77). Shouldn't all the
students in this clump receive the same score? Shouldn't one try to avoid creating categorical
paradoxes?
But the second approach might also cause problems if there was one student with a
score of 92 who could not easily be lumped with the 95-clump or the 88-clump. The first
approach involves creating boundaries in the continuous domain, and fails to take account of
clumps of entities in the collective domain. The second approach involves recognizing
clumps of entities in the collective domain, and fails to take account of the vast range of
potential values in the continuous domain. Each approach is grounded in one domain but
fails in the other.
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The chart in Image 2.10, designed by cartographer
Mark Monmonier, graphically illustrates these problems.104 It
shows four different ways in which one can choose to
partition a pair of linked collective and continous domains.
The two strategies discussed in the previous paragraph are
equivalent to the "equal intervals" and "natural breaks"
strategies in the chart. "Quantile breaks" involve a partition
of the collection of entities, set in rank order, into equally-sized groups — regardless of their
closeness in the continuous domain, thus risking falling afoul of the categorical paradox.
"Dispersion breaks" use mean and standard deviation values to inspire a partition.
Cartographers have long struggled with this issue in the design of the intervals used in
choropleth maps, which define hard boundaries and leave cartographers particularly open to
charges of miscategorization.105 The assignment of differently-sized point symbols or fonts to
towns and cities of different sizes creates a similar challenge. In both cases the problems
surface because one wants the colors or symbols derived from one's categorization of a scale
to echo the similarity relations one feels exist within the collection of entities.
Indeed, we have a naive tendency to expect partitions in one domain to carry over to
linked domains. In a classic traveler's cognitive slip, classification in a key domain is assumed
to penetrate to all linked domains, so that "even the sheep seem Moroccan, even the
volcanoes seem Indonesian,"106 and one expects everything about France to be different
because France is not England. As well, we tend to expect a kind of "transitivity" in which
104 Mark Monmonier, Maps, distortion, and meaning (Washington: Association of American
Geographers, 1977), p. 26. Reprinted with permission.
105 A choropleth map takes a preexisting geographical contrast set (usually defined by political
boundaries), each of whose elements has a value in some scalar domain. A partition then
simultaneously divides the scalar domain and groups the entities of the linked geographical contrast
set. A color or shade is assigned to each group and a map created which shows each entity in the
geographical contrast set in the color or shade of the group it belongs to. For a discussion of the
problem, see Mark Monmonier, How to lie with maps (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp.
40-42, 129-134; also Arthur H. Robinson, Early thematic mapping in the history of cartography
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 111-112, 199-200.
106 Clifford Geertz, After the fact: two countries, four decades, one anthropologist (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 22. For more similar examples, see Zerubavel, The fine line, p. 28.
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oppositions in one domain carry over as well. This type of overgeneralization is also
responsible for our expectation that Bostonians would be more likely to support the Red Sox
over the Yankees, as well as travelers' common fear that they will become the target of
resentment for their government's policies even if they disagree with them, and politicians'
assumption that if the opposition supports a bill, that they should probably find some reason
to be against it. After all, people tend to be interested in statistical correlations, and to look
for correspondence in structural contrasts across domains, so that one expects that the
divisions between the shelves in a friend's bookcase or pantry might well correspond to
divisions in the domains of their books or provisions. It might be possible to relate this
tendency to the principle of "cognitive economy" (see section 4.6).
However, the two isogloss charts illustrated here
show that reality is more complex, and that the natural
features of one domain do not always carry over to linked
domains. Both charts are based on dialect studies which
surveyed people — the instantiations of a collective domain.
Each instantiation was grouped: in Image 2.11 according to
what vowel they use in the word cut, and in Image 2.12 according
to what word they use for a male goose. A symbolic label was
applied to each group. Since each instantation was tied to a
particular place (of residence), the label associated with its group
membership could be plotted on a two-dimensional map. The
question is then: can the two dimensions of the map be
partitioned according to the group membership of the entities plotted on it? More precisely
phrased, the question is about the nature of this partition — how "neat" will it be? Can
partitions within a continuous domain be made to correspond to the way that entities tied to
particular points of that domain are grouped? The answer to this question is "not
necessarily." Image 2.11 (designed to illustrate the discussion of dialect geography in an




which all the entities in each of the two geographical categories have the same group
membership in the linked collective domain. Rarely in real life do we see such neat and
perfect divisions. Image 2.12, from a dialectologist's survey of the Scottish-English linguistic
border, is much more typical. The black isogloss line is an approximation, which conveys a
very general sense of difference accurately, but which does not allow us to accurately infer
each entity's group membership in the linked domain. Image 2.11 is entirely "consolidated,"
and drawing the boundary is no more difficult than dividing white from red in the Polish
flag; the bottom chart is "fragmented," and partitioning it is like trying to draw a single
boundary between black and white squares on a chessboard. We all know, or should know,
that we cannot assume correlations and correspondences across domains in the real world:
for example, if you sort your e-mail messages by date, they will no longer be in order by
sender. Linked domains are like multiple columns in a database which belong to the same
database "tuple" or relation: there may be correlations between the columns, but you cannot
assume that as a fact.
One of the weightiest and most complex real-world applications of the problem of
linked domains has been in the political partition of the world into countries. Historically
speaking, this partition is more emergent than planned, but it has also been the subject of
conscious design at certain times and places (for example, in central Europe after World War
I). This partition involves, at minimum, two domains: a collection of entities (people) and a
two-dimensional geographical domain (the landmass of the earth). But the collection of
people also has other qualities — in particular, each person's mother tongue can be located at
a particular point in the domain of language. Each person can also be located in various other
cultural domains, such as religion, diet, or dress, while geographical domains are also riven
by other frontiers, such as mountain ranges and coastlines.
Political partitioners using language as an organizing principle typically hope that a
partition by language, translated into geographical terms, will result in a geographical
partition that does a reasonable job of minimizing the length of the borders between the
members of the contrast set created. Political partitioners using geography as an organizing
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principle typically hope that a partition by geography, translated into linguistic terms, will
result in the creation of viable and unified linguistic communities that promote efficient
public administration.
Unfortunately there is rarely a perfect relationship between geographical and
linguistic consolidation. Linguistic classifications, projected into geographical space,
generally scatter enclaves and fragments across the map. After all, the dialect spoken in a city
may be closer to that of another city than to that of the nearby countryside, just as
neighboring black squares on a chessboard will always have a white square in between.
Similarly, geographically based classifications, which take no account of cultural
differentiation, may well cut natural linguistic communities in half. Two entities that are
similar in one domain may not be in another. A partition which makes sense in one of these
domains, when transposed into another domain which is organized according to different
attributes and qualities, will not necessarily result in a simple or efficient partitioning of that
second domain. 
Despite these problems, we have collectively created a contrast set consisting of
nearly two hundred first-level geographical partitions of the landmass of the world, which we
use on an everyday practical basis. Some of these partitions (Iceland, for example) transpose
well into cultural domains. Others do not. Some partitions are still controversial. We ought
not to expect that a perfect transposition can ever exist. Even if one did, we can be sure it
might deliberately be ignored for reasons of realpolitik or political expedience. However, it is
important to have a clear grasp of the necessary compromises involved in such partitions.
Note that our political creations can influence the presentation of domains linked to
the one they partition, by creating "refugees," "exiles," and "irredentists" (terms which
presuppose a geographical contrast set), and stimulating immigration that increases the
linguistic or cultural homogeneity of geographically created entities, similar to the way that
defragmenting a hard disk drive clumps together all the used sectors of the drive. For
example, Hungary has become more Hungarian and Romania more Romanian since their
creation in current form after World War I, as the ethnic minorities in each country have left
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for those nation-states where their language is the majority standard. Anne Applebaum
writes about how two adjacent villages, both in Poland before World War II, were split
between Belarus and Lithuania afterwards; slowly but surely, the two villages diverged in
everyday attributes such as the language villagers spoke, where they shop, what television
they watch, and which authority does road maintenance on either side of the border.107 As
Thomas Schelling demonstrated in investigating neighborhood segregation,108 consciousness
of a partition in a literally spatial domain can change peoples' choice of instantiations within
that domain. More generally, a partition in one domain can induce a partition in domains
linked to it.
Before leaving the example of geopolitical contrast sets, it would be only fair to
mention that there are even more complexities involved in it. I have only laid out the very
basics of the problem. I have presented it in a structural, static way, but one must also take
into account that many people are multicultural and multilingual, and that language exists
not only as knowledge in the head but as individual acts at particular moments in time. In
addition, cultural variables can be mapped to geographical focal points, such as national
capitals, and larger political entities were in earlier times more often defined by focal point
(with fuzzy boundaries) than by boundary.109 Also, in geographical domains, transport
corridors such as roads and rail lines, as well as institutional relationships between
producers and purchasers, bind different parts of that domain together in ways that can be
inconvenient to cut. I could also explain in detail how the choice of "perceptual focus" in
partitioning (see section 2.7) can be thought of as a choice of which of a set of linked domains
to prioritize as a basis for partition. Overall, though, I think that the vocabulary of domains
107 Applebaum, Between east and west, p. 94.
108 Thomas C. Schelling, "Dynamic models of segregation," Journal of mathematical sociology 1 (1971):
143-186. For a recent summary see among others Philip Ball, Critical mass: how one thing leads to
another (London: William Heinemann, 2004), pp. 383-396.
109 In the medieval world, it seems that large-scale political categorization was often (but not always)
relatively more defined by focal point than by boundary, but that at the micro level, boundaries were
routinely used to demarcate villages, parishes, and agricultural land. See Daniel Abulafia, "Seven types
of ambiguity, c. 1100-c. 1500," in Medieval frontiers: concepts and practices, edited by Daniel Abulafia
and Nora Berend, pp. 1-34 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), p. 15, and Ronnie Ellenblum, "Were there
borders and borderlines in the Middle Ages? The example of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem," pp.
105-119 in the same volume, pp. 110-111.
§ 2.9 78
and contrast sets could be much more widely used in discussions about geographical
boundaries, and it would be interesting to see this issue explored in much greater depth.
2.10 Precision
Finding our bus in the gigantic car park at Pryca was supposed to be easy. Each small section
of the car park was signposted with a different animal. So if you parked in, say, the elephant
section, which had a silhouette of an elephant on the sign, you knew you'd find it among the
hippos and lions, just like the eagle was near the duck and toucan, etc., etc. The only problem
was that the car park was so vast that they had to use many animals, and they ran out of ones
that look completely different. You may be able to tell the difference between the silhouette of a
spiny-tailed bandicoot and a blue-nosed aardvark at 40 paces, but I can't. So I always made
sure we parked in the shadow of an unmistakable animal, like a giraffe.110
The former motorcoach tour guide whose memoir is quoted above is complaining
about a situation where there was insufficient contrast between the members of a contrast
set. In this case, the contrast set of animals was being used as a set of labels. It seems the
number of labels needed was fairly large and hence so was the number of animals. Indeed,
their number perhaps started to exceed the number of animals that people are easily able to
distinguish. When choosing the members of a contrast set one wants to pick distinct, salient
entities that people are easily able to keep apart — not aardvarks and bandicoots, whose
profiles people may not be able to recognize.
Within a given context, systems of classification usually have a lower limit on the size
of the units which they recognize. We distinguish red and blue, but not scarlet and crimson.
We think of both Chihuahuas and St. Bernards as dogs even though they appear as different
as wolves and foxes. We consider South Africans, Scots, and Canadians as speakers of
"English" even though the Englishes they speak are not the same. We speak of our trip to
"India" or "Italy" even though we may only have been to Rajasthan or Rome. Because the
town is the smallest political division in New Jersey, residents of different parts of
Piscataway have the same mayor, even though equally distant residents of Piscataway and
Bound Brook have different mayors. 
The challenge for the designer of a contrast set is to help users find an appropriate
level of precision in the division of a domain. In choosing how finely to partition the domain,
110 Brian Thacker, Rule no. 5: no sex on the bus (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2001), pp. 213-214.
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designers must decide what degrees of difference between instantiations they should take
account of, and what they should ignore. Stopping points built into the design of a contrast
set have a powerful effect on users' choice of a level of precision (for example, though we
could discuss time in terms of 45-second chunks, we tend to use the convention of 60-
second-long minutes). Since the level of precision appropriate for one context may not work
in another, designers may want to recognize several different levels of precision in their
partitions, thus effectively creating a taxonomy (such as days, hours, minutes, and seconds).
The term granularity can be used to refer to the size of the smallest unit deemed significant
in a given context. The finest level of the taxonomy might correspond to the least effective
difference111 between the instantiations in the domain — that is, the smallest difference that
really matters.
In contrast sets defined by focal point, the issue of precision is connected to the
concept of tolerance around the focal point of each contrast set member. In general, the finer
the degree of precision, the smaller the tolerance around a focal point. At a basic level of
color categorization, for example, where we distinguish "red" from "blue," scarlet and
crimson fall within a tolerable distance of our prototype of the color "red," but we can also
imagine moving down to a finer level of color differentiation where the terms "scarlet" and
"crimson" would have prototypical focal points of their own.
The definition of a scale unit suggests a particular level of granularity and set of
stopping points within a domain. Thus the use of the Celsius scale in European television
weather reports strongly encourages that all temperature figures be "rounded" to the
"nearest" full degree, suggesting that "8 degrees Celsius" is something significantly different
than "9 degrees Celsius" whereas "8.1" and "8.2" are just allovariants of "8". However,
mathematical scales are open to the possibility of capturing differences in a domain that are
below the granularity of the unit. We have conventional ways of symbolizing fractional value
by using decimal points and numerators and denominators ("8.63", "8⅝"). But whether we
111 This term is borrowed from Edward Tufte, Visual explanations: images and quantities, evidence
and narrative (Cheshire, Connecticut: Graphics Press, 1997), chapter 4 (pp. 73-77).
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use them is optional, and indeed, rounding conventions in timekeeping or retail sales are
agreements about how far to go in taking account of these small differences.
Contrast set designers face a tradeoff between the costs and the benefits of precision.
Precision is valuable up to a certain point, after which it becomes wasteful. Precision is what
allows us to build accurate machinery, express complex and nuanced meanings, produce
useful maps, and coordinate our plans with others. But it costs us time and effort to measure
precisely, to produce rulers with accurate fine spacing marks, or to remember to take into
account the difference between a dotted and an undotted i. One wants instantiations that are
significantly different to belong to distinct contrast set members. But at the same time, one
does not want to institutionally recognize differences that are barely perceptible. In public
situations people expect the members of a contrast set to make neither too fine nor too
coarse distinctions but rather the distinctions that are relevant. There is an economy of our
attention and people expect it to be used thriftily.
This realization has been a cornerstone of the discussion of precision in linguistics
and philosophy. H. P. Grice expressed it as the Maxim of Quantity: "1. Make your
contribution to the conversation as informative as necessary. 2. Do not make your
contribution to the conversation more informative than necessary."112 From this principle
one can derive the idea that the level of precision used in a given context must be relevant to
the needs of the discourse, and that inside that level of precision one has license to be
vague.113 Thus, we give ourselves license to lie a little bit, and to simplify "minor" details, as
long as we "present the essential on the scale on which we are working."114 
The problem is that imprecision at one level becomes untruth at a finer level. Since
our ability to represent analog domains in terms of discrete contrast sets is limited by the
granularity of the set, such representations will never be perfectly true at all potential levels
112 H. P. Grice, Studies in the way of words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 33-34; H.
P. Grice, "Logic and conversation," in Speech acts, edited by Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan, pp. 41-58
(New York: Academic Press, 1975).
113 On the concept of relevance see Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber, "Truthfulness and relevance,"
Mind 111 (2002): 583-632. See also the discussion of a "functionally determined lower limit to
specificity" in Cruse, Lexical semantics, pp. 153-155.
114 Mircea Eliade, Journal II, 1957-1969 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 202.
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of precision. (Mark Monmonier had this fact in mind when he ironically titled a book How to
lie with maps.115) To accept a conventional standard of precision is, then, to tacitly agree not
to accuse contrast set users and other representers of being unfaithful to the things that they
are trying to represent — at least, not at a level below the granularity of the representative
process. In America, the standardization of the penny as the smallest coin allows a
storekeeper to be confident that if they compute seven percent sales tax on a ninety-nine cent
sale, a customer will not protest when they are charged $1.06 instead of $1.0593.
In fact, similar questions of precision arise not just in contrast sets, but in any human
activity where one kind of information is projected onto or represented by another. Other
real-life situations where we project one set of information onto another in a way that calls
for a particular level of precision include the creation of maps and narratives, the
reproduction of images, and the design and use of collections of terms. The Borges story
about the cartographers who made a "map of the Empire which was the size of the Empire,
and which coincided point for point with it"116 shows how ubiquitous these situations of
representation are, by pointing out the absurdity of any representational process which does
not involve a certain degree of simplification and approximation.
In certain contexts (such as in choosing a lower limit of monetary value), the
members of a social group have settled on a single shared level of precision, for which we can
use the term standard of precision.117 Standards of precision are conventional guidelines for
what level of precision is appropriate in a given everyday life context. They are sometimes
formally specified, and sometimes not; they can be rough, flexible guidelines, or very exact
specifications. But when a standard of precision exists, we expect people to take the trouble
to follow it. Within a single domain, the standards of precision can vary from context to
115 Mark Monmonier, How to lie with maps (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). See especially
chapter 3 ("Map generalization," pp. 25-42).
116 Jorge Luis Borges, Collected fictions (New York: Viking Penguin, 1998), p. 325.
117 This term has been previously used by David Lewis, "Scorekeeping in a language game," in
Philosophical papers, 1: 233-249 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983-1986 [1979]), p. 245.
Wilson and Sperber, in "Truthfulness and relevance," suggest that Lewis's concept of standard of
precision can be replaced by the more flexible concept of relevance. I propose that there is a need for
both concepts and that standards of precision may be considered conventionalized judgements of
relevance.
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context. Thus a different level of precision is required when timing the length you clocked on
your last work shift (which you might measure to the nearest quarter hour) and your
finishing time in the hundred-yard dash (which might be measured to a hundredth of a
second). And, when asked the time of day, a large number of people who wear digital watches
go to the extra effort of rounding off to the nearest five minutes rather than simply reading
off the already precise-to-the-minute digital display.118
Many domains exhibit a default level of precision that we expect unless we are told
otherwise. Thus we might use the same men's room sign to signify both a men's room with
one urinal and one with ten. The size of a men's room is largely irrelevant to our interest in
finding it, we do not normally expect others to give much attention to the domain of the size
of men's rooms, and thus we do not partition and label them in a way that reflects the
attribute of size. Similarly, if we are looking for wing A of a building, we are likely to assume
that a sign reading A refers to our destination, even though the A in this case is in italics.
These standards of precision are not natural or universal, but we learn them from our
experience of the world. We can call the distinction between "mens' room and womens'
room" and "A and other letters of the alphabet" a basic level of precision, working from the
idea of basic-level categories in linguistic categorization.119 Below the basic level of precision,
people consider distinctions to be technical (too specific to make much of an effort to
capture). Thus the distinction between different types of mens' rooms or different types of As
is, in the examples given, technical, not basic. 
As, however, people do not lead only "everyday" lives but also use and make technical
distinctions in certain contexts, it is important to have technical distinctions available to us
without forcing them on everyone all the time. While most people would find it odd to hear
someone observe at a garden party that the wind was coming from the west-northwest, the
same observation would be entirely appropriate in a meteorological office where wind
direction is described with a higher degree of precision. In algebraic formulas, we might
118 Jean-Baptiste Van Der Henst, Laure Carles, and Dan Sperber, "Truthfulness and relevance in telling
the time," Mind and Language 17 (2002): 457-466.
119 For a summary of basic level categories, see Taylor, Linguistic categorization, pp. 46-51.
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consider the forms y, y, and Y equivalent in some contexts, and pay attention to the
differences between them in other contexts. This need for flexibility is a good reason for
contrast set designers to consider partitioning a domain in multiple "layers." That may mean
creating a taxonomy with different levels, so that it is possible to choose a level of the
taxonomy that corresponds to the level of precision that is appropriate for the context at
hand. One may say, then, that something happened in the United States, in New York State,
in Monroe County, or in Rochester. One may discuss "A, B, C, and other letters of the
alphabet" or "A, A, a, a and other types of As." In written Japanese, dakuon diacritical
markings (which mark voiced versions of unvoiced consonants) do not have any affect on
alphabetical order, so that と 'to' and ど 'do' are alphabetized together, effectively creating
two levels of precision in the Japanese syllabaries; similarly, accented and unaccented letter
pairs such as a and á are lumped together in certain Icelandic dictionaries, and not in others.
Consider as well how many writing systems typically choose not to indicate certain features
of spoken language (tone in Chinese Pinyin, vowels in Arabic and Hebrew) but can do so
optionally, for example in texts for children or foreign learners. In other cases, having
multiple layers means being able to choose between quite different sets of focal points which
partition the same domain at different levels of precision, so that the sets {N, W}, {N, NW,
W}, {N, NNW, NW, WNW, W}, and {270, 271 … 360} partition the north-western quarter of
the compass by focal point at four distinct levels of precision.
Just as our everyday, "basic" level of precision is widely shared and assumed
throughout a whole society or thought community, it can also change from community to
community. In Hungarian, there is a distinction between the letters o, ó, ö, and ő whereas in
German handwriting, any o with a mark over it is likely to be taken to represent an ö
(German does not use ó or ő). Visitors to Florence (Italy) who are trying to find a street
address must take account not only of the house numbers, but of whether they are written in
red or black. Russians have basic level terms for two different kinds of what we call "blue"
and Hungarians more or less do the same with what we call "red." Different musical
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traditions prefer to partition the octave into five, seven, or twelve divisions or even into so-
called microtones.
A standard of precision can be challenged in two ways: by saying it requires too much
exactness, and by saying that it is not precise enough. We can think of a person (or a
situation) who makes the first type of challenge as an approximator and a person who makes
the second type of challenge as a hairsplitter. As an example of approximating, consider
those situations that force people to ignore important distinctions in their regular
orthography for technical reasons. For example, Icelanders generally conflate the letters d
and ð as d, t and þ as t, and a and á as a when writing cell phone text messages, not by choice
but since most phones do not support ð and þ and it requires bothersome extra keystrokes to
write á. Similarly, a Swedish company posts a notice on its website explaining that the e-mail
address of each employee is simply "firstname.lastname", except that one must "round off" å,
ä, and ö to a, a, and o.120 Both examples show a more precise contrast set being
approximated by a "restricted" or "generalized" version which is less precise.
Hairsplitting challenges to a standard of precision claim draw our attention to
features in a domain that are not reflected in the construction of a contrast set. Statements of
the form "There is x and then there is x" (such as "There is first class and then there is first
class") tell us that a particular contrast set member warrants further conventional
partitioning. Author Vladimir Nabokov, who had a keen interest in sets and classification,
once told his annotator that 
I am therefore puzzled and distressed by the significance you lend to the general idea of "red"
in my book. When the intellect limits itself to the general notion, or primitive notion, of a
certain color it deprives the senses of its shades … For me, the shades, or rather colors, of, say,
a fox, a ruby, a carrot, a pink rose, a dark cherry, a flushed cheek, are as different as blue is
from green or the royal purple of blood from the English sense of violet blue. I think your
students, your readers, should be taught to see things, to discriminate between visual shades as
the author does, and not to lump them under such arbitrary labels as "red" (using it, moreover,
as a sexual symbol …)121
When people are confronted by others who disregard small differences that they
consider important, they often find it insulting or disappointing. Hungarians put in a
120 "Kontakta SvD," http://www.svd.se/dynamiskt/omsvd/did_5454742.asp (May 2004).
121 Vladimir Nabokov, The annotated Lolita (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1970), p. 362.
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situation which does not distinguish between o, ó, ö, and ő may feel that they have been
shown a lack of respect, while an American newspaper article which renders the Icelandic
girls' name Þorbjörg as Porbjorg122 provokes a small sigh of resignation from those who know
the difference between Þ and P and between ö and o. Consider, as well, an American, the
brother of a former co-worker of mine, whose parents named him Søren (as in Kierkegaard)
but who was forced by the conventions of written language in America to go by Soren.
Reports from Norway are that parents, eager to help their children avoid this sort of minor
indignity, are avoiding first names that include the typically Norwegian letters å, æ, and ø,
which do not fit into the system of significant distinctions supported by the least-common-
denominator lingua franca of the Roman alphabet.123 
In certain domains, when levels of precision are defined too finely, one runs the risk
that users will make too much of the categorical difference between two instantiations which
are actually quite similar. Consider the Doonesbury cartoon where the head of Nike denies
that the company hires 13-year-old Asian workers. "The 13 thing is a total media fabrication,"
he says; they are actually 14.124 The humor here plays on the question of the lack of formal
agreement in society about what degree of transmission error is significant enough to render
inaccurate a message that conveys a certain position in a domain. Is a claim of importance
based on someone being 13 years old rendered completely invalid if the actual age turns out
to be 14, or simply diminished? The fact that the year is a basic-level unit of age
measurement gives the head of Nike an opening to shift the focus of the debate from the
fairness of the practice to the issue of the accuracy of the claim, but doing so makes us laugh
since we know that 14-year-olds are only slightly poorer examples of "underage labor" than
13-year-olds. To take another example, consider that in Russia in the summer of 1992, a
kopek was worth less than a hundredth of a U.S. cent and kopek coins were in short supply.
One day at a state-run store, I bought a subsidized loaf of bread priced at eight rubles forty-
122 Jason George, "In Iceland, freeze frame takes on new meaning," New York Times, 4 November
2004, p. B1.
123 Þráinn Bertelsson, "Alþjóðleg mannanöfn," Frettablaðið (Reykjavík), 17 November 2003, p. 32.
124 Garry Trudeau, Doonesbury, original release date 14 October 1997.
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seven kopeks and presented the cashier with eight rubles and a fifty-kopek coin. Trained to
be exact, she adamantly refused to "keep the change," creating an absurdist situation as I and
the line of disgruntled customers behind me waited for her to search through the bottom of
her cash drawer for three kopeks.
Designers should keep in mind that people and machines differ in their ability to
disambiguate. Computers and other machines cannot use contextual clues outside of the
artificial framework of their own competence to disambiguate, but they can perceive very
small degrees of difference which humans have trouble seeing so long as they are "told"
where to look. Human beings, meanwhile, constantly mix up their scrawled 1s and Is and 0s
and Os, and have difficulty telling the sounds of s and f apart on the telephone. This is why
telephone reservationists have to spend so much time repeating the letters and numbers on
airline ticket record locator codes like ERQ2SM or Z1DLW9, and why early computer
displays which were limited in their rendering resolution distinguished between the letter O
and the number 0 by putting a slash across the latter. Although these figures are completely
distinct in the code in which the computer represents them, humans easily confuse their
names and shapes. 
A designer who is planning a numbering system
whose elements frequently need to be transmitted visually
or through speech might be well advised to use a reduced
symbol set with fewer potentially confusable elements, or to separate and thus contextualize
the use of letters and numbers. Thus the airline Iceland Express uses only numeric booking
references (such as 208783). "Hollis," the database of the Harvard University libraries, for
some years identified each record with a seven-letter code which was always three letters
plus four numbers (ABC1234, for example), so that even a beginning user could see that the
Hollis number in Image 2.13 contains neither the numeral 1 nor the letter O. Although this
limitation of form reduced the capacity of a seven-symbol ID tag from 367 to 263 x 104, it




Precision is a fascinating theme which cuts through almost every domain of daily life.
Although philosophers of language have considered it in some detail, social scientists and
scholars of everyday life have not. Despite tantalizing book titles like "The values of
precision," and many references to standards of precision in specific contexts, when I wrote a
graduate term paper about standards of precision in 1997, I could not find any previous
treatments of the topic as a practical, mundane social form. I hope that this brief discussion
might encourage someone to explore precision in everyday life in greater depth.
2.11 How contrast sets fill slots
Particular discourse contexts often create "slots" which are designed to be filled by
the members of one particular contrast set. Contrast sets thus act as sets of the arguments or
variables that can be "taken" by a particular formula in everyday life. As examples of how
everyday life formulas "call" the members of contrast sets as arguments, consider how the
different slots in a cognitive schema,125 the attributes of objects in object-oriented computer
programming, or the elements of relationships in entity-relationship database modeling126
may each be filled only from a particular set of hyponyms. For example, your credit card
expiration date is a two-slot schema whose arguments are the two contrast sets of month and
year numbers. In the lexicon, compare how only a limited class of words can fill a particular
role (such as the object of a particular verb) in a sentence.
Thinking in the opposite direction, given a particular contrast set, there are many
different types of slots that its members can fill. Take, for example, the domain of standard
languages, and the element "Vietnamese" within the contrast set formed by partitioning that
domain. It is possible to be a native speaker of Vietnamese, to be in an environment where
most people speak Vietnamese, or to be speaking with a native speaker of Vietnamese. Or,
take the days of the week. It is possible that it is Monday, or that it is not Monday but you are
thinking about Mondays in general, or that it is not Monday but you are making an
125 For an introduction to schemas and scenarios see Roy D'Andrade, The development of cognitive
anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
126 See Connolly and Begg, Database systems, section 11.1.
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appointment for next Monday. Similarly, you can be geographically in telephone area code
315, or calling from 315, or calling someone who lives in 315, or simply focusing on that part
of your work that deals with area code 315. You can be on the red team, or cheering for the
red team, or wearing a red sweater, or on vacation on red days. You can be listening to an A
flat, or playing one on the piano, or seeing one written out on a score, or singing one and
knowing you next need to sing a B. Consider, as well, domains of measurement: when you
drive, you are going at a particular speed, and the temperature outside is at a certain level,
and that carton of eggs you are holding occupies a particular position in the domain of
standardized egg sizes. Databases and other collections of entities work the same way: if, for
example, you have just given your ticket record locator to the airline telephone
representative, you are the person identified with the entity referred to by that locator, while
the representative is simply thinking about your record (as opposed to the other records in
the database), and about you as its holder (as opposed to all the other people in the world).
All of the italicized words in the preceding paragraph are verbs, while all of the
consciously created contrast sets referred to involve nouns. When asking what kind of slot
the members of a contrast set belong in, one is therefore asking what context of activity
provides an option to choose between the different members of the contrast set. What is the
action schema in which the contrast matters? 
In each case, there is a human actor or user in the picture as well. At any given
moment, the context of activity associates that user with a particular member of the set
chosen to fill a slot. This relationship may be different in nature but it always involves some
type of tie or focus. As we pass through the course of the day we enter and then leave dozens
of such contrast set relationships, so that I am currently in room number 505 in the building
I work in, but an hour from now I no longer will be.
The fact that, in a particular context, one member of a contrast set and not the others
fills a slot, creates a special link or affinity between the human beings in that context, and the
selected member of the set. To say that "I am in Lisbon (and not Larnaca)," or that "I am
Asian (and not a Pacific Islander)," or that "I am processing this item in the inventory, not
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that one," or that "it is 1989, and not 1988" is to attribute to oneself a particular location with
a contrast set, and with that, a particular identity that is defined against the other members
of the set. These acts of definition of a user's place are important, because some ways of
referring to locations in contrast sets and domains assume that the user's location is known
and understood. Linguists call this phenomenon of context-dependent reference deixis (the
adjectival form of the word is deictic).127 Words like "here," "there," "me," "you," "now,"
"then," "next," "last," "left," and "right" cannot be definitively interpreted without knowing
the position and identity of the speaker in a given domain.
The most classic deictic settings are literally spatial. In many cases the user is actually
physically inside the domain and inside one of the members of the contrast set. This is most
obviously true of geographical domains and their contrast sets. That means not only
administrative contrast sets like countries, counties, school districts, voting districts and the
like, but also sets like the rooms or floors of a building, or telephone and postal coding areas.
Being inside the contrast set lends a certain flavor to the user's relationship to it; the domain
becomes identical with the user's physical environment, rather than being an abstract idea.
In other cases, the user is not literally "in" the domain, but rather has a special
relationship with one part of the domain at a time that they are holding, looking at, focusing
on, paying attention to, thinking about, surrounded by, connected to, or dealing with. 
Users of a domain often have the choice to discuss that domain in one of two ways: a
deictic way that can only be interpreted with knowledge of our position in the domain, or a
non-deictic way which is independent of such knowledge. The most common terms for this
distinction are "relative" and "absolute" respectively, but other pairs are commonly used
including the more technical terms "egocentric" and "allocentric."128 The choice of absolute or
127 See Charles J. Fillmore, Lectures on deixis (Stanford, California: Center for the Study of Language
and Information, 1997), esp. pp. 59-75; Stephen C. Levinson, Pragmatics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983), ch. 2 (pp. 54-96). Czechs may be familiar with the Jára Címrman skit in which
Címrman teaches his students how to use the telephone, explaining that they should not answer with
(for example) "Smith here," but rather "Smith there," because they need to keep the perspective of the
caller in mind.
128 See Tversky, "Remembering spaces," p. 364-365 on terminology; for more on the allocentric-
egocentric contrast see Stephen C. Levinson, "Language and space," Annual Review of Anthropology
25 (1996): 353-382. Roger M. Downs and David Stea use "state description" and "process description"
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relative reference is most typically a conventional design choice made in the assignment of
labels to a preexisting contrast set (see section 3.3). However, the issue also comes up in the
design of contrast sets themselves in a few cases, where the actual partition of a domain may
take place in different ways depending on the position of the user. Thus we often express
direction absolutely and non-deictically in terms of the four focal points of north, south, east
and west, or by using the convention of a circle divided into 360 degrees with 0 as north;
these directions are grounded in a shared theory of the shape of the earth. But if we are on a
ship we may prefer to express direction relatively and deictically using the bearing-based
terms fore, aft, starboard and port, and if we are a guide on a bus we may communicate
relative directions with our group in terms of a clock face where the front of the bus points
towards 12:00 and the rear towards 6:00.129 Thus, if you are piloting a ship with a bearing of
90 degrees, both "go east" and "go forward" are commands with the same practical meaning
that rely on different conceptions of the structure of the domain.
In dreams, our sense of our relationship to a contrast set may be disrupted or
perturbed, and dreams may loosen the conditions that a schema normally places on the type
of contrast set that can fill a certain slot. For example, we may imagine ourselves "in"
something that we normally cannot be in. In Nicholson Baker's novel The everlasting story
of Nory, he tells us about Nory's dream "of being chased through various shades of colors by
a queen who was determined to cut off her arm for a punishment."130 It seems that Nory is
running through something like the color spectrum projected into space, and thus that the
dream reinterprets the domain of color as something with an actual spatial existence. This is
not such a huge leap, since the spatial metaphor suggests that any domain is something that
we could possibly imagine ourselves going through.
for a similar opposition in Maps in minds: reflections on cognitive mapping (New York: Harper &
Row, 1977), pp. 43-47.
129 On the partition of the domain of direction generally, see Edwin Hutchins, Cognition in the wild
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), and Levinson, "Language and space."
130 Nicholson Baker, The everlasting story of Nory: a novel (London: Vintage, 1999), p. 15. My
emphasis.
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2.12 Images of contrast sets
We very often create conventional derivative representations, usually visual or
visualizable images, of a contrast set. An image usually takes a form that is the same or
similar to the topology (literal or metaphorical) of the contrast set, but this is a matter of
inspiration, not determination. Such images may be entirely mental, existing only in the
mind of a person or a group, but they may alternatively or at the same time be real and
physical, like a map. They are durable, whether in our minds or in the world, and we use
them as tools to allow us to think about the contrast sets they represent.
The most familiar images of contrast sets are the ordinary physical representations of
them that we work with every day. For example, the piano keys, the musical staff, or the keys
or strings of any other instrument are physical representations of the contrast set of standard
pitches. The alphabet, written out in ABC order, is a conventional way of representing the
contrast set we have picked out of the domain of letterform. The speedometer in your car is
an image of the contrast set of speeds, while the diagram on the bulb of a stick-shift lever is
an image of the contrast set of gears in the transmission. A political map of the seven
divisions of Australia is an image of that contrast set (a physical map of Australia is more an
image of the underlying domain). Similarly, a diagram or chart may show all the stops along
a subway line. A simple number line is an image of the contrast set of integers, while
calendars, appointment books, and employee shift plans physically represent months, dates,
days of the week, and hours of the day.
When these images are shared throughout a community, they are necessarily
conventionalized, so that not all of the many possible images that could be shared actually
are. The alphabet, for example, frequently presents itself sequentially, beginning with A, B,
and C, even though there are other ways it can be visualized. But ABC order is so deeply
ingrained in us that we have difficulty thinking of the alphabet in any other way and may
indeed rarely think of the alphabet without seeing this image. Certainly we find it hard to say
the alphabet backwards, or in any other sequential order, though many people can manage to
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reproduce the layout of a typewriter keyboard. (For more on ordering standards, see section
4.5.) 
Images of contrast sets generally not only approximate the topology and replicate the
conventional order of a contrast set, but also highlight particular members of the set which
are "marked" or which serve as particularly important focal or anchor points. Some members
of a contrast set may be "regular" or "normal" while others are special in some way. (The
classic example is of "default" weekdays and "marked" weekend days.)131 In other cases, a
particular contrast set member forms a dividing point, focal point, or anchor point, or simply
stands out in some other way. Thus my calendar marks Sundays in red, some appointment
books allot less space to weekend days, two dots mark out "north" on my compass (making it
easier to align the needle), and in most stick-shift cars reverse gear is marked by a special
location or shifting strategy.
Some images of contrast
sets are not shared, indeed they
are entirely personal. Though
personal, these private contrast
set images still normally bear
some relation to the shared
image or the natural topology of
the contrast set.132 The most
commonly reported versions of these images are of numerals and various calendrical
contrast sets, but they have also been reported for the contrast sets of the alphabet and for
131 On markedness within the week specifically, see Eviatar Zerubavel, The seven day circle: the history
and meaning of the week (New York: Free Press, 1985), pp. 107-129. For a review of the idea of
markedness, see Edwin L. Battistella, The logic of markedness (New York: Oxford University Press,
1996). Markedness has been defined in several ways. I use "unmarked" in a sense close to Roman
Jakobson's, to describe those members of a contrast set or structural opposition which are "default" or
"normal." See also Linda R. Waugh, "Marked and unmarked: a choice between unequals in semiotic
structure," Semiotica 38 (1982): 299-318; Wayne H. Brekhus, "A sociology of the unmarked:
redirecting our focus," Sociological Theory 16 (1998): 34-51.
132 Kevin Lynch makes a similar point about individual and shared images of domains (specifically,
cities) in Image of the city, p. 46.
Image 2.14 (075)
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height, weight, and temperature measurement.133 They are typically durable, life-long images
that their possessors automatically use to "locate" a particular member of the contrast set,
and, perhaps, to amplify their sense of that member's distinct identity by assigning it a
particular spot on the image. Image 2.14 illustrates four such private images which a former
college classmate of mine possesses.
One study estimates that 14% of the population have (like my classmate) a private
visual image of the contrast set of integers (called a number form). Typically, they visualize
the numbers along a line which takes a particular form in space, usually twisting or bending
at the important turning points in the sequence, and receding or becoming indistinct as the
numbers rise.134 
Some people also form powerful and permanent private images of temporal contrast
sets. For example, the year might be represented as a circle or a triangle with a particular
orientation in space and with each of the months located at a particular point; these images
are often called calendar forms. Someone with a form for the year or the week who is
thinking about (say) "April" or "Tuesday" will simultaneously, automatically, and only half-
consciously visualize the corresponding point on their year- or week-form.
Such private images do reflect the naturally determined and socially conventional
aspects of the contrast set formed out of a given domain. Number forms represent the
sequence of integers in a linear fashion, and although the line is not geometrically straight, it
usually bends at socially conventional points, in other words at multiples of ten in our base-
ten societies. Images of the year are often cyclic. In Image 2.14, the week is, as one would
expect, seven days long with a two-day weekend (although it proceeds from right to left,
which seems unconventional in an English-speaking world). The image of "my chronological
133 Richard E. Cytowic, Synesthesia: a union of the senses (2d ed., Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002), pp.
179-205.
134 For a general introduction to number forms see Brian Butterworth, The mathematical brain
(London: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 235-240, 308-309, and the references therein. Also see Xavier Seron,
Mauro Pesenti, Marie-Pascal Noël, Gérard Deloche, and Jacques-André Cornet, "Images of numbers,
or 'When 98 is upper left and 6 sky blue,"' Cognition 44 (1992): 159-196. For a perspective from
educational psychology, see Noel D. Thomas, Joanne T. Mulligan, and Gerald A. Goldin, "Children's
representation and structural development of the counting sequence 1–100," Journal of Mathematical
Behavior 21 (2002): 117–133.
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age" in the picture does not include numbers below zero or over two hundred, and similarly,
we expect that a subjective image of human height measurement would show typical human
values, like 5 feet 5 inches, not 9 feet 9 inches. Such images are tied to the conventional
contrast set formed within a given domain, not to the domain directly; thus a form based on
feet and inches would not be transferable over to metric units.
 Those of us who do not possess such images typically find the experience of them
somewhat difficult to grasp. Private images are also difficult to study, because, like mental
maps, they cannot be seen, only elicited.135 Researchers have dealt with this problem by using
methodologies that rely on observations of consistencies from person to person in the nature
of the phenomenon, consistencies from time to time in a person's own reports of their
images, and objective studies of the unconscious effects of such images. Although no one
really understands why some people have private images of contrast sets and others do not,
after well over a hundred years of research on them, it is clear that they are a bona fide
phenomenon. I would add that they are specifically dependent on the conventional creation
of contrast sets in certain particularly basic and fundamental domains.
An open research question is whether the ability to create or manipulate images of
contrast sets (and domains) plays any role in various mundane human abilities and talents.
Maps and visual images, models, or representations of a domain are very powerful tools,
since, like a landscape or photograph, humans can think about many parts of them at once
instead of bit by bit. As economists or physicists know, diagrams "automatically support a
large number of perceptual inferences, which are extremely easy for humans."136 The
"method of loci" used in medieval memory techniques improves recall by projecting each
element of a sequence into an imaginary physical space.137 Some argue that images,
landscapes, and diagrams can in fact be what permits an understanding of and feel for a
135 See Passini, Wayfinding in architecture, pp. 34-35.
136 Jill H. Larkin and Herbert A. Simon, "Why a diagram is (sometimes) worth ten thousand words,"
Cogntive Science 11 (1987): 65-99, p. 98. The same point is made by Daniel R. Headrick, When
information came of age: technologies of knowledge in the age of reason and revolution, 1700-1850
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 125.
137 See Frances Yates, The art of memory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 2.
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contrast set or domain.138 A calendar form concretizes into physical space the abstract
difference between, say, "June" and "August," and a number form concretizes the ability to
say that eight minus six is less than nine minus six. The case of a person with terrible
arithmetic trouble who turned out to have a number form with the number 5 mistakenly
listed twice suggests that a faulty understanding of a contrast set can be the result of a faulty
image of it.139 The strongest hypothesis one could put forth would be that everyone who really
is able to work with a contrast set or domain has some sort of image of it, even if they are
barely aware of what that image looks like.
Since the topology and form of public images of contrast sets seems to have some
effect on the way that people internally conceptualize those sets, design choices for public
images of contrast sets are important not just on independent aesthetic grounds but also
because they will affect the way that countless people conceptualize the set. For example, the
way stations are listed on subway signposts and route maps suggest spatial metaphors and
images for the set of stations on a given line. The ring motifs of the Moscow metro and
London Underground maps have become cultural icons, despite their cartographic
inaccuracies.140 Any designer who is responsible for creating a shared image of a set should
know that their choices will end up not just on walls and signboards but also in the minds of
many, many individual people.
138 See Kevin Dann, Bright colors falsely seen: synaesthesia and the search for transcendental
knowledge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 81-82, 84-85.
139 Butterworth, The mathematical brain, pp. 308-309.
140 See Ken Garland, Mr Beck's underground map (Harrow Weald, Middlesex: Capital Transport,
1994), and the critique of the London underground map in Paul Mijksenaar, Visual function: an
introduction to information design (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1997), p. 6.
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3 Labeling
Imagine that you lost your cat, or left your best hat at the opera coat check, or left an
envelope with your two-hundred dollar cash bonus in it by the photocopier at work. If you
then saw a "Cat Found" sign on a telephone pole or a "Money Found" sign on the bulletin
board and called the number on it, or if you went back to the opera to ask about your hat, you
would probably be asked to identify what you lost. How else, given the millions of cats and
hats and envelopes in the world, would anyone be sure it was yours unless you could agree on
the existence of some identifying mark? You would have to say that the cat was a black
female with a white spot on the chest and a tear at the inside base of the right ear; the hat
was brown with a white band and size 7; and that the envelope was a small-size security
envelope with four fifty-dollar bills in it.
Your job would be much easier if your cat had a collar with a local police ID number
on it; if you had sewn a name tag into the lining of your hat; or if the envelope had your
Social Security number on it. Each of these systems would have tagged your property with a
more or less unique identifier that would set it off unambiguously from other cats, hats, and
envelopes. It would be much easier to identify your cat if you knew her number.
The fundamental issue here is the social problem of distinguishing between virtually
identical members of sets. While we usually think of the numbering of things as something
modern, associated with increasing bureaucratization and standardization, it is really
something that has been around for centuries. The first person in the ancient Near East who
gave instructions along the lines of "insert Tab A into Slot B,"1 and indeed the first person
who thought up writing and numerals as ways of symbolizing sound and number, were
creating systems of signification using the same principles as assigning vehicle identification
1 See Michael Patrick O'Connor, "The alphabet as a technology," in The world's writing systems, edited
by Peter T. Daniels and William Bright (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 791.
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numbers or zip codes. Just as we do today, they came up with labels to identify the different
elements of a preexisting contrast set.2
To appreciate the centrality of labeling to daily life, think of what would happen if the
identification systems that we take for granted suddenly disappeared. For example, imagine
what the world would be like without page numbers. Although we would still be able to write
books, in indexes and citations we would have to refer people to particular pages by
describing the identity of that page. The first few entries of an index might read:
Aardvark, picture of
about halfway through the book in the upper right-hand corner
Abacus
 discussed two pages before the aardvark picture
Acrobats, training of
 near the end of the first chapter starting on the bottom of the page
 with the line drawings
Indeed, this is exactly what at least used to happen on the island of Saipan in the
Northern Mariana Islands. "Up Navy Hill, left by the broken pump, the white house across
from the basketball court" is an example of how the local pizza deliveryman referred to
destinations on an island with no house numbers or street names. This type of identification
worked just fine when Saipan had only a few hundred people. By 1999, when it had 70,000
residents, addresses on Saipan had become a public issue, especially because the
development of an addressing plan had been stalled for more than ten years.3
Or consider what would happen if none of the multiple, nearly identical-looking
checkin desks, boarding gates, and baggage carousels at a large airport were identified with
names and numbers. Knowing (and mostly likely forgetting soon after) that you must check
in at counters 35-38, proceed to gate D13, and retrieve your baggage from carousel B is
essential to a successful trip.4 Imagine if none of these labels were posted, forcing travelers to
ask the airport staff to point to their check-in counter, gate, and baggage carousel. 
2 A similar point is made by Alessandro Duranti in Linguistic anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), p. 33.
3 Seth Faison, "Saipan journal: palm trees and sun (and who needs an address?)" New York Times, 22
February 1999, p. A4.
4 See Nirmal Kishnani, "Evaluation of the wayfinding system at Stansted Airport," in Visual
information for everyday use: design and research perspectives, edited by Harm J. G. Zwaga, Theo
Boersema, and Henriëtte C. M. Hoonhout, pp. 257-265 (London: Taylor and Francis, 1999).
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It is not always worth giving a formal label to every member of a contrast set. Not all
deliberately designed contrast sets are labeled, and a lack of labels does not necessarily
render a contrast set unusuable. For example, yellow or white lines often mark off one
parking space from the next in a garage, creating clearly different entities, but whether to
number or label the spaces is a separate choice. Sometimes we do and sometimes we do not.
In small parking lots, it is usually enough to remember that one parked "a few spaces from
the left in the row by the tree," but those of us who have lost our car in a large parking lot
know that sometimes it would be nice to be able to know that we parked in, say, space A-150.
The issue is ease of reference.
We start to label contrast sets when
the bother of labeling becomes less
than the bother of getting one
contrast set member confused with
the next. A label is like a handle: it
gives us something simple, concise,
and graspable to metaphorically hold
onto when we are thinking about a
particular member of a contrast set. It offers a sure and easy strategy for telling the members
of a contrast set apart and being able to say which is which — for example, which floor of an
eighty-floor skyscraper we are on (or were on, or will be on), or which of a flock of ducks
migrates to a particular place in the winter (with the help of the green identification bands in
Image 3.1). And labels are at least designed to be shared by an entire community of thinkers,
such as office workers or wildlife researchers. The fact that people have died unnecessarily
when ambulance crews have been unable to figure out where to find them,5 and that the main
impetus for creating house numbers in a community sometimes comes from the fire
5 Romedi Passini, Wayfinding in architecture (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1984), p. 21.
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department,6 shows how important it is to agree on a common way to label the environment
we live in.
In any given society, one can trace the
historical circumstances that led to the creation,
popularization, or demise of various labeling
systems. As long as peoples' own "instinctive"
sense of the identities within a set of things
suffices,7 formal labels need not be introduced. In
a small and homogenous society people expect others to know where things are, so that in
2003 in Reykjavík many entertainment advertisements in the newspaper neglected to list the
street address of the venue (Image 3.2 shows an example), while New Zealanders still did not
use postal codes on their mail. The title of the Saipan article mentioned above shows that
those of us who have gotten used to such labeling systems find it shocking that some others
live happily without them.
Labels become worthwhile when informal knowledge systems break down or no
longer suffice. This can happen when a domain grows too large and complex for a single
person to be able to maintain a sufficiently detailed subjective image of it. The Saipan
example shows that such labeling tools often arise at points where societies are moving from
village-style organization to a more anonymous life where people expect to be able to conduct
impersonal encounters according to shared rules. Informal knowledge systems can also cease
to suffice when there is a change in the average level of familiarity with a contrast set in a way
that becomes problematic for all concerned — for example, if tourism brings a wave of
visitors into town who, disoriented and guideless, are trying to find the lodgings that they
have booked. (Similarly, you may know that you need to swivel your kitchen faucet left for
6 See, for example, Brewster Fire & Rescue, "Can we find you?"
http://www.town.brewster.ma.us/brewfire/can_we_find_you.htm (January 2005). This is also true in
New Zealand, where in March 2003 a resident along a rural road near Moetapu Bay in the
Marlborough Sounds region explained to me how house numbers had only been put up when the local
fire department insisted.
7 I am still searching for studies which discuss how people remember the identity of different contrast
set members (say, streets) without a labeling system.
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hot water and right for cold, but your guests may not.) The introduction of centralized
systems of taxation or conscription, in which those managing the system have no contact
with those who it enumerates, has sometimes been a reason for the introduction of formal
labels (for example, house-numbering in the Austro-Hungarian empire8). Overall, the more
people live in diverse and populous communities, the more they interact with people they
neither know nor see regularly, and the more that information is processed with procedures
(whether electronic or human) that cannot match the richness-of-field of normal human
attention, the more we need formal label systems and other types of institutionalized
coordination to be able to operate in the world. 
The following quote (from a historical novel about the village of Nuoro in Sardinia)
shows that people raised under a system where informal knowledge sufficed can feel quite
troubled by the introduction of labels: 
They have given names to the streets. These are written in blue on white ceramic plaques with
a thin blue line around the edge … I am sure that Don Priamo would have disapproved of them.
"What do you need plaques for," he would have told the council in memorable words, "when
everyone knows where they have to go?"9
When a labeling system is introduced, not everyone will necessarily use it. There are
plenty of cities in the world where street names and house numbers officially exist, but are
rarely used, and where city maps are rarely sold. The following quote from a travel writer
points to cultural differences in label usage between different groups of residents in
Ashgabat, Turkmenistan:
… the Turkmens were a nomadic, tribal people, who still wore traditional costumes and didn't
know the names of streets, perhaps because knowing street names requires an abstract and
impersonal knowledge that is not based on habit. The people I met who knew one street from
another were usually Russian hotel clerks, Armenian cab drivers, Azeri merchants, and so on
— the urbanized foreigners.10
8 Anton Tantner, "Galerie der Hausnummern,"
http://homepage.univie.ac.at/anton.tantner/hausnummern/index.html (January 2005).
9 Salvatore Satta, The day of judgment (London: Harvill, 1987), p. 89.
10 Robert D. Kaplan, Eastward to Tartary (New York: Vintage, 2001), p. 298. We know what he means
by saying that "knowing street names requires an abstract and impersonal knowledge that is not based
on habit" but it would be more accurate to say that knowing street names permits coordination
between people who do not share common experiences. And it is not only the urbanized foreigners who
"know one street from another," i.e., who can perceive the contrast set; Turkmens surely know one
street from another too. What the urbanized foreigners know is the labeling system; here Kaplan is
confusing contrast with labeling.
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Labeling systems, once developed, may also be destroyed. In 1993 in Tirana, Albania,
two years after a fairly destructive revolution, my experience of trying to take public
transport was that nothing was labeled. Pre-revolution regularities had been swept away.
One had to know by experience, or ask somebody, where buses stopped and where they were
going.
3.1 Defining labels
When a contrast set is used to identify and refer to the members of another contrast
set, I call it a label set and its members labels. The relationship between label sets and
contrast sets is an instance of the most fundamental semiotic relationship, that between the
signifier and the signified.11 A signifier that refers to a concept is not properly a label, in my
terms, unless it is part of a label set. Letters, numerals, and colors are the most commonly
used material for label sets. 
While all sorts of signifiers can be grouped into sets, I focus on those label sets which
were consciously designed, and whose passage through the workshop can be traced, not
those (such as many proper names, not to mention the lexicon) which arose in an emergent
fashion without conscious and deliberate planning. Also, just as with contrast sets, my
primary interest is in those labels which were designed as a set and are maintained as such,
and not in those human-designed signifiers which incidentally came to form a set without
conscious design, like trademarks or the names of major car makes. Note that I do include in
my scope those consciously designed label sets (such as identification numbers) which are
applied to naturally distinct contrast sets (such as people or animals). In such cases the role
of the workshop is to attach labels to each of the naturally distinct entities in a preexisting
collective domain.
These definitions restrict my focus in this book to a particular kind of signification.
One could, if one wished, use the word "label" to refer to any signifier that is attached to any
signified, including all of the lexicon. For example, we could say that we "label" actions with
11 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in general linguistics (London: Duckworth, 1983 [1916]), pp. [97]-
[99].
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words like "to run," prepositional relations with words like "under," people with proper
names, and telephone lines with telephone numbers. But my focus in this book is on cases
which are like the last of these examples (the case of telephone numbers). I do not hesitate to
use signifiers outside this restricted focus to illustrate a point, taking advantage of their
similarities to labels. But (unless otherwise indicated) I reserve the noun "label," and usually
the verb as well, to refer to the limited circle of signifiers that includes numerals, letters,
colors, symbols, Braille dots, and the like, rather than words or names which contrast
primarily in the domain of spoken language. Occasionally, for variety, I will substitute for the
term "label" an alternative, basically synonymous term, such as tag, code, identifier, or ID.
Some peoples' first reaction to the subject of labels is to try to trivialize them by
saying that labels have only an auxiliary role in society, and that letters, numerals, and the
other things that labels consist of are purely conventional signs that probably never existed
before a few thousand years ago (whereas language and naming are much older and deeper
phenomena). This is surely accurate, but it does not make labels trivial. Labels are ubiquitous
in society, and regardless of the historical or evolutionary shallowness of letters and numbers
as a phenomenon, mastering the instrumental uses they are put to is essential to
participating in social life. Finding shared ways to label things is one of the means by which it
becomes possible to communicate with other people. Numbers, letters, colors, and other
types of labeling, just like words and names, contribute to peoples' ability to create in others'
minds the same understandings that occur in their own.12 They involve a grand act of social
coordination. They depend on a compact between their everyday users, the people who came
up with them, and, in cases like street names, those who are officially responsible for
displaying them. 
Aside from their ubiquity and essentialness, labels are also interesting because they
are an explicitly planned form of symbolic communication. The labels for (say) the set of
wings of a building are truly human-authored place names — deliberately and consciously
12 See George Herbert Mead, Mind, self, and society: from the standpoint of a social behaviorist
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 47.
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designed by designers who we can identify. They can easily be changed and indeed often are
changed. (The names of mountains, rivers, cities and towns are frequently so ancient that we
do not know who chose them or why, and changing such names is always difficult and often
unthinkable.) From the point of view of the study of language and communication, one of the
interesting things about labels is to see what sort of symbolic communication emerges when
it is possible to systematically and deliberately design and plan it. The distinction between
emergent and planned coordination is discussed in more detail in section 5.1.
Labels are not spoken words. This is yet another difference between labels and other
signifiers like personal names, place names, and the words in the lexicon. Names — even
those deliberately created to label the members of a contrast set, such as {white, black, Asian,
Hispanic, Native American} — remain fundamentally spoken words, which may or may not
have a written existence. Labels are "basically written but may be pronounced," whereas
words and names are "basically spoken but may be noted down."13 Though labels can often be
read off, they usually do not have their own "pronunciation," and reading them off usually
means simply reciting the names of their component symbols. They are most commonly a
visible rather than an audible form of signification.
Accordingly, while the controversial aspect of words and names is usually how they
should be written down — that is, transformed from spoken to visual symbols according to
an accepted orthography — the opposite issue of translating visual contrast into auditory
contrast is more likely to become a problem with labels. Thus the alpha-bravo system of
letter spelling, and the "S as in Sam" formula used by airline reservationists to distinguish S
and F or M and N in giving customers booking reference numbers (like "QXRS8F") over the
phone, fulfill the function of coping verbally with a signification system designed to be
visually distinctive. Since there are too many characters in written Chinese to have a name
for each one and since some spoken Chinese syllables are labeled by several different
characters, Chinese cope with the same problem by using the "x-y de y" formula which
13 These terms come from Fred W. Householder, Linguistic speculations (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1971), p. 250.
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defines character y by citing a context (x-y) in which it commonly appears and which the
person at the other end of the line can be expected to know.14 We face a similar problem with
Internet domain names. Those domain names which are obviously the written form of words
or proper names can easily be spoken, but those which are definitely not words have to be
read off, and reading off such labels is not always conducive to preserving the visual
distinctiveness that is essential to their referential function. Consider, for example, the pause
that Minnesota Public Radio announcers have to put into the recitation of their web site
address (mpr.org) to underscore that its m is real, not just an n (as in npr.org) that has
assimilated to a following p.
The scholarly literature on onomastics, or the study of names, reflects the distinction
between labels and names by basically ignoring labels as a field of investigation. A recent,
comprehensive, three-volume encyclopedia of naming research includes nothing on labels
except for one article on street names. It gives no direct theoretical or descriptive treatment
of numbering systems or other similar identification systems.15 Similarly, a recent general
introduction to onomastics, daring and progressive in many respects, goes no further afield
from the canon than a consideration of streetnames and a discussion of the reuse of personal
names to label commercial goods styles (such as the labels for lines of furniture used by
IKEA).16 Even when a class of things are commonly labeled as well as named, it usually does
not catch onomasts' attention: thus a recent onomastics collection of some quality contains
an article on the naming of houses and another on the naming of vehicles and airplanes,
14 The syllable de in Mandarin Chinese is a genitive suffix, so that x-y de y literally means x-y's y and
can be more loosely translated "y as in x-y," just as we use "S as in Sam" in English. For those
unfamiliar with Chinese spelling communication methods, let me give an example. My university
roommate in Beijing in 1992, a native of the city, had the relatively unusual last name of Mĭn, which is
represented by the character 闵. He often had to communicate or "spell" this character over the phone
to people unfamiliar with it. The character is formed from two common radicals: 门, which in isolation
stands for the syllable mén, and 文, which stands for the syllable wén. He would start off "spelling" his
name by saying yìge mén, yìge wén ("a mén and a wén"). If this did not work, he would use the x-y de
y system, defining mén as kāimén de mén; kāimén is a common word meaning "to open" which the
person at the other end of the line could be expected to know how to spell. His saying kāimén de mén
was like an English speaker saying "o as in open."
15 Ernst Eichler et al., ed., Namenforschung: ein internationales Handbuch zur Onomastik (3 vols.,
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1995-1996).
16 Gerhard Koss, Namenforschung: eine Einführung in die Onomastik (Germanistische Arbeitshefte,
no. 34; Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1990), pp. 89-96, 101-106.
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neither of which appears to even mention the everyday phenomenon of numbering these
same entities.17 In general, onomastics rarely discusses the process of creating or designing
names, tending rather to focus on names which were created far back in time (especially
town names, river names, and mountain names), and individually instead of as part of a set.
Street names have both label and name-like features and do show up in the onomastics
literature now and then, but scholars of geographic names consider them peripheral and
usually omit them in placename studies.18 (Among the label-like features of street names are
that they are more human-authored than other placenames, do not always consist of words,
and refer to bounded, limited, and somewhat artificial contrast sets.)
Linguistics and semiotics also has surprisingly little to say about labels. Semiotic
theory is important for understanding labels, but semioticians typically study more complex
and opaque systems of signification, although a few contributions to what I would call a
theory of labels are referenced under the heading of "code" in Winfried Nöth's massive
encyclopedia of semiotics.19 (They deal, however, with different themes than does this
chapter.) In linguistics proper, where the study of writing systems is considered marginal, it
is no surprise that labels are never discussed directly. The typical linguist's attitude towards
written phenomena has been summed up as that "language is basically speech and writing is
of no theoretical interest,"20 and Leonard Bloomfield famously remarked that writing was
"merely a way of recording language by means of visible marks."21 Although, as Einar Haugen
puts it, "the aggressively pejorative form of this statement is understandable in the light of
Bloomfield's didactic purpose,"22 such negativity has an effect. If the alphabet is of no
theoretical interest, surely its use as a labeling tool is utterly trivial.
17 Ritva Liisa Pitkänen and Kaija Mallat, ed., You name it: perspectives on onomastic research
(Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 1997).
18 See Fred Tarpley, "Street names as signposts of world cultures," in Namenforschung: ein
internationales Handbuch zur Onomastik, edited by Ernst Eichler et al., pp. 1481-1499 (3 vols., Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter, 1995-1996), p. 1482.
19 Winfried Nöth, Handbook of semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), pp. 206-220,
esp. 217-220.
20 Fred W. Householder, review of Language and its structure by Ronald Langacker, Language 45
(1969): 886-897, p. 886.
21 Leonard Bloomfield, Language (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1935 [1933]), p. 21.
22 Haugen, "Linguistics and language planning," p. 163.
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There is an existing literature on labels, but it is much more dispersed than that on
contrast sets. References to labeling are scattered through the literature on computer
science, database management, graphic design, wayfinding, social anthropology, cognitive
psychology, measurement, information theory, mathematics, and the history of technology,
and on the various concrete contexts in which labels are used (such as musical notation and
subway design). Very often, discussions of labeling are conflated with discussions of
partitioning and the creation of contrast sets. Contrast sets and labels also surface as
occasional preoccupations in fiction, for example in the work of Jorge Luis Borges.23
But no scholar, as far as I can tell, has directly discussed the particular intersection of
mundane, everyday phenomena that I treat in this chapter. The closest approaches to a
discussion of labels as I define them have perhaps been by Michael Patrick O'Connor and
Thomas Crump, who have discussed the way that the alphabet and the numerals respectively
have been put to use to label other sets of things.24 In a footnote, Crump comes close to my
definition of labels, mentioning the use of "ordinal numbers in cultures which require the
specific identification of the different members of certain recognized classes, which may vary
from the days in a year, through the inhabitants of a city, the pages of a book [sic] to the
postal districts in a given country."25
Another relatively close approach is in the theory of database design in computer
science, which puts forth what amounts to a fairly comprehensive model of the process of
creating and labeling contrast sets. Both of the two classic models of database design — the
relational model and the entity-relationship model — are explicitly designed to link contrast
set members (or instantations of domains) to one another.26 The two models have slightly
23 Two Borges stories with particular contrast set preoccupations are "A survey of the works of Herbert
Quain" (pp. 107-111) and "The library of Babel" (pp. 112-118) in Jorge Luis Borges, Collected fictions
(New York: Viking Penguin, 1998).
24 M. O'Connor, "The alphabet as a technology," in The world's writing systems (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996), p. 791; Thomas Crump, The anthropology of numbers (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990), pp. 38-39.
25 Crump, The anthropology of numbers, p. 39n.
26 See Thomas Connolly and Carolyn Begg, Database systems: a practical approach to design,
implementation, and management (3rd edition, Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education, 2002), pp. 72-79
(on the relational model), 331-339 (on the entity-relationship model). The two models derive from two
classic articles: E. F. Codd, "A relational model of data for large shared data banks," Communications
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different strengths and use slightly differing terminology. Both, however, generally involve
linkages between at least two different domains or sets of possible values, which one can
think of as occupying different columns in a database matrix. One of the domains of any
database (usually called the primary key) is generally more fundamental than the others, and
the instantiations from that domain are usually listed in the first column of the matrix; they
may be thought of as the "independent variable" or as the "source" contrast set which is then
labeled by the values in the other domains. For example, a database might contain the name,
address, and phone number of all the students at a university; the name of the student would
likely be the primary key, and their address and phone number the secondary attributes.
Each horizontal row in the database (what we popularly call a "record") contains one
instantiation of the primary-key database, plus the instantiations it is linked to in all the
other domains of the database: for example, one student's name, their address, and their
phone number. The data in a single such horizontal row is called a "tuple." Databases
organized according to the entity-relationship model allow the user to encode further
"relationships" which specify the different domains or columns which fill slots in a particular
action or interaction. For example, a phone call from a customer might constitute a
relationship linking a customer number, a phone representative's name, the date and time of
the call, and the customer's order number. These relationships are roughly equivalent to the
scripts, scenarios, image schemas and action schemas postulated by cognitive scientists and
discussed in section 2.11. 
3.2 Labeling tools and techniques
We label, in my sense of the term, when we use the members of a contrast set to tag
or identify the members of another contrast set. Normally, each label is linked, or set in
correspondence, with a member of the contrast set being tagged. Thus each duck in a flock
may be labeled with a code number that is printed on the band on their leg; one code number
is linked to one duck. Similarly, one can label subway lines with colors, North American radio
of the ACM 13, 6 (1970): 377-387; and Peter Pin-Shan Chen, "The entity-relationship model — toward a
unified view of data," ACM Transactions on Database Systems 1 (1976): 9-36.
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stations with call letters, parts of books with page or chapter numbers, or parking spaces
with painted numbers. These linkages may have to be learned individually (as in the case of
subway lines and radio stations), or they may be predictable according to a rule (as with page
numbers, which rise as one gets towards the end of a book). 
The relationship between contrast sets and label sets has certain special features not
shared by all signifier-signified relationships. Prominent among these features is the fact that
it involves a linkage not just between one signified and one signifier, but from a set of
signifieds to a set of signifiers. The relation between the word "desk" and the piece of
furniture behind which I sit is a signified-signifier relationship, but neither the word "desk"
nor my desk are members of any well-delineated contrast set. In contrast, the label "24" for a
bus route and the actual route itself are members of the contrast sets of bus route numbers
and routes respectively, and their relation is thus not only one of signification but also of
labeling. Musicians use the label set {A, A flat, B …} to identify the members of the contrast
set of standardized musical pitches. Cartographers use label sets of visually contrasting
symbols to label different types of roadways (highways, through roads, regular streets,
pedestrian zones) or different features on a city map (hospitals, train stations, hotels,
museums). The International Organization for Standardization's ISO 3166 standard is a set
of agreed-upon numeric and alphabetic labels for the contrast set of countries and political
units that partition the landmass of the world. The elements of a writing system, such as the
individual letters of the English alphabet, the symbols used in linguists' International
Phonetic Alphabet, or the syllabic signs in Japanese, are label sets which are mapped to
contrast sets in the domain of speech sounds — or at least were so mapped at some point.27
Since label sets are basically contrast sets which have been specially designed or
adapted for the purpose of tagging other contrast sets — so that labeling is a function that
27 The elements of a writing system may over time lose their precise linkage to the contrast set they once
straightforwardly labeled, as they have in English, where the relation between sound and spelling is not
always direct. The labels used in writing systems thus retain a certain degree of utility even when they
stop functioning as "true" labels and lose their clear one-to-one linkage to the contrast set. The
tendency for these links to lose clarity over time does not, in my view, mean that writing systems are
any poorer an example of labeling.
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certain contrast sets take on, not something embedded in the nature of the set — it is
perfectly possible to attach labels to labels. The letters of the alphabet are labels, but they
may themselves be labeled by letter-names (ay, bee, see, etc.) or by a transliteration scheme
(say, a set of rules for mapping Cyrillic words into Roman script). Indeed, the crucial
difference between transliteration and transcription is that in transliteration, labels label
other labels, while in transcription, labels label contrast sets formed out of the domain of
spoken sounds.28 (The difference between ciphers and codes can be described in a somewhat
parallel way.) Indeed, in theory, any two contrast sets can be linked so that the members of
one correspond to the members of another. (It can sometimes even be a little unclear which
set is taking the "labeler" role and which set the "labeled" role.)
At the risk of introducing unnecessary complexity, it is worth mentioning briefly that
the instantiations of a domain, or indeed the entire infinite continuum of a domain, can also
take on a signifying role. For example, a mood ring purports to show how you feel by
displaying one point out of a smooth continuum of colors. Although I focus primarily in this
chapter on linkages using contrast sets as tools, I will not hesitate to mention certain
examples of domains as signifying tools as well.
Not all contrast sets are equally well suited to the labeling role and to serving as the
"matter"29 that actually carries out the act of signification. The most common visual material
out of which we make labels are the elements of our writing system (letters and numerals).
The alphabet and the numerals were originally developed as a tool for tagging sound and
numerosity. By giving these graphic contrast sets a broader labeling role, we are using the
alphabet and the numerals "as a technology"30 instead of for their original purpose of
representing language and number.
While letters and numerals are pretty much equally capable of serving as labels,
numerals are perhaps a more canonical way of distinguishing things than are alphabetic
28 Hans H. Wellisch, The conversion of scripts, its nature, history, and utilization (New York: Wiley,
1978), pp. 23-36.
29 The term "matter" comes from Roland Barthes, Elements of semiology (New York: Hill and Wang,
1968), p. 34.
30 O'Connor, "The alphabet as a technology."
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symbols. This is evident from the fact that we often refer to "numbering systems" but rarely
to "lettering systems," and from the frequent slip of the tongue whereby people refer to
something as (for example) "number A." (Of course, we often combine letters and numbers
— paper size "A4", for example — as part of multi-level taxonomic labeling strategies.)
Numerals as labels
It is worth going into detail for a
moment about the way numerals have
come to be used as labels. Numerals are
one of the most fundamental labeling
tools that we have. Scholars of numbers
suggest that what the outside world
delivers to the workshop is nothing more
than the raw idea of number or
numerosity — the fundamental
distinction between singleness, twoness,
threeness, and so on as far up in the set of
positive integers as we can manage.31 The
collection of these different sizes of
groups forms a contrast set ("oneness,
twoness, threeness and other integral amounts"). This contrast set is is slightly mind-
boggling in its fundamentalness. Try to think of it without thinking of its graphic and
linguistic labels such as 3 and "three" (fighting the fact that, as Thomas Crump says, "one's
intuition revolts against the idea"32). 
To this contrast set we applied another set, one which we had constructed ourselves
instead of taken from the natural world: namely, the set of graphic forms starting with {1, 2,
31 On the set of integers see Bertrand Russell, Introduction to mathematical philosophy (London:
George, Allen & Unwin, 1919), pp. 1-19. Also see Crump, The anthropology of numbers, pp. 6-11.
32 Crump, The anthropology of numbers, p. 32.
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3 …}. We set these contrast sets into relationship with one another, so that 1 corresponded to
the idea of oneness, 2 to twoness, and so forth. It is this relationship which transformed
those ten graphic forms from simply a contrast set of focal points in the domain of graphic
form into labels which we call numerals. We must not forget to acknowledge that an
important part of this labeling convention was the choice of a conventional cyclical stopping
point, or base, within the contrast set of integers.33 We use 10 today, but could have used 12,
or any other amount that would limit the number of labels we need to a reasonable and
convenient amount. Along with a base, we also came up with a label for zero. 
These tools — a base, a limited set of numeral labels, and the label for zero combined
with the invention of the place-notation system — allowed us to develop a label set which can
be linked not just to the first few integers {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} but rather as many as we
choose: {10, 11, 12 …}. This set of composite numerals is formed by combinations of the set of
single numerals, but it is a distinct set of its own. Like the integers it corresponds to, it is an
unbounded, potentially infinite set, which makes it particularly suitable as a label set for
contrast sets with an uncertain number of members. It is this set of numeric labels which we
most often use to label all sorts of other contrast sets besides the integers: for example, the
years since 1 A.D., the set of people boarding a plane (say, in the order that they received
their boarding pass), the set of countries in the world (according to their ISO 3166 number),
the houses on my street, or the different types of rolls and pastries in Image 3.3. (Note that
the idea of using spoken words for larger numbers, such as "eleven" or "seventy-three," is not
necessarily of any greater antiquity than the idea of using visual symbols, such as 11 and 73;
in fact, some scholars believe that visual representations of number antedate aural
representations.34)
There is, therefore, quite a bit inside the "black box" of the process that we use when
we label things by number. When we number the people who are boarding a plane, using
33 On the idea of base see Georges Ifrah, The universal history of numbers: from prehistory to the
invention of the computer (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2000), pp. 23-46; Crump, The
anthropology of numbers, pp. 33-46; James R. Hurford, Language and number: the emergence of a
cognitive system (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987).
34 Crump, The anthropology of numbers, p. 41.
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numeric labels to identify the contrast set of passengers, not only are the numeric labels
themselves a contrast set which is taking on a labeling role: this contrast set was originally
developed as a set of labels for yet another contrast set (the class of positive integers), by
forming it according to the combining principles of the base and place-notation system from
another contrast set in the domain of graphic form (the ten numerals from 1 through 9 plus
0). The ten numerals, in turn, function independently as labels for the set of integers from
zero to one less than the conventional base.
Color and other labeling sets
Color is also an effective labeling technology,
especially when we use it to tag the members of relatively
small contrast sets. Thus color is a main distinguishing
feature of traffic lights, customs lanes at airports (red if you
have something to declare, green if you don't), different paths
or tracks in museums and parks (group visitors to Plitvice park in Croatia follow the grey
square), harp strings (Cs are red, Fs black, and all other strings are white), temporary
subgroupings within a class at school (for example, the Red Team and the Blue Team in a
game), the different lines of a transport system, the different floors of a building,35 different
sports teams, different political groups, and the different categories (of, say, elevation or
mean annual temperature) shown on maps. When Soviet Russia instituted a five-day week
from 1929 to 1931, each of the days was color-coded, workers' days off were staggered, and
people were encouraged to have visiting cards printed in the color of their day off so that it
would be easy to see who one shared one's free time with.36 The convenience of color as a
35 For design advice on color coding and wayfinding in architectural settings see Paul Arthur and
Romedi Passini, Wayfinding: people, signs and architecture (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992), pp. 16,
177-178; Spencer and Reynolds, Directional signing and labeling in libraries and museums, pp. 40-
42.
36 Leo Gruliow, "Significant Russian approval," Journal of calendar reform, September 1953, p. 104n.
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labeling system for small sets is responsible for the popularity of keys whose shape allows
them to be outfitted with a colored plastic jacket, as in Image 3.4.37
While color can be a very attractive labeling tool, it
also has distinct disadvantages. It is technically more
challenging to render the distinction between colors than
numerals or letterforms, although in recent years the greatly
reduced costs of color printing have made it less of an
extravagance to use color as a label.38 Another disadvantage
is the surprisingly large number of people (men especially)
who are "color blind," or, to be more accurate, who have
variant color vision abilities.39 Since not everyone perceives color in exactly the same way,
color labels need to be supplemented with other labeling devices (which is why not just the
color but also the position of traffic lights is standardized, and why many multi-line public
transport systems, such as the Copenhagen suburban train system in Image 3.5, use line
letters, numbers, or names in addition to color). Another limitation is that humans do not
easily perceive and remember fine distinctions in the domain of color, and can thus use only
a relatively small number of color labels at a time. It would not be very useful, at least not for
identification purposes, to label a set of a hundred classrooms with a hundred different
colors, and unlike the case of numerals, we do not have a system of recombining the elements
of a small contrast set of colors to create a larger set of distinctions.
Beyond letters, numbers, and colors, there are many other visual ways to
conventionally symbolize discrete distinctions between the members of a contrast set. For
37 On the classification of keys see Christena E. Nippert-Eng, Home and work: negotiating boundaries
through everyday life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 48-50.
38 Paul Mijksenaar, "Maps as public graphics: about science and craft, curiosity and passion," in Visual
information for everyday use: design and research perspectives, edited by Harm J. G. Zwaga, Theo
Boersema, and Henriëtte C. M. Hoonhout, pp. 211-223 (London: Taylor and Francis, 1999), pp. 214-
215; Mark Monmonier, How to lie with maps (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 147.
39 An excellent introduction to color blindness is chapter 10 ("Color vision variations," pp. 411-484) in
Peter K. Kaiser and Robert M. Boynton, Human color vision (2nd ed., Washington: Optical Society of
America, 1996). On color as a labeling device, see also Edward Tufte, Envisioning information
(Cheshire, Conn.: Graphics Press, 1990), chapter 5 ("Color and information," pp. 81-95).
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example, maps use differences in line width and color to symbolize different categories of
roadways, military symbols set off the army from the navy and privates from sergeants and
generals, and weather symbols (smiling sunny faces, clouds with drops, and so forth) tell us
what things will be like outdoors (there is more discussion of these "graphical variables" in
section 4.3). Differences in pavement color or composition distinguish the street from the
sidewalk, bicycle lanes from pedestrian lanes, and public from private space.
Practically any contrasting set of shapes can be used as visual labels. Think, for
example, of the vast variety of symbols used to distinguish the mens' and womens' rooms, or
of the standardized label sets used in highway and urban signage, or the somewhat more
open-ended set used in train stations, airports, and so on. Parking garages often use animal
signs or other contrasting shapes to label different levels or areas in the lot. At least through
2000, public buses in Warsaw (Poland) required that passengers punch their ticket in a small
device on board; the punch pins in every bus were set to create a slightly different pattern, so
that inspectors could be sure from the punch pattern that you had not punched your ticket
hours before in another bus. 
Nonvisual labels exist too. Standardized tactile and audible contrast sets (Braille and
Morse code) can be used to label the same set of distinctions as the graphic elements of our
writing system. Or consider distinctive telephone ringing signals (of the type where each
person in an office is assigned a different ring). A hotel I know in Kraków, Poland uses a
room card key system where if you have correctly inserted the key, you are rewarded both
visually and audibly with green flashes and a pleasant peeping sound; if not, you get a steady
red light and a subtle alarm-like tone. However, since we do not share contrast sets of of
sound, taste, or smell in as precisely coordinated a way as we do visual and spatial contrast
sets, the usefulness of nonvisual contrasts (with the notable exception of spoken words) as
labels is somewhat limited.
The key, of course, is that the elements of a set must really contrast to be used as
effective labels. As the tour guide's critique of the parking lot's animal-label navigation
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system showed (in section 2.10), poorly differentiated label sets whose elements are difficult
to distinguish and remember are always unwelcome.
3.3 Communicating the context of a label
In order for a label to be understood, not only must the label be communicated but
the nature of the set it refers to must also be made clear. This is particularly important
because the same label set may be reused over and over, in different contexts, to label
different contrast sets. This context-dependence highlights how the use of labels requires
common agreement not only on the meaning of the label but also on the context and framing
of the discourse.
If a label set is linked to multiple contrast sets, the same element of the label set may
have multiple meanings in these multiple contrast sets, despite functioning as a unique
identifier relative to each individual contrast set. Such labels are "multivalent" (the term
proceeds from the idea that a label indicates a particular "value" within the contrast set to
which it is mapped).40 Examples of this contextual dependence abound. For example, "CO"
means Continental Airlines in the airline labeling world, Colombia in the world of ISO-3166
country codes and Internet domains, Colorado in the world of American postal zip codes,
and undoubtedly many other things in many other different contexts. It is useless to refer to
a musical composition as number 100 unless you know you are talking about "opus,"
"Köchel," or "BWV" numbers. Similarly, it is not very helpful to tell someone to call phone
40 My use of the term "multivalence" comes from the use of the term "bivalence" to describe the way
that some graphic symbols in the Roman alphabet also occur (often mapped to a different sound) in
the Cyrillic alphabet; see Laurie Beth Feldman and Dragana Barac-Cikoja, "Serbo-Croatian: a biscriptal
language," in The world's writing systems, edited by Peter T. Daniels and William Bright, pp. 769-772
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). This is a slightly different phenomenon than the one
discussed in the text, involving the same graphic form having value in different label sets, rather than
the same label set having value when applied to different contrast sets. For example, "CAMOBAP" is an
example of a sequence of symbols which, since it has at least potential value in both Cyrillic and
Roman, gives no formal clue to its proper interpretation; if you know it is Cyrillic you will read it off as
samovar. Students of Russian are all familiar with the lame joke about going out for a bite to eat at the
pektopa (as one would pronounce the Russian word РЕСТОРАН, meaning restaurant and pronounced
restoran, if it was written in Roman instead of Cyrillic). In the pre-Unicode era, the designer of the
now-defunct Web site of the Estonian ferry company Estline (www.estline.ee) took advantage of this
bivalence by using the word Pyckuu, coded in the Roman alphabet but readable as Ruskii in Cyrillic, to
indicate the link to the Russian-language version of a site, thus not having to worry about whether the
reader had Cyrillic installed on their computer.
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number 987-6543 unless the geographical location of the number is clear to both people
involved. The same sequence in the Roman alphabet can take on quite a different meaning if
one knows it is in Finnish or Malay instead of English. The Thai writing system helpfully
indicates the tone of each syllable using a set of four diacritical marks, but (unlike the Pinyin
system for Mandarin Chinese) the linkage between tone mark and tone is not direct; there
are several different types of syllables in Thai, and the same tone mark denotes entirely
different tones in the context of different types of syllables. 
In fact, a label set is often assigned to a contrast set for a temporary purpose, so that
the mapping between the label set and contrast set may be forgotten directly afterwards. For
example, in putting together the American "Stor-All" brand of cardboard storage boxes one
must learn to follow the manufacturer's identification of four different flaps as A, B, C, and D.
However, we are free to forget the connection between these tags and their referents as soon
as we finish putting the box together, and we may re-use these letters in a completely
different label system an hour later. It seems that labels are more often used in this way than
words and names, whose referents we usually at least try to keep stable.
It is quite common for a label to have different meanings at different levels of a
taxonomy — for example, in telephone numbering or the hierarchy of year, month, and date.
The different levels of the taxonomy "count" as different contexts for a label set. Thus if (as
Europeans commonly do) we cite dates in the day-month-year format where January 10,
2000 becomes 10.01.00, the label "05" in this system could mean May, the 5th day of the
month, or 2005, depending on where it appeared in the hierarchy. Unless the sequence of
contrast sets being referred to is made clear in series of this sort, they cannot be properly
interpreted. If someone tells me that my credit card expires on "05-06," I cannot tell you
whether that means May 2006 or June 2005 unless I know which label refers to the month
and which to the date.
From the design point of view, multivalence, context-dependence, and the reusability
of labels simply means that label designers need to make sure users know what contrast set
(or level of a label taxonomy) the label is referring to. One must know not only what element
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of a contrast set each labels refers to, but what contrast set is being labeled to being with. If
you see a big sign saying "2" at the airport, is it telling you something about baggage claim 2,
gate 2, terminal 2, level 2, or check-in counter 2? 
There are many ways to communicate this kind of context, but they all involve coming
up with some sort of sign for the superordinate concept, the hyperonym of all the contrast set
members, or the contrast set as a whole. We can use the term superordinate sign for this
type of context designation (if several contrast sets together constitute the members of a
superordinate contrast set in a taxonomy, their superordinate signs together constitute a
superordinate label set). Computer scientists might think here of the very similar concept of
"data type." The consistent use of a superordinate sign conveys a clear message that all of the
labels so marked belong together as equal members of a set which passes the X and other Ys
test. 
In public settings such as train stations and airports, the typical design strategy is to
give all signs referring to the same contrast set a graphic identity which may involve the
typeface, color, layout, size, or placement of the signs. If there is space, a word such as
"Platform" also serves as a verbal superordinate sign. The result is that the look of labeling
signage varies from contrast set to contrast set. For example, the use of a consistent design
for train platform numbers helps confirm that a sign reading "1" is a platform number which
contrasts with other platform numbers such as "2a" and "13" (and not, say, a sign for ticket
window number 1). The use of standardized station name signs helps train passengers
understand that a sign reading, say, "Haarlem Spaarnwoude" is a station name which
contrasts with other station names like "Amsterdam Sloterdijk" (and is not, say, an
advertisement for a local savings bank). Distinctive signage for things like "WC" and "Exit"
helps one figure out that these are not the names of platforms or destination stations, but
rather help you find the bathroom or your way out of the building. On city streets, public
transport signs usually show by means of some sort of symbol whether the listed route
numbers are buses, trams, or something else; the signs themselves use a standard format and
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are regularly renovated, which provides assurance that a bus will actually come.41 Similarly,
conventions of placement encourage us to guess that the insignia on a policeman's sleeve or
above a military officer's breast pocket, even if we do not understand their precise meaning,
tell us something about their bearer's rank and experience.
In written language, we often conventionally create specific symbols to serve as
superordinate signs. When we write ₤10, €10, 10:00, 10% and 10°, the symbols ₤ € : % ° tell
us that we are dealing respectively with ten pounds, ten euros, ten o'clock, ten percent, and
ten degrees. Within the taxonomy of worldwide telephone numbers, we have a number of
strategies for indicating the particular contrast set that a number we cite belongs to: a "+"
indicates that what follows is a country code, a 0 in most countries with area codes (or a 1 in
North America) indicates that an area code follows, an "x" in America or a "-" in Europe
indicates an extension number within a building or company, and no prefix indicates the
default, usually a local number.
Quite often, however, no specific superordinate signs are given in a particular context
where contrast sets are being labeled. In these cases one relies on the user to bridge the
inferential gap. In some cases, a user's knowledge of the nature of the contrast set being
labeled, or of the constraints on the potential form of the labels for it, can help the user
pinpoint the contrast set that a particular label is referring to. If one knows that the sequence
of labels "30.01.99" refers to a date, simply knowing something about the nature of the
contrast sets being labeled helps you be sure that January 30th is the date in question, even if
you did not previously know that day-month-year order was being used. A label such as
"BLAHBLAH.EXE" is immediately recognizable by anyone who used IBM compatible
computers in the 1980s and 1990s by its capital letters, eight-letter filename, three-letter
extension, and separating dot. Regular users of American libraries know that "DK123.L45" is
likely to be a call number for a book. Compare, as well, the related way in which many
Northern European countries create and enforce official lists of accepted boys' and girls'
41 For examples, see Phil Baines and Catherine Dixon, Signs: lettering in the environment (London:
Lawrence King, 2003), pp. 75-79.
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names, which allows one to tell with considerable assurance both that one is dealing with a
given name, and whether its holder is male or female.
The context-dependence of labels can sometimes create considerable efficiencies, by
allowing us to signal only the terminal, contrasting portion of the label if its context is
indubitably clear. As Charles Frake put it: "Taxonomies make possible a regulation of the
amount of information communicated about an object in a given situation."42 For example, if
the country code and area code are already clear, you can cite your telephone number at
somewhat less length. I remember being puzzled as a child when, on a visit to friends of my
parents, the father of the family asked his son to make a telephone call and told him the
number, which was only four digits long (not seven); my parents explained to me that it was
a small town, and everyone in the town had the same first three digits of their phone number.
Similarly, not including the name of the country in the address of a letter I am sending
suggests that the letter will not be crossing national boundaries. Old family letters addressed
to my grandfather read simply "James Watson, 161 N. Cortez St., City." Although dropping
city, state, and zip code in this way is frowned upon in America today, you might doubt my
sanity if I included "Earth" as part of the address on a letter — not because it would be
strictly incorrect, but rather because it is a safely assumable and thus omittable context.
Assuming taxonomic context in the presentation of a label often contributes to the
readability of a label. Edward Tufte shows the dramatic difference in readability between a
schedule of frequent trains which assumes the hour number and a schedule which does not.43
However, the value of context-assumption in citing a series of page numbers (for example, by
writing 297-99 or 297-9 instead of 297-299) is more dubious, because the reader may not
have enough reason to feel secure in their assumption that context-assumption has taken
place (297-9 could also refer to item 9 on page 297).
In most cases the members of a label set are tied to the members of a contrast set in
an "absolute" way, which never varies and is not dependent on the user's current location in
42 Charles O. Frake, "The ethnographic study of cognitive systems," in Cognitive anthropology, edited
by Stephen A. Tyler (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1969 [1962]), p. 34.
43 Tufte, Envisioning information, pp. 47-48.
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that same contrast set. Thus "NY" refers to New York State within the domain of American
states regardless of whether you are in Albany, Alabama, Albania or Antarctica. But there are
other contrast sets whose members' absolute location can be calculated from a label only if
you know the user's location in that same contrast set. This is the phenomenon of deixis,
which was introduced briefly in discussing contrast set creation (see section 2.11 and the
references cited there). Thus "A flat (above middle C)" is an absolute label for a particular
standardized pitch, but the same pitch could also be called by the relative labels "mi" or "so"
(or alternatively, III or V) if we knew that the user was "located" in the reference key of E or
D flat respectively. Similarly, the dialing sequence that you follow to reach a telephone
number varies depend on your location, so that while a telephone number beginning with the
country code is an absolute label, a dialing sequence is effectively a relative label for that
same subscriber line. In a similar way, cartographers have a special word for placenames
used by people who live outside the place being referred to ("exonyms").44 Designers who
choose to use a label system involving egocentric, relative reference should do their best to
convey the location of the user or "ego" in the contrast set. Otherwise, there is no way to
interpret a relative reference; there is no way to know what "mi" or "so" refers unless you
know where "do" is at the moment.
Very often one can choose among several
different sets of label sets which can each be
mapped to the same contrast set. Thus Roman
numerals, Arabic numerals, and a myriad of other
congruent collections of ten signs are different
ways of rendering the contrast set that we can
also refer to with the words "zero" through
"nine."45 Similarly, it is equally possible to render
the discrete differences usually labeled by the
44 For references on the subject of exonyms, see C. R. Perkins, and R. B. Parry, ed., Information sources
in cartography (London: Bowker-Saur, 1990), pp. 399-400, 406-408.
45 For more examples of ways of rendering this set, see Ifrah, The universal history of numbers.
Image 3.6 (031)
§ 3.3 121
twenty-six letters of the English alphabet in Braille, typing, handwriting, uppercase,
lowercase, italics, Morse code, semaphore, finger-spelling, or any number of different
computer character codes.46 The contrast between the twelve standard notes of the Western
temperament system may be labeled with absolute note names such as A'' and C#' or relative
names such as do, re, mi or I, IV, V, with exact frequency numbers such as 415 Hz, by the
location of a dot on a standard musical staff, by marking one key on an image of a piano
keyboard, by Braille musical notation, by the contrast of different fingering charts for the
guitar, or by any of the various algorithms by which computers store music. Similarly, the
twelve months of the year may be labeled with names such as January, February, and March,
or with numbers like 1, 2, 3, through 12. In baseball scoring, there are at least five different
graphic labeling conventions for the contrast set {single, double, triple, home run}.47 Any pair
of label sets which can be mapped to the same contrast set will have a certain degree of
congruence and isomorphism; they may be alike in number, partitioning locations,
metaphoric topology, functional origin, or in the way they themselves are labeled. For
example, although Scandinavians number floors of residential buildings with Arabic
numerals while Hungarians use Roman numerals, the two strategies share the same
structure, topology, and functional origin, and they are read off in the same way (one, two,
three, and so on up).
 In certain cases, two label sets for the same contrast
set may be used simultaneously to fulfill different functions.
Thus the playing cards in Image 3.7 use two different
rendering styles for the same two contrast sets (card and
suit), allowing both blind and sighted people to play together.
Meanwhile, the tag from a frying pan at the IKEA housewares
chain in Image 3.6 labels the pan with a "frontstage" name (STEKA) that is easy for
46 For some example illustrations, see Otl Aicher and Martin Krampen, Zeichensysteme der visuellen
Kommunikation: Handbuch für Designer, Architekten, Planer, Organisatoren (Stuttgart: Alexander
Koch, 1977), p. 16.
47 Paul Dickson, The joy of keeping score: how scoring the game has influenced and enhanced the
history of baseball (New York: Walker, 1996), pp. 20-21.
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customers to remember, a bar code that is easy for cashiers to scan, and a less user-friendly
"backstage" numerical code (962.258.00), which clerks can presumably use to find the
product in their inventory database.
3.4 The art of label display
In order to recognize a member of a contrast set by its label, one must see that set
member associated with that label. In cases of primary socialization to very fundamental
labels like the alphabet and numerals, a teacher may actively drill the association into us by
making the sound [b] and explaining that it is represented by the letter b, or showing a
picture of three things and explaining that this quantity can be labeled by the word "three" or
the symbol 3. In everyday adult life, however, it is the art of label display which help us make
the connection between set member and label, and which gives us a handle for referring to
the sense of being somewhere and the feeling of "here-ness" associated with a particular
member of a contrast set.
What I am referring to is that fact that in everyday life, many contrast set members
"wear" a "nametag." A nametag is simply a label which appears on or in proximity to the
contrast set member, and says to the user "You are here, this is how 'here' is labeled, and if
you were somewhere else you would see a different nametag." Thus the "view" from aisle 5a
of the supermarket is different than that from aisle 6a, and the labels are conveniently in
your field of vision if you are in either of those two aisles and looking for a way of tagging the
view that you see. The number by the door of your house is a simple example of a nametag or
you-are-here mark, but that same number in your listing in the telephone book is not a
nametag because it is no longer physically associated with your house.
In order to understand the function of nametags, remember (from section 2.11) that
action schemas describe the relationship between a user and a slot that can be filled by any
member of a particular contrast set, that the user has a special relationship with the member
of a contrast set that is filling that slot at a particular time, and that the user's view or
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experience of the world varies slightly depending on which member of the contrast set that
is. By "view," I mean a set of impressions and sensory inputs which is specific to the
relationship with one member of a contrast set; the term "view" comes from the literature on
our experience of literally spatial domains.48 After all, as the spatial metaphor helps us see,
knowing which member of a contrast set you are experiencing is quite similar to being able to
say (by one of various methods) which part of a literally spatial domain you are in at the
moment. (Note that one can also talk of views that are specific to particular points in a
domain, instead of members of a contrast set. Thus, one of the main design
recommendations in the scholarly literature on everyday you-are-here maps is to make them
correspond as closely as possible to the view that the user experiences in the location where
the map is placed.49)
Knowing "where" you are within a contrast
set, and how that set member is labeled, is very
important in everyday life. For example, you might
want to know which bus you are on, what month
and day of the week it is, what airport terminal your
plane is arriving at, what speed you are going at,
what house number you are staying at, what gear
your car (or your bicycle) is in, what tram stop this is, what note you are playing, what the
number of this telephone is (so someone can call you back on it), whether that other army
officer is your superior or subordinate, or what is the value of the coin in your hand. If you
48 The idea of "view" comes from Benjamin Kuipers, "The cognitive map: could it have been any other
way?" in Spatial orientation: theory, research, and application, edited by Herbert L. Pick, Jr. and
Linda P. Acredolo, pp. 344-359 (New York: Plenum Press, 1983), p. 353. Also see Kuipers, "Modeling
spatial knowledge," Cognitive Science 2 (1978): 129-153. The idea of "view" is also closely related to
geographers' explanations of what conveys a sense of place; see, for example, Roger M. Downs and
David Stea, Maps in minds: reflections on cognitive mapping (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), pp.
107-123.
49 On you-are-here maps see Michael J. O'Neill, "Theory and research in design of 'you are here' maps,"
in Visual information for everyday use: design and research perspectives, edited by Harm J. G.
Zwaga, Theo Boersema, and Henriëtte C. M. Hoonhout, pp. 225-238 (London: Taylor and Francis,
1999); Marvin Levine, "You-are-here maps: psychological considerations," Environment and behavior
14 (1982): 221-237; Marvin Levine, Iris Marchon, and Gerard Hanley, "The placement and
misplacement of you-are-here maps," Environment and behavior 16 (1984):139-157.
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are moving from place to place, the decisions you take in order to get to your goal depend on
where you are starting from, so you need to know where you are in order to know how to act.
If you need to get to gate C19 at the airport, it makes a difference whether you are in terminal
A or B, or already in C, and if your destination is the 6th floor, it may help to know whether
the main entrance you just came in through is on the ground, first or second floor.50 Even if
you are not trying to find your way, the decisions you make in daily life depend on where you
are in various contrast sets, so that you may choose to make a telephone call differently
depending on whether the system defines it as "local" or "long-distance," an American police
officer may behave quite differently once they cross the county or state line, smokers need to
know when they are in the smoking area, and a tourist may take a very different attitude
towards marijuana use depending on whether they are in Amsterdam or Singapore. 
It is thus crucial that these set members be labeled in an easily perceptible way.
Fortunately, the label on the outside of a public bus (and ideally the inside too) tells you that
you are in a vehicle traveling on route 362, not 236; the calendar on the wall tells you that it
is December and not January; the calculator screen gives you feedback that tells you that you
really did just press the "5" key; when you go up or down a level on the escalators in a
department store, signs usually remind you which level you have arrived at; and a sign on the
door tells you that you have found the classroom number you are looking for. Similarly, we
try to label water faucets so that we know which is hot and which is cold; most telephones at
least used to have a little slot intended to hold a slip of paper listing their number; in some
countries, it is customary for the called party to answer a phone call by stating their
telephone number; piano players can visually confirm what key they are pressing; and (for
example) the Indonesian 100-rupiah coin is helpfully labeled "100 rupiah." In featureless
landscapes where the views associated with two different contrast set members are
practically indistinguishable (for example, just on either side of the border between two
American states as one drives through them on an expressway), nametags and signals of
50 See the discussion of floor numbering in Arthur and Passini, Wayfinding, pp. 193-195, and in
Spencer and Reynolds, Directional signing and labeling in libraries and museums, pp. 22-23.
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passage such as "Welcome To" signs may be the only thing that allows you to figure out
which member of the contrast set you are currently in.
Besides letting people know how what they are seeing is labeled, nametags make the
use of labels more practical in the communication of directions. It is pointless, or at least
much less useful, to give directions in terms of a label which is not displayed on its referent.
For example, as a travel guidebook writer covering Albania in 1993, the fact that there were
no streetname signs in Tirana made it much less helpful to the reader for me to mention the
fact that an establishment was on a street called Rruga Myslim Shyri. In contrast, telling an
employee to deliver a package to a particular street and house number, or making a mental
note that shelled walnuts are in aisle 3 at the supermarket, are ways of communicating the
identity of a contrast set member by means of a conventional label. A nametag lets someone
who is looking for that particular label know that they have found the right member of the
contrast set. Another, underestimated function of nametags is to tell people who are looking
for a differently labeled contrast set member that this is not it. Thus, if you know you are
looking for room B201, a sign for room B214 tells you that you are in the wrong place.
There is an entire art to the placement of nametags in the built environment,51 much
of it surrounding the fact that they need to fulfill not only their semantic identifying function
but also be easy for users to see. Nametags can be bigger or smaller. They can be illuminated
or not. (Major streets are labeled with illuminated signs in Palo Alto, but not in Reykjavík.)
They can, and generally should, be standardized through the use of a superordinate sign, so
that all the signs which label a particular type of entity are similar, and one knows from the
design of the sign what kind of thing it is labeling. Thus house numbers are often displayed
in a standard form in European cities,52 with this standard form serving as a superordinate
sign that tells us it shows a house number and not some other kind of number. There is,
meanwhile, little or no such standardization in America (where missing or hard-to-see house
numbers often create anxiety about whether one has found the right building). 
51 Spencer and Reynolds, Directional signing and labeling in libraries and museums, pp. 48-50.
52 See the examples in Tantner, "Galerie der Hausnummern."
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When riding on public transport in an unfamiliar environment, the problem of
picking out your stop from among the limited set of all the stops made by the bus forms a
classic problem of matching a label (the stop name) to a view of a contrast set member (what
things look like at the stop). Even if you are familiar with the "view" of your intended stop, it
is particularly difficult to recognize that it is "the next stop" (and thus that you should press
the stop button) when you cannot see it yet, especially if you are on a bus that does not stop
at all potential stops (which makes it hard to be sure whether you have yet passed the stop
before yours). It is possible to ask the driver for help, but drivers are sometimes not
supposed to speak to passengers, or do not share a common language with them. It is
possible to follow along on a map (either one's own or the one provided in the bus or tram),
but this requires a lot of attention and the map must be detailed. Designers can help by
labeling each stop and posting nametags, so that passengers have direct access to the labels
for each stop, without someone else's assistance. These nametags may take the form of driver
announcements, signs at each stop, or a display in the car listing the name of the upcoming
stop. Labeling the stops on a route reinforces the sense that they form a defined contrast set,
which adds to the passenger's cognitive tranquility by giving them a sense that the set of
stops is bounded and catalogued. Subway and tram networks generally tend to be better set
up for matching than bus networks, and to have a clearer sense of stops as a contrast set,
probably because of the greater physical commitment to the location of each stop.
When displaying a label which refers to something at the terminal level of a
taxonomy, and which is composed of the successive labels for each level of the taxonomy, it is
helpful when possible to make the divisions between the levels of the taxonomy part of the
display. Consider, for example, how we generally put spaces or other dividers in between the
significant parts of a phone number. Similarly, Paul Arthur and Romedi Passini advise
against assuming that people will be able to analyze the taxonomic structure of a building
room number such as "505" (the number of my office, which is on the fifth floor).53 They
would approve of the label on the outside of my door, which reads "5 05". The space between
53 Arthur and Passini, Wayfinding, p. 193.
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the floor number and the room number helps reinforce users' sense of the taxonomic levels
of the label system. 
Unfortunately, the goal of telling users
where they are within any given contrast set
frequently fails. Consider that the United States
is one of the few countries whose coins show no
visible numerical indications of their value. (The
penny and nickel do show the words "one" and
"five," but the dime does not display the word
"ten.") Strangers to the American coin system,
especially if they do not read English, have a
harder time learning the value of each coin than
strangers in (say) the euro zone, because they require explicit input from a source external to
the coin itself. Image 3.9 shows a guidebook doing its best to teach travelers the connection
between coin and value in America. Unfortunately, the guidebook authors seem to have had
a little trouble straightening out the mapping themselves. Similarly, the unfortunately
common practice in scholarly book publishing of keying endnotes to the chapter number,
rather than the page number, ignores the fact that readers often do not know the number of
the chapter they are in (and have to do quite a bit of page flipping to find it).54 Page numbers,
whose nametags are always readily available in the corner of the book's regular visual field,
are a better keying device. To take one more example, I remember once trying to buy a pair of
long underwear in a department store in Munich. I figured out what floor it was on, but first
had to use the bathroom on the top floor. I then got mixed up finding the floor, because the
floor number signs were not easily visible to those coming off the down escalators. When I
finally found the long underwear, I realized that I had no idea what size I might need in the
local system, and that, of course, in the case of underwear, propriety does not permit one to
54 For an example of a book reviewer complaining about this practice, see Edith A. Moravcsik, review of
The logic of markedness by Edwin L. Battistella, Journal of Linguistics 34 (1998): 501-505, p. 504.
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try on a pair to learn the relation between oneself and one's size label by trial and error.
Moving out of the realm of contrast sets, it is (as some designers have pointed out)
unfortunately quite possible and common in everyday wayfinding to have a clear idea of
where you are going, and then to arrive at the right place (whether that be a home, a
restaurant, a small village, a subway station, or an airport departure gate), but to have no
sense of confirmation from the environment that you have indeed done so. 55 Usually we rely
on a sign, a house number, or something that tells us a building's function (its shape or
design, the goods on display in the window, the kinds of cars parked in the parking lot, the
pile of raw materials next to it) to confirm that we have arrived where we wanted to be. Still,
all of us have probably had the experience of looking for a building, having a reasonable
sense of how it might be labeled, and standing outside it, but hesitating for lack of a nametag
or other signal confirming that it is in fact our destination — for example, looking for a house
number which is nowhere marked on the house itself. 
3.5 "Just a number" and the level playing field
A common critique of certain labels, and of
the process of creating contrast sets, is that they
reduce individuals — whether these are people,
books, trains, or parked cars — to "just a number."
Indeed, being just a number is a symptom of
impersonality, insensitivity, inhuman scale, and
many other supposed ills of modern society. 
Practically speaking, labels (instead of names) are often applied to contrast sets of
people and animals which form large and bureaucratically managed groups, such as soldiers,
inmates, subscribers, customers, and herds of sheep or cows. In all of these cases, to those
doing the numbering, the individual identity and experience of those numbered is not
particularly important, but ease of reference is. The controversial aspect of such numbering
55 On this issue see Mijksenaar, Visual function, pp. 8-10; Arthur and Passini, Wayfinding, pp. 15-16.
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comes out in the emotion with which a survivor of Auschwitz, or the director of a home for
chimpanzees freed from biomedical experimentation, displays a tattooed identification
number dating from the survivor's or chimpanzee's incarceration.56 The number speaks of a
moral code grossly different from that now enjoyed by the survivor or the freed chimpanzee.
Seeing how an individual's identity can be totally effaced by their group membership drives
home the reminder that the people who we sometimes see as objects in our work are
conscious experiencers of the world.
In the reverse of this phenomenon, we sometimes, exceptionally, name things that
are typically just labeled, such as houses, airplanes, cars, and boats. Predictably, this adds a
sense of familiarity and homeyness to the thing that is named.
We expect people to follow social norms about when it is appropriate to label
someone and when it is appropriate to use their name. Sometimes, we get these norms mixed
up. A newspaper article tells the story of Truman Bradley from Boulder, Colorado, whose
parents received a letter offering "congratulations on 987-65-4321's admission to Arizona
State University!"57 Perhaps his Social Security number was just mistyped into the "name"
field of the admissions database. Although an admissions office might well sort applicant
files by Social Security number behind closed doors, in addressing correspondence outwards
the norm is to "rehumanize" the person by using their name. Similarly, the existence of
several different types of labels for the same entity, as in the example of IKEA products, is
usually accompanied by rules for using certain labels in certain contexts. We might refer to
the same TV or radio station by labels like "96.5" (its frequency) or "WCMF" (its call letters),
by a name such as "the Discovery Channel," or by describing its format as "classic rock" or
"talk." In general, the more vivid styles are generally used in informal and personal contexts
and the more numeric labels in technical and impersonal contexts.
56 For an example of this kind of indignation see Roger Fouts, Next of kin: what chimpanzees have
taught me about who we are (New York: William Morrow, 1997), p. 281.
57 Tom Kuntz, "Congrats! You're a big number on campus!" New York Times, 21 March 1999, section 4,
page 2. (987-65-4321 is a pseudonymous number.)
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Identification numbers by themselves say little about the "soft" nature of what they
identify. Labels only convey something about the things they label if they are related by an
iconic mapping principle (see chapter 4), where each label reflects something about each
contrast set member. Even in iconic mappings, this reflection is not usually very robust. The
only clue that American Social Security numbers give to the myriad features which make up
the true identity of a person is that one can tell from the first three numbers which state the
label was issued in. When we use these "more organized ways of referring to our
environment — by coordinates, numbering systems, or abstract names" we sometimes regret
having foregone other labeling systems which "vivify" the world around us and "add to the
depth and poetry of human experience."58 Thus we can understand the feeling of regret when
the reduction of library catalog entries to strings of computer characters, coded without
nuance into 256 categories, eliminated the nonalphanumeric clues to the nature of a book
conveyed by the typeface, wear, and annotations of a card-catalog card. We can understand
this even if we consider the computerization of card catalogs to be worthwhile on balance.59 
Similarly, considering both x and q as members of the set of English consonants
makes them seem just as central and common as h or p. A student identification number
conveys nothing about the student's height or academic record, nor whether they are a part-
time or full-time student. Uniformly assigning non-iconic three-letter identification codes to
airports all over the world masks the differences in size and centrality between airports such
as ORD (Chicago's huge O'Hare Aiport), and VEY (the airfield on Iceland's Westmann
Islands, which has one terminal building and much shorter runways).
However, deindividualization is sometimes carried out deliberately and considered to
be socially beneficial. Arranging entities into a contrast set, and then reducing each member
to "just a number," smooths out the individual differences between each entity (especially if
the labeling strategy used is relatively non-iconic). It creates equivalence and a "level playing
58 Lynch, The image of the city, pp. 127-128.
59 See the essay on library card catalogs in Nicholson Baker, The size of thoughts: essays and other
lumber (New York: Random House, 1996), originally published as "Discards," The New Yorker, 4 April
1994.
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field" between things that are very different but, some feel, deserve to be treated in the same
way.60 The practice of numbering the French départements creates a sense of equality
between administrative divisions regardless of whether they are Breton, Basque, Provencal,
"typically" French, or even overseas. When we see a police mug shot of a famous person such
as Michael Jackson or Martha Stewart, the booking number in the photograph attracts our
attention because it symbolizes the fact that the wheels of justice will, at least in theory,
consider them no more above the law than any other citizen. Meanwhile, someone whose
equal status is in doubt may be thrilled beyond words by the chance to be "just a number."
The proudest moment of a new member of a contrast set may be when they get the label that
says that they really belong (for example, a newly minted dentist who has just received their
numbered license to practice). As Slovenia progressed towards independence from 1989 to
1991, every new label that showed Slovenia's membership in the contrast set of independent
political entitities was applauded, whether that meant the assignment of ISO 3166 codes or
the informal sprouting of white oval car bumper stickers carrying a "SLO" label (in the now-
abandoned national car labeling format that was standard in Europe at the time).61 In this
case, a label legitimates the contrast set membership of the thing they label, ceremonially
"recognizing certain distinctions while ignoring others"62 and entrenching the leveling effect
of membership in a contrast set.
The simultaneous existence of both positive and negative aspects of leveling explains
why many acts of contrast set creation and labeling are contested and controversial, with one
side generally emphasizing the fairness of leveling and the other emphasizing the way that it
ignores individual differences. 
60 On the idea of the "level playing field" see Kristen Purcell, "In a league of their own: mental leveling
and the creation of social comparability in sport," Sociological Forum 11 (1996): 435-456, and Purcell,
"Leveling the playing field: constructing parity in the modern world," Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers
University, 2001. On the idea of comparing the unlike, see also Wendy Nelson Espeland and Mitchell
L. Stevens, "Commensuration as a social process," Annual Review of Sociology 24 (1998): 313-343.
61 See Naško Križnar, "Visual symbols of national identity: Slovene bumper stickers and the collective
unconscious," Visual sociology 8 (1993): 58-63.
62 Duranti, Linguistic anthropology, pp. 124-125; see also p. 15. Here, the distinction recognized is that
Slovenia and (for example) Spain are independent countries and Alaska is not; a distinction ignored is
that Spain and Alaska are large territories and Slovenia is quite small.
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I propose that contrast sets and labels give rise to an opposition between what I will
call structural and descriptive knowledge of the members of a set.63 Structural knowledge
emphasizes the place of the entity in the set (and possibly in a taxonomy). Descriptive
knowledge emphasizes the "feel" of an entity, the "view" associated with being "in" it, or the
attributes that contribute to its sense of identity. Take, for example, the street in Reykjavík
called Öldugata, which I walk along to reach downtown from my office. Structural knowledge
about Öldugata would include the fact that Bárugata, Ránargata, and Vesturgata parallel it
and are similarly laid out, that Ægisgata is a street which crosses all four of these streets, that
all these streets are in postal code 101 and that the house numbers on Öldugata run from x to
y. Descriptive knowledge about Öldugata might include a story about its history, a memory
of how the street smells, a photograph of the view looking down it, or my awareness of the
fact that it is a quiet enough street to walk down the middle of it on days when the sidewalks
are very icy.
Just as leveling and labeling have advantages and disadvantages, so does a focus on
structural and descriptive knowledge. One scholar suggests that focusing on a particular
geographical location's place in the "colored polygons" of our geopolitical taxonomy
contributes to the "obscuring" of the "political and economic … cultural, social, and
psychological" individuality of that location,64 and undoubtedly, thinking structurally about a
contrast set created by boundary gives rise to many categorical paradoxes. Structural
63 For a fine literary example of this distinction, see Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, The little prince
(Harcourt, 2000 [1943]), p. 10. I have not yet found this exact distinction made in existing scholarly
literature, despite many close approaches, and many discussions of the distinction's consequences. It is
related to, but not identical with the distinction between metrical and topological perception of space,
on which see Eviatar Zerubavel, The fine line: making distinctions in everyday life (New York: Free
Press, 1991), p. 24. Neither does it quite correspond to the opposition between taxon and locale
knowledge hypothesized by John O'Keefe and Lynn Nadel in The hippocampus as a cognitive map
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978; available online at http://www.cognitivemap.com, January 2005).
The taxon-locale distinction has, nevertheless, often been misinterpreted as identical with the
structural-descriptive distinction: for an example, see Dave Woodcock, "Learning chemistry: the
importance of imagination," unpublished handout, Department of Chemistry, Okanagan University
College, British Columbia, 1995 (available at http://people.ouc.bc.ca/woodcock/probsol/imagine.html,
January 2005). 
64 Clifford Geertz, After the fact: two countries, four decades, one anthropologist (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1995), p. 22; Geertz, "Primordial loyalties and standing entities: anthropological
reflections on the politics of identity," Collegium Budapest Public Lectures #7 (1994), p. 9,
http://www.colbud.hu/main/PubArchive/PL/PL07-Geertz.pdf (February 2005).
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knowledge is typically thought of as more "rational" and descriptive knowledge more
"intuitive," a polarity which can be mapped into value terms in either of the two obvious
ways. Among the writers who emphasize the value of descriptive over structural thinking,
Benedict Anderson makes it seem like geographical and social-group categorization in
Thailand and Malaysia was an evil imposed by the rationalist colonial powers on the spiritual
colonized peoples,65 while Jonathan Kozol rails against educational concepts such as "unit,"
"sub-topic," "credit hour," and "area of concentration" which are based on contrast sets,
arguing that they deprive us of our sense of solidarity, wholeness, community, and individual
coherence.66
An example which can easily be argued in both ways is the perhaps increasingly
common practice in scholarly bibliographies of using only the initials of given names, which
obscures authors' gender and also eliminates their first name as a source of descriptive
information about them. Some presumably applaud this as an effort to make gender
irrelevant to the advancement of science. Others surely rue the fact that this style obscures
the individuality of the author and makes it more difficult to imagine who they are or were.
One can imagine that scholars from particular disciplines might be more likely to sympathize
with one of these arguments or the other.
A culturally entrenched practice under which people seem quite happy to be "just a
number" is the common tradition in Bali and Italy of using numbers as names for sons In
Bali, a family's first four sons are commonly named Wayan, Nyoman, Made, and Ketut.67 In
Italy, one frequently finds Primo, Secondo, and Terzo; ironically, the best known example is
Primo Levi, a man best known for writing about the horrors of concentration camps. This
practice challenges the common assumption, implicit in Anderson's and Kozol's criticisms,
that numbering and labeling is a phenomenon of evil, rational "modernity."68
65 Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism
(Revised edition, London: Verso, 1991), pp. 163-178, 184-185.
66 Jonathan Kozol, The night is dark and I am far from home (Revised edition, New York: Touchstone,
1990), pp. 56-59.
67 On the Balinese case see Crump, The anthropology of numbers, p. 68.
68 Note also that it uses a clear iconic principle (younger sons receive a higher number), and that it
shows how people often allow themselves to be guided by a very fundamental social convention like
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Practically speaking, bureaucracies, which may deal with millions of people, and
computer programs, whose discriminatory capacities are limited, truly benefit from leveling,
the creation of comparability, and the elimination of the individual features of each entity
from the system. After all, prose descriptions and "fuzzy" distinctions are usually of little help
in finding something in a database. For computers and bureaucracies, impersonal labels
create precise contrast, and thus increased individuality in the units they represent, by
making it possible to rely on the ability to focus precisely and unambiguously on the
situation of a single individual. Creating comparability in a contrast set and labeling the
members systematically helps avoid getting distracted by extraneous similarities, such as
that 123-456-789 and 987-654-321 are both tall red-haired women with glasses. It ignores
each entity's position in any domains not iconically reflected by the label itself. It also aids in
treating things objectively, without personal prejudices and supposedly unwarranted
sympathy — just as maps of South Vietnam used by American aerial bombing missions in the
early 1970s listed coordinates but not place names in order to keep the crew's task
"impersonal."69
Overall, there are both pluses and minuses to leveling a contrast set and creating an
even playing field. It is the set designer's job to weigh the consequences of their decision.
Labeling does not always imply leveling, because designers can choose an iconic labeling
principle which reflects some distinctive attribute of the contrast set members. However,
such principles have only limited power to convey distinctions within a contrast set because
they cannot encode the variation in more than a few attributes of the contrast set members at
a time. 
Even in a highly levelled set, designers are sometimes in circumstances where they
have the opportunity to convey a fair amount of distinctiveness "on top" of a highly levelled
system. For example, maps often list the members of the set of the stops along a public
transport route with a sense of complete equivalence and equality, which rightly conveys the
numeral labels in making difficult, relatively arbitrary choices like that of naming one's children (see
further section 6.4).
69 Downs and Stea, Maps in minds, p. 44.
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fact that the bus will stop at each one. But, of course, nobody thinks of them that way, except
perhaps the first-time visitor. It is useful, when possible, to give information which
complicates our image of such contrast sets, such as which stops form nodes and landmarks
in the pattern of a city; which stops have connections to other transport lines; or, perhaps, at
which stops it is possible to go shopping or to find something to eat late at night. Similarly,
the linking of photographs or comment fields to a customer database adds liveliness and
distinctiveness to a record that might otherwise indeed be "just a number."
3.6 Norms of attention to labels
In the American children's book Alvin's secret code, a grandfatherly neighbor shows
Alvin how to read the manufacturing codes printed inside his shoe and to understand the call
number system in the library. Alvin puts his skills to use when, after figuring out how the
manufacturing date of a hi-fi stereo system is coded on the product tag, he exposes a case of
false advertising at the local department store (forcing the embarrassed manager to offer
Alvin's father a big discount). One of the goals of the book is to show how pervasive
numbering systems and symbols are in everyday life, and to give children confidence in their
ability to figure these systems out. The hero and his buddies learn that numbering systems
and other codes are "much more widely used than you would imagine."70
Yet one is not supposed to be
too interested in labels. Rather one is
supposed to reserve one's attention
for the nature of the thing itself. This
is why trainspotters are considered
weird, as are idiot savants who have prodigious memories for labels.71 This is also why the
clock in Image 3.11, with its labeling system in ruins, is said to have "the right attitude." (The
70 Clifford B. Hicks, Alvin's secret code (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1963).
71 A literary reference that demonstrates this attitude is the description of a retarded boy in Carlo Levi,
Christ stopped at Eboli: the story of a year (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Co., 1963), pp. 170-171. For an
introduction to savantism with particular attention to calendrical knowledge, see Michael J. A. Howe,
Fragments of genius: the strange feats of idiots savants (London: Routledge, 1989); see also Darold
A. Treffert, Extraordinary people: understanding "idiot savants" (New York: Harper & Row, 1989).
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message of its advertising copy is that categorization creates stress, which the clock helps
release.) We use words like "nerd" for people who, by choice, pay more attention to contrast
sets than to the "fuzzy" aspects of the rest of life. At least, there is a sense that one should be
restrained in one's interest in sets. Normality is to focus on descriptive, not structural
knowledge; one should capture the true identity and spirit of the moment, not focus on its
place in a system of lifeless categories and tags.
There is a sense that labels are just discardable handles which help us find our way to
the actual passion and pathos of the thing. Thus travel writer Paul Theroux titles his chapters
with the names of trains, but tells us that "I sought trains; I found passengers."72 The
structural facts about a train (such as departure time, train number, and destination) may be
all we know when we first step on board, but the passengers inside are one aspect of that
train journey with much richer descriptive potential. In the same vein, knowing someone's
birth and death dates and places of residence tells us quite little about the person themselves,
the page numbers of a book are normally irrelevant to the message of the book itself, and the
periodization of history into decades or centuries is something that is basically read into, not
discerned within, the flow of historical events.73 Thus it is considered not just a habit, but an
eccentricity, of Iceland's second-most prominent twentieth-century writer, Þórbergur
Þórðarson, that he regularly mentioned the precise date and time of events (and usually the
weather conditions too) in his autobiographical essays.74 
One author warns us of the "danger of taking numbers so seriously at the expense of
what is non-measurable, non-calculable: intuition, creativity, imagination, happiness …"75
Some people feel that not only are labels irrelevant to the real nature of the things they tag,
72 Paul Theroux, The great railway bazaar: by train through Asia (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), p.
2. All the chapter titles follow the same form, e.g. "The 11:33 to Margate," in his book The kingdom by
the sea: a journey around Great Britain (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983). Venedikt Yerofeev uses a
similar chapter titling motif in Moscow stations (London: Faber and Faber, 1997 [1976]).
73 See Edwin Muir, An autobiography (London: Hogarth Press, 1954), p. 49; Garry Wills, "A guide to
the century," New York review of books, 15 July 1999, p. 24; Eviatar Zerubavel, Time maps: collective
memory and the social shape of the past (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), pp. 96, 139.
74 For example, in one of his books, Ofvitinn (2d ed., Reykjavík: Mál og menning, 1964), the first
sentence is "It was Sunday, 9 May 1909 in the early afternoon" and 17 of 43 chapters begin similarly.
75 From the back cover blurb of David Boyle, Why counting can't make us happy (London:
HarperCollins, 2002).
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they even distract us from their true spirit. For example, it has been suggested that the
introduction of postal codes in Sweden in 1968 made love letters less romantic.76 Here the
idea is perhaps not just that labels are unromantic, but also that categorical partitions and
romance are antithetical.77 However, even those who despise structural knowledge must
admit that labels are often a good way of summoning forth descriptive images and memories
of a person or a place or an experience.
If you still doubt that an interest in labels is considered deviant, consider the case of
Michael W. Thyen. He has posted, on the Internet, a comprehensive list of fake phone
numbers with the prefix 555 that have been used as stand-in numbers (see section 3.7) in
American movies.78 Connected to the list is a page where people can write in with
comments.79 Although the phone number site contains no other content, and absolutely no
personal information about Mr. Thyen himself, the comments call him "strange,"
"obsessive," "too weird," "dull," "boring," "nutty," "like Rain Man," and "a loser" with "way
too much time on his hands." Furthermore, his page was chosen for listing by another
website, "The Useless Pages," which provides links to "useless" information on the Internet.80
I suggest that we disattend labels in the course of daily life because we consider them
the background against which we do truly meaningful work that has value for other people —
as opposed to preparatory work that consists just of debating what conventional symbols we
should use during those real tasks. Labels are auxiliary tools for getting real things done.
Reading an entire study devoted to labels has somewhat the same feeling to it as listening to
an entire evening of opera preludes, or reading the prefaces to a series of books or the
legends for a series of maps, without getting to experience the main body of the works
involved.
76 "Men visst måste kärleksbrev ha varit mer romantiska förr, utan postnummer?" From Jacques
Wallner, "Numren som retade svenskarna," Dagens Nyheter (Stockholm), 21 August 1998.
77 On this theme see Zerubavel, The fine line, pp. 87-89.
78 Michael Thyen, "555-LIST," http://home.earthlink.net/~mthyen (April 2004). As of my viewing, the
site had not been updated since 2002.
79 http://home.earthlink.net/~mthyen/comments.html (April 2004).





topics — perhaps not
only because they are
safe, impersonal, and
external (like the
weather), but also because people are truly curious about them,
and even, need to be sure they know how they work. For
example, the three-letter airport coding system was enough a part of everyday life to serve as
the foundation for a humorous graphic motif in the 1992 Swedish advertising campaign
illustrated in Image 3.12 and Image 3.13. (The booklet cover reads "Timetable for SAS and
Linjeflyg"; the advertisement on the back of the airport bus seats reads "News from SAS and
Lin.") Labels show up often in print journalism — never as breaking news, but rather as the
focus of sometimes humorous, sometimes whimsical sidebars and features. Naturally, these
articles do not go into great detail, they often apologize for foregrounding such a trivial
subject, and they usually frustrate anyone who wants to find out the full details of a
particular labeling system, but they do demonstrate peoples' half-suppressed curiosity about
the central symbolic conventions that they use. It would be going too far to call labels "seen
but unnoticed," but it is probably fair to say that they are rarely fully noticed, certainly taken
for granted, and often tabooed in the foreground of daily life.
The truth is, though, that sets of things command a tremendous fascination that most
of us know in our own personal way, whether it involves sorting through our baseball cards,
learning about all the elements of the periodic table (or singing the Tom Lehrer song about
them), knowing the capitals of all the countries in the world, or other such juvenile pursuits
that many of us, sheepishly, never completely outgrow.81 Even something so simple as the
81 Those people who have developed special perceptual abilities in a particular domain can appreciate
distinctions between contrast set members which others may not even be able to perceive. When I




contrast set of one's high-school teachers can provoke this sort of fascination. Elias Canetti
practically falls into a reverie in his autobiography while recalling their paradigmatic
procession through the same experiential slot: he describes "the alternation of their
appearances, each one in turn appearing before you, in the same place, in the same role, with
the same goal, thus eminently comparable …"82 Although Oliver Sacks exoticizes a set of
mathematically gifted autistic twins he studied, who he observed visibly "savoring" the
thought of particularly interesting prime numbers, this is an experience that most of us can
find some sort of sympathy with in some labeling domain. Indeed, just a few pages later,
Sacks confesses to having had his own fascination with numbers, and in another book he
describes his even deeper childhood relationship with the periodic table of the elements.83
Vladimir Nabokov, as well as his annotator and critics, saw commonality in Nabokov's
passions for number theory, wordplay, chess, and lepidoptery, all fields which involve
"patterning," or, in my terms, structural knowledge.84
The same tension between the usefulness and the eccentricity of structural
preoccupation shows up in writing about the intense special interests of children with the
increasingly commonly diagnosed Asperger's syndrome.85 A recent guidebook to Asperger's
syndrome mentions colors, letters, butterflies, beer-bottle labels, road signs, trains,
timetables, lamp-post numbering in the United Kingdom, sports statistics, carrot varieties,
notes on the piano, like, one by one, and really listening to them, and they're all different. It's really fun
to experience that." I would like to be able to experience that difference as well, but I cannot and never
will be able to because I do not have absolute pitch. See Ian Watson, "Pitch standardization and perfect
pitch," unpublished term paper, Rutgers University, 2000.
82 Elias Canetti, The tongue set free: remembrance of a European childhood (London: André Deutsch,
1979), p. 150.
83 Oliver W. Sacks, The man who mistook his wife for a hat and other clinical tales (New York: Summit
Books, 1985), chapter 23; Sacks, Uncle Tungsten: memories of a chemical boyhood (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 2001). On the fascination of the periodic table, see further a fine web site,
http://theodoregray.com/PeriodicTable (March 2004).
84 Vladimir Nabokov, "Portrait of my mother." The New Yorker, 9 April 1949, pp. 33-37; Nabokov, The
annotated Lolita (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), p. xxviii; D. Barton Johnson, Worlds in regression:
some novels of Vladimir Nabokov (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1985).
85 On the increase in Asperger diagnoses see Erica Goode, "Autism cases up; cause is unclear," New
York Times, 26 January 2004, p. A1; Amy Harmon, "Answer, but no cure, for a social disorder that
isolates many," New York Times, 29 April 2004, p. A1. 
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and truck manufacturers as examples of the fixations of Asperger's children.86 All of these
fixations arguably involve richly structured fields of knowledge with many contrast sets and
labels. To be fair, considering contrast sets and labels as typical of Asperger's syndrome is
perhaps more of a stereotype than a regularity. The preoccupations of those children
considered to be examples of the syndrome are actually much more diverse than the list
above would suggest. The same book also cites fascinations with sliding doors, vacuum
cleaners, yellow pencils, Vikings, toilet brushes, the Japanese tea ceremony, and a particular
pop music star. One is tempted to hypothesize that the common thread here is exploring the
diversity of a particular semantic domain or set of hyponyms, but the last two examples do
not fit into even this weaker theory.
Even if one accepts the link between Asperger's syndrome and structural knowledge,
the problem with medicalizing a fascination with structural knowledge is that an interest,
sometimes intense, in contrast sets and labels is a common and very useful part of normal
human development — both among children, adolescents, and adults. Just because it is
correct to say that Asperger's syndrome often involves structural fascinations does not mean
that it is right to suggest that structural fascinations are a sign of Asperger's syndrome.87 The
mastery of every facet of a particular semantic domain is essential to being able to do your
job well, whether you are a doctor who knows lots of muscles or diseases, a carpenter who
knows all about doors or types of wood, or a video shop attendant who knows exactly how
your collection is organized. In primary as opposed to secondary socialization, we take it for
granted that small children should become very interested in calendars, letters of the
alphabet, and colors, and should also have a clear grasp of the difference between such things
as the various grades in their school. In the working world, there are plenty of people who
not only must master labeling systems in their work, but who must carefully and attentively
create and manage such systems. There is, for example, a whole industry surrounding
86 Tony Attwood, Asperger's syndrome: a guide for parents and professionals (London: Jessica
Kingsley, 1998), pp. 9, 89-102.
87 On this issue see the response to Oliver Sacks regarding the relationship between absolute pitch
ability and savantism by Gottfried Schlaug et al., Science 268 (5 May 1995): 621-622.
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wildlife labeling88 and an entire art and history to baseball scoring.89 There are also people
professionally charged with managing the labeling systems for library classification,
telephone lines, and medical diagnoses.
Thus a recurrent difficulty in the Asperger literature is the conflict between the
medicalization and exoticization of structural interests, and the undoubted essentialness of
contrast set mastery in many highly paid and respected occupations. Is attention to labels
and contrast sets deviant? Or simply a manifestation of talent? Or, perhaps, is talent deviant?
If so, how do we cope with the fact that structural talents are simultaneously deviant and
admirable?90
88 See, for example, www.wildlifecomputers.com (March 2004).
89 See Dickson, The joy of keeping score.
90 I am reminded of a high school classmate who, I was told, kept the Metro map in his pocket on the
French class trip to Paris, and took obvious pleasure in figuring out which routes the group should
take. My other classmates ridiculed him as "Metro Man" (implicitly pressuring him to conform and not
to excel), but made use of his skills nevertheless. 
§ 3.6 142
Another difficulty is the tension between "one-drop" and "whole-ocean" theories of
deviant identity formation. In an environment where one-drop-based judgements of
deviance flourish, "dressing in" to a cognitive style for ten minutes a day is enough to warrant
a deviant label. But this reflects a lack of sensitivity to the temporal structuring of identity.91
Surely the truly noteworthy deviance actually lies not in attention to labels, but rather in not
being able to attend to the other aspects of social life such as making friends, falling in love,
saying interesting and companionable things, earning a living, taking the car to be fixed and
so forth. As long as attention to structural knowledge is temporally and situationally
restricted — something you do not every waking moment of your life, but rather at work, or
only as a hobby, or only on Tuesdays — an interest in labels or contrast sets is routine, indeed
valuable. Still, it is unlikely to be considered the "coolest" part of one's identity, no matter
how much some people claim that Bill Gates made it cool to be a nerd. And perhaps
particularly in the United States, talent is often considered deviant; some say that in America
a sense of shame is attached to intellectual interests even at the highest academic levels.92
Indeed, I wonder if precisely this sense of shame is one contributing factor in the reification
and backgrounding of contrast sets and label systems (see sections 1.2 and 6.2).
3.7 Meet John Doe: stand-ins
Here are several real-life examples of stand-ins: 
Anytown. The 1999 edition of United States Internal Revenue Service Publication #334, Tax
Guide for Small Business, includes two sample tax returns. The first is for Stanley Price, 99
Oak St., Anytown, TX 70000. His social security number is 000-00-0000, and he runs Stan's
Barber Shop, 1001 Maple Ave., Anytown, TX 70000.
The other return is for Susan J. Brown, 1313 Empire Blvd., Franklin, NY 18725. Her social
security number is 111-00-1111. She runs Family Fashions, 725 Big Sur Drive, Franklin, NY
18725. Family Fashions' employer ID number is 10-1234567.
Roe vs. Wade. In the early 1970s, a woman files suit to overturn the United States' legal
prohibition of abortion. Because she does not want to reveal her real name, court records call
her by the surname Roe — the full name of the case being, of course, Roe v. Wade.
Buddy. On February 26, 2000, the Rochester (New York) Democrat and Chronicle runs an
article with advice for apartment hunters with pets. The article advises preparing a "pet
91 For a recent application of these concepts see Wayne H. Brekhus, Peacocks, chameleons, centaurs:
gay suburbia and the grammar of social identity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).
92 See, for example, Leonid Fridman, "America needs its nerds," New York Times, 11 January 1990, p.
A23.
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resume" for your prospective landlord, listing information about your pet's age, health, and
habits, and including the phone numbers of previous landlords. The fictional pet resume
included with the article is for a mixed-breed dog named Buddy, who is 7 years old, neutered
and flea-free, weighs 45 pounds, and is walked twice a day. Under "References," it says that
Buddy's current landlord may be reached at 555-1212.
Juanita. A question on the math section of the SAT (a standardized test used to measure
American high school students' abilities) reads, "It normally takes Juanita ten minutes to walk
to school in the morning. If she walked twice as fast …"
Paolo and Monica. My Italian textbook includes a made-up practice dialogue between two
people named "Paolo" and "Monica."
2,458. A book I am reading, which is discussing theories of learning, says "Under this scenario
— and it was a fashionable theory at one time — the brain would function like a giant
switchboard, hooking up stimulus number 2,458 to response number 2,458."93
Erika Mustermann. In 1981, the West German State Printing Office introduces a new style
of identity card. A widely circulated sample card (illustrated in Image 3.14) uses the following
identity: name, Erika Mustermann (maiden name Gabler); birthdate, September 12, 1945;
birthplace, Munich; eyes, blue; height, 176 cm; residence, Heidestr. 17, Munich. In 1997 and
again in 2001, Germany redesigns its identity cards, continuing to use the name Erika
Mustermann and birthplace Munich on samples (but with new photos and other details).94 The
name Erika Mustermann gains considerable currency in Germany as a stand-in of the "John
Doe" variety, particularly in personal identification contexts.95 The word "Muster" means
"sample" or "specimen" in German.
Stand-ins exist all over the lexicon, and indeed for any cognitive entity that passes the
"X and other Ys" test.96 But they are more highly concentrated in the world of proper names,
contrast sets, and labels. Common to all stand-ins is that an individual is selected to stand for
an entire contrast set. (This is an example of what linguists call metonymy, and this
particular type of metonymy has been called "role-for-individual" metonymy.)
Stand-ins are often, but not always, deliberately and consciously chosen (as in most of
the examples above, including that of Erika Mustermann). In some cases, particular stand-
93 This example is from Roger Fouts, Next of kin: what chimpanzees have taught me about who we
are (New York: Morrow, 1997), p. 166.
94 See "The changing Ms Mustermann over the years," press release, Berlin, 12 November 2001,
http://www.bundesdruckerei.de/en/press/press_archive/e_2001/p12_11_2001_en.html (January
2005); "Photo archive — identification documents,"
http://www.bundesdruckerei.de/en/press/photo_archive/4_4_03/index.html (January 2005), all on
the website of the Bundesdruckerei (German State Printing Office).
95 A web site about Erika Mustermann is Uwe Haupt, "Sonntag, 12. September 2004: Erika
Mustermann ist 59," http://134.102.55.200/haupt/erika (January 2005).
96 In the sentence "If Johnny told you to jump off the Empire State Building, would you listen to him?"
— a commonly used admonishment to children not to be overly suggestible — the "Empire State
Building" is a stand-in for "any tall building" whereas the verb phrase "to jump off the Empire State
Building" is a stand-in for "to do anything dangerous or stupid." Similarly, linguists are familiar with
the problem of how to select example sentences that illustrate particular syntactic phenomena. In
American classrooms, conventionalized names such as "John" and "Mary" are frequently used to make
sentences like "John gave Mary a kiss," but one professor I knew tried to make class a little more
interesting by picking cartoon themes and using examples like "Calvin builds Hobbes a treehouse."
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ins become conventionalized (as in the case of
"John Doe"). The designers of a contrast set may
choose to build a stand-in into the design of a set,
or may ignore the issue and allow a stand-in to
emerge out of users' behavior. Conventional
stand-ins are, in a way, the court jesters of the
contrast set world: they are amusing, and it is
always nice to have one, but the business of the contrast set goes on without them.
The use of a well-chosen stand-in is particularly important in designing the
instructions for forms, and indeed instructions for any situation in life which contains a slot
meant to be filled by the user with one of the members of a specific contrast set. When we
give an example of such a scenario, it feels wrong to us (and can be rhetorically cumbersome)
to leave that slot empty and unspecified. Therefore, particularly if a contrast set is likely to be
used in either of these types of situations, contrast set designers might want to spend a
minute or two thinking about whether it is worth specifying a stand-in at the outset — or at
least "leaving room" within the domain for one to be specified later. One example of a clearly
specified stand-in is the 555 range in American telephone numbers, which, it seems, were
deliberately left unassigned by the numbering plan (except for a few special services such as
directory assistance which is 555-1212 in America). Numbers from the 555 range are
regularly used in American movies as fictional stand-ins.97 An example where those
responsible for a contrast set have had an ambivalent attitude towards the specification of a
stand-in is that of American Social Security numbers. It has been widely reported that "the
Social Security Administration recommends that people showing Social Security cards in
advertisements use numbers in the range 987-65-4320 through 987-65-4329."98 This may
have been true at one point. However, as of January 2005, the Social Security
Administration's official written policy was to discourage all "nonprogram" use of Social
97 See Michael Thyen, "555-LIST," http://home.earthlink.net/~mthyen/index.html (April 2004).




Security numbers. If pressed, and only if pressed, SSA staff could suggest the use 0f 000-00-
0000 as a stand-in.99 
Stand-ins can serve in two different roles, which I will distinguish with the terms
exemplifier and metasyntactic signifier. All stand-ins are exemplifiers, but only some
function as metasyntactic signifiers. 
The best-known kind of stand-ins are those that also function as metasyntactic
signifiers. Metasyntactic signifiers are always created within a contrast set that is being used
for labeling. However, they lack specific reference themselves. But they do not refer to
something unreal (like the phantom members discussed in section 2.8). Their purpose is to
refer explicitly to the indefinite idea of "any member of the contrast set that is tagged by the
label set that the stand-in belongs to." (Unlike superordinate signs, which also mark an
entire contrast set, metasyntactic signifiers also "fit in" the slot that would normally be filled
by the label for a contrast set member.) The best-known and most-documented example of
this phenomenon is the stand-in proper name. Most commonly "John Doe" in English, there
are equivalent versions in other languages, such as Otto Normalverbraucher (literally Otto
Normalconsumer) in German, Zhāng Sān (literally Zhāng Three) in Chinese, or Matti and
Maija Meikäläinen (literally Matti and Maija Yourstruly) in Finnish.100 (Different stand-in
names are more popular in different contexts; consider the different registers in which one
might prefer "John Doe" or "Joe Sixpack.") In computer science, "foo" and "bar" are among
the conventionalized stand-ins for "any algorithmic variable," and my use of the term
"metasyntactic signifier" is based on computer scientists' use of the term "metasyntactic
99 "Nonprogram Use of the Social Security Number (SSN)," Social Security Administration Program
Operations Manual System, RM 00201.010, version of 22 January 2001.
http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/0/9c606d03be36ec7785256e370011e5f2?OpenDocument (January
2005).
100 Xiaohui Xin and Aino-Maija Muuri supplied the Chinese and Finnish examples. On stand-in proper
names, see Paul Dickson, What's in a name? Reflections of an irrepressible name collector (Merriam-
Webster, 1999), pp. 131-134; Roger Clarke, "Famous Nyms,"
http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/FamousNyms.html (April 2004); and "Anonymous
Names," http://www.funnyname.com/anonymous.html (April 2004), which gives the most complete
list of equivalents in other languages that I have seen. "Meet John Doe," by the way, is the title of a 1941
movie starring Gary Cooper and directed by Frank Capra; see http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0033891
(April 2004).
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variable" for these stand-ins.101 In the list at the beginning of the section, the terms
"Anytown," "10-1234567," "555-1212," and "Erika Mustermann" are classic, conventionalized
metasyntactic signifiers; the name "Roe" is a conventionalized metasyntactic signifier which
is being used as a pseudonym; and the number "2,458" is a metasyntactic signifier which is
understandable but not conventionalized. Within the lexicon proper, "widget" may be the
best known English metasyntactic signifier, familiar to anyone who has studied economics.
Anyone using the word "widget" typically expects that their readers will understand it is a
way of referring metasyntactically to the set of "all possible industrial products" or "all
possible items for sale." Algebra rests on the use of metasyntactic signifiers, such as the
signifier x in the statement "For any integer x, there is an integer y such that x+y=0."102 
The other stand-in role is to be a representative exemplifier of the contrast set that
the stand-in belongs to, whether that contrast set has a labeling function or not. For example,
in the list at the beginning of the section, the names "Paolo," "Monica," and "Juanita"
exemplify the contrast set of Italian and American first names but do not refer
metasyntactically to the class of all potential people that could fill the same slot (whereas the
use of the number "2,458" does asks the reader to extend the truthfulness of the sentence to
all the things with similar numbers). "Erika Mustermann" is a fictional name which
metasyntactically represents the idea of "any German," but Erika's photograph, date of birth,
and height are real instantiations which exemplify the set of photographs, dates of birth, and
heights of Germans. If the designers of the specimen had wanted to use exemplifiers which
were also metasyntactic signifiers, they could have listed her height as "xxx cm," her date of
birth as "dd.mm.yy," and put a conventionalized silhouette in the photograph spot. Consider,
as well, the choice of Lĕi Féng (雷锋) and Stakhanov to represent "everyman" in communist
China and Russia respectively, or a school's choice of which student (or students) they
should picture on the cover of their prospectus. Metasyntactic signifiers are exemplifiers too,
101 "Metasyntactic variable," in The jargon file, version 4.4.7, edited by Eric S. Raymond,
http://catb.org/~esr/jargon/html/M/metasyntactic-variable.html (January 2005).
102 On this issue see George Lakoff and Rafael E. Núñez, Where mathematics comes from: how the
embodied mind brings mathematics into being (New York: Basic Books, 2000), pp. 74-75.
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but not of the contrast set that they label; rather of the label set that they belong to. "Erika
Mustermann" is an exemplifier of the set of German names at the same time as it is a
metasyntactic signifier of the set of all Germans. If "Lĕi Féng" appeared, as a name and not a
personality, in the "name" field of the instructions for a form to be filled out, it would be a
metasyntactic signifier too.
Those exemplifiers which are not metasyntactic signifers are typically real members
of the contrast set they belong to (such as "Juanita," "176 cm," "99 Oak Street," or "7 years
old"). Those exemplifers which are also metasyntactic signifiers are more often unreal (for
example, "Joe Sixpack," "MM/DD/YY," and widgets). In everyday discourse, a common way
of signaling that one is temporarily using a real-life exemplifier as a metasyntactic signifier is
to prefix it with the word "say." (Imagine that the Slovene ice hockey team was playing, say,
the Slovak team.) Many metasyntactic signifiers are, technically, well-formed members of
their label set (such as 987-65-4321, John Doe, or XYZ Corp.), but most are oddly formed in
some way, and few are fully typical and convincing.
Most of the metasyntactic signifiers discussed so far are conventionalized. The
process of stand-in conventionalization is one that designers can potentially influence.
Conventionalization means that when people see the stand-in, they know right away that it is
a stand-in rather than a "real" member of the contrast set. Also, when people find themselves
in need of a stand-in for a particular contrast set, they usually think of the conventionalized
ones first. It is, of course, entirely possible to use nonconventionalized metasyntactic
variables (such as Stanley Price or 2,458 instead of John Doe or x), but when one does, users
may interpret the stand-in as real, just as one easily falls for a non-obvious pseudonym.103
When a metasyntactic stand-in becomes conventionalized, its availability as a label is
eliminated or limited. In the most extreme cases, it conventionally cannot be used as a label
for a real member of that set, or at least cannot be used without special confirmation that it
refers to something real. If your name really were John Doe or Erika Mustermann, you would
103 For an interesting account of falling for a non-obvious pseudonym see Thomas Satterlee, "A Case for
Smilla," Translation Review 50 (1996): 13-17.
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have to constantly emphasize to people that that really is your name and not a pseudonym. If
your telephone number really were 123-4567, if you really had a dog named Fido, or if you
really lived at 123 Any Street, you would constantly have to say things like "My phone
number is, now get ready for this, 987-6543. No, I'm not kidding. Really." Thus the
conventional use of "John Doe" or "Erika Mustermann" is predicated on the hope that
everyone in society will understand not to name their daughter Erika Mustermann, and a
common theme in popular writing about stand-in is to wonder whether (or fantasize that)
they actually exist in real life.104
The establishment of a conventionalized stand-in thus marks off a particular member
of the contrast set as unusual, unavailable, and special. Conventionalized metasyntactic
signifiers are not "normal" members of a label set; they are outside the conventionally "used"
and meaningful area of that set. In giving these parts of a contrast set a role which somehow
calls attention to the nature of the contrast set itself, metasyntactic signifiers are somewhat
similar to the idea of control sequences in computer science. These are specially marked
members of a label set which are meant to prefix signification outside that normally
permitted by the "regular" use of that label set. For example, the character "&" is used as a
control sequence introducer in HTML to tell us that the characters which follow have
something other than their usual meaning.105 
Very often — and especially for metasyntactic signifiers — it matters much less (often
not at all) what exact member of a contrast set is chosen as a stand-in and much more that
some member is simply chosen. If "John Doe" and "widget" were not already
conventionalized stand-ins, "Richard Roe" and "glork" might be just as good ones. "ABC" and
"8,542" are no worse than "XYZ" and "2,458." In the terms that I use in section 6.4, quite
often the act of solving the problem is more important than the identity of the solution
chosen, and the process of deciding on a stand-in is more a process of picking than choosing.
104 See Dickson, What's in a name?, pp. 133-134, and the "search" for Erika Mustermann by Xaver
Frühbeis, "12.09.1945: Erika Mustermann geboren," http://www.br-online.de/wissen-
bildung/kalenderblatt/2001/09/kb20010912.html (April 2004).
105 See, for example, Elizabeth Castro, HTML for the world wide web (Berkeley: Peachpit Press, 2003),
p. 30.
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But there are also very definite norms or typical strategies for stand-in design, and it
is often (though not always) possible to argue that one contrast set member works better
than another as a stand-in. This is particularly true for exemplifiers which are chosen to
convey an impression of what a contrast set is or should be like, as well as those stand-ins
which need to be obviously recognizable as such.
A very typical strategy for creating stand-ins that will be easy to conventionalize and
easy for people to recognize as such is to use specially salient or marked areas of the contrast
set involved (the same strategy is used in creating contrast set topologies; see section 4.5).
Fame is a way in which certain members of a contrast set come to be specially marked, and in
one example at the beginning of the section, the dog's name is Buddy — the name of the dog
of the then American president Bill Clinton. One can also take advantage of other types of
salience, focality, or centrality. Using Social Security number 000-00-0000 or the Empire
State Building as a stand-in follows the strategy of focusing on superlatives (the first in
numerical order, the tallest building).106 Using round numbers or numbers whose digits form
a sequence (in the first example, the employer ID number is 10-1234567 and the barber
shop's zip code is 70000) is another strategy whose salience is inspired by the same principle
responsible for the fact that one wins a game of gin rummy or poker by accumulating a
sequence of cards. 
An entirely different strategy for making a metasyntactic signifier obvious is to use a
clearly unreal member of a contrast set. "So-and-so" is obviously not a name, and Otto
Normalverbraucher is not only not a familiar German name, it even encodes its stand-in
status in the transparent derivation of "Normalverbraucher." The obvious use of numbers
106 This strategy has some bearing on a well-known paradox in certain debates about the nature of
linguistic categorization. Specifically, the problem is how to reconcile the fact that all odd numbers are
(mathematically speaking) equally odd, with the existence of prototype effects for the class of odd
numbers (namely, that subjects asked to state the best example of the class "odd number" tend to
choose "3"; see John R. Taylor, Linguistic categorization: prototypes in linguistic theory (2nd ed.,
London: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 68-71). I would suggest that what these subjects were actually
responding to was not so much the question as literally posed, but rather the somewhat different and
more easily answerable issue of what a good exemplifier of the contrast set "odd number" would be.
The choice of "3" as a stand-in is consistent with the typical norms of stand-in choice; the avoidance of
"1" can be explained by the fact that its salience as the first number overwhelms its salience as the first
odd number.
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instead of names in the Chinese stand-in Zhāng Sān and its companion forms Lĭ Sì and Wáng
Wŭ (Zhāng Three, Lĭ Four and Wáng Five) serves a similar function. The goal in these cases
is to be deliberately non-valent, thus making it obvious that the name does not really exist.
There are other times when one wants the stand-in to blend in and to "appear" like a
normal member of the contrast set (as pseudonyms do). This typically involves avoiding
sequences, round numbers, and famous labels in favor of ordinary-looking labels such as
"2,458" in the list above. This is why the common Social Security Number stand-in 078-05-
1120 has been described as "convincing-looking."107 Consider also the intent of Douglas
Adams, author of the Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy, in which the answer to the obviously
very important question of the meaning of life is the very mundane number "42."108 Or the
case of the 1980s popular song "Jenny." This song would not have had the same effect if the
lyrics had endlessly repeated an obvious stand-in phone number such as "123-4567" instead
of the real-sounding "867-5309." Unfortunately, by choosing not to use an obvious stand-in,
it made many people start to wonder whether 867-5309 was someone's actual number, and
created considerable inconvenience for some people who did have that number.109 (Israelis
may recall the similar song "Dina Barzilai" from the late 1950s — Dina's phone number was
496351.110) Designers who create stand-ins and pseudonyms meant to be convincing can, if
they wish, build a "self-destruct" feature into this convincingness, so that it becomes obvious
after a little reflection that the stand-in does not actually exist. For example, any American
road atlas will confirm that there is no interstate highway 13 in the United States (perhaps
for the same reasons that many tall buildings in America have no 13th floor). An
ethnographer who wanted to realistically convey the life of the municipal police department
he was studying used Interstate 13 as a pseudonym for the city's actual expressway. This
allowed him to simultaneously conceal the identity of his subjects, preserve the flow and
107 Clarke, "Famous Nyms."
108 Douglas Adams, The hitchhiker's guide to the galaxy (New York: Harmony Books, 1980).
109 See Barbara and David P. Mikkelson, "Jenny 867-5309," Urban legend reference pages,
http://www.snopes.com/music/songs/8675309.htm (April 2004), citing Julie Brener, "New phone
exchange leads to confusion, prank calls," Brown Daily Herald, 10 September 1999. The original song
is by Tommy Tutone from Tutone 2 (Columbia Records, 1981).
110 "Dina Barzilai," by Haim Hefer and Sasha Argov, recorded by Lahakat Ha-Nachal, circa 1957-59.
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literary effect of his writing, and communicate that he was using a pseudonym to any readers
willing to linger long enough on the number 13.111 
Exemplifiers often need to come across as even-handed and fair, especially when they
are representing a collective domain with politically charged diversities. It is no coincidence
that the Italian dialogue in the example at the beginning of the section is between one man
and one woman, not between two men or two women. It has become almost a cliche for
American university admissions prospectuses to depict students of several races on their
cover photos. When the structure of the slot being filled makes it only possible to choose one
exemplifier, several different strategies emerge. Sometimes, "legacy" inequalities and
defaults persist (despite their injustices) in, for example, the tendency for their to be much
more general agreement on the primacy of "John Doe" and "Otto Normalverbraucher" as
stand-in personal names in English and German than on the primacy of any particular
female equivalents, and in the tendency of the male names to be used for people of both
sexes. Sometimes, we see an effort at rectifying injustice by deliberately choosing an
exemplifier from an ostensibly disadvantaged group (the idea being that such usage will help
create a sense of equality for members of that group). The "Juanita" example above shows a
deliberate symbolic effort to convey a sense of equal opportunity to the Spanish-speaking
community in America. As for the lexicon, some people use conditional sentences like
"imagine that you step on someone's toe and she …" Such efforts sometimes work, and
sometimes come across as heavy-handed and forced.112
An entire book could be written about stand-ins. This section is just a very brief but
hopefully helpful summary. In conclusion, let me say a word about the translation of stand-
ins between one culture and another. It is a curious phenomenon because, instead of the
111 This example comes from John Van Maanen, Tales of the field: on writing ethnography (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 110. A somewhat similar example was the cunning use of
"Nacirema," a pseudonym derived from the actual name by a reversible process, in the classic article
about American hygienic norms by Horace Miner, "Body ritual among the Nacirema," American
Anthropologist 58 (1956): 503-507. For a description of the consequences of having no self-destruct
feature built into a pseudonym, see Satterlee, "A Case for Smilla."
112 The choice between being fair or heavy-handed can, in such cases where you are limited to a single
exemplifier, make you feel damned if you do and damned if you don't. It is therefore perhaps not
surprising that some choose a third way, a neither-nor strategy which avoids the horns of the dilemma.
Witness the increasing popularity of "they" as a singular third person pronoun in English.
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translator's usual task of determining which member of a specific contrast set in language Y
to use to match a specific member of the corresponding contrast set in language X, the
translator must figure out which part of the contrast set in Y has been marked out as non-
referential. Such translation is not so difficult when a conventional stand-in exists (for
example, "Karakószörsög" is the conventional Hungarian equivalent of the pejorative
American English metasyntactic town name "Podunk," although I had to find this out by
asking a Hungarian rather than looking in my English-Hungarian dictionary). However,
when no conventional stand-in exists, such translations present a particularly interesting
challenge. The translation of Lewis Carroll's semi-nonsense poem Jabberwocky, although it
involves nonsense words instead of stand-ins, is a fine and well-known illustration of the
problem.113 The task is, instead of translating one word to another on the basis that they refer
to the same thing in different languages, finding equivalents for words on the basis that both
are within the domain of potential words but "outside" the set of words that has been
conventionally created within that domain. In the specific case of Jabberwocky, the
complicating and enriching factor is that since even nonsense words can convey meaning by
virtue of sound-symbolism, phonesthemes or by analogy to other words, the translator needs
to choose "meaningless" words in the target language that are "meaningless" in the same way
(or an equally interesting if different way) as the words in the original.
113 On translations of Jabberwocky see Keith Lim, "Jabberwocky variations,"
http://www76.pair.com/keithlim/jabberwocky/index.html (April 2004); Jessica Augustsson,
"Jabberwocky," http://www.augustsson.net/jessica/Jabberwocky (April 2004); David Shaw, "Glorious
nonsense," http://www.jabberwocky.com/carroll/jabber (April 2004); Douglas Hofstadter, Gödel,
Escher, Bach: an eternal golden braid (New York: Basic Books, 1979), pp. 366-368, 372-373. 
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4 Mapping
Consider the names of the ten provinces of Canada. There is nothing about the form
of the name which tells you anything about those provinces themselves. It is possible to sort
the provinces themselves by any number of criteria — west to east, east to west, date of
accession to the union, population, whatever. It is possible to sort the names as well — by
alphabetical order, or length, or quality of the first vowel. In the lists that result, there would
be no correlation between the order of the provinces and the order of the names, except
perhaps by chance.
Now think of the system used to label interstate highway numbers in the United
States (or in the many other countries which use a similar principle). The major highways
use numbers greater than zero and less than 100. In America, odd-numbered highways run
north-south and even-numbered ones run east-west. The easternmost odd-numbered
highways and southernmost even-numbered highways have the lowest numbers. There is
thus a direct relationship — in fact, two direct relationships — between the number that
labels the road, and other aspects of the road, namely its axis of travel and its latitude or
longitude. This kind of labeling relationship is an example of what I call a mapping.
I use the word "mapping" to mean a type of labeling in which a principled or iconic
relationship is created between a contrast set and a label set. A mapping is a labeling
relationship which involves a regular, predictable correlation between certain attributes of
the elements of the respective sets. One could, alternatively, call mapping simply "iconic
labeling" or "principled labeling." I often use a bracket notation to express a particular
mapping principle, so that the two mapping principles in American highway numbering can
be expressed by the notation {east-to-west, north-to-south} = {even, odd} and {south or
east : north or west} = {lower number : higher number}. In the bracket notation, the
elements within a single set of brackets are the set of members or polarities within a contrast
set (colons divide polarities, commas divide set members). Although I normally discuss
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mapping as something that applies only between contrast sets and their label sets, one can
also speak of mappings involving domains, and I will occasionally mention such examples. 
As with any labeling linkage, there is an
inequality between the two contrast sets involved
in a mapping. One of the sets labels the other. In
this chapter, I will use the terms "source set" and
"target set" to refer to these two paired roles (or,
when appropriate, "source domain" and "target
domain"). The target set labels the source set.
Although the terminological pairs signified and
signifier, thing and word, referent and symbol, and
so forth often get used to label the two roles in
mappings, these very singular words fail to convey
the plural and collective flavor appropriate to
thinking about sets of signifiers and signifieds
instead of individual pairs. The terms signantia
and signata, which were used by Roman Jakobson and Linda Waugh,1 do have a plural
flavor, but are unfamiliar and difficult to tell apart. 
The six drawings in Image 4.1 illustrate different types of mappings. The first drawing
("Signification") shows a single entity which is labeled by a single signifier. This is not a case
of mapping or even of labeling (because it does not involve multiple members of sets) and it
is included to highlight how mapping and labeling differ from simple signification. Any
average word in the lexicon could serve as an example of this kind of signification, as could
an example such as "Kraków is the Boston of Poland" which connects two points in the
domains of "the United States" and "Poland."
1 Roman Jakobson and Linda R. Waugh, The sound shape of language (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1979), p. 196. (Also published as Jakobson, Selected writings, volume 8. Berlin:
Mouton de Gruyter, 1988.)
Clarification of signification 
terminology used in this book
Unavoidably, for the purposes of this book I 
have had to conventionally settle on a 
particular terminology to discuss processes of 
signification. In the terminology I have 
adopted, mapping is a type of labeling and 
labeling is a type of signification.
● links between signifiers and signifieds: 
signification
● links between entire sets of signifiers and 
sets of signifieds: labeling
● signifier-signified links that are not parts 
of sets: signification that is not 
labeling
● links between contrast sets and labels 
based on a principle: mapping
● links between contrast sets and labels not 
based on a principle: labeling that is not 
mapping
It might have been less confusing to call 
mapping "principled labeling," since the term 
"mapping" has been used in a different way 
by authors such as Fauconnier. But it is a 
short and convenient word, and moreover, 
one appropriate to the meaning it is used for.
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The second drawing
("Labeling") shows a set of six labels
which are attached to the six
members of a contrast set. In this
particular case, the linkage is
exhaustive, in that all the points in
both sets are linked. An example of
this kind of labeling would be the
way that American radio station call
letters label frequencies, or the relationship between the letters of the alphabet and the
sounds they stand for, in which two contrast sets are linked but there is no principle to the
linkage.
The third drawing ("Mapping") shows the same situation, with the added difference
that it is mapping, not labeling: it proceeds by taking account of correspondences between
some aspect of the source set and some aspect of the target set. In the diagram, "leftness" and
"rightness" are the aspects of both sets that are used; the leftmost member of the source set
is mapped to the leftmost member of the target set. In reality, any aspect of the source and
target sets could be used. Simple examples of mapping are the way pages are numbered in a
book (the "frontness" of the page corresponds to the "lowness" of the number), or the way
that streetnames work in certain parts of Washington, D.C. (the number of syllables in the
streetname corresponds to the street's distance from the center of the city).
The fourth drawing ("Domain Mapping") shows a somewhat similar mapping, but
one in which the source and target are continuous domains instead of contrast sets. The
characteristics of these domains vary smoothly instead of discretely. The mapping between
the domains involves, metaphorically speaking, "contact" between the entire "surface" of
both domains rather than links between specific points or entities. An example of this kind of
mapping is the relationship between a physical quantity, such as weight or temperature, and
an analog instrument dial which measures that quantity (such as the one on your bathroom
Image 4.1 (079)
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scale), abstracting away from any marks which impose a unit scale on the movement of that
dial.
The fifth drawing ("Domain-to-set mapping") is similar to the third and fourth
pictures, except that in this case the mapping is between a domain and a contrast set. An
example of this kind of mapping is that between the domain of temperature and the units of
the Celsius scale used on a digital thermometer which reads to the nearest single degree.
However, I suggest that it is easier to consider this kind of mapping as a combination of two
processes, the first being the creation of units within the domain, and the second being a
mapping from the resulting contrast set to an appropriate label set (for example, the creation
of divisions within the domain of temperature by means of the Celsius scale and then the
mapping of the set of those divisions to a set of labels).
The sixth drawing ("Polar mapping") shows the case in which two binary polarities
are mapped onto each other. A literal example of this kind of "mapping" is the cartographer's
choice of how to map the polarity {north : south} onto {up : down}. There are only two ways
to align a pair of polarities — in the map case, either {north : south} = {up : down} or {north :
south} = {down : up}. Another example is the choice of whether to put the low notes on the
left or the right of a keyboard, the source and target sets here being {left : right} and {low :
high} respectively. This type of mapping is familiar to many people because it is very
common in orientational metaphors such as "happy is up, sad is down."2 In many polar
mappings, the polarities are facts of nature but the choice of which way to map them is made
by the workshop.
In cognitive science, the term "mapping" is often used in studies of analogy, a
tradition in which Dedre Gentner's "Structure-mapping: a theoretical framework for
analogy" (1983) is the seminal article.3 My use of the terms "source" and "target" is taken
directly from these authors' use of "source domain" and "target domain." But this tradition
2 See George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors we live by (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1980), chapter 4.
3 Dedre Gentner, "Structure-mapping: a theoretical framework for analogy," Cognitive Science 7
(1983): 155-170.
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use the terms "domain," "mapping," and "cross-domain mapping" in a way distinctly
different than mine. Essentially, these authors' domains are schemas and scenarios. My
domains are sets of hyponyms. Their analogical mappings deliberately and purposefully
carry over the internal relations between the elements of both domains. My contrast set
mappings are first and foremost one-to-one mappings between the members of two sets of
hyponyms. The two types of "mappings" connect different types of material. 
However, contrast set mappings are, like analogical mappings, "relational." Indeed, in
my terms, a relational element (an iconic principle or correlation) is what distinguishes
mapping from mere labeling. I mean that, in mappings, the relation between the elements of
a label set does indeed in some way correlate with the relation between the elements of a
contrast set. But the second key difference between analogical mappings and contrast set
mappings is this: the point of analogical mappings is to understand the target domain in
terms of the source, while the point of contrast set mappings is primarily to label the source
domain, but to do it in a slightly richer and more meaningful way. A further difference is
that, at least in the examples I use, the relational structures of the source sets that are
replicated in the target sets are generally relatively primitive and crude ones (of sequence or
position in the set) — not the complex relations that hold between the different elements of
image or verbal or action schemas.
One might try to sum up the difference between analogical and contrast set mappings
by saying that the tradition stemming from Gentner studies analogues for the syntagmatic
relationship between several elements of a set, where I am interested in how we create
analogues for the paradigmatic relationship between several elements of a set. Concisely put,
the Gentner tradition is more interested in the mapping from the concepts {two, four} to
{three, six} or {five, ten}. I am more interested in describing the mapping from {two, four} to
{2, 4} or {II, IV} or {二, 四}.
I have had difficulty finding a satisfactory discussion of these "paradigmatic" or
"hyponymic" or "contrast set" mappings within the existing semiotic, lexical-semantic, and
cognitive science literature. The most broad-minded source I have found so far, and one
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which does explicitly recognize them, is Donald Norman's popular discussion of mappings.
Norman defines "mapping" very generally as "a technical term meaning the relation between
two things" and gives some examples comparable to those I discuss.4 Umberto Eco comes
close to a theory of such mappings when he discusses the establishment of correlations
between the "expression plane" and "the content plane" (examples of which would be a
contrast set and its labels), but he does not make the final step from talking about single links
to principles that govern many links.5 Paul Kay lays out a useful theory of labeling in
taxonomies which explicitly uses the term "mapping," but he does not generalize the theory
beyond strictly lexical taxonomies and he reviews only a minimum of concrete cases.6 The
title of one of Gilles Fauconnier's books (Mappings in thought and language) raised my
hopes, but he mentions contrast set mappings only in passing, using the term "projection
mappings"; for the most part the book is interested in other phenomena.7 Mathematicians do
discuss "many-to-many" and "one-to-one" mappings in the description of functions. And
cryptographers use the term "mapping" in a way similar to my use of the term labeling
(speaking, for example, of the mapping between plaintext and ciphertext).8 Database
designers have also come up with concepts analogous to those I use here. But not
surprisingly, these technical fields' expositions of mapping do not generally make the link to
the issue of designing conventional mappings for everyday use.
The rest of this section goes into more detail about how mapping works, includes
many examples of mapping design, and draws design advice conclusions about how to map.
The section's focus is on mapping design, and the major issue for mapping designers is the
choice of the principles which relate attributes of the source set to attributes of the target set.
I will also mention in passing certain mappings which (whether natural or emergent) are not
4 Donald A. Norman, The design of everyday things (New York: Doubleday, 1990), pp. 23-27.
5 Umberto Eco, A theory of semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), p. 50. The
contrast between "expression" and "content" planes traces to Louis Hjelmslev, Prolegomena to a
theory of language (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961 [1943]), pp. 47-48, 59-60.
6 Paul Kay, "Taxonomy and semantic contrast," Language 47 (1971): 866-887.
7 Gilles Fauconnier, Mappings in thought and language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997), pp. 1, 9.
8 See Bruce Schneier, Applied cryptography (2nd ed., New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996), pp. 2-3.
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products of the workshop, such as "iconicity" in language and other systematic form-
meaning relationships. I also discuss ordering standards for contrast sets (which are formally
similar to mappings), and the issue of optimality in mapping and labeling (the
communication of one set of distinctions by means of another in the most efficient, elegant,
and easy-to-use possible way). I finish the chapter with a sections on private labels and
mappings, and a discussion of "the case of the revolving restaurant," both topics that build
on the cumulative understanding of contrast sets, labels, and mapping that this chapter and
the previous two have built up.
4.1 The nature of mapping principles
There are several traditional ways of defining or describing mapping principles which
come originally from the study of mapping in the lexicon (or iconicity, as lexical mapping is
often called). One is to say that mappings are relationships between the signifier and the
signified — to be more precise, systematic relationships between a set of signifiers and a set
of signifieds. Another is to say that mappings are the quality which a set of signifiers
possesses when those signifiers have been chosen according to a set of principles which
derives each signifier from some attribute of the signified, or which at least constrain our
choice of signifier for each signified. Social scientists might find it helpful to think of the
(imperfect) analogy between mapping and correlation, in which a label set, a contrast set,
and the relationship between them can be likened to a dependent variable, an independent
variable, and a significant correlation between the two (if one is willing to muddle the
distinction between causality and representation). The broadest definition of mapping is to
say that given two sets or two domains (or a set and a domain), where one is the source and
the other is the target, it is any kind of principled relationship between attributes of the
elements of source and target set members.
In all such situations — going back to the original terms of Plato's Cratylus,9 the
earliest surviving treatment of the issue of mapping in the lexicon — to know the name is to
9 Quoted by, among others, Roger Brown, Words and things (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press of Glencoe,
1958), p. 110.
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know something about the thing, once you have figured out the system that relates the two.
Another way of phrasing it is to say that in mapping, the form of a label gives clues to its
meaning. In naive terms, people might describe mappings by saying that they have a
structure, a system, a kind of architecture, or a consistency to them.
Not only does mapping allows people to predict relationships between labels and the
things they label, it allows a labeling system to be expressed, at least in part, by stating its
principle rather than by listing each individual link. This mapping principle can be applied to
any given label or entity to generate at least some aspects of the corresponding entity or
label. For example, it is simpler to store the naming convention for New York City street
numbers as a principle (streets are labeled by consecutive numerals and the further north,
the higher the numeral) than by remembering every individual link between street name and
street.
This is generally seen as a positive thing, the idea being that the retrieval and
manipulation of contrast sets is much easier when the are labeled by principle rather than
without a principle.10 The design advice given in this chapter proceeds from the assumption
that, all other things equal, a mapped label set is usually more convenient for users than an
unmapped one.
As an example of how not just the retrieval but also the use of a contrast set becomes
easier when one maps instead of labels, consider that if you are on 79th Street in New York
City and understand the street naming system, you have a good idea of where 81st Street
might be, whereas knowing that you are on Lexington Avenue does not tell you where Park
Avenue is unless you have memorized the individual links between avenue names and
avenues. Similarly, if you are playing the piano (at least in the key of C) and know how to
read music, you can be sure that a note a little higher on the staff will be a little further to the
right on the piano. The key here is how mapping creates what I call navigational ability in a
contrast set. If you know there is a principle to the linkages between contrast set members
10 See Thomas Crump, The anthropology of numbers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990),
pp. 29-30.
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and their labels, and you know what that principle is, and you know that signifier X1 refers to
referent Y1, and you are given signifier X2, you can predict, or at least guess, the nature of its
referent Y2. (You may also be able to guess X2 if given Y2.) A mapping is, thus, like a linear
equation (if it is determinative) or a regression line (if it is only suggestive) which allows one
sometimes to determine and always at least to make an educated guess at the value of one
quantity, if you know the value of the other quantity.
Mapping requires a certain amount of isomorphism between the topologies of the
source and target sets, whereas plain labeling can take place between two contrast sets with
different topologies. Thus the material used as a target set in mapping depends on the
topology of the source set. If the source set is linear, the target set should be too. If the source
of a mapping is a continuous domain, the target must naturally also be a continuous domain.
For example, a thermometer maps the continuous variation in temperature onto the
continuous variation in the level of the mercury in the tube.
The source set topology that really matters, however, is actually that of the particular
attribute of the source set that is reflected by the target set. The relationship between target
and source sets is never to everything about the source set members, but only to certain
aspects of those members, which designers select and users are ideally aware of. Thus New
York City street numbers relate to how far north or south the street is, not the average height
of the buildings; American interstate highway numbers relate to the geographical position of
the highway, not how much it cost to build; and airport codes relate to the name of the
airport or city, not to the length of the longest airport runway or to the name of the architect
of the most recent airport terminal.
For linear source sets, numeric labels are the most commonly used material used to
make target sets. Numeric labels commonly reflect the temporal, spatial, or narrative order
in which they were assigned: in New York City, the higher the street number, the further
north the street. The first six digits of Icelandic identification numbers encode the holder's
§ 4.1 162
date of birth.11 Assigning even numbers to north- and east-bound flights, and odd numbers to
south- and west-bound flights, is one of several iconic conventions used in airline flight
numbering.12 Although one might think that because of privacy concerns, American Social
Security numbers would be non-iconic (so that nothing about an individual could be
predicted from their ID number), in fact the first three numbers straightforwardly reflect the
state of issue.13 (The Social Security Administration maintains a page on their website
specifically to debunk the myth that the fourth and fifth numbers code a person's racial
identity.14)
Despite the fundamentalness of numbering as a mapping strategy, it is important to
remember that it is a strategy that did have to be discovered and popularized. Bertrand
Russell comments that "it must have required many ages to discover that a brace of
pheasants and a couple of days were both instances of the number 2; the degree of
abstraction is far from easy."15) Using numbers as target sets is yet a further development
from the idea of counting. There is, as well, other labeling material that serves easily as a
target set for linear source sets, such as the letters of the alphabet.
In mapping, as opposed to labeling, not only must the topologies of the domains
correspond, but also the relational structure within the domains must carry over.16 For
example, in the travel bookstore where I once worked, different regions of the world
corresponded to different bookshelves in the store, but did not do so in a principled way; if
you knew that books on region X1 were on shelf Y1, you could not predict which shelf books
11 "Kennitala — reikningsaðferð," http://www.hagstofa.is/template38.asp?PageID=808 (October
2003).
12 Mary Breslin, "Flying by the numbers: destinations, whimsy help airlines pick flight symbols,"
Chicago Tribune, 6 April 1997, section 12, p. 1.
13 "Quick intro — Social Security numbers," http://www.ssa.gov/history/ssn/ssncards.html (January
2005). 
14 "The SSN numbering scheme — Debunking a myth." http://www.ssa.gov/history/ssnmyth.html
(January 2005).
15 Quoted by Crump, The anthropology of numbers, p. 10. See also pp. 83-87.
16 Douglas Hofstadter makes the same point, using the term "isomorphism" to describe a linkage
between two "complex structures … in such a way that to each part of one structure there is a
corresponding part in the other structure, where 'corresponding' means that the two parts play similar
roles in their respective structures." Gödel, Escher, Bach: an eternal golden braid (New York: Basic
Books, 1979), p. 49. 
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on region X2 would be on. This was, then, labeling instead of mapping, because the relational
structure of the shelves did not match anything about the relational structure of the regions.
A more complicated example of a topological isomorphism in which the relational
principles between the members of each set do not fully hold (and which thus fails to qualify
as a mapping) is Douglas Hofstadter's search for the "Bloomington of California."17 Consider
as well that I regularly do tell tour group participants that Kraków is the "Boston of Poland";
that a culinary memoirist calls pastry chefs the "neurologists of cooking";18 that a Norwegian
scholar of language standardization described Vuk Karadžić as the Ivar Aasen of Yugoslavia,
and vice versa;19 and that one might speak of the "Cadillac of beers" or the "Harvard of the
West." What is amusing about these examples is that although the link between single
instantiations in the source and target domains cannot be extended to a "full-body" mapping
between all of the instantiations, they do invite us to imagine trying. Specifically, the
topologies of Indiana and California, the United States and Poland, or the domain of doctor
specializations and culinary specializations are sufficiently isomorphic to try mapping the
instantiations of each domain onto one another. And the single relations between {Kraków :
rest of Poland} and {Boston : rest of America} do map onto each other. But the relational
correspondence does not necessarily go further; we cannot find links for all the other points
in the domains, and thus the attempt fails not only as mapping but also as an exhaustive
labeling of all set members. The breakdown of this correspondence provides many comic
opportunities as we fruitlessly search for, say, the Edsel of beers or the sommelier of the
medical world.
Returning to typical mappings such as the New York City street numbers, another
important issue is whether mappings are determinative or suggestive. If a mapping is totally
determinative, one can take the features of a source set member and work out from the
17 Douglas R. Hofstadter, Fluid concepts & creative analogies: computer models of the fundamental
mechanisms of thought (New York: Basic Books, 1995), p. 331.
18 Anthony Bourdain, Kitchen confidential: adventures in the culinary underbelly (New York: Ecco
Press, 2000), p. 62.
19 Einar Haugen, "Linguistics and language planning," in The ecology of language: essays by Einar
Haugen, pp. 159-190 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972 [1966]), p. 187.
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mapping principle exactly what the corresponding member of the target set wil look like. A
determinative principle leaves no freedom to choose the label that will signify a particular
member of the source set. (Certain signifiers — those called indices or indicators in
classifications of signs derived from the theories of C.S. Peirce20 or symptomic signs by
Keller21 — are always determinative. Note that the other types of signifiers in these
classifications — iconic and symbolic signs — are not necessarily not determinative.) 
If an iconic principle is only partially determinative, it specifies something about the
form of that label but not everything, and leaves the system's designer a certain amount of
wiggle room to decide the actual form of the label. Within this wiggle room the labeling
remains a conventional product of the workshop and its form may be the result of a
somewhat arbitrary decision. For example, there is already a conventional iconic or at least
motivated principle for airline flight numbers in which east-west flights are numbered with
odd numbers and west-east flights with even numbers. Within those restrictions, however,
there is a lot of wiggle room to number flights however the airlines want — a given east-west
flight could be labeled with any odd number. Ultimately, we may number things randomly;
we may choose a new mapping principle which applies at this sublevel within the constraints
of the larger principle; or we may take advantage of our wiggle room to make whimsical,
individual labeling choices which appeal to our sense of humor and play, such as the ones
that have resulted, in the United States, in United Airlines flight 1776 to Boston (center of the
American Revolution whose Declaration of Independence was signed in the year 1776) and
flight 1492 to Columbus, Ohio.22 Scholars of iconicity in language have often described
partially determined target sets as motivated, a word that describes the middle ground in
between complete specification and complete lack of specification. 
A case which stretches the concept of mapping slightly is that of abbreviation, which
operates on names. Abbreviations are distinguished by the fact that the source and target
20 Eviatar Zerubavel, Social mindscapes: an invitation to cognitive sociology (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1997) , pp. 69-72, among others, gives an introduction to Peirce's distinction.
21 Rudi Keller, A theory of linguistic signs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 [1995]), p. 100.
22 Breslin, "Flying by the numbers."
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domains are made of the same material.23 Thus both an abbreviation and the thing it
abbreviates are usually made of letters or the elements of a writing system. The relation
between source and target is that the abbreviation usually selects certain elements of its
source and is thus constrained in potential form by the makeup of the source. Consider that
three-letter airport codes generally bear some relationship to some alphabetical attribute of
the airport that they stand for, whether it is the name of the city it is in (e.g., BOS for Logan
Airport in Boston) or the name of the airport itself (e.g., JFK for John F. Kennedy
International Airport in Queens), which is why people sometimes have trouble remembering
that the ISO 3166 code for "Switzerland" is CH (as in Confederatio Helvetica, its Latin name),
not SW, SV, SU or SC (as in Switzerland, Svizzera, Suisse, or Schweiz). While the form of
abbreviations is motivated, there is not necessarily a clear principle which determines their
form, although the acrophonic principle (that the first letter of a word has special
prominence) does exert a strong influence on the form of abbreviations.24 The abbreviations
for universities, in languages as diverse as English and Chinese, typically string together the
initial written symbols in each word of the university's name (thus RU for Rutgers
University, and 哈工大 Hāgōngdà for 哈尔滨工业大学 Hārbīn Gōngyè Dàxué or "Harbin
Institute of Technology"). The postal code for Ontario is ON while Saskatchewan is SK. In the
case of postal abbreviations for American states or Canadian provinces, the process of
abbreviation operates on a bounded contrast set of names for a bounded contrast set of
geographical entities, and the target set is a bounded set of 676 (26 x 26) two-letter
sequences. In the wider world of general abbreviations for all sorts of things, although it is
easy to think of abbreviations as both labels and mappings, what makes them different is that
like the lexicon, they do not always operate on contrast sets. The set of things that gets
abbreviated is unbounded and lacks a natural topology. The relationship between a name
23 This fact that the source and target sets involve the same material means that abbreviations are
effectively exempt from the requirement that there be a correspondence between the topologies of the
two sets; in many cases of abbreviation neither set can really be said to have a topology.
24 For a discussion of the acrophonic principle in the history of writing systems, especially the process
by which a sound came to be represented by a drawing of something whose name begins with that
sound, see John DeFrancis, Visible speech: the diverse oneness of writing systems (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 1989), p. 277.
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and its abbreviation is often an individual case of signification which does not necessarily
have a sense of paradigmatic "sisterhood" with other abbreviations. 
If one wants to open up the scope of the concept of "mapping" as broadly as possible,
one can actually apply it to any design task where two contrast sets are linked to each other.
To ask whether two such contrast sets are "mapped" is to ask whether this linkage proceeds
in a systematic way. Donald Norman, for example, emphasizes the art of matching the
location and appearance of switches to something about the thing that they control (lights or
oven burners, for example).25 Since the switches are derivative of the thing they control, and
some aspect of the switches might by design replicate some aspect of the things controlled,
the mapping concept can be made to apply to such situations, but such "mapping" no longer
really involves signification.
4.2 Mapping in the lexicon
Mapping has a long and controversial history as a topic in linguistics, in which it is
often referred to as iconicity or sound symbolism.26 The age-old question of whether the
form of a word bears an arbitrary or motivated relationship to its meaning is usually resolved
in introductory linguistics classes these days by treating form-meaning relationships that
work according to a principle as somewhat cute exceptions to the general rule that the
relationship between linguistic form and linguistic meaning is arbitrary. Thus a
tremendously popular recent introductory text tells us that "Since a word is a pure symbol,
the relation between its sound and meaning is utterly arbitrary" and then dismisses certain
exceptions to this rule as a "quaint curiosity."27 
25 Donald A. Norman, The design of everyday things (New York: Doubleday, 1990), pp. 94-97.
26 On the terminology of lexical mappings see, among others, John Lyons, Semantics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1977), 1: 105.
27 Steven Pinker, The language instinct (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), pp. 152, 166-167. Even
Ferdinand de Saussure's famous textbook introduces the principle of arbitrariness quite strongly
(Course in general linguistics, (London: Duckworth, 1983 [1916]), pp. [100]-[102]) and only then
admits certain exceptions to it (pp. [102], [180]-[184]).
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There is overwhelming scholarly recognition that mapping principles do affect the
form of the lexicon.28 There are emergent principles which operate conventionally within the
limits of particular speech communities. There also seem to be certain natural principles
which surface in many different languages. Yet some linguists can be so zealous in their
desire to establish that linguistic form is arbitrary and abstract, that they make too much of
the fact that when these principles exist, they do not usually fully determine the form of the
words in the lexicon that they affect. This leads them to the point of implying that the form of
words is never even influenced by mapping principles, and thus disregarding even the small
degree of effect that those principles have. Thus the general linguistics text mentioned above
tells us that "Onomatopoeia … is almost as conventional as any other word sound."29 
This bias against form-meaning relationships comes through even in the study of the
obviously iconic domain of animal-sound words. A popular textbook in historical
linguistics,30 and the introductory matter of the "Sounds of the World's Animals" website
maintained at the Georgetown University linguistics department,31 both chose to focus on the
minor differences between different languages' words for the same animal sound as evidence
of arbitrariness, rather than on their overwhelming acoustic similarities as evidence of
motivation by the actual sound of the animal's vocalism.32 
28 See, for example, Leanne Hinton, Johanna Nichols, and John J. Ohala, Sound symbolism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Brown, Words and things, chapter 4; Eco, A theory of
semiotics, pp. 191-217; Lyons, Semantics, 1: 99-109; Alessandro Duranti, Linguistic anthropology
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 205-207. See also Paul Friedrich, "The lexical
symbol and its relative non-arbitrariness," in Linguistics and anthropology in honor of C.F. Voegelin,
edited by M. Dale Kinkade, Kenneth L. Hale, and Oswald Werner, pp. 199-247 (Lisse: Peter de Ridder
Press, 1975); Jakobson and Waugh, The sound shape of language, pp. 181-207; Benjamin Bergen, "The
psychological reality of phonaesthemes," Language 80 (2004): 290-311, esp. section 5.2.
29 Pinker, The language instinct, p. 152.
30 The textbook tells us: "We need merely note that English speakers reproduce the barking of a dog as
bow-wow, whereas Japanese hear a dog saying won-won and Turkish dogs bark by pronouncing the
syllables hav-hav." — Anthony Arlotto, Introduction to historical linguistics (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1972), p. 34. 
31 The website tells us: "Animals make much the same sounds around the world, but each language
expresses them differently. English and French cows sound the same, but not in English and French!"
— Catherine Ball, "Sounds of the world's animals,"
http://www.georgetown.edu/cball/animals/animals.html (January 2005).
32 In actual fact most words for canine vocalisms (which are just one of many examples) contain at least
three of the following four items: a velar constriction, a labial constriction, a low back vowel, and an r.
That there are similar cross-linguistic tendencies in other animal-call words can be seen by a quick look
through a childrens' book like Hank De Zutter's Who says a dog goes bow-wow? (New York:
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This is simply a matter of seeing the glass as half empty rather than half full, by
focusing on the remaining wiggle room in the form of a motivated sign, rather than on the
existence of motivation and constraint. That an element of conventionality exists even in
motivated words demonstrates how one should not imagine that iconicity and mapping
principles are necessarily determinative, but does not call into question the fact that non-
arbitrary form-meaning relationships exist, and quite widely so.33 This realization is often
phrased by saying that iconic principles may motivate without determining.
To me, it seems that the tendency to belittle iconicity is greatest among those
linguists who are committed to an autonomous or modular view of language (the idea that it
forms a separate organ in the brain). Perhaps that is because iconicity threatens theories of
linguistic autonomy and modularity by pointing out systematic links between the lexicon and
aspects of cognition entirely outside language.
Against the background of this debate, it is of course fascinating to see that outside of
the lexicon, in the world of consciously designed contrast set mappings, iconicity is not only
common, but valued. It seems very useful for the members of a target set to bear some
relationship to the source set. Indeed, in the deliberate design of labels for contrast sets, one
can actually argue that the use of an obvious mapping principle increases the designer's
chances of success.34 At the very least, resolving the question of whether one should use one
is one of the most important decisions of the workshop.
There is, however, a reason why mappings in the lexicon are relatively rare, and
mappings in constructed label systems so much more common. It is a direct consequence of
the fact that semantic domains in the lexicon rarely have a simple topology, whereas the
Doubleday, 1993). Linguists who have been taught to see the disjunct contrast set of phonemes more
readily than the acoustic similarities in the underlying domain of sound might understandably
overlook these patterns.
33 Rudi Keller, in A theory of linguistic signs, chapter 10 ("Arbitrariness versus motivatedness"), pp.
130-140, and Umberto Eco, in A theory of semiotics, pp. 191-217, do a particularly good job of making
this point.
34 This argument has two components: one is that any newly created sign must be motivated in some
way, and the other is that a newly created sign is more likely to catch on and spread if that motivation
is apparent to potential users. On the first point, see Edmond L. Wright, "Arbitrariness and motivation:
a new theory," Foundations of Language 14 (1976): 505-523, pp. 515, 517. On the second point, see
Keller, A theory of linguistic signs, p. 140. 
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domains that contrast sets are formed out of frequently do have a simple topology. Not
surprisingly, the search for iconicity in the lexicon has borne the most fruit when it has been
conducted on those sets of lexical terms which are closed (or at least well defined), and are
similar enough to share distinct attributes or features — size, age, longitude, name, and so
forth — that can be measured, compared, and checked for statistical correlations with some
aspect of the word that signifies them. Thus, for example, using corpuses of Central
American bird and fish names, Brent Berlin has demonstrated systematic correlations in
certain Central American languages between the size of a bird or fish and the quality of the
vowels in its name.35 He was able to do this because one can measure and compare the length
of different birds and different fish, and because there is a fairly clear natural boundary
between birds and non-birds, and fish and non-fish. It might not be going too far to say that
iconicity in the lexicon can only be evaluated for such sets of terms. 
Such sets are, however, not particularly abundant in the lexicon. Mostly the lexicon
does not consist of closed paradigmatic classes, and groups of lexical items rarely possess one
obviously salient variable to which their labels can be mapped. The tomato in my
refrigerator, the cutting board in my kitchen drawer, and the light fixture above the stove are
not particularly equivalent nor is there any obvious need for a mapping system to label them.
But many contrast sets, especially those created in the workshop, routinely constitute
well-defined sets whose members share measurable features. Contrast sets such as airports,
telephone area codes, and New York City streets all have attributes (such as city name,
population, and latitude) that can be systematically measured, and there is quite a clear
boundary between items that belong to the set or do not. And when labels are also
deliberately planned, not emergent, one can easily ensure that a mapping principle is carried
out consistently through all links between a contrast set and label set. For example, in a mail
order business, where it is extremely important to keep the hundreds or thousands of
35 Brent Berlin, Ethnobiological classification (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), chapter 6.
See also Berlin, "Evidence for pervasive synesthetic sound symbolism in ethnozoological
nomenclature," in Sound symbolism, edited by Leanne Hinton, Johanna Nichols, and John J. Ohala
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 76-93.
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equivalent pending orders distinct and to have some easily sortable way of referring to each
one, one can easily pick out an attribute to use as the input to a labeling principle, such as an
order's position in a chronological sequence, and apply it dependably.
Overall, the ability to sustain a mapping instead of plain labeling requires that both
the source set and the target set be able to support it. And while emergent, self-ordering
mappings do occur, mapping comes about much more often through deliberate planning.
While investigations of iconicity in language have been all about looking for correlation in
the emergent label set of language, the rest of this chapter returns to the subject of designing
correlation as opposed to trying to asking whether it exists in the world we inherit.
4.3 The design of target sets 
The designers of the floor labeling system in the Sydney Casino
parking lot in Sydney, Australia seem to have been trying to use mapping
principles to label the contrast set of floors — but their efforts fell short
of the mark. The table lists the correspondences they set up, while Image
4.2 shows the elevator buttons.
Floor Color Image
1 (highest) green bird
2 yellow moon and stars
3 purple crocodile
4 pink snail or shell
5 (lowest) blue whale or fish
Surely the colors and images make it easier to remember what floor you parked on
than if all you had to go by was the floor number. However, they do so as a set of
unprincipled labels rather than as a consistent mapping. The colors are not organized in any
obvious order. While there seems to be a loose relationship between the altitude of the
parking lot level and the altitude of the image, it does not hold fully (the moon is higher than
any bird), and such a mapping is sufficiently unconventional that one doubts many users
would notice it. The designers did build in a floor numbering system with a clear mapping
principle: {lower number : higher number} = {physically up : physically down}. However,
Image 4.2 (035)
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although this mapping is not unusual in buildings which are largely underground, it would
not be surprising if some users of the system naively expected the reverse polarity. The
overall result is that if you are standing on floor 3, see a picture of a purple crocodile, and
remember only that you parked by the green bird, you have no information which tells you
which direction your car is in. You only know it is not on the floor where you currently are.
Even if you are on floor 3 and know you parked on floor 4, and have correctly guessed that
you are only one floor away from your car, you still might not know whether to go up one or
down.
This example shows that the goal of mapping design is to help users navigate
successfully among the members of a contrast set, reasoning in the same way described by
the tour guide in the bus parking lot (see section 2.10). Mapping designers want users who
parked by label X1 (say, the lion) to know that being near label X2 (say, the elephant) has a
certain meaning for how they should look for their vehicle — and want users to be able to
work out what that meaning is.
Image 4.3, courtesy of Martijn Geerdes of the Bureau
Mijksenaar wayfinding signage consultancy in Amsterdam, shows a
very clear example of a target set which has the proper topology for
a multilevel parking lot. It was considered for (but not used on) a
parking garage in Arnhem in the Netherlands. The four levels were
to be labeled, from top to bottom, with the head, neck, body, and
legs of a giraffe. The partitioning of the giraffe has the same
topology as the partitioning of the parking lot. The reason that this
target set was not used probably has more to do with the unconventionality of the target set
material rather than with anything about its topology.
The discipline that has thought the most about the labeling, visual communication,
and graphic representation of linear contrast sets is cartography. Solving the familiar
cartographic problem of partitioning continuous domains such as altitude (see section 2.7)
brings cartographers to the next step of designing a set of labels which can graphically, on a
Image 4.3 (028)
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map, indicate membership in one of the resulting categories as an attribute of a particular
point in space. In the case of altitude categories, color is a very appropriate labeling tool, and
Eduard Imhof's book Cartographic relief presentation offers advice on the best sets of
shades to choose.36 Mark Monmonier suggests that such contrast sets are best mapped to
value distinctions within a single hue (e.g. pale green to dark green; the hue may be gray) or
to a part-spectrum scale (such as the green-to-brown scale commonly used on relief maps).
The problem with the green-to-brown scale is that people understandably imagine that it
must be representing a source set involving something about vegetation cover instead of
altitude.37 
An example of another common type of mapping problem in cartography (no pun
intended) is as follows: there are a lot of towns on your map, each is located at a particular
point, and you have already sorted the towns into different categories according to
population — say, {0-2,000, 2,000-5,000, 5,000-20,000, 20,000 and up}. Now you want to
mark each town's location with differently sized symbols so that there is a mapping between
the size of the point and the size-category that the town is in. What do you do? The design of
symbols to mark different types of roadways (which vary in width, freedom of access, and
speed limit) is similar, and there are many analogous analogous symbol design challenges
outside cartography too. This type of problem involves not the choice of colors, but the
definition of a set of stand-alone graphic symbols, out of the infinitely large domain of
possible graphic symbols, which has the same topology as the source set. Such sets of
symbols have been called "graphical variables." The pioneering work on graphical variables
was Semiology of graphics by Jacques Bertin, but there is now a large literature on them.38
36 Eduard Imhof, Cartographic relief presentation (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1982 [1965]), chapter 13
(pp. 295-324). See also Edward Tufte, Envisioning information (Cheshire, Conn.: Graphics Press,
1990), pp. 91-94.
37 Mark Monmonier, How to lie with maps (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 24, 151-
154.
38 Jacques Bertin, Semiology of graphics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983 [1968]). See
also the special issue on Bertin in volume 10, number 1 of Information Design Journal (2001); the
table of graphical variables in Robert L. Harris, Information graphics: a comprehensive illustrated
reference (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 231; and Paul Mijksenaar, Visual function: an
introduction to information design (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1997), pp. 38-39. On
graphical variables for corridor width, see Otl Aicher and Martin Krampen, Zeichensysteme der
visuellen Kommunikation: Handbuch für Designer, Architekten, Planer, Organisatoren (Stuttgart:
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An important issue in the choice of graphical variables as target sets is whether the
user will focus on one contrast set member at a time or whether (as in the case of color-to-
altitude mapping) they will process a large number of symbols simultaneously as part of a
visual pattern. In the latter type of case, where the data needs to be quickly scannable, it is
best to choose a target set which has an unmistakable sense of graphic progression and
which can thus "give viewers a sense of natural visual sequence."39 
The two tables that follow illustrate the difference that a good choice of target set can
make.40 The two tables display the same information — the same four ratings of the same
eighteen imaginary products. The source set mapped by both tables is the same — a five-
member contrast set with a linear topology: {bad, poor, average, good, excellent}. The
difference is in the choice of target set. The first table is in the style currently used by the
Icelandic consumer magazine Neytendablaðið, which labels this contrast set as {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
The second table is in the style current used by the American consumer magazine Consumer
Reports, which labels this contrast set as { , , , , }.
Alexander Koch, 1977), pp. 92-93.
39 Tufte, Envisioning information, p. 92.
40 Note that the example of consumer magazine rating labels is also used (to make a different point) by
Edward Tufte, The visual display of quantitative information (Cheshire, Conn.: Graphics Press, 1983),
p. 174.
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I do not think it is only because I am used to reading Consumer Reports and have
committed their labeling system to mind that I feel much more quickly able from their table
to pick out, for example, the superiority of product e and the inferiority of product q, or the
generally poorer performance of all products on rating IV than on rating II. I think it has to
do with the fact that nothing about the graphic form of the numerical labels replicates the
linear relational structure of the source set, whereas the axis "black to red" not only replicates
that structure but does so in a way that is very easy for human beings to process visually. The
Arabic numerals certainly form an unambiguous and well-known sequence, but their linear
topology is abstract, based on something they signify rather than something about their
physical nature, so they do poorly as visual communicators of this sequence. Consumer
Reports' visual system allows the user to quickly pick out the best and worst products by
color patterns. Surely it would be possible to confirm the superiority of this style

















product a 2 4 5 2
product b 4 3 4 4
product c 2 5 5 3
product d 4 4 4 4
product e 4 5 5 4
product f 2 2 4 4
product g 4 4 4 3
product h 4 4 5 4
product i 4 4 5 3
product j 4 4 5 3
product k 2 5 5 2
product l 2 4 5 2
product m 2 4 5 2
product n 3 3 5 3
product o 3 4 5 2
product p 2 2 2 4
product q 1 2 4 1




































In general, the topology of any
target set mapped to a linear source
set should have an "easily
comprehended order"41 which lends
itself easily to the (usually visual)
perception of difference. Thus, for
example, one cannot recommend the
system of "feedback stars" assigned to sellers at the online retailer "Half.com by eBay" in
2003 and illustrated in Image 4.4. The sequence starts with a yellow star and then increases
in value through blue, turquoise, purple, red, and green; then it goes around again through
the cycle, starting at yellow but going only to red (and skipping turquoise), with the addition
of a shooting star motif, so that the top rating is red with a shooting star.42 This contrast set
does not have a natural sequence and is hard to learn to "read" without quite a bit of practice,
as the very complexity of the description hints. Similarly, I did not predict a long life for the
mapping {lava, fjord, glacier, ice, geyser, ocean, steam} = {most restrictive fare : least
restrictive fare} which was introduced by the airline Icelandair as part of a promotion in the
American market in spring 2004,43 and indeed it was no longer being used in January 2005.
Although color is a fine labeling tool, it is generally best to avoid the rainbow colors as a
target set in mapping: although they have a clear order, it is not an easily perceptible one, as
"the mind's eye does not readily give an order to ROYGBIV."44
The target set {bronze, silver, gold}, usually mapped to {less valuable :
more valuable}, is considerably well conventionalized in the public mind (and
rooted in the history of metal values). We see it used in the Olympics, in credit
card and membership levels, and also in the Danish and British coinage
systems (Image 4.5 shows the Danish system; the least valuable coins are at the
41 Tufte, The visual display of quantitative information, p. 154.
42 "Feedback stars," http://half.ebay.com/help/index.cfm?helpsection=ebay_stars.cfm&popup=1
(January 2005).
43 http://www.icelandair.com/index.jsp?branch=3050805 (May 2004).





top). It can be useful for small contrast sets, but it does not have enough visual salience to
work well in charts nor enough members to be applicable to larger contrast sets. 
When a mapping involves a continuous source domain rather than a source set, the
target must also be a continuous domain. For example, a weather map may, instead of using
a choropleth approach to divide the map into areas of 30s, 20s, 10s, 0s, and so on, map the
exact temperature at each point (say, 28.44) to an exact color value scaled iconically to
represent 28.44 by means of a mathematical function. (Of course, since no weather
forecaster can possibly have data for every single point on their map, some smoothing and
estimation would be required.) In such cases, instead of selecting a contrast set of points
from the target domain to use as tags for choropleth categories in the source domain, the
target domain is itself transformed into an actual measure of the source domain. This is the
distinction made by Edward Tufte between "color as label" and "color as measure."45 Polar
mappings such as that between {north : south} and {up : down} on a map work according to
similar principles.
Sometimes several mapping principles intersect in the design of a label set. The
lettering system for the campus buses at Rutgers University offers a real-life example. As it
existed in 1999, the system consisted of a set of unprincipled labels, not a mapping. There
was very little relation between the bus letter and anything about the route it followed. Some
people felt that the lettering system was confusing. As part of a project for a graduate course
on tourism planning, I came up with a redesign of the system that built in a correspondence
between each label and what it stands for, turning a set of labeling links into a multi-
principle mapping:
45 Tufte, Envisioning information, p. 81.
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Existing name Route Proposed name
A College Ave.–Busch via stadium B
H College Ave.–Busch via Bevier Rd. B2
L College Ave.–Livingston L
LX College Ave.–Livingston (express) L2
EE College Ave.–Douglass/Cook D




C College Ave.–Stadium S
With the partial exception of the "S" bus, my redesign would allow people to
internalize five reliable principles relating attributes of the set of buses to attributes of the set
of letter labels:
All buses that go to Busch, Douglass, or Livingston have B, D, or L respectively in their label
Buses that run on evenings, weekends, and during
the summer
have a label consisting of one letter only
Buses that are "alternate routes" to a campus and do
not run outside termtime weekdays
have "2" in the label
Buses that stop at College Avenue have only one letter in their label
Buses that do not stop at College Avenue have two letters in their label
If implemented, these formal correspondences would bring practical advantages for
users. The status of College Avenue as both bus hub and "central" campus would be
enshrined in the system. Bus labels would always include the first letter of the peripheral
campus(es) to which they go, so that a person needing to go to Livingston could be told that
getting on any bus with "L" in the label would eventually do the trick. My redesign would
improve on the easily muddled distinction between the routes originally labeled "G" and
"GG," which no one at Rutgers could ever keep straight. The bus originally called "C," which
served the football stadium and had a completely different type of route from any other,
would be given a letter which symbolized that separateness by not being easily groupable
with the other route labels.
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An interesting, and common enough problem for mapping designers occurs when
several closely related contrast sets exist in very closely related domains, each contrast set
with its own set of labels. Think of a hotel: the rooms in the hotel form one contrast set, and
the telephone lines that run to those rooms form another. The question in such situations is
whether there is a principled relationship between the labels for two different (but linked)
contrast sets. Does the number of your hotel room predict anything about the number of the
telephone line going to your room?
This question basically amounts to asking whether the label sets for two closely
related contrast sets have been created in tandem and coordinated. If so, there may well be a
correlation between the two label sets (even if neither of the label sets happens to map to any
features of the contrast set it labels). This correlation does not quite constitute a "mapping"
in my terms, especially if neither of the correlated label sets was the primary "source" of the
relationship, but it does at the least manifest what we could call the phenomenon of
"coordinated labels." And if one considers the number of the room it runs to as an attribute
of a particular telephone line, one can in fact stretch the definition of "mapping" to cover
such cases.
A fine example of coordinated labels comes from the Faroe Islands in the late 1980s.
The numbering systems for telephone codes, ferry routes and bus routes were harmonized so
that in any given part of the islands all these numbers began with the same digit: for
example, the town of Klaksvík was served by ferry number 50, bus route number 500, and all
its phone numbers began with 5.46 (This harmony lasted until Faroese phone numbers were
lengthened to six digits in 1998.) Image 4.6, from the 1986 Faroese transport map, shows
part of this system of correlations. The three-digit numbers are bus route numbers, the two-
digit red numbers are a destination code used in the bus fare table, and the one- and two-
digit black numbers are ferry route numbers. (The letters D and E refer to helicopter routes,
which were not part of the coordinative scheme.)
46 See the corresponding timetable, Ferðaætlan 30. mai 1988 - 27. mai 1989 (Tórshavn:
Samferðsluskrifstofan, 1988).
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Contrast the United States, where
highway numbers, telephone area codes, and
postal codes bear no relationship to one
another. Thus in Rochester, New York, there is
no relation between the local telephone code
(585), postal codes (which all begin with 146),
and the number of the local interstate highway
(90).
Coordinated labeling is usually a
positive thing, as long as users know it exists.
In most cases of labels for linked domains, one
wants people to be able to have some basis for
guessing the relationship between an unfamiliar signifier-signified pair. For example,
consider that in Germany (and some other European countries), the structure of the
telephone numbering and switching system makes it easy to assign direct-dial telephone
numbers to the rooms in a hotel. In these countries, the direct-dial room numbers are
formed by adding a certain number of digits (usually one, two or three digits) onto the main
number of the hotel. Having direct dial into the room means that calls need not go through
the hotel desk, saving time for both staff and guests. Guests in German hotels often ask how
to work out their direct dial number, and usually assume that it might bear some relationship
to their room number. From the hotel staff's point of view, it is nice to be able to remember
the answer to this question as a single statement that concisely expresses the principle
relating any phone number to its room number or vice versa. This allows the staff to keep
less knowledge in their heads, and also builds in a positive redundancy for guests, who
potentially have two ways of remembering their phone number (both the principle and the
actual number).
Two hotels I have worked with ran into problems with this relationship. At one hotel,
room numbers and phone numbers were related by a fairly simple principle, but the
Image 4.6 (062)
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overworked staff had apparently grown tired of explaining it. They felt they needed to take
action. Technical reasons made it difficult for them to change the (three-digit) telephone
extensions to match the (two-digit) room numbers, so instead they changed the room
numbers to match the telephone extensions. In the other hotel, the system for relating room
number to extension number involved three different principles for rooms in different
sections of the hotel. The staff members themselves had not committed the principles to
memory, and found them quite difficult to explain to guests; although they could consult a
list where all the correspondences were written out, more often they simply discouraged
guests from using the direct dial system. Both cases show that there is often an incentive to
design the simplest possible principle for relating two labeling systems used for closely
related contrast sets — and by extension, the simplest possible mapping principles in general.
Taxonomies create pseudo-mappings
Say that you know I live in Ireland, but not where, and I tell you my phone number is
021/2345678. This number is a label, and if you know something about the way Irish
telephone numbers work, you can tell something about the phone line that it labels. It is in
Cork. How do you know that? Because all Cork numbers begin with "021." The form of the
number tells you something about what it labels. So this is a mapping.
Or is it? Maybe so, but if so, only in a special way. Telephone number labeling is
taxonomic, involving a hierarchy of contrast sets. In Ireland, as in many countries, there are
city codes, like 021, and local numbers, like 2345678. A label for a unit at the terminal level of
a taxonomy, that is formed by compounding the labels for the units at each successive level
of that taxonomy (such as 021/2345678), possesses a sort of "pseudo-iconicity" and the set of
such labels exhibits what we could call a "pseudo-mapping." Such labels are formed
compositionally. The iconicity of a "complete" label, specified from the unique beginner of
the taxonomy all the way down to the bottom, exists only by virtue of the fact that although it
refers to a unit at the terminal level of the taxonomy, it also specifies the upper level divisions
to which that terminal unit belongs, and that this specification constitutes the aspect of that
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unit which gives rise to the mapping principle. But if the labels for each level were considered
in isolation there might be nothing iconic about them. The upper level labels, when used as
part of the label for a terminal level unit, constitute a "superordinate sign" (see section 3.3).
Another fine example is that of the streetnames in Reykjavík, Iceland. All over the
world, street names include what we might call a street type — which in English might be
Avenue, Street, Court, Place, Road, and so on. Reykjavík and its suburbs use an unusually
large number of street types. Much more systematically than in other cities, most of these
street-types are associated with a particular section of town, in which all the streets bear that
and only that street-type. The street-types thus effectively label city neighborhoods. If one
remembers the individual links between the perhaps thirty or forty street-types and the area
they cover, one can tell, from a fully specified streetname, which part of town the street can
be found in. Thus all the streets ending in -grandi, -skjól, -melur, -hagi, -hlíð, -tún, -teigur
and so forth are clumped together. At the level of the street-type, there is no mapping
principle which relates the street-type to something about the neighborhood that it covers.
One must memorize each of these links individually. But at the level of the full street-name,
the street-type creates a pseudo-mapping principle that confers navigational ability.
Practically speaking, if you are looking for an address on Faxaskjól and find yourself on
Sörlaskjól, you can be sure you are pretty close by.47
Exactly the same principle applies in parking lots which post two-level alphanumeric
labels like "G23" on lampposts (meaning lot or level G, section 23). If you are under a sign
saying G5 (and able to read), you can guess that G23 is probably not far away, or at least,
closer than B10. Guessing that G22 and G23 are next to each other constitutes navigational
ability based on the mapping principles of the terminal-level labels, but guessing that G23
and G5 are closer together than B10 and G5 constitutes navigational ability based on the
pseudo-mapping of taxonomic organization and compositional labeling.
47 This system is briefly described by Þorsteinn Vilhjálmsson, "Hverjir ákveða götunöfnin og eftir hverju
fara þau?" Morgunblaðið (Reykjavík), 13 September 2003, Lesbók, p. 11.
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The principle can be expressed another way: In taxonomies, a labeling system for
superordinates becomes a mapping principle for their subordinates, if the superordinate
labels are included in the subordinates' labels. For example, in the Korean writing system
(hangul), vowels are visually distinct from consonants (vowels have a more linear appearance
and consonants a squarer look). At the level of the distinction between vowels and
consonants, this is simply a two-member label set applied to a two-member contrast set. But
at the level of individual signs, it becomes possible to predict something about the sound that
it stands for (namely, whether it is a vowel or consonant), from the form of its graphic sign.
(Compare the Roman alphabet and numerous other writing systems where there is no
analogous distinction — nothing about their graphic form separates the vowels aeiou from
the consonants mrstx). To take another case, in a bookstore, the location of the cookbook
section may tell you nothing about the location of, say, the music section, but encountering a
book in the cookbook section tells you that it does probably have to do with cooking. (To put
this example in abstract terms, the arrangement of each category of book may have been
done without the use of a mapping principle, so that there is no other way to understand the
relations between categories and locations other than to list them all; but the location of an
individual book within the area devoted to a given category gives a clue to the nature of its
contents.)
In the United States, where the first three digits of phone numbers are an "area code"
which formerly told you something about the physical location of the telephone line, new
developments in telephone technology mean that it is no longer possible to be sure that the
person answering your call is actually located in the place that those three numbers label.
This example illustrates the breakdown of a pseudo-mapping: the superordinate sign no
longer has any superordinate meaning, and in a certain way, two levels of the telephone
number taxonomy are effectively collapsing into one. (This particular change, taking place in
a very widely used labeling system, has aroused strong and not necessarily rational feelings:
one commentator claimed it was "a form of progress in the irreversible evolution of
humanity," while another called it a "deeply confusing development" which would result in
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"one less North Star and one less compass point that people have to help orient themselves
in an increasingly complicated world."48)
One could turn the tables at this point and ask whether, in fact, all iconic labeling
actually amounts to the creation of a taxonomy and the labeling of its levels and units.49 The
strongest version of this would suggest that all cases of "mapping" can be reduced to cases of
compounding, and that the only reason a label ever correlates to something about its referent
is because it is a compound. I suggest that this would be going too far and that mapping
sometimes reduces to compounding, but not always. In the case of a hotel whose room
numbers really are formed compositionally from the floor number and then the room
number within the floor, the mapping and the taxonomy are one and the same. But it seems a
little far-fetched to consider cases such as two-letter abbreviations for states, airlines, or
countries, where the mapping principle is more suggestive than determinative, as
taxonomies. There is, however, a certain gray area where mapping principles and the
compounding of labels in a taxonomy overlap.
4.4 The drawbacks of mapping
The previous section might make it seem like there is never any reason not to build an
iconic mapping principle into a set of labels. But in fact, mappings pose a series of
maintenance problems which should make designers, before choosing, think twice about
whether a mapping principle will wear well on the contrast set they are working with.
Exhaustion
A mapping principle increases the speed with which the target set can become
exhausted. Requiring that there must be a motivated relationship between each source and
target set member reduces the number of potential labels in the target set that will be
suitable for any member of the source set. If the size of the source set expands (with new
48 Ian Urbina, "Area codes, now divorced from their areas," New York Times, 1 October 2004, p. B1.
49 The question is similar to the linguistic conundrum of whether a compound word that contains two
morphemes or other distinguishable units counts as one signifier or two. The words mailbox,
raspberry, and sneeze are progressively murkier cases which move from simple compounding through
so-called cranberry morphemes to phonesthemes.
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members needing to be labeled according to the same mapping principle as older ones),
while at the same time the number of labels in the target set is limited, the system can break
down.
Thus, for example, the American Social Security number system has a theoretical
maximum capacity of one billion numbers, of which it has currently only used just over four
hundred million; it would exhaust its capacity slightly more slowly if it did not use a mapping
principle relating the number to the state of issue.50 Because the Icelandic personal
identification number system uses a mapping principle relating the number to the holder's
date of birth, it will break down if it ever has to assign numbers to more than one hundred
people born on the same calendar day. (As the number of babies born in Iceland has hovered
around 4,000 per year for several decades, this is exceedingly improbable.51) In street-
naming, many mapping principles have been exhausted as cities have grown and built more
streets than the capacity of the target set.52 And as the quantity of telephone numbers in
America grew, three mapping principles in the telephone numbering system had to be
progressively sacrificed in order to avoid increasing the standard length of the numbers
beyond their current ten digits.53 Similarly, although the development of platinum credit
cards and membership levels responds to the desire in these contexts to create a status more
valuable than gold (see further section 6.7), it is problematic because it disrupts the
conventional familiarity of the trio of bronze, silver, and gold. In general, choosing an
50 "FAQs — Frequently Asked Questions," http://www.ssa.gov/history/hfaq.html (January 2005).
51 Landshagir 2002 / Statistical yearbook of Iceland 2002 (Reykjavík: Hagstofa Íslands, 2002), table
2.30 ("Fæðingar og fædd börn 1951–2001"). Also available at
http://www.hagstofa.is/template25.asp?pageid=299 (January 2005).
52 See Fred Tarpley, "Street names as signposts of world cultures," in Namenforschung: ein
internationales Handbuch zur Onomastik, edited by Ernst Eichler et al., pp. 1481-1499 (Berlin: Walter
de Gruyter, 1995-1996), p. 1489.
53 These three mapping principles were (1) the correspondence between the two letters which used to
form the first two figures of the central office code, and something about the location of the central
office; (2) the correspondence between the middle digit of the area code, and whether the state that
area code was located in was divided into one or more than one area code; and (3) the correspondence
between the middle digit of the area code or central office code, and whether that code referred to an
area code or a central office. See Ian Watson, "Equilibrium and exhaustion: can America survive when
we run out of area codes?" Exposé: essays from the Expository Writing program, 1988-89, pp. 4-9.
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unprincipled labeling strategy allows one to be freer and less disciplined in linking labels and
referents.54 
Principles that disappear
The navigational ability conferred by a mapping principle is fickle. The conditions
that allow one to perceive a correlation between source and target set can vanish. If a
mapping principle requires that a target set member reflect something about a source set
member, an existing signifier-signified pairing can start to violate the mapping principle if
something about the source set member changes. For example, in labeling systems which
involve a geographical taxonomy or a geographically based mapping principle, one of the
most common problems is that the things labeled may move from one geographical category
to another. In Iceland, Reykjavík telephone numbers begin with 5 and Akureyri numbers
with 4; if you allow people to keep their 5-number when they move from Reykjavík to
Akureyri, you lose the benefit of being able to predict where the owner of a given number
lives. But if you insist on preserving the principle, you force people to get a new number
whenever they move, and to alert all their friends. The same tradeoff applies in the choice of
whether to use a mapping principle in the assignment of car license plate numbers (which
Germany does, and Iceland once did). There is thus a tradeoff between the benefits of
iconicity and the benefits of portability. The more the referents of a label set are likely to
change character, the less advisable it is to try to enforce continual compliance with a
mapping principle.
This does not mean that one should not initially assign labels to a contrast set based
on a mapping principle or other type of motivation, if one can reconcile oneself to the fact
that the mapping principle may cease to confer navigational ability or that the motivation
may become obscure. Some might put it this way: all labeling is somehow motivated (and
there is a reason for every choice), and sometimes this motivation may even involve a
54 Linda R. Waugh has made the same observation and uses the terms "mediacy" and "immediacy" to
describe non-iconic and iconic labeling methods respectively in "On the sound shape of language:
mediacy and immediacy," in Selected writings, by Roman Jakobson, 8: 255-271 (Berlin: Mouton de
Gruyter, 1988).
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mapping principle; but this motivation becomes obscured as both source and target set
members change over time. Those without historical knowledge of those developments lose
the ability to trace that motivation. One can summarize this view by calling the process "the
symbolification of icons"55 or the "erosion of iconicity,"56 or by saying that "many causal links
are partially or entirely asymmetrical,"57 meaning that when a source set member changes,
the corresponding target set member will not necessarily change to match it. When iconic
relationships erode in this way, a dictionary etymology, or a history of any other convention,
effectively becomes an exercise in tracing the reason why we use a particular conventional
form for a particular purpose back to a time when the motivation for it was more obvious
than it is now. (In the terms used in section 6.3, erosion effectively amounts to the
replacement of natural justifications by historical justifications.)
In the lexicon, both labels (through sound change) and their meanings (through
semantic change) can mutate considerably over time, and perhaps part of the explanation for
why there is relatively little iconicity in the lexicon is that regular change, both in source and
target sets, ultimately tends to erode any motivated relationships that make it into the
system.
One way that mapping principles can erode is if a label's association with the thing it
labels starts to become stronger than its sense of simply having been assigned to that thing
temporarily as a function of a mapping principle. This is why, in revising the manuscript of
this book, I might continue to refer to "chapter 5" even when chapter 4 has been deleted so
that chapter 5 now succeeds chapter 3. In effect, "5" is no longer the output of a mapping
principle, but has become simply a label for a particular chapter. Consider as well the
following three ways of labeling seats in single-aisle airplanes:
A B C   D E F
A B   C D
A C   D F
55 Keller, A theory of linguistic signs, pp. 150-155.
56 John Haiman, Natural syntax: iconicity and erosion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985).
57 Stanley Lieberson, A matter of taste: how names, fashions, and culture change (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2000), pp. 267-268.
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The mapping principle {A, B, C … } = {leftmost seat : rightmost seat}, which is usually
applied in six-across jets such as a Boeing 737, is not always applied in four-across aircraft,
which often use the ACDF label set rather than the ABCD mapping. A good reason to use
ACDF is that for the employees of a company which uses both six-across jets with ABCDEF
labeling and four-across jets with ACDF labeling, A and F then reliably mean "window" while
C and D reliably mean "aisle," window- and aisleness being important attributes of seats. In
such cases, the seat numbers that were assigned according to a mapping principle in the six-
across aircraft have become just labels in the four-across aircraft. The motivated origin of the
ACDF label set can only be shown historically, by referring to its development from labeling
in six-across aircraft. "D" has come to take on a meaning (right-hand aisle seat) which
originated as an incidental and trivial consequence of a mapping principle used in another
context. (The drawback to using ABCDEF together with ACDF is that one then knows
whether two people sitting in A and C seats are seated next to each other only if one knows
the type of aircraft.)
The effort of taxonomy maintenance
In cases of pseudo-mapping in which terminal labels are composed out of the labels
for successive levels of a taxonomy, the organization and labeling of the taxonomy can be
quite time-consuming. For example, organizing your computer files into a sensibly labeled
system of folders and subfolders, probably several levels deep, takes quite a bit of time and
thought as well as continued maintenance when new categories and partitions emerge. 
One can work around this problem by eliminating the intermediate levels of the
taxonomy — for example, keeping all your computer files in one folder. This has drawbacks,
of course: one must then name the files so they contrast with all other files in the system, not
just all other files in the same immediate paradigm, and one loses the benefit of the fact that
the taxonomy's categories serve as searching devices within a body of information. However,
systems of information storage and retrieval which use extremely powerful search engines
can tolerate less robust systems of classification and subclassification because of what we
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could call the "Google effect," by which the search engine compensates for the lack of
classifications and subclassifications as a lookup facilitator. Using this principle, the
stepfather of a friend of mine designed a system for the storage boxes he uses in his home for
old papers and other such things. He numbers all the boxes sequentially, so that the only
source set that the numbers map to is the set of dates the boxes were first filled. The boxes
are then placed all over the house — not only in designated storage areas but also the odd box
or two in corners, or under chairs, wherever they just happen to fit. There is no mapping
between the number of the box and the location or contents of the box, and it is also not
necessary for the numbers to run in perfect sequence with no breaks. A master list of each
box's number, contents, and location is on his computer. The lack of iconicity in the labeling
system is compensated for by the power of the search function in the computer application.
In order to find the box with the widgets, he needs only to plug in the word widget into the
search window of the program. In exchange for complete reliance on a search engine, one
avoids the need to build iconic principles into a labeling system.
Iconicity as a scarce resource
A feature of mappings which is both a drawback and a curiosity of its own is that, in
those mappings which are not fully determinative, and which leave some wiggle room in the
ultimate assignment of a label, a clear sense of prestige may become associated with
"owning" an iconic label, and the ability to have an iconic label may become a scarce
resource.
For example, in the airline industry, where each airline company is represented by a
two-character code, it is the old, established airlines which have a motivated, iconic code
(like AA for American Airlines or LH for Lufthansa) and the recent startups which have non-
iconic codes (like 7Y for Greendale Aviation). As the two-character codes have been
progressively exhausted, it has been harder and harder for new airlines to find an iconic
code.58 Similarly, the concern in the late 1990s over "cybersquatting" (registering in-demand
58 On airline code assignment see International Air Transport Association, "IATA coding systems,"
http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/coding (January 2005) and the links therein.
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Internet domain names and then reselling them at a high price) reflects the uncertainty over
whether having an Internet domain name that directly relates to the name of your
organization is a right, or a privilege you have to pay for — and whether the principle of first-
come-first-serve is fair.59
The competition for iconic domain names is not only a problem because it can
exhaust certain parts of the set of labels, but also because the competition for names creates
bad feeling and bureaucratic confusion. Frustration, conflict, and formal dispute resolution
procedures have arisen in the Internet domain name system because people and companies
want to have a domain name that bears a relationship to their own.60 Other number issuers,
such as some telephone companies and personal identification number authorities, avoid
this problem by refusing to give users any control over the form of their label at all. License
plate issuers commonly charge car owners for the privilege of choosing their own "vanity"
license plate number, which also certainly keeps demand for motivated numbers down. 
The prestige of iconicity is a phenomenon distinct from the way that certain sections
of a label set come to take on value (see sections 4.5 and 6.7). Here the prestige is not
attached to a specific section of the label set (those labels that begin with A, for example) but
rather to the ability to have a motivated relationship between label and referent. However, it
can indirectly lead to prestige differences between certain areas of label sets. If certain parts
of those label sets rarely happen to be the result of a motivated choice (for example "7Y" is
rarely a motivated airline abbreviation because airline names rarely include numbers), those
sections may acquire an air of unwantedness and unattractiveness. Conversely, although
iconicity by itself does not explicitly confer prestige on any area of the label set, certain areas
of the label set may turn out to be in higher demand than others.
In a few cases, it seems that particular authorities have voluntarily agreed to use
relatively less prestigious areas of a target set. Whether this was deliberate or not, it does
reduce the pressure of competition within the system as a whole. For example, at some point
59 See James Gleick, "Get out of my namespace," New York Times Magazine, 21 March 2004.
60 See, again, Gleick, "Get out of my namespace." 
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it was decided to give almost all Canadian airports codes starting with "Y" so that, for
example, YVR is in Vancouver, YWG in Winnipeg and YYZ in Toronto.61 The attempt to map
from the name of the city or airport to the code affects only the last two letters. The State
University of New York adopted an identical strategy for the three-letter codes identifying
libraries in the OCLC system. Thus while the Rush Rhees Library at the University of
Rochester was very iconically coded RRR, all SUNY schools' codes began with Y (the Milne
Library at SUNY Geneseo, for example, is coded YGM). Similarly, American radio stations
which try to build iconicity into their call letters are constrained by the rule that station
names east of the Mississippi must all start with W and those west of it with K.62 In these
cases, what seems at first as a drag on form-meaning correspondences turns out to create its
own sense of signification, so that the "Y" becomes a sort of superordinate sign which marks
out Canadian airports (admittedly, not reliably so). Once one learns the system, one can
predict that an airport whose code begins with Y is in Canada, and that an American radio
station whose call letters begin with K is in the West.
61 I have not been able to find an authoritative source for the history of this decision.
62 See Thomas H. White, "K/W call letters in the United States,"
http://earlyradiohistory.us/kwtrivia.htm (March 2004).
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Restrictions on the topology of target sets
A minor drawback of mappings is that they discourage designers from using labeling
"material" that is not easily sortable. Mappings sometimes favor numbers instead of names
as target sets — and this leads to a system which may lack the "flavor" of a named or colored
system (see section 3.5). There is something more human about "February" than "2" and
indeed in labeling the months of the year we can choose between the principled strategy of
numeric labels running from 1 to 12, and the non-iconic but more vivid set of labels which
runs from January to December. Similarly, the American practice of numbering expressway
exits either ordinally or by milepost allows for easy navigation, so that a pair of exit labels
instantly tell us something about the exits' relative position; but the Israeli approach of
naming each intersection, though it reduces novice users' navigational ability, has a certain
aesthetic appeal.
Mapping principles which disclose things that some would like to
keep secret 
A final drawback to mapping is that the clues a target set provides about the nature of
the source set may not be desirable. For example, a member of parliament in Iceland recently
proposed that the personal identification number system be changed so that birthdates
would no longer form the first six digits of each identification number. According to the
proposal, since people constantly find themselves required to give their ID number, they
should at least have the right to choose whether to communicate their birthdate — an
important and, to some, sensitive piece of personal information — or not.63 The solution
proposed is to remove the mapping principle from the numbering system. Similarly, we
usually try to avoid marking keys in a way which would, if we lost them, allow an unknown
person to figure out what they open. The general lesson is that any mapping principle allows
63 "Vill breyta kennitölukerfinu," Fréttablaðið (Reykjavík), 1 April 2004, p. 20; "Tillaga til
þingsályktunar um breytingu á kennitölukerfi," Alþingi [Icelandic Parliament], 130. löggjafarþing
2003–2004, Þskj. 1248 - 820. mál, http://www.althingi.is/dba-bin/ferill.pl?ltg=130&mnr=820 (April
2004). 
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those who understand the target set to "be in the know" about aspects of the source set that,
some may feel, should only be disclosed if people really need to know (see section 7.3).
4.5 The design of contrast set topologies
Why is it that the numeric keypads on calculators have "1 2 3" as the bottom row, but
those on telephones have "1 2 3" as the top row? Why is it that, in some lists of American
racial classifications, "white" comes first and "Asian/Pacific Islander" comes last? Why is it
that the letter Å precedes Ö in Swedish alphabetical order, but follows it in Danish? And why
is it that king-ace-two is a permissible sequence in some card games but not in others? 
All these questions revolve around the choice of a topology for a contrast set. Many
contrast sets, such as the alphabet or the different American racial categories, lack a natural
topology. Others, such as the numbers, have an obvious topology in one dimension, but not
in two. Others, such as the set of countries in the world or students in a class, suggest several
different linear topologies depending on what attributes one sorts them on. An important job
for the design workshop is to create topologies for contrast sets which lack them. In doing so,
the designer is getting a contrast set ready to serve as a source or target set in a mapping,
since mapping requires that the sets involved have some kind of topology. The designer can
choose to form these topologies in many different ways.
The most typical artificial topology is linear, and the arrangement of a contrast set
into a linear topology is commonly called "ordering." Because it is common to map linear
topologies to the set of numbers (so that the letter a or the racial classification "white" might
be labeled 1), it is easy to get ordering confused with numbering. In fact, though the two
processes are analytically separate. The act of arranging the letters of the alphabet in the
order {A, B, C … X, Y, Z} has to precede the act of numbering them one through twenty-six.
The first involves ordering — creating a topology from scratch — and the second involves
mapping — using that topology to make systematic links to a target set. (Of course,
numbering a contrast set, or creating some other kind of mapping to it, is often the ultimate
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goal when one creates a topology. Without putting racial categories in an order, for example,
one would not be able to number them and store them in a computer database as easily.)
The word "ordering" does not easily fit those cases where we outfit contrast sets with
two-dimensional or other more complex topologies. In these cases, an alternative to talking
about "designing a topology" is to speak of designing the "layout" or "presentation" of a
contrast set.
Contrast set topologies typically serve as collation standards. To collate a set of items
is to sort them so that they can be found again. Arranging a card catalog in alphabetical
order, putting books on the shelves by call number, or keeping a paper file of customer
orders sorted by order number are typical cases of collation. Because people often need to
find things that other people have collated, it is specifically the shared knowledge and the
conventionalization of a contrast set topology that allows it to be used by many people as a
collation standard. For example, it is only because many people agree on what alphabetical
order is that we use it as a collation standard. Since "collation standard" is only a role that a
contrast set topology may (or may not) take on, the design of a topology and a collation
standard may take place separately. For example, the Unicode standard created a linear
topology involving thousands of sequentially numbered characters, but allows the separate
definition of collation standards which do not replicate that linear topology (although they
do reference its numbering system).64
When a contrast set (say X) is given a topology and then mapped to a label set (say Y),
and there is a mathematical relationship between the elements of Y, it is important to
remember that that mathematical relationship does not automatically extend to the elements
of X. For example, if the linear contrast set {white, black, Hispanic, Native American,
Asian/Pacific Islander} is mapped to the contrast set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, that does not mean that
anything about the original relationship between "Native American" and "black" is analogous
to the mathematical relationship between 4 and 2. The only thing that "4" and "2" measure
64 See Mark Davis and Ken Whistler, "Unicode collation algorithm," Unicode Technical Standard #10,
version 4.0, http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr10/tr10-11.html (January 2005).
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or map to is the place of "Native American" and "black" in the artificial topology. They do not
measure or map to any inherent attributes of "Native American" or "black." The numerals
here are just tools which "provide for a convenient catalog of the objects."65 Indeed, in such
situations, if it could be made to be practical, it would be less misleading to label the racial
categories with another set that also lacks a clear topology (five contrasting fruits or animals,
for example). The use of numerals to label contrast sets whose linear topology is artificial was
called a nominal scale in Stanley Smith Stevens' "N-O-I-R" classification of types of scales.66
Otis Dudley Duncan argues that N "scales" should not even be called scales because their
values do not measure anything about the things that they label.67 Indeed, nominal scales
commonly confuse beginning social science statistics students, who need to be cautioned
specifically that while correlations involving ordinal, interval, and ratio scales can be
measured by mathematical techniques, mathematical measures of correlation cannot apply
to entire nominal scales at once but only to their individual elements (which one can treat as
binary variables using logistic regression).
The process of specifically designing contrast set topologies has received little direct
scholarly attention as an abstract social form. Two writers who have touched on the
theoretical aspects of the subject have done so out of a desire to understand the contrast set
of number, which has a linear topology that, though not entirely natural and inevitable, is at
least very difficult in practice to escape.68 Another close approach to the subject has been the
study of degree words and polarities in language, which typically have a linear or polar
topology.69 A few scholars have found their way into a discussion of ordering through an
interest in the development of lists and tables.70 It is somewhat easier to find descriptive
65 Otis Dudley Duncan, Notes on social measurement: historical and critical (New York: Russell Sage
Foundation, 1984), p. 128.
66 Stanley Smith Stevens, "On the theory of scales of measurement," Science 103, 2684 (7 June 1946):
677-680.
67 Duncan, Notes on social measurement, chapter 4 ("On scales of measurement," pp. 119-156).
68 Bertrand Russell, Introduction to mathematical philosophy, chapter IV ("The definition of order,"
pp. 29-41); Crump, The anthropology of numbers, pp. 6-11, especially p. 10.
69 See, for example, Lyons, Semantics, 1: 288-290.
70 Jack Goody, The domestication of the savage mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977),
chapter 5 ("What's in a list," pp. 74-111); Joshua R. Goldstein, "What's in an order? Reading statistical
tables as cultural artifacts," paper presented at the Dialogues in Culture and Cognition conference,
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studies and references on the individual histories of the artificial topologies created for
particular sets, such as alphabetical order or the keyboard layout of pianos and typewriters,
but much more could be written on these topics as well.
Brief case studies: alphabets and keyboards
 The domain out of which our letterforms
were chosen has no natural topology, and neither
does the conventional set of focal points in that
domain. The order we use for them seems to be
purely a matter of convention. The Roman,
Cyrillic, Greek, and Hebrew alphabets use
variations of the same order. This "ABC" order is, along with the seven-day week, among the
existing standards and conventions that has the longest record of continuous use.71 We know
that it goes back at least as far as its use in Ugaritic cuneiform in the 14th century B.C., since
the alphabetical order we still use today appears (in cuneiform) on a tablet found in the
excavation of the Royal Palace of Ugarit (currently in northern Syria) in 1948.72 Image 4.7
shows a Syrian postage stamp celebrating the tablet's discovery.
Image 4.8 shows the
approximate phonetic values of
each of the tablet's cuneiform
signs in the Ugaritic language. The signs marked in bold have definite relatives in the English
Princeton University, 17 April 1999.
71 On the history of why alphabetical order follows the order that it does, three helpful, but
unfortunately less than in-depth resources are David Diringer, The alphabet: a key to the history of
mankind (3rd ed., London: Hutchinson, 1968), 1: 169-170; John Healey, The early alphabet (London:
British Museum Publications, 1990), pp. 22-26; O'Connor, "The alphabet as a technology," pp. 788-
790. The temptingly named Contributions to a history of alphabetization in antiquity and the Middle
Ages, by Lloyd W. Daly (Brussels: Latomus, 1967) is unfortunately not the illuminating treatment of
the history of alphabetical order that the title suggests it might be. On the use of alphabetical order as
an information-retrieval technology, see Daniel R. Headrick, When information came of age:
technologies of knowledge in the age of reason and revolution, 1700-1850 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000), pp. 160-167, which links the history of alphabetical order to the development of collation
technologies, and Goody, The domestication of the savage mind, pp. 110-111. 
72 For the original report of the Ugaritic discovery see Charles Virolleaud, Le palais royal d'Ugarit, II:
textes en cunéiformes alphabétiques des archives est, ouest, et centrales (Mission de Ras Shamra,




alphabet (shown below). The Ugaritic alphabetical order is, of course, not identical to
today's, but the essential continuity is obvious. The tablet's order must, of course, have had
some motivation, but no material remains allow us to trace it further, so the original
principle behind the order is not yet and may never be recoverable. That means that we do
not and probably never will know why the conventional order for the script you are reading
runs in the way that it does.
Other major scripts use different orders with different histories. To take a few
examples, the modern Ethiopian alphabetical order has its roots in the order of the ancient
South Arabian script, while the order used in modern Arabic is a (relatively) new creation
which is based on the recoverable, traceable principle of grouping similarly shaped letters
together.73 Japanese kanji and Chinese character dictionaries are traditionally ordered by a
natural, mostly recoverable principle — the number of strokes in the most fundamental
radical of the character. (Unfortunately, it is not always obvious which part of the character
is fundamental, and the system is cumbersome. Recently, romanized Chinese dictionaries
have become more common, and in many circumstances they speed lookup.74) Meanwhile,
the two parallel graphic variations of the 48-element Japanese syllabary (hiragana and
katakana) can be organized into either of two topologies. The most common approach
(called a-i-u-e-o jyun) arranges them by initial consonant, in the order økstnhmyrw (ø
represents "no initial consonant") and thereunder by vowel (in the order aiueo). This yields
either a ten-by-five matrix or the linear sequence a i u e o ka ki ku ke ko … An older principle
(iroha jyun) arranges the syllable signs linearly, according to the text of a famous medieval
poem which contains each syllable once.75 The old Scandinavian runic alphabet had its own
order, of so far irrecoverable derivation, the first six letters of which (fuþark) have become
73 Healey, The early alphabet, pp. 48, 56.
74 On Chinese character dictionary lookup, stroke order, and the identification of radicals see William C.
Hannas, Asia's orthographic dilemma (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), pp. 139-140, 281-
284. An example of a romanized dictionary is John DeFrancis, ABC Chinese-English comprehensive
dictionary (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2003).
75 The original text of the poem, now archaic in modern Japanese, is いろはにほへと/ ちりぬるを/ わ
かよたれそ/ つねならむ/ うゐのおくやま/ けふこえて/ あさきゆめみし/ ゑひもせす. It is similar
to the English sentence "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog," which uses all twenty-six letters
of the alphabet. 
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the name for the alphabet itself on the same principle as the word "alphabet." Daniels and
Bright's The world's writing systems gives basic information on alphabetical order for most
of the scripts it lists.76
The problem of keyboard layout, like the problem of alphabetical order, involves
coming up with a topology for the set of letterform. The differences are that keyboard layouts
also include punctuation, numbers, and both capital and small letters, and that their
topology is two-dimensional (or three-dimensional, if one thinks of the shift and control keys
as creating extra planes which overlay the regular key identities). 
Just as with alphabetical order, the real value of a keyboard layout is that it is
standardized. People often switch from one computer to another. It helps to be able to
depend on one's expectations of keyboard layout, so that one knows where to find each of the
symbols even on a keyboard one has never seen before. Imagine having to switch between
multiple computers each of whose keyboards had been customized in a completely
idiosyncratic way. While (as I know from personal experience) it is not so difficult to learn
two different keyboard layouts for the same writing system, having to switch between them is
an unwelcome bother.
Virtually every country and every language has a different keyboard layout standard.
The American Sholes or QWERTY layout is the basis for many layout standards used by
cultures that write with the Roman script. But the basic Sholes form has been significantly
altered from its original American form in many of these standards. In France, for example,
five of the twenty-six keys have been rearranged so that the three main rows are
AZERTYUIOP, QSDFGHJKLM, and WXCVBN. The diversity becomes even greater if one
includes punctuation marks and numbers. In Hungarian, the zero key is to the left of the "1"
key, not to the right of the "9" key, while in Czech, what is the number row in other layouts is
transformed into ĚŠČŘŽÝÁÍÉ (these keys still give the numbers too, but for this one has to
press shift). Many non-Roman scripts have entirely unrelated layouts, and the function of the
76 Peter T. Daniels and William Bright, ed., The world's writing systems (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1996).
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shift key is totally different in layouts for languages like Thai, Korean, or Arabic which do not
have capital letters.77
It has been widely reported that the layout of the Sholes keyboard originally reflected
a desire to keep the most common letters of the English alphabet physically as far away as
possible. However, one has to wonder whether this principle can explain all the letter
placements. There must be more to the story. Indeed, it seems that we lack a fully reliable,
precise, and detailed account of the QWERTY layout's creation (likely because, as with the
genesis of many other conventions, the keyboard's designers did not think it was important
enough to record in detail at the time).78
Notwithstanding the fact that we do not really seem to know why it has the layout it
does, the story of the Sholes keyboard shot to prominence in American intellectual life as an
example of standardization in 1985 when an economist, Paul David, wrote an article on the
history of American keyboard layouts.79 David stated the commonly held position that the
Sholes layout is less efficient than certain other layouts which (though they have been used)
have not become the standard. His theoretical hypothesis was that the best solution to a
given standards problem does not always win out over other competing ones. Rather, the
solution that wins is the one that has the most "early adopters." Thus "markets" for
standards solutions are not fully "efficient" in terms of providing optimal value to society.
David's article has reverberated widely and the keyboard story has been extensively quoted in
both popular and academic literature.80
77 A handy source of information on dozens of different keyboard layouts is Datacal Enterprises, "Use
international overlays to create a bilingual keyboard," http://www.datacal.com/dce/international-
overlays.htm (January 2005).
78 A good starting point on the history of the typewriter is Richard N. Current, The typewriter and the
men who made it (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1954).
79 Paul A. David, "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY," American Economic Review Papers and
Proceedings 75 (1985): 332-337; see also Paul A. David, "Understanding the economics of QWERTY:
the necessity of history," pp. 30-49 in William N. Parker, ed., Economic history and the modern
economist (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
80 An example of popular treatment is Peter Passell, "Why the best doesn't always win," New York
Times Magazine, 5 May 1996, pp. 60-61; of semi-popular, Donald A. Norman, The design of everyday
things (New York: Doubleday, 1990), pp. 145-151; of academic, Douglass C. North, Institutions,
institutional change and economic performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp.
76, 93-95.
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The article, however, was not a systematic investigation of the history of the keyboard
but rather a rhetorical piece designed to orient economists' attention to the power of history
as a determining factor in standards development. Capitalizing on this fact, two other
economists, Stan Liebowitz and Stephen Margolis, criticized both David's assumption that
the Sholes keyboard is inferior, and his hypothesis about the historical development of
standards. But Liebowitz and Margolis's work is also open to severe criticism.81 Since David's
hypothesis, if true, is an argument for government involvement in the design of conventions,
while Liebowitz and Margolis's perspective, if correct, is an argument in favor of a laissez-
faire approach, the debate has a strongly political aspect (on which see see section 6.3).82 The
actual history of keyboard layout has almost been forgotten in the battle, and the combatants
do not mention that there are entirely different keyboard layouts in countries other than the
United States which must be taken into account. My hope is that the next scholar to tackle
the subject will do so with ideological balance, worldwide reach, and careful historical and
factual detective work.
Several other layout conventions are similar to the typewriter keyboard case but
much less politically controversial. The layout of numeric keypads also involves figuring out
how to arrange a standard contrast set of symbols in two-dimensional space, with the same
provision that they must be densely packed and organized into rows. As Image 4.9 shows,
telephones tend to have 1 2 3 as the top row, computers and calculators 1 2 3 as the bottom
row. Other similar examples include the piano keyboard, whose layout is quite well
81 See Stan J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, "The fable of the keys," Journal of Law and
Economics 33 (1990): 1-25; The economics of QWERTY: history, theory and policy (New York: New
York University Press, 2002); Winners, losers & Microsoft: competition and antitrust in high
technology (Oakland, Calif.: Independent Institute, 1999); and "Typing errors," Reason, June 1996,
http://reason.com/9606/Fe.QWERTY.shtml (December 2004). To take a fairly mundane example of
the kind of argumentation that leaves Liebowitz and Margolis open to criticism, consider a statement
from "Typing errors," their popularized article: "the advent of computer keyboards, which can easily be
reprogrammed to any configuration, lowers the cost of converting [from one keyboard layout to
another] to essentially zero (not counting retraining)." This sentence uses verbal sleight of hand to
exclude the cost of retraining from the cost of change, even though the cost of retraining might be the
largest component of the cost of change. The result is that the article conveys an inaccurate conception
of the process of standards change, specifically suggesting that physical commitments (e.g. keyboards)
matter and cognitive commitments (e.g. familiarity with them) do not.
82 A useful review of the debate, though biased in favor of Liebowitz and Margolis, is Peter Lewin, "The
market process and the economics of QWERTY: two views," Review of Austrian Economics 14 (2001):
65-96.
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standardized today but has been the subject of
much experimentation in the past,83 and the
spatial placement of sets of buttons, switches, or
switch positions (consider the layout of rangetop
burner controls84 and manual transmission
gearshifts, or the standard positioning of clutch,
brake, and accelerator).
Creating starting points and
directions
Sometimes necessary in the creation of a topology for a contrast set is the definition
of starting points and directions of precedence within the set.85 This is particularly important
if the set is to be mapped to a target set which has clear starting points or precedence
relations (such as the set of numbers).
The most memorable cases of starting-point choice involve contrast sets (and
domains) with circular topologies. The definition of a prime meridian on the earth (or, for
that matter, the moon or Mars) involves assigning artificial prominence to one single
meridian for the purpose of making it easier to map a set of numbers to all the other
meridians. The conventional choice of a first day of the year (such as January 1 or March 25)
or the week (such as Sunday or Monday) is similar.
Certain unbounded or only partially bounded linear domains, such as time and
temperature, also require the definition of a starting point. Most systems for counting years
define a particular year as anchor point of the system, such as 1 A.D. or the year the Prophet
Mohammed was born. The Celsius scale uses the freezing and boiling points of water as
83 Edward Tenner, Our own devices: the past and future of body technology (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 2003), pp. 161-186.
84 See Norman, The design of everyday things, p. 75-78.
85 Two previous (but brief) discussions of starting points are Eviatar Zerubavel, Time maps: collective
memory and the social shape of the past (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), pp. 90-91, and
Crump, The anthropology of numbers, pp. 82-83.
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anchors for its mapping to the set of numbers (they are represented by 0 and 100 degrees
respectively).
Even the simple act of listing the members of a contrast set which might otherwise
not have any clear topology at all requires choosing one of them to list first. Listing the
members of a contrast set thus "transforms" the set because "it establishes the necessity of a
beginning and an end."86
Choosing directionality can be thought of as creating a polar mapping in which the
members of the target set stand in some kind of sequence, so that the natural directionality
of the target set is transferred over to the source set. This happens in a conventional way. The
Celsius scale could just as well have used 0 to label the boiling point of water and 100 the
freezing point, thus using the mapping {warmer : colder} = {lower number : higher number}
rather than {warmer : colder} = {higher number : lower number}. (If you think this sounds
absurd, you might be surprised to learn that this is the way Celsius originally conceived of
it!87) The numbers on clock faces could just as well be laid out in the opposite direction
(which would force the hands to run in the direction we now conventionally call counter- or
anti-clockwise), and it would be perfectly possible to build pianos with the low notes on the
right instead of the left.
In binary, polar topologies, as well as in bounded linear topologies, the process of
defining a starting point and a direction of precedence are usually one and the same, because
when there are only two terms the definition of a starting point implies the definition of a
direction. In unbounded linear topologies and circular topologies the two decisions may be
quite distinct.
Another type of directional convention involves whether to "zoom in" or "zoom out"
in presenting the successive levels of a taxonomic hierarchy. In Europe, February 3, 2001 is
sometimes abbreviated as 03.02.01 and sometimes as 01.02.03 — the former style zooms in,
moving from the top to the bottom of the taxonomy, while the latter style zooms out, moving
86 Goody, The domestication of the savage mind, p. 105.
87 W.E. Knowles Middleton, A history of the thermometer and its use in meteorology (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1966).
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from bottom to top.88 (The American style — 2/3/01 — differs, I would argue, in a more
complicated way: it creates an internal frame around the two lower levels of the taxonomy
(day and month), and zooms in within the internal frame, but zooms out overall.) Another
such "zooming convention" involves envelope addressing styles. The zooming-in approach,
found classically in Russia or China, is to start with the country, then list the town, street,
house number, and name. The zooming-out approach, found classically in Britain, is to start
with the name of the person, then list the house number, street, town, province, and country.
The information presented is the same, but the order is different.
Digressing away from contrast sets for a moment, consider how many
fundamental directional conventions we use in daily life, some of them involving
topologies assigned to contrast sets, others polar mappings between domains.
Image 4.10 shows how the titles on book spines run top to bottom in Scandinavia
and the United States, but bottom to top in Central Europe. Meanwhile, it causes
no end of confusion for Western European and especially American travelers in
Hungary that Hungarians always put the family name before the given name. (A
number of Asian countries, including China, regularly use this same name
ordering style.) In some cultures one writes from left to right, in others from right
to left. Americans flip light switches up to turn them on, New Zealanders flip them
down. The humor of a colleague who teases me in Hungarian contexts by calling
me "Watson Ian," or the watch with a counterclockwise face that a friend of mine used to
wear, all revolve around play with these binary directional standards, reversing conventional
polar mappings just like the postcard on sale in New Zealand and Australia which shows a
world map where south is up, proclaiming that "we're not down under any more."
88 For more information, and references to the ISO 8601 date notation standard, see Markus Kuhn, "A






In another nationalist gesture Pyongyang denounced the English spelling of Korea as a
national humiliation imposed on it a century ago by the "Japanese imperialists." The official
news agency has prominently reported a call by North Korean scholars to correct the spelling
to Corea.
The Japanese colonial government is alleged to have changed the C to K so that the
peninsula would not be listed alphabetically before Japan.89
The development of a conventional topology
for a contrast set often leads to the inadvertent
conferral of value on some of the set members, where
no value judgements may have existed before.
Whichever entities within the contrast set have a
privileged position in the newly created topology
(which often but not always means being or being
near an anchor or starting point) come to have
intrinsic value. 
Once a conventional topology confers value on certain members of a contrast set,
people often start to catch on. They choose those members of a contrast set above others in
situations where they can benefit from that value, even though those same members of the
contrast set have no intrinsic value other than that derived from the conventional topology.
Although Americans usually consider alphabetical ordering a relatively impartial organizing
tool, consider the many companies named "AA" or "AAA" who know that their name and
phone number will appear first in many lists. Or the person I know whose name is on a list of
willing substitutes at work, who is happy to have a name beginning with A because it seems
to result in getting more calls than others on the list. Or the relatively large number of used
booksellers registered at Amazon.com whose names begin with A (the booksellers with a
particular title in stock appear in alphabetical order by name). "A Aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaba Carl's
Professional Sewer and Drain Cleaning" of Rochester, N.Y., whose phone book listing is
illustrated in Image 4.11, shows the extreme lengths that people will go to to be first in a list
89 John Gittings and Oliver Burkeman, "Bush plans sanctions in N. Korea stand-off," The Guardian
Weekly (London), 2-8 January 2003, pp. 1-2.
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(spaces actually come before A in many collation orders, but a name cannot begin with a
space). But if everyone else is doing it — after all, a web site offering advice on how to make
your web site more prominent recommends that, if practical, you "choose something as close
to the beginning of the alphabet as possible"90 — it is hard to avoid getting sucked into the
game. It is not a very worthwhile game, though, since if everybody changes their name to
begin with A, people will soon need to choose names beginning with Aa to get the same value
that they once got from A (see section 6.7).
The construction of a topology can thus become a sort of expulsion from the Garden
of Eden for a contrast set, because it can monetize previously unimportant differences
between its members, changing innocent coexistence into inequality, jealousy, and
competition for a "resource" that was never previous thought of as such. Even an order
designed value-neutrally will likely come to take on a value gradient. It is easy to feel troubled
by the unfairness of ordering, but it seems virtually impossible to create a linear order
without conferring value: one cannot create such an order for a contrast set without singling
out certain members, and as Nöth comments, "any selection is an implicit evaluation since it
implies the rejection of all nonselected items."91 We can, however, try to even things out by
(for example) sometimes proceeding in reverse alphabetical order instead of regular
alphabetical order.
The sense of value in certain label sets is so strong that we often assign labels to sets
of things in different ways depending upon whether we want to associate a hierarchy of value
with them or not. Thus at the school I attended, from seventh grade on students were placed
in separate math classes according to ability. The most advanced class was labeled 7A while
the less challenging ones were 7B and 7C respectively. However, in dividing the nursery class
of 3-year olds there was no tracking or ranking involved, and thus a neutral label system was
chosen which did not suggest any ordering (as well as being understandable without knowing
the alphabet): the three groups were called Nursery Blue, Nursery Yellow, and Nursery Red.
90 Yelena Shapiro, "The importance of alphabetical priority,"
http://www.searchengines.com/alphabet.html (January 2005).
91 Winfried Nöth, Handbook of semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. x.
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In East Asia, one can use both the regular numerals and the sixty compound gānzhī (干支)
symbols as tools for ordinal labeling. According to Thomas Crump, the gānzhī symbols are
preferred in cases where value-neutrality is desired, since the ordinal numbers carry strong
connotations of value and good or bad luck.92
Once a contrast set or domain starts to feel "spoiled" or "dirtied," with different
values attached to different parts of it, it becomes very difficult to ever again consider the
choice of a member of that contrast set (or instantiation of that domain) as unconscious,
uncalculated, and innocent. One starts to wonder whether the choice was made deliberately,
or not; with, or without consciousness of the position in the domain that it would confer;
innocently, or strategically, with the intent to take advantage of the system. If a new country
were founded next year and named "Abzania" (a name which would come first alphabetically
in the list of countries of the world), we would naturally ask whether the people living there
had called themselves Abzanians since time immemorial, or whether they made up the name
so they could be first on lots of lists. Using Erving Goffman's distinction between signs
"given" and "given off,"93 if the Abzanians had been called that for millenia, we could say that
this label functions as a sign which is innocently "given off"; if they chose the name
deliberately for its value, it functions like a sign which is calculatedly "given" as part of a sort
of impression-management or branding strategy.
Archeologist Frederick Wainwright's interesting discussion of placenames as clues
given off rather than given,94 Daniel Boorstin's criticism of "pseudo-events" which are held
"primarily for the immediate purpose of being reported,"95 and the investigative style of
consumer magazines reveal that many people feel that only signs that are innocently "given
off" can be taken seriously and scientifically — as indicative of some true quality of the things
92 Crump, The anthropology of numbers, pp. 39-40. On the gānzhī system see Colin A. Ronan and
Joseph Needham, The shorter science and civilization in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1978-1994), 2: 184-186.
93 Erving Goffman, The presentation of self in everyday life (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959), p. 2.
94 Frederick T. Wainwright, Archaeology and place-names and history: an essay on problems of co-
ordination (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), pp. 45-47. 
95 Daniel J. Boorstin, The image: a guide to pseudo-events in America (Revised edition, New York:
Atheneum, 1987), pp. 9-12.
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that they label — and that signs that are chosen deliberately for the purpose of spin, striking
an image, or looking good are diversions and decoys which it is scientists' job to unmask.
This helps us understand better why many people regret the conferral of value on a contrast
set like the letters of the alphabet. It is a process which encourages people to manipulate
appearances for their own benefit, and reduces the value-neutrality of an originally innocent
contrast set.
In statistical tables, on signs, and on numbering plans, it would be nice if we could
avoid any hurt feelings about listing-order, and bring about a state of affairs where no
Koreans would even care whether they were listed before or after the Japanese. But the fact is
that a list simply must have a beginning and an end, so that either Finnish or Swedish must
be listed first on signs in the Helsinki public transport system, and the main standard
language of Yugoslavia had to be called either Serbo-Croatian or Croatio-Serbian if it was to
be based on the names of its two main components. 
Unfortunately, there is also really no way around the fact that the choice of anchor
points and start points in a set tends to privilege both the point of view and the position
within the set of the people who are doing the choosing, at the time the choice is made. One
cannot fully separate a solution from its solver.96 Those who select often place some aspect of
their personal environment in first place.97 The makers of a list may put themselves first.
People name companies after their spouses and dogs. It is not a coincidence that the United
States has the telephone country code 1 whereas Italy has the telephone country code 39, and
that the international country code system was designed in a century of American and not
Roman dominance in international politics, or that the Internet domain names which
express location by default assumption rather than explicit statement (especially .com and .
edu) are in America, and that the early Internet was largely an American phenomenon. Nor is
it coincidental that the Greenwich meridian was already in use by many countries when it
96 This is a paraphrase of a statement by Clark Blaise, Time lord: Sir Sandford Fleming and the
creation of standard time (New York: Pantheon, 2000), p. 212.
97 This point is also made by Goldstein, "What's in an order?"
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was officially chosen as the prime meridian in the 1880s. Just as one of the norms of stand-in
choice involves choosing something well-known to you, one of the norms of starting-point
choice in the creation of topologies involves choosing yourself or what you already use.
4.6 Efficiency and economy in labeling
Implicit in much of my discussion of labeling so far has been the question "What is
the best possible way to design labels for a given contrast set?" There are several ways of
interpreting and restating this question. One way focuses on the display qualities of labels,
asking whether a given label set (within a distinct display context) is aesthetically pleasing
and makes it easy for users to perceive the underlying contrast set. This is the main approach
that I have, so far, used in this book (for example, in section 4.3). Another approach is to ask
whether a given label set is the most efficient way of encoding a contrast set. A third
approach asks whether the labels in the set are easy to remember. These three approaches
might be called the ease of decoding, the efficiency of encoding, and the memorizability
approaches. This section briefly discusses the second and third approaches.
These sorts of questions are part of a long tradition of scholarship which evaluates the
fitness of consciously designed sign systems — which one might call a kind of
unapologetically prescriptive "cognitive ergonomics." Scholars of writing systems ask which
ones work better, as do the people charged with the development of road signs. In the area of
language planning, Einar Haugen cites the Swedish linguist Esaias Tegnér, writing in 1874,
who said that the best language is "that which, most easily uttered, is most easily
understood."98 The introduction of postal codes in the 1960s led to a substantial body of
research on memorizability (summarized below). The Internet poses new label design
challenges and a 2001 article on e-mail address design issues includes a useful, if incomplete
review of recent literature.99
98 Haugen, "Linguistics and language planning," p. 173.
99 Pei-Luen P. Rau and G. Salvendy, "Ergonomics of electronic mail address systems: related literature
review and survey of users," Ergonomics 44,4 (2001): 382-401. See also, by the same authors,
"Ergonomics guidelines for designing electronic mail addresses," Ergonomics 44,4 (2001): 402-424.
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The table below invites you to evaluate the encoding efficiency of schemes for labeling
the days of the week. It shows the shortest commonly used, unambiguous abbreviations for
the days of the week in a selection of European languages. Which language, would you say, is
most efficient?
English M T W Th F Sa Su
Dutch Ma Di Wo Do Vr Za Zo
German Mo Di Mi Do Fr Sa So
Swedish Må Ti On To Fr Lö Sö
Icelandic Má Þ Mi Fi Fö L S
French L Ma Me J V S D
Italian L Ma Me G V S D
Romanian L Ma Mi J V S D
Czech Po Út St Čt Pá So Ne
Polish Po Wt Śr Cz Pi So Ni
Slovene Po To Sr Če Pe So Ne
Russian Пн Вт Ср Чт Пт Сб Вс
Lithuanian Pr An Tr Kt Pn Št Sk
Greek Δε Τρ Τε Πε Πα Σα Κυ
Hungarian H K Sze Cs P Szo V
Estonian E T K N R L P
Finnish Ma Ti Ke To Pe La Su
Basque Al As Az Og Or Lr Ig
Turkish Pzt Sal Çar Per Cum Cmt Paz
It is clear that Estonian has the most economical system of
abbreviations. Indeed, if we had a chance to choose the names of the days
of the week over again, we might try to use Estonian as a model. Certainly
it takes the least amount of ink to print calendars in Estonian, the least
amount of space to run listings of museum hours in Estonian, and the least
amount of stick-on letters to post opening hours in the window of an
Estonian shop (as Image 4.12 shows). And there is something attractive
about the consistent single-letter length of the Estonian abbreviations. Of
course it is just happenstance that in Estonian, and no other European
language listed, all seven names for the days of the week begin with a different letter.100
100 The names of the days of the week in Estonian starting with Monday are esmaspäev, teisipäev,
kolmapäev, neljapäev, reede, laupäev, and pühapäev. The chances of all seven names for the days of
the week starting with a different letter in an equally distributed alphabet of 26 letters would be
Image 4.12 (072)
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This example shows how, for any deliberately designed set of labels, one can ask
whether the label set, and the mapping rules which encode contrast set members as labels,
have been designed with the maximum possible efficiency. Efficiency is defined as the
average amount of information necessary to communicate the identity of the contrast set
members involved. This question, and the idea of signaling efficiency, rests ultimately on
information theory, which provides a way of discussing the amount of energy it takes to
communicate the message carried by the variation between any number of instantiations in a
domain or members in a contrast set.101 It bears saying that for information theorists,
encoding is (though important) something of a side issue; most of information theory is
concerned with how to deal with the problem of noise in the communication channel (for
example, by the use of error-correction algorithms). With labels, the sender's and recipient's
facility with the code is perhaps more of a reliability problem than the fidelity of the
communication channel.
The issue of encoding and signaling efficiency is also part of a much broader tradition
in linguistics and semiotics, which relates both to Grice's Maxim of Quantity (the axiom that
we should not say that which is unnecessary, see section 2.10) and to Zipf's "principle of least
effort." Eleanor Rosch discusses "the almost common-sense notion that, as an organism,
what one wishes to gain from one's categories is a great deal of information about the
environment while conserving finite resources as much as possible," and calls this the





or 41%, but since the letters of the alphabet are not equally common, the actual chances are
considerably less than that.
101 For a concise introductory treatment of coding within information theory, see Gareth A. Jones and J.
Mary Jones, Information and coding theory (London: Springer, 2000), chapter 2 ("Optimal codes,"
pp. 19-33). The seminal article on information theory was Claude Shannon, "A mathematical theory of
communication," Bell System Technical Journal 27 (1948): 379-423, 623-656.
102 Eleanor Rosch, "Principles of categorization," in Concepts: core readings, edited by Eric Margolis
and Stephen Laurence, pp. 189-206 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), p. 190.
103 Haugen, "Linguistics and language planning," p. 173.
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Harald Weinreich has written a useful survey article on the history of the idea of economy
and efficiency in language.104
In practice, a maximally efficient label system would be one in which contrast
between the different labels in a set is achieved with the minimum label length possible. Thus
there would be no point in labeling things 11 and 12 when 1 and 2 would do. Information
theorists have found that the most efficient way to encode a set of distinctions depends on
the number of members in the source set; the relative frequency of each member (if there is
great variation in frequency, one gains efficiency by using shorter labels for more frequently
occurring members); the number of members in the label set; and the likelihood that the
labels will be misperceived or misremembered, which depends greatly on the discourse
context of the labels' use.105
There are obvious advantages to a maximally efficient label system. In a computer
data structure it requires less space to store labels that are shorter. Designing things that are
efficient and concise brings a kind of aesthetic satisfaction. Many people find efficiency a
compelling challenge. Certainly any label designer should be aware that some labels are more
efficient or less efficient. But it would be going too far to argue that labels should always be
designed with the maximum efficiency. 
It has partly to do with who is going to be using the labels. If we are designing a
computer database which includes information on the day of the week, it would be very
sensible and efficient to use the Estonian abbreviations. (It could also be very efficient to use
the numbers 1-7 to correspond to the days of the week, as printed airline schedules do; this is
particularly convenient for speakers of Chinese, Hebrew and Arabic, in which the name of
each day of the week actually contains that day's "number" in the weekly cycle.106) But what is
most efficient for a computer is not necessarily what is best suited for human beings. And for
104 Harald Weinreich, "Economy and ecology in language," in The ecolinguistics reader: language,
ecology, and environment, edited by Alwin Fill and Peter Mühlhäusler, pp. 91-100 (London:
Continuum, 2001).
105 "Information theory," in Encyclopædia Britannica, 15th ed. (1975), Macropædia, 9: 576.
106 The same is true of the names of some of the days of the week in some European languages. See
Zerubavel, The seven day circle, p. 123.
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general use in society by both people and computers it is not really possible to conclude that
efficiency in the days of the week is of real positive value. There are two reasons why. We
humans can attend to context and to multiple identity cues even if we lack explicit
instructions to do so; thus we do not requiring complete unambiguity in labeling. And
because we humans are fallible, we can benefit from redundancy and double marking (which
are of no use in a computer database).
The human ability to take account of context explains why, a few years ago, I was able
to use a Croatian calendar on which the days of the week were marked as "P U S Č P S N"
even though this uses both the letters P and S twice, thus failing to distinguish Monday from
Friday and Wednesday from Saturday. I knew that I was looking at a calendar, knew that the
week has seven days which were likely to be represented on the calendar in order, knew what
country I was in, and (although I do not speak Croatian) had some idea of what the names of
the days of the week might be based on my familiarity with related languages. Thus I did not
need to have the names unambiguously spelled out in order to interpret the calendar
properly. Context resolved the ambiguity of the two "P" and "S" labels.
For human beings, there are in fact advantages to using a label set that conveys more
than the minimum necessary distinction, by means of redundancy or double-marking. The
advantage of double marking is that if one mark is missed the other can be picked up on.
Thus livestock are often earmarked and branded to identify their owner, since long hair or
dust can obscure a branding and real problems result if it is impossible to discriminate
livestock marks.107 Polish abbreviates the names for Tuesday, Saturday, and Sunday with two
letters although only one would technically suffice.
When trying to match the labels they perceive in the environment to those they carry
on a mental or physical map, it is easier and makes people feel more secure to have more
than the minimum necessary number of points to match.108 Consider for example the naming
system for the New York City subway stops such as "34th Street — Penn Station," "59th
107 Per Mollerup, Marks of excellence (London: Phaidon, 1997), pp. 30-31.
108 See Marvin Levine, "You-are-here maps: psychological considerations," Environment and behavior
14 (1982): 221-237, p. 230.
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Street — Columbus Circle," and "65th Street — Lincoln Center." Simply for the purposes of
achieving contrast it would be more efficient to use the street number alone. But adding in
the name of a landmark makes the subway stop name more meaningful and practical to the
system's users, just as the Sydney Casino parking lot designers (see section 4.3) had good
intentions when they added color and shape to the purely numerical identity of each level. 
Linguists too have long noticed the historical balance of redundancy in grammatical
systems such as number, person, or singular/plural marking. There is a tradeoff between the
benefits of a concise, efficient marking system and of a redundant marking system that
makes it harder to miss the message being conveyed.109 As Stanley Smith Stevens put it
(speaking about acoustic phonetics):
The fact of redundancy increases the reliability of speech communication and makes it
resistant to many types of distortion. By limiting the number of discriminations required of the
listener [i.e., not making contrast sets too big] and by assisting his choice through the
redundant coding of information [i.e., giving multiple clues to the identity of a member], we
make talking to one another a reasonably satisfactory business.110
It is also good to make the members of a set of labels sufficiently distinct from one
another that common errors in reproducing a label do not yield other valid labels in the set.
Internet addresses, which do not have any such safeguards, are terribly prone to failure,
because while computers have no problem perfectly copying them, humans have difficulty
typing them correctly from scratch. And simply typing one letter wrong means that your e-
mail might go to a completely different person than you intended with no failure message
whatsoever, or that you may not only not reach the web page you are looking for, but be
redirected to a completely different page without even realizing it at first. (Crafty folks like
the owner of www.yahhoo.com have learned to exploit this for profit.) In working with multi-
digit identification numbers, the idea of a "checksum" digit (derived by a formula from the
109 On redundancy and double-marking in language, see the discussion of Lüdtke by Rudi Keller, On
language change: the invisible hand in language (London: Routledge, 1994 [1990]), pp. 108-110, and
John Haiman, Natural syntax: iconicity and erosion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985),
pp. 180-195. Also see Wendell R. Garner, Uncertainty and structure as psychological concepts (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962), chapters 5, 7, and 8.
110 Stanley Smith Stevens, "A definition of communication," Journal of the Acoustical Society of
America 22 (1950): 689-690, p. 690.
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other digits in the number) is a way of adding in extra security against such human mistakes
by ensuring that an error in a single digit will result in an invalid label.111 
The question of whether labels should be efficient codes also brings back the old
design debate about how strictly form should follow function, and to what extent we should
allow (technically purposeless) convention and stylization to affect our design choices
whether those are in writing systems, graphic design, or architecture. Should we discourage
label designers from creating mappings which reflect trivial or unimportant attributes of the
members of a contrast set — and if so, how does one judge which attributes are unimportant?
In architecture, some of the most extreme moves in the direction of making form
strictly follow function were taken in central Europe in the early twentieth century. Adolf
Loos, in his 1908 essay "Ornament and crime," maintained that "The evolution of culture is
synonymous with the removal of ornament from objects of daily use."112 It was only a short
while before these ideas filtered into the world of cognitive design. The German typographer
Jan Tschichold put forth a set of ten principles including that "the purpose of all typography
is communication," that "this communication must appear in the shortest, simplest, most
forceful way," that typography should "serve social purposes," and that this "precludes the
use of any ornament" which does not directly aid in communication.113 The Bauhaus design
school put these principles into practice:
"At the end of 1925 the Bauhaus decided to abolish capital letters and only to use printed
materials satisfying existing DIN norms. The bottom of every piece of Bauhaus writing paper
carried the line: 'we only use small characters because it saves time. moreover, why have 2
alphabets when one will do? why write capitals if we cannot speak capitals?'"114
111 For example, see the explanation of the computation of the checksum digit in Icelandic personal
identification numbers at "Kennitala — reikningsaðferð,"
http://www.hagstofa.is/template38.asp?PageID=808 (October 2003).
112 Quoted in Paul Greenhalgh, ed., Art nouveau 1890-1914 (London: V&A, 2000), p. 433.
113 Jan Tschichold, ed., "Elementare Typographie," Typographische Mitteilungen, Zeitschrift des
Bildungsverbandes der deutschen Buchdrucker, October 1925 special issue. My translation. This was
during Tschichold's most ardent internationalist phase, during which he also briefly changed his first
name to Ivan. Later in life Tschichold criticized these ideas as juvenile. See Ruari McLean, Jan
Tschichold: typographer (London: Lund Humphries, 1975), appendix 8 (pp. 155-158). 
114 Magdalena Droste, Bauhaus 1919-1933 (Köln: Taschen, 1998), p. 139. On the same period see also
Alan Bartram, Bauhaus, modernism and the illustrated book (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2004), pp. 48-82; Sebastian Carter, Twentieth century type designers (new ed., London: Lund
Humphries, 1995), p. 123.
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In German, all nouns (not just proper nouns) and the beginnings of sentences are
traditionally capitalized, but these radical thinkers felt that the distinctions that capital
letters mark are not important, or at least not worth the bother of supporting two separate
versions of the same label set. The debate has a long history, which extends beyond
Germany, and it is still alive today.115 Although the capitalization of common nouns has been
abolished in Scandinavia (which formerly used the German approach), the entire Roman-
script world still continues to use the special capital form for the first letters of sentences and
of proper nouns. Yet many of the world's alphabets get by fine without such a distinction —
examples include Thai, Hindi, and Georgian. And in one Roman-script environment where
the effort of retaining the capital/lower-case distinction rises dramatically — the sending of
SMSs, short text messages, on GSM cellphones, which requires that extra buttons be pushed
for upper-case — we see people abandoning the effort to use upper-case "properly."
Nevertheless, numerous studies have shown that people read Roman-script signage with the
customary mixture of upper- and lower-case letters better than signs in all-upper or all-lower
case.116 However, one must ask carefully whether any experimental study involving already
socialized adults can tell whether using upper-case is a better strategy because it is naturally
superior, or because they are already used to it.117 (For more on this problem, see the
discussion of the appeal to nature in section 6.3.)
Overall, encoding efficiency in the design of a label system is a valid issue and an
interesting question to raise. In practical terms, though, efficiency is only sometimes the
right goal to keep in mind. Inefficiency, redundancy, and double marking have plenty of
value — up to a point. Less is not always more. People are able to cope with a certain amount
of unnecessary complexity — such as capitalization or italics — and even, in some cases,
115 Several organizations in the German-speaking world agitate for the abolition of capitalization for
common nouns in Germany; see, for example, www.kleinschreiben.de (February 2005). 
116 Mijksenaar, Visual function, pp. 20-22, 24.
117 This point is also made by Johanna Drucker, The alphabetic labyrinth (London: Thames & Hudson,
1995), p. 301, and by Susanne Wehde, Typographische Kultur: eine zeichentheoretische und
kulturgeschichtliche Studie zur Typographie und ihrer Entwicklung (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2000), pp.
70-77. For further reading on capitalization debates, see also the references given by Herbert Spencer
and Linda Reynolds, Directional signing and labeling in libraries and museums: a review of current
theory and practice (London: Readability of Print Research Unit, Royal College of Art, 1977), p. 29.
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enjoy or benefit from it (see further section 6.5). There is, though, surely a limit to the
amount of unnecessary complexity and inefficiency that we ought to make ourselves endure.
However, even in cases where this limit has been exceeded (as is probably the case with the
Chinese and Japanese writing system), the difficulty of changing an entrenched labeling
standard may be an almost insurmountable barrier to greater efficiency. 
Memorizability
Another efficiency consideration to consider in the process of designing label systems
is whether they are easy to memorize (and reproduce accurately) or not. Experimental
psychologists carried out a number of studies in this area in the 1950s and 1960s,118 a
particular spur to such research being the introduction of postal codes by many national
postal systems.119 As a result, much of this research focused on the development of
alphanumeric codes of roughly five to ten characters (although the question of
memorizability is perfectly appropriate to other types of labels). Six of the key results that
designers should keep in mind are:
(1) People remember codes better when they are consistently subdivided into groups
of about three or four characters each: 123-4567. Blank space, or a hyphen, or contrasting
character type may be used to mark off the groups: A12 B345.120 Canada's postal code system,
which violates this principle by using alternating letters and numbers (such as L3Y 4W9) has
been called "Exhibit No. 1 in how not to design a code intended for memorizing" and "reliably
worse than even randomly assigning letters or numbers"; moreover, its designers should
have known better, since it was "introduced well after psychologists had learned how difficult
it is for humans to process strings of symbols from alternating categories."121
118 A useful review of some of this research is C. C. Gallagher, "The human use of numbering systems,"
Applied Ergonomics 5,4 (1974): 219-223.
119 On the applications of this research for postal code design see R. Conrad, "Designing postal codes for
public use," Ergonomics 10 (1967): 233-238.
120 Gallagher, "The human use of numbering systems," pp. 220, 223.
121 Richard Hébert, "Code overload: doing a number on memory," American Psychological Society
Observer 14, 7 (September 2001). Available at
http://www.psychologicalscience.org/observer/0901/code.html (February 2005). Hébert is quoting
Alan D. Baddeley in the second instance and Saul Sternberg in the third.
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(2) If a code contains mostly numbers and just one letter, such as A12345, people will
remember the letter better than the numbers (and vice versa if a code contains mostly letters
and just one number). This is called the Von Restorff effect. Designers can use such
distinctive characters in particular sections of a code where they want to improve users'
chances of accurate recall.122
(3) The initial characters in a code are remembered best and the characters towards
(but not at) the end worst, so designers may want to put less critical characters just before
the end.123
(4) Memory for a string of numbers improves when the memory can be based on a
principle rather than simply on the brute recollection of all the digits. For example, the
sequence 581215192226… is better recalled when thought of as 5+3+4+3+4 … than as 5 8 1 2
1 5 1 …124 This is an effect quite similar to the helpfulness of remembering labels as a mapping
principle rather than a set of individual links.
(5) Memory for sequences of letters improves when the labels are "meaningful" or at
least can be pronounced, so that CAT is more easily remembered than XQR and QWERTY
more easily remembered than RTYEQW.125
(6) The recall of strings of letters shows systematic errors whose principal cause is
confusion between the conventional names of the letters (ay, bee, see, dee, etc.), not
something about the letters themselves (such as their graphic form).126 Just as one ought not
to use a set of labels which are visually easy to confuse, one should also try to avoid labels for
which it is easy to confuse the names we use to read them off.
The memorizability of codes has been a mostly dormant area of psychological
research since the early 1970s. However, the issue has come back into public and scholarly
122 Gallagher, "The human use of numbering systems," p. 220.
123 Gallagher, "The human use of numbering systems," pp. 220-221.
124 Alan D. Baddeley, The psychology of memory (New York: Basic Books, 1976), pp. 270-274.
125 Benton J. Underwood and Rudolph W. Schulz, Meaningfulness and verbal learning (Chicago:
Lippincott, 1960).
126 R. Conrad, "Acoustic confusions in immediate memory," British Journal of Psychology 55 (1964):
75-84; Gallagher, "The human use of numbering systems," p. 222. 
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consciousness with the recent proliferation of usernames, passwords, and PIN numbers —
which users are often instructed to keep secret and unique, to change regularly, and not to
write down — thus frustrating our hope that technology would lighten our cognitive loads
and allow us, increasingly, to outsource our memory to external devices.127
4.7 Private labels and private mappings
Many of us, if not directly then through a second-hand report or an article in the
media, have come into contact with a person who claims to "have" a color for every letter of
the alphabet, every standard musical pitch, or every day of the week. The letter A or the pitch
E flat might "be" red. Now, the common labels for letters, pitches, and days of the week (such
as "ay," "E flat," and "Monday") are widely intersubjective, socially shared, and serve as a
general means of communication. These colors, by contrast, are subjective, private labeling
systems which are not shared with the outside world, yet are deeply fixed into peoples'
memory and cognitive organization. These "private labels" have received wide attention since
the late 1980s,128 though more often from neurology and neuroscience than from lexical
semantics, social science, or the historians of the contrast sets involved. This section briefly
reviews the phenomenon, and shows its crucial dependence on contrast sets and its
similarities and differences with labeling and mapping in general.
The most commonly reported private label systems tag the letters of the alphabet, the
numerals, and the set of socially standardized pitches (or their corresponding key
signatures).129 One also finds private labels for temporal units, geographical categories, and
127 See Hébert, "Code overload."
128 This section draws on recent scholarly surveys including Lynn C. Robertson and Noam Sagiv, eds.,
Synesthesia: perspectives from cognitive neuroscience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004);
Richard E. Cytowic, Synesthesia: a union of the senses (2nd ed., Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002); John
Harrison, Synaesthesia: the strangest thing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); John Harrison
and Simon Baron-Cohen, eds., Synaesthesia: classic and contemporary readings (Oxford: Blackwell,
1996). Two recent popular treatments are Patricia Lynne Duffy, Blue cats and chartreuse kittens: how
synesthetes color their worlds (New York: Times Books, 2001); Richard E. Cytowic, The man who
tasted shapes: a bizarre medical mystery offers revolutionary insights into emotions, reasoning, and
consciousness (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1993). There are many websites devoted to private
labels, as well as an electronic mailing list, for which see
http://home.comcast.net/~sean.day/Synesthesia.htm (March 2004).
129 Sean Day, "Some demographic and socio-cultural aspects of synesthesia," in Synesthesia:
perspectives from cognitive neuroscience, edited by Lynn C. Robertson and Noam Sagiv, pp. 11-31
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units of measurement, but the labels for these entities are usually derived acrophonically
from the the element's number or the first letter of its name (so that the label for "January"
would be the same as the label for "J" or "1"). It is noteworthy (but often overlooked in the
literature) that all these "things that get labeled" are socially conventional contrast sets with
relatively few members (say, five to fifty).130 A confusing factor in the analysis of private
labels is the fact that some of these "things that get labeled" are contrast sets that very often
take on a labeling role themselves — such as letters and numerals.
By far the most commonly reported type of private labeling for the alphabet and the
numerals tags every letter or numeral with an instantiation in the domain of color. It is also
not uncommon for people to think of each letter and numeral as either male or female. While
color is also the most common tag for standardized pitches, another tool for private pitch
labeling is to use the name of a tune which features that pitch prominently (most typically, a
tune which starts with that pitch) — such as "that's the first note in the song 'Hotel
California.' "131 Similarly, key signatures may be internally labeled with the name of a piece
written in that key. 
People with private color labels report that, say, seeing the letter Q, or listening to a
middle C (261.6 Hz) — or just thinking about doing so — will more or less automatically
bring to mind the color that the letter Q or the note C is tagged with, in somewhat the same
way that visualizing a lion or elephant might bring to mind the word "lion" or "elephant," or
that those with a firmly planted image of the calendar year might automatically visualize
something that happened in the month of March against that image. The color links are
lifelong. Private color labels do not force their possessors to focus on the color sensations as
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
130 This fact was, to my knowledge, first emphasized by Benny Shanon in "Colour associates to semantic
linear orders," Psychological research 44 (1982): 75-83. 
131 See Daniel J. Levitin, "Absolute pitch: self-reference and human memory," International journal of
computing anticipatory systems, 4 (1999): 255-266, section 1.2; Daniel J. Levitin, "Memory for
musical attributes," in Music, cognition and computerized sound: an introduction to psychoacoustics,
edited by P. R. Cook, pp. 209-227 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), section 17.9; and Richard Parncutt
and Daniel J. Levitin, "Absolute pitch," in New Grove dictionary of music and musicians, edited by
Stanley Sadie, 1: 37-39 (2nd ed., London: Macmillan, 2001). See also Ian Watson, "Pitch
standardization and perfect pitch," unpublished term paper, Department of Sociology, Rutgers
University, 2000.
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they read or listen to music, but the colors are, so to speak, automatically there if they want
to pay attention to them. This automaticity helps distinguish private labels from other
subjective types of labeling. For example, in revising this book I devised a subjective label —
green pen — to mark material which I had already entered into the computer. I am the only
one who understands the meaning of that label, just as I am the only person who knows
which bin in my office holds the scrap paper, but "green" is a conscious semiotic construction
which means "already entered," not my automatic lifelong response to thinking about the
category of "already entered material."
This shows that, despite my use of the term "private labeling," what is going on is
slightly different from signification in the Saussurean sense. Tagging letters with a gender is
obviously not a way of uniquely identifying them, nor does even a color tag necessarily serve
as a unique identifier for the thing that it tags (the same color may tag several different
letters of the alphabet). Even when a color tag does uniquely identify the member of a
contrast set, the tag does not tend to function like a label but rather as a concurrent sensation
whose practical value is more confirmatory than indicative — for example, although seven
might be the only number which is yellow for someone with private labels, it would still
primarily be the shape of the numeral seven that tells them that they are seeing a seven, with
its yellowness serving only as a confirmatory signal. Still, private labels are sufficiently label-
like that I prefer the term "private label" to the term "synesthesia."132 Though it has become
the regular way of referring to private labels, the word "synesthesia" has misleading
connotations of sensory crossover, and masks the close relation between private labels and
contrast sets.
This connection to contrast sets is one of the most important features of private
labels. Private labels always tag contrast sets that exist in a stable, recurring, durable,
conventional form. They are applied to conventional contrast sets produced by the
workshop, not to natural phenomena such as random shapes or features of the landscape.
132 Shanon, in "Colour associates to semantic linear orders," also avoids the use of the term
"synesthesia."
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Only people who have learned to tell the members of a contrast set apart seem to have
private labels for them, so that only people with absolute pitch have color tags for pitches,
just as color tags for letters apparently occur only among people who know how to read.
Although this is, logically speaking, obvious and a tautology, those of us who take pitch or
letterform for granted as sets of distinct categories often forget that the distinctions are
conventional and it is in fact hard to learn to tell the members of both sets apart. It is thus
only society's consistent use of the same focal points in the domain of letters, numbers, the
days of the week, and the months of the year that makes these contrast sets stable enough for
people to develop private labels for them. Similarly, absolute pitch possession — the ability to
recognize, label, and sometimes reproduce the pitch of any given musical tone — depends
crucially on the standardization of pitch categories. If one did not hear the same
standardized pitch foci over and over, it would not be possible to think of them as a contrast
set, much less to come up with a labeling system for them (whether private or shared).133
Private labeling systems coexist with socially shared label systems. "C sharp," "277
Hz," "mi," and standard musical notation are examples of socially shared pitch label systems
which are widely understood by other people, just as "ay" and "bee," "alpha" and "bravo,"
ASCII 65 and 66, or Unicode U+0041 and U+0042 are common ways of referring to the
graphical shapes that constitute the first two letters of the Roman alphabet. Private labeling
systems tag these very same contrast sets, but in ways which no one else will ever share
unless their "owner" tells people about them specifically. (Typically, those with private
labeling systems reify their subjective experience, imagining that everyone uses such a
system until they at some point find out that they are the exception rather than the rule.)
133 Absolute pitch decomposes into two abilities, which Daniel Levitin calls pitch memory and pitch
labeling, and which could respectively be called "the ability to represent the contrast set of pitch" and
"the ability to label its members." Someone with good pitch memory, the first ability, can recognize
when two given instantiations in the domain of audible frequency belong to the same socially
standardized pitch focus, and may be able to reproduce that pitch focus at will (saying, for example,
"Those two songs begin on the same note, and here, I'll hum it for you …"). Pitch labeling means being
able to use some kind of identification strategy to refer to such pitch foci: ("… and it's an A flat.") See
Daniel J. Levitin, "In search of the musical mind," Cerebrum: the Dana forum on brain science 2,4
(2000): 31-49 for a convenient introduction to absolute pitch; on pitch labeling and pitch memory see
also Daniel J. Levitin, "Absolute memory for musical pitch: evidence from the production of learned
melodies," Perception & Psychophysics 56 (1994): 414-423.
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Certain phenomena closely related to private labels need to be analyzed with a slightly
broader arsenal of semantic concepts than the strict idea of the contrast set provides —
specifically, one that includes domains and polarities rather than just contrast sets, and
mapping rather than labeling. In most (though not all) cases of color tags, the set of numbers
or letters is labeled not by a restricted contrast set of color such as ROYGBIV, but rather by fairly
specific and not necessarily focal instantiations within the continuous domain of color:
"bluish-purple-black," for instance, not just "black" or "blue." In these cases, a contrast set is
being tagged by instantiations of a domain, not members of a label set. Similarly, there are
well-attested reports in the literature on private labels of people who say very convincingly
and consistently that each letter of the alphabet has a different "personality" for them.134
Here, a collection of entities is being labeled not with another contrast set, but rather by a set
of points that are the instantiations of some other semantic domain and do not constitute a
contrast set. 
Another similar private labeling tool involves different positions along a polarity,
which contrast only in degree. For example, a friend of mine, a musician, though he does not
possess absolute pitch, consistently claims to feel that the flat end of the "circle" of fifths (an
ordered array of key signatures) is more "salty" whereas the sharp end is more "sweet."135 In
another, much-publicized case which inspired a book on private labels, the subject had a
private labeling system where increases and decreases along the polarity {pointiness :
roundness} were used to tag some part of the semantic domain of taste. The investigator
134 For example, the following letter to the Synesthesia list from Damian Stewart, 30 October 2003: "I
find letters have personalities. Rounded 'a' like an 'o' with a stick is naive, but 'a' with a third bar across
the top is smug. 'u' has just made a statement it's particularly proud of (despite its obvious stupidity). 'f'
is eager to go somewhere. 't' is cute and female, 'e' is happy … they all have some personality or other."
List archive access via http://home.comcast.net/~sean.day/Synesthesia.htm (November 2004).
135 Queried further, he tells me (personal communication, 1 April 2004) that for him, this does not have
to do with the sound of the key signature, but only with its position on his mental image of the contrast
set of the circle of fifths (which form a line, not a circle, in this particular way of viewing it). Thus D flat
and C sharp, though they are on equal-tempered instruments just different ways of representing the
same key and encode exactly the same pitches, are for him at extreme poles of saltiness and sweetness.
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came up with a scale of different degrees of pointiness and roundness to be able to chart the
subject's private system.136 
In these two cases, the source, the target, or both source and target are domains or
polarities, not contrast sets, and they are more continuous than they are discrete. These
private linkages involve labeling less than they do private polar mappings, such as {flat :
sharp} = {salty : sweet}. These private mappings are similar to the apparently universal
human sensory scale mappings such as {pointiness : roundness} = {high pitch : low pitch}
that have been documented in psychophysical experiments.137 Like any mapping, these
private mappings link not only the points in two domains, but also the relational structure of
the domains themselves. Such private mappings for continuous domains are less well
documented or understood than are private labels for collective domains and contrast sets.
Though private labeling systems do seem to be less common than the private images
of domains discussed in section 2.12, they are by no means extraordinarily rare. Some
researchers, especially those who discuss private labels in a medically tinged discourse
frame, have tended to romanticize, exoticize, and medicalize them, showing amazement that
private labels exist,138 overestimating their rarity,139 and waxing ecstatic over the idea that
they might give insights into the deepest and most spiritual workings of consciousness.140
One researcher has proclaimed that those with private labels are "cognitive fossils" with
overactive limbic systems141 while others have theorized that the phenomenon is due to
136 This is the case that inspired Cytowic's title The man who tasted shapes; further details are given in
Cytowic, Synesthesia.
137 See Lawrence E. Marks, The unity of the senses: interrelations among the modalities (New York:
Academic Press, 1978).
138 On medical doctors' amazement that subjective labels are common among "normals," see the
anecdote related by Gladys A. Reichard, Roman Jakobson, and Elizabeth Werth in "Language and
synesthesia," Word 5 (1949): 224-233, p. 224. 
139 See, for example, how private labels are called a ten-in-a-million and one-in-25,000 phenomenon in
Cytowic, The man who tasted shapes, p. 6, and Cytowic, "Synaesthesia: phenomenology and
neuropsychology — a review of current knowledge," in Synaesthesia: classic and contemporary
readings, edited by John Harrison and Simon Baron-Cohen, pp. 17-39 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 17.
Then compare the much higher prevalence figures, based on more objective research, cited by Shanon,
"Colour associates to semantic linear orders," and now also suggested by more recent research.
140 See, for example, Cytowic, The man who tasted shapes, p. 7; the subtitle of this same book speaks of
"a bizarre medical mystery [which] offers revolutionary insights into emotions, reasoning, and
consciousness."
141 Cytowic, Synesthesia, and Cytowic, The man who tasted shapes.
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insufficient neuronal pruning during brain development.142 I am skeptical of such claims, and
would point out that Kevin Dann demonstrates at length that, especially among investigators
who do not have personal experience of private labels, there has long been a tendency to
hijack the study of the phenomenon to advance other scientific, intellectual, or spiritual
interests.143 That said, many of those researching private labels in the last fifteen years have
worked diligently to document the phenomenology of the topic in a systematic and objective
way, and to confirm introspective reports by means of cerebral blood flow measurements. 
Still, the medical discourse frame for private labels has made unnecessarily deep
inroads into public consciousness through articles in the popular media. It is visible in many
postings to the online synesthesia mailing list. Private labels are discussed as a "condition"
and one often sees people asking whether it might be comorbid with other "conditions" such
as depression or anxiety. This discourse frame reifies social conventions such as the alphabet
and the musical scale, conveys the misleading sense that private labels are a consequence of
fundamental, hard-wired, inborn, strictly nature-driven pecularities of sensory perception,
and hides private labels' dependence on the workshop's role in creating standardized
contrast sets and socializing children to them. Even in scholarly discussions of private labels,
few recent authors have paid attention to the actual nature of the contrast sets and domains
involved in private labels, and few have any training in the linguistics, sociology, or history of
these sets as conventions. My view is that private labels, and private images of domains, are
quite an unsurprising consequence of the encounter between our everyday cognitive abilities
(including the attaching of signifiers to signifieds, the construction of mental maps and
images, and the mapping of contrast sets and domains onto one another) and the contrast
sets that we are conventionally required to master. One can think of building a private label
system as a very natural and even mundane step that, by amplifying the distinctiveness of
contrast set members with a colorful tag or some other attribute, conceivably aids in learning
142 Simon Baron-Cohen, John Harrison, Laura H. Goldstein, and Maria Wyke, "Coloured speech
perception: Is synaesthesia what happens when modularity breaks down?" Perception 22 (1993):419-
426, p. 425.
143 Kevin T. Dann, Bright colors falsely seen: synaesthesia and the search for transcendental
knowledge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
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and manipulating socially conventional contrast sets. Such a view can still coexist
comfortably with the belief that the scholarly rediscovery of private labels opens up exciting
new methods for neuroscientists to research the physiological basis of cognition and
perception. 
4.8 The case of the revolving restaurant
This section concludes the chapter with a case
study which brings together several of the themes of the
last three chapters. The case involves a real-life physical
environment with a particularly unusual topology for
which a contrast set, a set of labels, an anchor point,
and a directional mapping for the labels were created.
The case is the design of the seating area of the revolving restaurant in Sky Tower, Auckland,
New Zealand, and my discussion is based on my own lunch in the restaurant in August 2001.
Since I was never actually able to speak to the interior designer of the restaurant, my account
of the design process is unfortunately hypothetical, and does not attempt to be an accurate
record of the actual thought processes of the system's creators. But regardless of whether it is
historically accurate in all its details, my account does illustrate the cognitive design
challenges which the restaurant's designers must have faced.
The design goal for the restaurant was the definition of a spatial contrast set within
the seating area, with the twofold aim of helping the staff productively refer to particular
locations within the seating area ("here's the order for table X") and of helping customers to
find their way back from the bathroom more easily. As in other revolving restaurants, the
kitchen and prep areas, as well as the entrance bathrooms, are in the stationary inner "core"
of the building, while the seating area is a ring-shaped platform which revolves around this
core. The restaurant makes roughly one full turn every hour. Since it is not possible to take in
the entire seating area at one glance (part of it is always obstructed by the building core), and
bothersome to have to walk the entire circumference of the seating area in a trial-and-error
Image 4.13 (048)
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search for a particular table, some kind of contrast set and label system had the potential to
make navigating within the restaurant much easier both for staff and for guests.
The first necessary choice was of a contrast set to partition the circular space of the
restaurant seating area. This, in turn, required the creation or identification of a set of
entities within the seating area. One could, of course, create sections within the seating area
entirely artificially, by marking lines on the floor and considering the space between each line
a section of the restaurant. It is, however, normal to want to seize on some natural feature of
the seating area — something from outside the workshop — as an inspiration for one's choice
of partition. A peculiarity of revolving restaurants is that since the seating area revolves with
reference not only to the restaurant core but also to the outside world, it is very difficult to
base a partition on absolute reference points. You can never say that you are in the north
section of the seating area because fifteen minutes later it will be in the east. (You could only
devise a reference method based on compass directions if you were able to count on all
concerned being able to taking into account the time of the reference, the current time, and
the speed of revolution — a difficult task in which everyone would have to spend all day
keeping track of which part of the seating area was to the north at, say, 8:00 this morning.)
For the same reason, plus the fact that circles do not have different "sides," it is also
impossible to use relative direction partitioning strategies in a revolving restaurant; even if
you could call part of the seating area the "starboard" side, it would be the port side a half-
hour later. 
Is there, then, no featuredness in the structure of a revolving restaurant seating area
that suggests where the partitions within it could be laid down? Is the effect similar to that of
trying to "decide" where is the "best" place to write the address on a totally blank mailing
tube? In fact, no. There were two features in the Sky Tower seating area that suggested
themselves as the basis for the creation of a contrast set and a labeling system: the set of
tables, and the set of short stairways between the restaurant core and the seating area. Of
course, neither the stairways nor the tables existed prior to the building of the tower; both
features were designed by people. But the stairways and tables were not created as part of the
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partitioning process, like section lines drawn on the floor of the seating area would have
been.
The tables in the restaurant constitute a contrast set which, in some ways, makes a
good candidate for a navigational labeling system. There are a finite number of them — say,
fifty — and they clearly form a set of entities. So one solution to the problem would be to
consider each table as a member of a contrast set, to label it somehow, and to encourage staff
and customers to learn the table numbers. After all, restaurants typically do label tables,
although usually only staff know each table's number. But since it is customers here who
need the most help, this solution would saddle the designer with the extra problem of
deciding how to display the numbers tastefully. And it would repeatedly force on staff, and
even worse, on customers, the task of finding by number one of fifty different tables which
are moving around all the time (imagine having to peer at the number of many occupied
tables in the restaurant in order to find yours). This would be particularly difficult for
customers, who are not used to knowing their table number at a restaurant, who probably do
not like being made to feel like "just numbers" when they are paying for a nice restaurant
meal, and for whom an actual table number is an unnecessarily precise label for the goal of
finding their way back from the bathroom (a label designating an area of several tables would
be enough).
Given these problems, it seemed that at least for customers, defining a somewhat
smaller number of areas or sections within the seating area — consisting of eight or ten tables
each — would set up a level of precision sufficiently fine to help with navigation back from
the bathroom and sufficiently coarse not to seem pedantic. Such sections could be created
artificially with partitions, but this turned out not to be necessary. A set of six stairways
(physically part of the revolving section) leads down a few steps from the slightly higher
restaurant core to the slightly lower revolving seating area. The stairways are evenly spaced
around the 360 degree circumference of the seating area. The six focal points suggested by
these six stairways were ultimately the seed of featuredness that inspired the partition of the
seating area into six sections defined around those focal points. 
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After accepting the stairways as focal
points, the next problem was to label them or
otherwise confer identity on them. There are
several ways of conferring identity. One could, for
example, define a particular theme (tropical,
desert, forest, etc.) or decorate in a particular color
(red chairs and upholstery, blue chairs and
upholstery, etc.) for all of the tables surrounding
each of the six different stairways. The strategy
chosen, however, was to label the actual stairways
themselves. This could have been done with colors (red, blue, etc.) or letters (A through F),
or native birds (kiwi, kea, etc.), or the names of famous New Zealanders, but the solution
actually chosen was to use the numbers 1 through 6. A large number (1 through 6) is posted
up on the banister of each stairway, as illustrated in Image 4.13, which shows stairway 5. On
your way to the bathroom, if you take note of the number of the stairway you walked up, it is
possible to then find your table again using it, as long as you remember the (thankfully fixed)
spatial relationship between your table and the stairway. The number signs are very large
and prominent, so that customers can get a clear sense of the identity of where they are
sitting by taking in the information passively and unconsciously, since they may not realize
until the moment of disorientation when they come out of the bathroom that this is a piece of
information they need to know.
The six stairways were for all practical purposes identical before they were labeled, so
this is a case in which the labeling of a contrast set is what made the contrast set members
truly different from one another — the labels made the contrast set not just a set but a
contrasting set. The waitstaff, of course, if they need to refer to specific tables, may




A final problem arises in the decision about how the labels 1 through 6 should be
assigned to the six stairways. Surely they should be assigned in sequential order, so that
stairway 1 is in between stairways 6 and 2, stairway 2 is in between stairways 1 and 3, and so
on around. This strategy, using a mapping principle rather than random labeling, means that
customers who know or guess the principle and who see that they are by stairway 2, can
know that stairway 3 will be just next to it, and that stairway 4 will be further in the same
direction. Customers and staff who happen to know that there are six stairways and who can
grasp the way that linear and circular topologies map onto each other can also figure out that
stairway 6 is next to stairway 1 (just like knowing that king-ace-2 is a valid straight under
some gin rummy rules). Indeed, because the restaurant constantly moves relative to all its
environmental reference points, the internal orientation provided by this mapping of
relational structure between the set of stairways and the set stairway numbers is the only
navigational aid available to customers looking for a specific table by its stairway number. 
But in addition to settling on this topology, the designer had to solve the problem of
where to begin, and which direction to proceed, in assigning labels to each stairway. There
were six different possible solutions to the question of which stairway to make the anchor or
starting point (the stairway that would be numbered 1), and then there were two possible
solutions to the problem of how to assign the remaining numbers (one can proceed either in
clockwise or counterclockwise fashion).
While going through all this detail may feel tedious, Sky Tower is a fine example of
how the creation of contrast sets in a domain is a practical, everyday life task and also of how
the abstract properties of domains and contrast sets are actually important and relevant to
us. As we go about designing seating areas, sorting books or CDs, dividing the gym class
students into two teams, separating East from West Germany or creating alphabets or pitch
standards, we too rarely step back to consider our decisions as examples of a social form.
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5 Standardization
I had a professor in college who had put a great deal of thought into his grading
system. When he passed out an assignment, he also passed out a sheet showing how he
would assign grades. He always used a numerical scale — 1 to 5, 1 to 10, 1 to 20. For each
number he wrote a prose description of the corresponding level of quality. Eight out of ten
might mean "a well argued paper showing a good command of the literature but with certain
flaws and omissions." While I was not used to such careful measurement design, I
sympathized with the problem he was trying to solve. After all, what kind of common
understanding exists between the professor, the student, the university, and the outside
world about the meaning of a grade? Very often, virtually none. My professor had tried to
introduce a little more certainty into the process. He wanted to make it very clear that if you
got an "8" it meant something fairly definite and precise about the quality of your work.
The preceding sections of this book showed how we create contrast sets, label them,
and order them. To create a set is a fine thing. But to get lots of people to use it in their daily
life is a harder problem. Contrast sets are not only semantic and onomastic, but also
explicitly social. This section discusses contrast sets as norms, conventions, standards, and
coordinated procedures which are shared throughout an entire community of people. 
My professor's grading standard did not extend beyond the limited realm of the
classes he taught. When he submitted his grades to the registrar at the end of the semester,
they had to be in the standard American format of A, A-, B+, and so on down to F. Since
these grading labels form an ordered series, within one teacher's gradebook we can be pretty
sure that an A- represents better work than a B+. But it is not very clear exactly which part of
the domain of student performance an A- or a B+ refers to. Americans have not generally
coordinated and standardized the relationship between grade labels and performance.
There are many contrast sets in society where such coordination needs to be repeated,
anticipated, and indeed institutionalized in peoples' minds and deeds and expectations, and
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often we are able to (and need to) do a better job of it than in the world of American grading
standards. It is inspiring to think that if you organize a list in alphabetical order, that really
will make it easier for other people to find things on it, because they know the alphabetical
order too; that musical manuscripts written by Mozart more than two hundred years ago can
be understood today; that if you suggest to me on the telephone that we meet today at two-
thirty, I will show up just about at the point when your watch does read half past two; that if
a recipe tells me I should stop boiling the sugar at the soft-ball stage, I can follow these
directions and make a successful batch of candy that replicates the recipe-writer's result; that
the telephone book says the phone code for Latvia is 371, and if you dial 371, you really do get
Latvia; and, last but not least, the fact that you are able to interpret the marks on paper that
you see as indicative of something I am thinking and saying.
There are also plenty of things that have little or nothing to do with contrast sets that
function in the same sort of coordinated way. It is also inspiring to consider that the music I
can purchase at the store (whether vinyl records, tapes, or CDs) will play on my stereo back
home; that the software that runs on my computer will also run on yours; that, at the store, I
can buy an Allen wrench that will fit my bicycle handlebar screw perfectly; that if I speak
French in France, it is likely that I will be understood;1 and that if I live anywhere in Canada
and turn out of my driveway onto the right side of the road, I can be fairly confident that no
one will be approaching head-on in the same lane. 
These are the standard operating procedures of society, which allow people to predict
what others will do, and to act in a complementary way. One can use many terms to describe
these procedures, including standard, convention, norm, coordination, and equilibrium.
These terms are overlapping, and, often, substitutable. They refer to the same family of
things, but with slightly different emphasis and connotations. Convention carries the sense
1 For the argument that speaking one language and not another is a convention comparable to the
others mentioned here, see David Lewis, Convention: a philosophical study (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1969), pp. 49-51; Edna Ullmann-Margalit, The emergence of norms (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 75; Thomas Schelling, Micromotives and macrobehavior (New York:
Norton, 1978), p. 39; Rudi Keller, On language change: the invisible hand in language (London:
Routledge, 1994 [1990]), pp. 129-132.
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that a standard could have been chosen differently; norm carries the sense that not following
the convention is deviant; coordination carries the sense that a norm is tacitly,
intersubjectively shared by many independently acting people in society; equilibrium is a
game-theory term referring to a coordination strategy which nobody has any incentive to
abandon; and standard carries the sense of an equilibrium which an entire society has
agreed on and formally committed to. Jon Elster has put together a detailed taxonomy of
social norms which is more carefully subcategorized.2
This chapter and the following two explore how contrast sets become norms and
standards, social facts and social institutions. Anyone telling the social history of an
individual contrast set can make their tale richer by showing how the story of its emergence
as a norm is an instance of a widespread social pattern. In order to understand this larger
pattern, these chapters lay out some of the theory of standardization as a general
phenomenon, which involves much more than contrast sets. (In the same way, chapters 2-4
discussed contrast sets against the background of general theories of categorization and
labeling.) 
This chapter lays out the basic concepts of standardization with specific reference to
contrast sets. Most of these concepts have appeared in previous literature, which I reference.
In chapter 6 I discuss the types of beliefs that tend to arise around contrast sets, concerning
their origin, justification, and changeability. In that chapter I have also tried to make more of
an original analytical contribution, but also relate my discussion to existing literature.
Chapter 7 is a brief overview of both childhood and adult socialization to contrast sets.
2 Jon Elster, The cement of society: a study of social order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989), pp. 12-13. Elster uses the term "convention equilibrium" for a subcategory of norms that
corresponds closely to that which I have under analysis here.
§ 5.1 232
5.1 Basic concepts of contrast set
standardization
Task, problem, and solution
In the story of any standard one can usually find three elements. I call them the task,
the problem, and the solution.3 The task is usually a technology (in a broad sense of the term
which includes writing systems, calendars, indexes and measurement), which we want to
use. The problem is an issue that needs to be resolved in carrying out the task, and which
everyone who participates needs to resolve in a coordinated way. A solution is a particular
way of resolving the problem. For example, if the task is the production and use of the
typewriter, one problem is the design of the keyboard, and the Dvorak and QWERTY layouts
are two potential solutions to the problem. If the task is the design of a grading system, how
fine-grained to make the divisions is one problem, and how to label them is another.
Making the distinction between task, problem and solution helps us discuss
standardization more precisely and accurately. The word "standard" is often ambiguous
between "problem" and "solution" readings, such as if we say that "the rule of the road is an
example of a standard." We may mean the entire issue of which side of the road to drive on
(the coordination problem): "I'm very interested in the worldwide history of the rule of the
road." Or we may mean a particular rule of the road (one solution to the coordination
problem): "The rule of the road in Ireland is keep-left."
To solve a coordination problem, you must choose a solution, even in those cases
where none stands out as best. Then, in order for the solution to a problem to become
accepted as a social norm, it must be not only chosen but popularized, so that it is re-chosen,
or re-enacted, or at least accepted, by many people at different times and in different places.
Plenty of standards ideas pass the first step but not the second, such as the dollar coin, the
3 The use of the terms "problem" and "solution" dates back at least as far as Thomas Schelling, The
strategy of conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 57. They have also been used by
Ullmann-Margalit in The emergence of norms, p. 76, and by Susanne Schmidt and Raymund Werle in
Coordinating technology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998). David Lewis in Convention uses
"coordination problem" but prefers "equilibrium" to "solution"; in game-theory language, a
coordination solution is an equilibrium strategy.
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metric system, and Benjamin Franklin's revised spelling system (to take three American
examples). A parent measuring their child's height on the pantry door with a yardstick, a
foundry creating rail-car bogies to the Russian track gauge, or a student using the Roman
alphabet to write an English composition are all re-enacting and perpetuating a particular
standards solution, even though other solutions are available to them. The person who puts
the new dollar coin in a jar and not in their coin purse is deliberately refusing to re-enact.
This coordination and re-enactment is largely tacit, meaning that it is usually
assumed and expected rather than discussed and planned, and it happens at a distance. We
coordinate our decisions, at one time and place, with other peoples' decisions at what may be
a totally different time and place. For example, to wire a house with American standard
electrical plugs later constrains a house's owner to buy appliances which fit those plugs. To
use alphabetical order or musical staff notation presumes the existence of as yet unspecified
people who will know that order or understand such notation. The decision by a paper mill to
cut paper to an A4 size, that by a copy machine maker to design the machine for A4 size
paper, that by a consumer to buy an A4 size inbox tray, and that by a retailer to sell the A4
paper and the A4 copy machine are all dependent on each other in a ritual of social
coordination across time and space. "Across time and space" is the key. Standards solutions
are not negotiated during face-to-face interaction. That is why they must be more precise and
specific than other conventions which can be renegotiated during the act of coordination
itself, such as greeting customs like a handshake or a kiss.
Conventionality and wiggle room 
Standards solutions could always have been otherwise. We could have picked or
chosen a different one. Standards solutions are conventional. That means that they are not
entirely determined by nature. They may be partly constrained by nature (obviously, we
choose standard paper sizes that are not too small for us to write on or too large to store
comfortably), but nature often leaves society some wiggle room within which societies make
a purely conventional choice: between Roman versus Cyrillic, or five-tone versus seven-tone
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scales, or the A4 and 8½-by-11 paper-size foci. With the design of alphabets, certain
primitives of form, such as lines, circles, crosses, and right angles, must obviously be taken
into account in any explanation of why written languages have the forms that they do. But
beyond that, the distinctions that we make between letterforms are only a subset of the vast
number of potentially salient ones available to us. Which distinctions we consider important
is a conventional matter which varies from culture to culture.
Just as nature only partially constrains social convention, convention only partially
constrains individuals. Even a well-established norm or standards solution may leave
individual re-enactors of the solution a certain degree of tolerance. Just as we may let our
feet or elbows intrude just slightly into the space of the airline passenger next to us, people
are granted a limited amount of leeway to sign their name just a little bit differently than on
the bank's signature card, to be less than exactly on pitch, or to park a little bit towards the
left edge of the parking space.
Game theory notation
The terminology and notation of game theory sometimes helps clarify how
standardization works.4 Most standardized contrast sets are pure coordination norms where
all the "players" in the "game" have an incentive to coordinate their behavior and no one has
an incentive to "defect." The "payoff matrix" is a notation commonly used by game theorists
which adopts the convention of numerically quantifying the benefit to each player of
different combinations of behavior. The matrix shown below is an idealized one which shows
a pure coordination problem in which the two players (X and Y) benefit equally regardless of














4 The pioneer in applying game theory concepts to social coordination was Thomas Schelling in The
strategy of conflict. See also Lewis, Convention, and Ullmann-Margalit, The emergence of norms.
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There also exist contrast sets whose use is more similar to the so-called prisoner's
dilemma, where players do have an incentive to defect from the norm. These include musical
pitch, student grading, and clothing-size labeling (see further section 6.7). 
Corpus and status standardization
One can speak of "the standardization of a contrast set," but it is good to distinguish
between what, exactly, about a contrast set gets standardized. On the one hand, we can speak
of the standardization of the individual elements of a contrast set. This includes the choice to
make a norm out of the way the set members partition a domain (i.e., the choice of
boundaries or focal points); the set's level of taxonomic precision; the type of labels applied
to it; the way those labels relate to the set members; and the ordering and layout of the set
members or their labels. For example, it is a fact of the internal makeup of the Roman
alphabet that one extra mark is enough to distinguish an O from a Q, whereas adding a cross
on a lower-case z or forgetting the dot on an i does not catapult you into a new contrast set
member (except in Polish and Turkish respectively). 
On the other hand, we can speak of standardization as society's choice to make a
norm out of the solution as a whole. The solution here may be an ensemble or package of
many smaller choices. We choose one solution above other potential contenders. Thus
Romanians today have chosen to use the Roman instead of the Cyrillic alphabet.
The difference is that between standardizing the design of the solution, and
institutionalizing the solution as a response to the problem. To take another example,
consider the difference between the internal design choices made in developing the Celsius
or Fahrenheit scale (unit size, zero point, and positive-negative mapping), and the
institutional choice of whether to settle on Celsius or Fahrenheit as a social norm. The latter
choice confers normative status on all of the former choices that come "inside the package."
Looking at the same distinction from the point of view of the history of a single
coordination solution, the set design process can focus either on the internal makeup of the
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solution, or on its promotion and marketing.5 Designers may need to pay as much attention
to turning contrast sets into norms, as to making the contrast sets themselves. This means
planning the social status of the set, not just its composition. Language planners know that
they must figure out not only which words to use ("corpus planning"), but how to get people
to use them ("status planning").6 The best-designed alphabet, measuring scale, pitch
standard, or national border is almost useless without general agreement on it. Success
comes easier for the contrast set designer who grasps how cognitive conventions succeed (or
not) at becoming institutionalized norms.
Designing a coordination solution or choosing one solution over another can be a
relatively stylistic decision, a matter of taste and fashion, but if the solution is to be broadly
adopted such choices acquire considerable gravity. For example, the people who decide what
colors or numbers to use for public transport routes may feel they are primarily making a
stylistic choice. But since such design choices in public transport affect the way people
conceptualize a city, designers really have an awesome degree of power over the mundane
mental life of thousands, perhaps millions of people. Once everybody starts thinking in the
same way and expects everybody else to too, the trend has been set, the fashion dictated, and
there may be no going back. 
Choice and coordination
A common thread in both the design and the successful coordination of a standards
solution is the process of selection, choice, and decision making. In designing a solution, one
chooses between different ways of creating and labeling a contrast set. In selecting a
standards solution as a norm, one chooses between different solutions. Thus Celsius chose
1/100 (not, say, 1/180) of the difference between the freezing and boiling points of water as
5 On the parallel theme of "language planning as marketing," see Robert L. Cooper, Language planning
and social change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 72-79.
6 On the distinction between "corpus planning" and "status planning," originally introduced by Heinz
Kloss, see Cooper, Language planning and social change, pp. 31-33, and chapters 5-6; Robert B.
Kaplan and Richard B Baldauf, Jr., Language planning from practice to theory (Clevedon:
Multilingual Matters, 1997), pp. 28-49.
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the size of the unit of his temperature scale. Meanwhile, societies as a whole choose between
Celsius, Fahrenheit, and other temperature scales as social institutions.
However, choice and selection are not uniquely associated with coordinative
standardization. Societies, designers, and planners make many choices and selections
between different possible courses of collective action which differ from my concept of
"standards" in their lack of a coordinative requirement. For example, choosing where to
locate a new train line or expressway, the form of a new building, what color shirt to wear
today, which typeface or map projection to use,7 or what to name your child are design
choices and matters of taste,8 not coordination problems. I admit that the distinction is a bit
fuzzy. Thus clothing choices and fashion trends do involve the social coordination of
behavior and aesthetic judgement, but the coordination is not essential to the task of clothing
oneself. A construction project involves coordinated action, but it is not tacit. Once chosen, a
child's name later does become the solution to a problem of coordinated reference; but
before the choice is made, society is not relying on its expectations of whether parents choose
to name a girl Ashley and not Brittany in the same way as they are relying on their
expectations that the parents will drive home from the hospital on the right and not the
wrong side of the road. Fashion and design choices lack the reciprocal interlock, the
intolerance of deviance, and the sense that social harmony depends on many peoples'
simultaneous, individual, and tacit decisions to do the same thing, that I am concerned with
in this section. They are, of course, fascinating in their own right, and they do have many
things in common with coordinative standards. 
With some other choices and selections, coordination is central to accomplishing a
shared task, but only momentarily so. Thus if you and I meet walking down a hall we may
have trouble figuring out whether to pass each other on the left or the right. We both must
7 On map projections, see John P. Snyder, Flattening the earth: two thousand years of map
projections (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
8 A good entry point to the study of taste and fashion is Stanley Lieberson, A matter of taste: how
names, fashions, and culture change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), especially chapters 1,
9, and the prologue. See also Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: a social critique of the judgement of taste
(London: Routledge, 1984 [1979]) and Jukka Gronow, The sociology of taste (London: Routledge,
1997).
§ 5.1 238
agree on one way or another, but we are then free to forget what we chose. We set no norm.
We might pass on the left today and the right tomorrow. Other choices involve long-term
coordination but have nothing to do with contrast sets as I define them, such as the choice of
which electrical plug shape to standardize, or the decisions made in the process of language
planning.9
Emergent and planned standards solutions
The power of the designer and the workshop over the social status of a contrast sets
varies, just like the power of the designer over the partition of a domain. Sometimes we can
plan coordination solutions and sometimes we cannot. Indeed there is a continuum of
plannability between coordination problems whose resolution is the hands of the workshop
and in the hands of forces beyond deliberate control.10
Solutions to problems which are less plannable tend to emerge out of the crowd-
behavior of society, by means of an "invisible hand" composed of the sum total of many
individual coordinative actions. They sometimes happen without anyone really noticing, and
certainly without anyone sitting down and deciding on them. By imperceptible stages, an
entire society might come to use the same type of computer operating system, proofreading
marks, or vacuum cleaner bag even though twenty years before there were a dozen
competing systems. There may be leaders, early adopters, or "influentials" in the spread of
such standards, but most are actors acting in their own interests and influencing society
unintentionally, rather than actors deliberately attempting to influence an entire society. The
typewriter keyboard is alleged to have developed in this way. Most (though not all) ice cream
stores sell much the same range of flavors. The lexicon works in this way more often than
not: nobody decreed that Americans should ultimately prefer to say "dot" instead of "point"
in reading off Internet addresses, nor did a committee sit down to oversee the process of tacit
coordination between your expectations and the kitchen's that happens when you order
9 On language planning as choice and decision-making see Cooper, Language planning and social
change, pp. 87-97; Haugen, "Linguistics and language planning," pp. 162-163.
10 For another statement of this, see Young, Individual strategy and social structure, pp. 145-146.
§ 5.1 239
"eggs over easy" at a restaurant.11 Similarly, when Sweden became the last country in
continental Europe to change from keep-left to keep-right driving in 1967, it was because the
change was in Sweden's interest, not that of some supranational driving-customs planner.12
While some might say that the term "invisible hand" is just a way to whitewash attempts by
those with a financial interest in the institutionalization of one solution to influence
individual choices, there are many cases where such interests simply do not and cannot wield
much power. There was no "author" of the keep-right, eggs-over-easy, or dot (not point)
standards. This does not mean that the solution is natural and that the problem could not
have been solved any other way. The solution is still conventional, but was arrived at through
an organic, emergent, self-selecting process.
But many coordination solutions are plannable — many contrast sets in particular.
Some (like character set standards or the streetnames in a new development) need to be
planned, in order to get synchronization and coordination to work. In other cases, we decide
to take deliberate control of a contrast set that has so far developed more organically. We sit
down and decide that now we are going to do things "this way": we assemble together all the
vacuum cleaner manufacturers and agree on one system of bags, we decide how to rename
street and place names after a revolution, we revise the writing system for a language, we
devise a new measurement system, or, as in Soviet Russia, we try to change the number of
days in the week from seven to five.
Along this continuum of plannability, contrast set and label set design is located more
towards the plannable end, and language planning more towards the uncontrollable end
(particularly when it tries to affect spoken norms). The workshop has little influence over the
grammar and lexicon of spoken language, whose norms are an emergent product of group
dynamics and crowd behavior, perpetuated and perturbed through constant reenactment by
vast numbers of mostly anonymous users. Even in the realm of personal and geographic
11 For a detailed statement of this view see Rudi Keller, On language change: the invisible hand in
language (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 61-67.
12 Of course, within the context of Swedish society, the change from keep-left to keep-right was planned
and not emergent. But the generalization of the keep-right rule across Europe was emergent, not
planned.
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names it is difficult to steer new spoken usage or revise entrenched custom. It is possible to
try to popularize a new word or two or to change a name, but one almost never has the
opportunity to design or redesign whole chunks of the set of words or names at a time. It is
somewhat easier, although still difficult, for a "language designer" to influence the norms and
conventions of putting words onto paper, and hence the written form of words is more often
a target of language planning than the spoken form.13
These challenges notwithstanding, throughout history people have dreamed of the
ability to take control over the forms of spoken language, either through the process of
remaking or sometimes "purifying" existing lexicons, or of constructing entirely new
languages like Volapük or Esperanto.14 Many people have committed years of their lives to
both of these types of effort. Strictly limited, small-scale lexical planning within an existing
language has often succeeded. But no artificial language has managed to win over the whole
world. The fact is that planning language requires not only devising a new standard lexicon,
but convincing thousands of people to willingly and repeatedly re-enact it — something that
can take place only under very unusual circumstances.
Contrast sets and labels are more plannable than language. They do not usually
evolve as spontaneously. Quite often they really are, or at least once were, under the direct
control of particular people or institutions, and the design decisions that those people make
really affect how other people think. (The fact that labels have a stronger existence as written
than as spoken symbols is consistent with the fact that they are consciously planned.) The
design of contrast sets and labels is a more realistic playing field for those attempting to
affect the shared mental life of society. The design process is less frustrating because
designers have a much greater chance of success. And in studying this type of design we get
to see what kind of cognitive structures we humans create when we really do have the
opportunity to consciously design and control them. 
13 Einar Haugen, "Linguistics and language planning," in The ecology of language, pp. 159-190
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), pp. 163, 165-166.
14 See Andrew Large, The artificial language movement (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985).
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5.2 Contrast sets as social facts
When you get up in the morning you could, if you wanted, go totally against all the
conventions of the world. You could reject all the contrast sets and labels that we normally
use and substitute others. You could use a different alphabetical order, even a different
alphabet, tune your piano differently, act as if Spain and Portugal are no longer separate
countries, drive on the wrong side of the road, redesign your typewriter keyboard, start
observing a ten-day week, and refuse to speak English any more. Some of these choices
might be a little difficult to carry out, but they are, at least, theoretically conceivable.
The point is that even in those cases where a contrast set has become an entrenched
social norm, we have some choice about whether we are going to re-enact a it. We do not
absolutely have to. We could do something else. So, then, if we are almost never in a position
where we are entirely prevented from choosing an abnormal coordination solution, what is it
that causes us to choose the prevailing norm over and over again? What makes us re-enact
the solutions that we already have?
The sociological tradition answers these questions by saying that social norms are
built into our environment, built into our buildings, built into our organizations, and built
into our minds before we ever come to question them. People follow prevailing norms
because they are born into a world in which other people follow them. Their general use acts
as a coercive force upon us. It is almost impossible for any single person to change them or
escape them without losing some of the ability to coordinate their behavior with the rest of
society. Why write in a new alphabet if no one else will be able to read it? When Richard
Feynman, as a schoolboy, invented his own symbols for sine, cosine, tangent, and their
inverses, he justifiably felt that his symbols were better — after all, why use three letters
when one will do? — but he quickly gave up when he saw that no one else could understand
his homework papers.15 Most people do not even think about the possibility of choosing an
15 Richard P. Feynman, "Surely you're joking, Mr. Feynman!": adventures of a curious character (New
York: Bantam, 1986 [1985]), pp. 11-12.
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alternative solution to a standards problem. It has never occurred to some people that clocks
even could run counterclockwise. 
The currency of a contrast set within a group is not fixed irrevocably by the laws of
nature. It exists only insofar as the group perpetuates it. The group, along with the things it
creates, carries the norm. If the group disappeared, so would the norm. A standards solution
is not something like the earth, the moon, the sun, or the planets, which were created by vast,
unimaginable natural forces. A standards solution is something that was created by human
beings acting (more or less) together and collectively.
The name that is most commonly given to these sorts of entities or concepts is social
facts, the idea being that the earth and the sun are "facts" too, but more natural ones. The
term "social fact" traces to Emile Durkheim.16 A large literature has grown up in the social
sciences around the idea of such things which persists in society by virtue of being there
already.17 The word institution can be substituted for "social fact," and often connotes
something larger than a single standards solution — typically an organization, tradition, or
an entire social system which has a life of its own that transcends the individual people
involved in it. 
Any social fact might alternatively be thought of not as an monolithic abstraction, but
rather as the innumerable actual diverse re-enactments of it. In saying this I am trying to pay
respect to a huge body of recent social science writing which emphasizes the messy concrete
realities of cultural practices and acts, over the sanitized abstraction of social facts and
institutions.18 But no matter how deep one's sympathy to this view, one must strike a balance.
16 Emile Durkheim, The rules of sociological method (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press of Glencoe, 1938),
chapter 1 ("What is a social fact?")
17 In addition to the works I have already cited, a few other references in this tradition that I have
reviewed are George Herbert Mead, Mind, self, and society: from the standpoint of a social
behaviorist (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), especially his definition of "institution," p.
211; Lynne G. Zucker, "The role of institutionalization in cultural persistence," American Sociological
Review 42 (1977): 726-743; John R. Searle, The construction of social reality (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1995); Eerik Lagerspetz, The opposite mirrors: an essay on the conventionalist theory of
institutions (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995); Pitirim Sorokin, Sociocultural causality, space, time: a study
of referential principles of sociology and social science (New York: Russell & Russell, 1964); Mary
Douglas, How institutions think (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986).
18 A convenient summary with references is Duranti, Linguistic anthropology, pp. 43-46.
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Challenging the "monolithicness" of cognitive conventions is fine so long as one recognizes
that one also gets somewhere by considering them as institutions with histories that can be
told and continuities that can be analyzed. Postulating the existence of, say, the seven-day
week as an "institution" or a "social fact" is a simplification, and it seems a worthwhile one. 
How much deviance from a standardized contrast set do we, in fact, permit
ourselves? The focal point of any contrast set member permits a certain degree of tolerance
(see section 2.4) and slight deviations from standardized focal points and boundaries are
sometimes actually encouraged. Thus it is OK if the orchestra is tuned a fraction flat as long
as they stay together, and we actually like to have a characteristic, individual style of
handwriting so long as it does not differ too much from the norm. But rejecting a
standardized contrast set in favor of an entirely different solution, or mixing up the internal
links between a set and its labels, isolates you from the mainstream and restricts your
coordinative ability to the very small community of people who share your choice. You can
design your own keyboard layout, tune your guitar differently, measure in rods and perches,
think in terms of the pre-1974 British provincial system, wear a watch which goes
counterclockwise, or call a pen a "frindle"19 as long as you keep your coordinative activity to
yourself or within a group of like-minded people. You can choose your own style, but you lose
something by doing so. And in other cases, where coordination with people you do not know
is the point of the whole contrast set, deviance is foolish: you cannot use your own system of
telephone numbers, reverse the order of postal addresses, or pay people in half-crowns or
shillings and expect to get by. Indeed, society sanctions those who refuse to respect
prevailing coordination norms, so that the police or the army will likely stop you if you try to
cross an international border without respecting the change of authority that such partitions
institutionalize.20Durkheim tells us that
A social fact is to be recognized by the power of external coercion which it exercises or is
capable of exercising over individuals, and the presence of this power may be recognized in its
19 See the children's novel Frindle, by Andrew Clements (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
20 See Elizabeth Bard, "How to cross borders: social or otherwise," New York Times, 27 October 2004;
Heath Bunting, "BorderXing Guide," www.irational.org/borderxing (November 2004).
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turn either by the existence of some specific sanction or by the resistance offered against every
individual effort that tends to violate it.21
The Microsoft advertisement shown in
Image 5.1 illustrates the principle of
Durkheim's statement. The advertisement
leads us to believe that, one fine day, a
Microsoft marketing executive in Seattle took
out their calculator and divided the number of
new users of Microsoft Office in, say,
November 1996 by the number of seconds in
November 1996, getting an answer of
20.008467—most calculators display eight
digits at a time. We see the external coercion
of standards of precision in the fact that the
advertising executive followed a socially
conventional standard of precision (the
conventional division of the minute into 60
seconds, not more and not less) and rounded this number to 20. The charm of the
advertisement is that it also tells us that one sanctions someone who disregards convention
and uses unnecessary degrees of precision by calling them a geek!
Who's in charge of a social fact? The control of contrast set design
and institutionalization
Very often we can identify a few select people (who may be inventors, industry
representatives, or government workers) who actually sat down to design a contrast set, or to
21 Durkheim, The rules of sociological method, p. 10.
Image 5.1 (010)
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choose one of several competing sets to solve a certain problem.22 Who are these people who
have the power to choose what terms others will think in?
They are not normally "contrast set specialists." Even a contrast set that is part of the
general knowledge of everyone in an entire society will only be used in a very definable subset
of social situations. Most people pay attention to telephone numbers, house numbers, or
library call numbers only when they are making a call, looking for an unfamiliar building, or
going to the library. Contrast sets are tied to particular subcultures. Most are created,
maintained by, and designed to benefit particular sectors of society such as the airline
industry, the postal service, the music world, the faculty and staff and students of a
university, or the employees of a company. Their creators do not usually think about contrast
sets, or even about standardization, as a general phenomenon, and one cannot call in the
consultants from the Contrast Set Division of a major business consulting firm to solve a
contrast set design problem; there are no such consultants. Even when the maintenance of a
contrast set has been centralized under a standards organization such as ISO (the
International Organization for Standardization), the committee representation may still
largely be from a particular industry or sector.
Thus it is no surprise that the development of contrast sets is something typically
carried out not by hypothetical categorization and labeling experts, but by groups of experts
in the sector which actually works with the contrast sets in question. The people involved
might be telecom specialists, librarians, representatives from the airline industry, or the
person who manages the university's course catalog numbers. Since this may be the only
contrast set standardization project that they ever work on in their career, they may not be
aware of formally similar problems in completely different sectors.
It is very often possible to identify the board or administrative body responsible for
creating or maintaining a particular coordination solution. Contrast set standardization may
22 Paul Starr uses the term "official classification" to describe classificatory, naming, and ordering
conventions authorized by a government body, and calls the question of which classification such a
body should choose "the problem of legitimate classification." See "Social categories and claims in the
liberal state," Social research 59 (1992): 263-295, pp. 264-265.
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serve the interests of a government, a consumer advocacy group, an industry association, or
of a particular dominant firm within an industry.23 History is full of examples of industry
gatherings where standards were hammered out, such as the standard time conferences of
the 1880s,24 the Unicode character set standardization discussions in the late 1980s and early
1990s,25 or the many conferences that have been held to define international political
boundaries. Today, for example, the non-profit agency responsible for managing the Internet
domain name system is ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(www.icann.org). International character set standards are maintained by the Unicode
Consortium (www.unicode.org) under the auspices of ISO. Both North American and
European governments have contracted the administration of their telephone numbering
plans to Neustar, Inc. of Sterling, Virginia (www.neustar.biz). Product codes on consumer
items (including ISBN numbers) are maintained by EAN International and the Uniform
Code Council (www.ean-int.org and www.uc-council.org). The ISO (www.iso.org),
headquartered in Geneva, provides an umbrella under which technical committees from
national standards organizations administer an extremely wide variety of coordinative,
product, safety, and business process standards. This mundane but crucial organizational
aspect of standardization has intrigued a number of scholars, who in writing about it have
had to struggle to overcome the bureaucratic dryness of the topic, and to find common
themes in vast diversity of standards activities.26
Once a contrast set has been designated as a norm, whether it catches on always
ultimately depends on its users. But there is quite a bit of variation in the proportion of users
23 Charles P. Kindleberger, "Standards as public, collective, and private goods," Kyklos 36 (1983): 377-
396, p. 385.
24 See Eviatar Zerubavel, "The standardization of time: a sociohistorical perspective," American
Journal of Sociology 88 (1982): 1-23.
25 The full history of the development of Unicode has not been written but in the meantime one source
is Tony Graham, Unicode: a primer (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2000).
26 See, for example, Nils Brunsson and Bengt Jacobsson, eds., A world of standards (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000); Henk J. DeVries, Standardization: a business approach to the role of
national standardization organizations (Boston: Kluwer, 1999); Samuel Krislov, How nations choose
product standards and standards change nations (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997);
Steven M. Spivak and F. Cecil Brenner, Standardization essentials: principles and practice (New
York: Marcel Dekker, 2001); Lal C. Verman, Standardization: a new discipline (Hamden, Conn.:
Archon, 1973).
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who actually have a real, active "say" in whether a solution becomes institutionalized or not.
One must distinguish between active users — players in the game, people who have a real
choice of whether to accept or reject the solution — and passive consumers of a standard.
Thus a library's decision to use the Dewey or Library of Congress classification system is a
matter of active choice, but the library visitor's use of that system is a matter of passive
consumption. My choice of "ianwatson.org" as my Internet domain name is a matter of active
choice, but the fact that it ends in "org" and not "abc" is a matter of passive consumption.
At one end of the spectrum there are some contrast sets where active control is very
democratic. The handwritten forms of the letters of the alphabet are recreated every day by
everyone who knows how to write. Although peoples' handwriting styles come under many
outside influences, it is difficult for anyone to control the form of a contrast set which has so
many active re-enactors; a recent attempt to bring about mass change in Icelanders'
handwriting styles did not succeed.27 Similarly, we recreate the alphabetical order in our
address books, Rolodexes and lists, even though there is not really anything to stop us from
using a different approach. The American government can (as it often has!) mint a new coin
and decree that it symbolizes a dollar of value, but it will never enter into Americans' mental
register of legal-tender money unless millions of them choose to use it over and over again to
pay for something. American thermometers and yardsticks are marked in both metric and
standard units and Americans do make a choice of how to report those measures every time
they do so.
Often, though, a restricted group of people determine the makeup of the set and have
enough organizational or market power to promote its general acceptance. In some cases,
such as political boundaries, a standardized set requires lockstep uniformity from all users,
meaning both a common understanding of the form of the set and a common agreement to
respect it. In the case of labeling standards, the only remaining wiggle room in which users
can exercise some control is in the actual assignment of labels to entities. Here, power is
typically shared with those who hold a stake in a particular entity. For example, when having
27 See Marion Muller, "Iceland goes italic," U&LC 15, 1 (February 1988): 12-15. 
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a new telephone installed, though one cannot choose one's country code, it is common to be
able to decide between several potential candidates for the final digits of your number. Some
people have compelling reasons for preferring one label to another. Consider the case of the
University of San Francisco, a Jesuit-run school, which suffered for many years with phone
numbers starting with "666" (a number traditionally associated with Satan) until it finally
managed to have its prefix changed to "422".28 It is easier to bear being "just a number" (see
section 3.5) if you have some control over what number you will be. (With vanity license
plates, it is even possible to charge people for the privilege.)
There is, then, a continuum of contrast set control. At one end we have contrast sets
which are constantly re-enacted by every member of society. At the other are contrast sets
that are reaffirmed by the members of a closed club or privileged subculture, invested in, and
then more or less passively consumed by the "general public." In this book, I do not explore
the consequences of this imbalance in detail, and I plead guilty to mostly having treated
contrast sets "as an object of contemplation rather than as an instrument of action and
power."29 In taking this approach, I do not mean to say that the issue of power is
uninteresting. Indeed it is fascinating, but it is material for a further study; this book's goal is
to provide a clear understanding of how contrast sets work, which is a prerequisite for any
investigation of the power relations surrounding them.
5.3 Contrast sets and thought communities
The collection of people who make use of a particular standardized contrast set (or, in
fact, of any coordination solution) form a kind of community. It may be a very widely
distributed community, which may be very different in many respects other than the fact that
it shares a standard; it may, however, be a community of individuals who are defined in other
ways which are exactly congruent with the distribution of the same standard. To the extent
that a contrast set is something that affects and resides in the minds of its members, this
28 Don Lattin, "USF giving Satan's number the pitchfork," San Francisco Chronicle, 11 September 1996,
section A, p. 13.
29 Bourdieu, Language and symbolic power, p. 37.
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community is a community of the mind, a community of shared thinking habits, a
community of coordinated behavior, rather than a community in any of the standard senses
of village, church, profession, and so forth. It is a community of people who think the same
way. The two terms that have been most often used to describe this phenomenon are thought
community30 and thought collective.31
The existence of these thought communities is of tremendous importance to people.
After all, we usually like to know whether someone shares our mental world before we start
communicating with them. If you are a tour guide, a musician, an indexer, or an American
census taker, it is quite important that your audience share the same fundamental ideas as
you do about the layout of Venice, the well-formedness of a chord, the normal order of the
alphabet, or the salience of certain "racial" features in ethnic classification. If you are trying
to swindle somebody, it helps a lot to know whether they have a good sense of the value of
the local currency or not. We would never buy a new computer without some basic level of
assurance that we will be able to use familiar concepts, programs, and procedures on a new
machine, thus not breaking completely with our previous thought community. Sliding into
the seat of a car whose controls work differently — say, a differently laid out gearshift, or
windshield wipers and headlights reversed — reminds us of the social gulf between, say,
Toyota drivers and BMW drivers, or between the mental worlds of drivers who normally
drive a right-hand drive car (as in Britain and Ireland) and those who drive a left-hand drive
car (as in the rest of Europe). 
If we take two individuals who belong to the same thought community in one sphere
of social action, we will probably find that they belong to different thought communities in
another sphere. Thus a teacher and a janitor may both be familiar with the room numbers in
a classroom building, but one may speak Chinese at home and the other English. Each of us
belongs to many different thought communities as readers, musicians, timekeepers,
30 Zerubavel, Social Mindscapes, pp. 9 and 116n16.
31 Ludwik Fleck, Genesis and development of a scientific fact (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1979 [1935]), pp. 38-51 ("Introduction to thought collectives"). See also Bloomfield, Language, pp. 46-
47, who describes in detail a rich network metaphor for the idea of "speech communities."
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computer owners, measurers, and drivers. Part of what gives an individual identity and
distinctiveness is the sum set of thought communities to which they belong, a set which is
always a little different from person to person.32
Of course, thought communities distinguish themselves through a range of
conventional thinking patterns much broader than the use of different contrast sets. But it is
specifically the use of a common strategy for the partition and labeling of some kind of
semantic domain which defines and unites the thought communities which share an
understanding of metric measurement, the Japanese writing system, musical notation,
baseball scoring, or the chapter divisions in this book. Of course, there are also similar
communities of people who drive on the left, who use a particular type of electrical voltage or
plug shape, watch TV encoded under the PAL standard, take trains running on five-foot rail
gauge, and keep paper in three-ring (not two-ring) binders — all coordination solutions
which do not involve contrast sets specifically.
The distribution of these communities — based on the fact that not every community
chooses the same solution to a standards problem — may itself, ironically, give rise to an
emergent partition of some sector of the domain of human beings. For example, the Dewey
Decimal and Library of Congress book cataloguing systems are two competing solutions to
the problem of partitioning and labeling the domain of books. But their distribution gives
rise to a partition of the domain of libraries, into those using Dewey and those using LC.
Similarly, the way different writing systems are distributed across the people and the
countries of the world, with some using the Roman alphabet, some using Cyrillic, some using
Arabic script, some using Korean hangul, and so forth, suggest a partition of the domains of
people and cultures into Roman, Cyrillic, and Arabic, and other "zones."
In this way, thought communities are both consequences of conventional partitions,
and a means by which partitions (of a different sort) emerge. To put it another way, the
choice of the way to partition a particular domain (say, the domain of books or of letterform)
32 See Georg Simmel, Conflict and the web of group-affiliations (New York: Free Press, 1955), pp. 138-
143.
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can be a coordination problem, and then the contrasting solutions to that very same
coordination problem can suggest a partition of the domain of users trying to accomplish the
task involved. To explain this using yet another set of terms, imagine a large group of people
who are faced with a task which requires the creation of a contrast set by means of
conventional acts of partition of some semantic domain (the task might be the creation of a
writing system and the problem might be the creation of a contrast set of letterform); there
exists a thought community which agrees on a solution to that standards problem (say, the
Roman alphabet); there are also thought communities which use different solutions to that
same standards problem (say, the Korean alphabet); and the collective domain of the people
who are all trying to carry out the task can then be partitioned on the basis of what solution
they use. The two partitions involved are of completely different domains (letterform and
people), but they are linked by being related to the execution of the same task (the design of a
standard writing system). From the point of view of the standards problem involved, the one
kind of partition takes place during the corpus planning of one particular solution, while the
other partition is a product of the varying statuses of the different solutions to the problem.
This double relationship is confusing, and somewhat paradoxical, but it is also important to
be able to distinguish between the two types of partitions, and to understand how the theme
of partition ties the two phenomena of standardization and classification particularly closely
together.33
33 Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan Leigh Star make a version of this same point in Sorting things out:
classification and its consequences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), pp. 13-16.
§ 5.3 252
The thought community which shares a particular contrast set varies in its size and its
permanence. Some contrast sets are designed for the general public, others for distinct
subcultures within society. Some contrast sets are designed to last, while others are mentally
disposable. A thought community can be very large, or can consist of a single person.
Naturally, the contrast set designer should know the size of the intended user community as
they consider how to construct and market a set. (Conventional wisdom would suggest that,
for example, the members of a professional association probably have higher standards of
precision than the general public.)
Any adult American is expected to understand how such contrast sets as the alphabet,
zip codes, license plates, telephone numbers, Social Security numbers, and the fifty states
function. They are expected to be able to sort things into alphabetical order and to identify
each of the fifty states. Learning to understand these public labels is part of Americans'
primary set socialization — by which I mean the acquisition of contrast set skills expected
from every member of society. School, parents, friends, books, and games such as spot-a-
license-plate-from-every-state ensure that we learn these things.
On the other hand, there are a lot of contrast sets which we only master
in the course of the secondary cognitive socialization that introduces us to the
sociomental customs of a particular sector of society. Thus, for example, it is
only people in the book business, the supermarket produce industry, the
university procurement field, or the interlibrary loan office who really understand the
workings of the ISBN system, the four-digit codes for types of fruits and vegetables in Image
5.2, the university property identification sticker number on the computer I am using, or the
three-letter codes used for libraries in the OCLC network. Only the people who work for the
same travel company as I do know how we divide up and label the group tours we run. It is
only people with an electronics education who know how to interpret the color codes printed
on resistors, it is mostly just blind people who know Braille, and mostly just specialized




All of these examples are of durable contrast sets which, once mastered, stick in one's
mind for many years. But other sets are designed to be used only for a single activity or
project, and then forgotten. Consider, for example, labeling of the "Insert Tab A into Slot B"
form, which we master just for a few minutes in the process of assembling something.
Scholars number example sentences (in linguistics) or equations (in physics) so that they can
then refer to them in the text, e.g. "(13a)", but these numbers matter only within the context
of the article in which they appear.
The smallest possible thought community is a single person — over time. Think, for
example, of the way you choose to divide up your music collection or filing system, or the
scrawl that passes for my handwriting when I am the only intended audience. These
conventions are still intended to be understandable by another mind at another time, even
though that other mind is simply one's own, in the future.34
5.4 Contrast sets and the sense of identity
The so-called 'chancery double', a folded sheet of paper of prescribed dimensions and format,
was perhaps the most indispensable requisite of the Austrian civil and military administration.
Every request, every memorandum, every report, had to be sent in on this neatly trimmed
form, which, owing to the uniqueness of its format, enabled official documents to be
distinguished at a glance from private correspondence … No communication is officially
recognized unless it is made on this white rectangle of paper.35
Either an individual contrast set member, or an entire contrast set that has been
chosen (over another set) as a standards solution, may come to serve as a symbol for an
entire thought community. 
Thus an individual can use a particular standards solution to demonstrate, reaffirm,
or reject membership in a community. Meanwhile, other individuals place you on their
mental maps of social groupings by attending to which solution you use. In this way contrast
sets, like other conventions, customs, and norms, become symbols of nations and cultures,
and badges of identity and locality in everyday social intercourse. They not only coincide with
social and geographic taxonomies, but help to maintain them. When a number of standards
34 Douglas Hofstadter discusses the imperfect isomorphism between the same person at different times
in Gödel, Escher, Bach: an eternal golden braid (New York: Basic Books, 1979), p. 369.
35 Stefan Zweig, Beware of pity (New York: Harmony Books, 1982), p. 246.
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boundaries coincide, the identity of the resulting "thought community" becomes even
stronger.
Thus the contrast between simplified and traditional characters, as well as between
the Pinyin and Wade-Giles transliteration systems, was for many years a symbol of the
division between communist and capitalist China, just as metric and standard systems divide
Canada and the United States, and the contrast between Fraktur (black-letter) and modern
Roman typefaces signified both temporal and political differences within German culture.
Meanwhile, Europeans in the United States often consider the constant attention to racial
and ethnic categorization as "typically American."
Similarly, small differences in the execution of a commonly used contrast set also
mark out subcommunities within, say, the wider world of people who use the Roman
alphabet. Thus the presence of the letter Ð in the alphabet distinguishes the Faroese
language from that of the Danes, their colonial masters, at the same time as it links the
Faroese with the Icelanders (who also use Ð). This extra contrast-set member is so closely
tied to the Faroese sense of national identity that a modern Faroese poet says "it is clear as
day that without Ð, none [of us] could live."36 Because we reify our own standards (see
section 6.2), we often forget that such cognitive styles allow observers to "place" us even
when we think we are anonymous. Thus C.S. Forester's fictional naval hero Captain Horatio
Hornblower is able to recognize a French privateer otherwise well disguised as an English
fishing trawler from an oar marked "27" with a Continental crossed seven instead of the
uncrossed English version.37 Here, the variation in the location of letterform prototypes
marks different social groups. Indeed, though people often think of handwriting style as an
individual matter, there are distinct national patterns within the Roman alphabet which
allow one to guess (with less than complete certainty) whether the writer is, for example,
British, Dutch, Polish, American, or Icelandic. 
36 See the poem "alfabet" in Rói Pátursson, Líkasum (Tórshavn: Mentunargrunnur Studentafelagsins,
1985).
37 C.S. Forester, Hornblower and the Atropos (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1953), p. 119.
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Opposing identities may also be linked to the different members of a single contrast
set, particularly when users have different "locations" within a contrast set — that is, a
special relationship with one member of a contrast set and not another. For example, I might
live in telephone area code 212 and you live in 718, or I might worship on Friday and you
worship on Saturday; in these cases it is the contrast between {212, 718} and {Friday,
Saturday} which defines one's identity. (The difference between identity that is linked to the
respective elements of a single contrast set and identity that is linked to the competition
among different contrast sets which all solve the same standards problem parallels to some
extent the difference between corpus and status planning.)
The process of social integration and exclusion around symbolic boundaries actually
involves a much wider range of semiotic raw material than contrast sets or standards
solutions.38 A sense of identity may form around oppositions such as classical music versus
rock, or southern American English versus standard American English. These are not really
contrast sets, or elements of sets, or standards solutions, and their contrast is more emergent
than deliberately constructed. 
When traveling to a foreign country, how do you tell that you have arrived? Of course,
changes in the light, the temperature, the humidity, and the smell of the air may be enough
to call to mind all the associations you have with a foreign place, especially on a return visit.
But part of our sense of the identity of a new place is based on the structural oppositions we
perceive in the use of contrast sets and in our location within a contrast set. For example,
while Canada is outwardly very similar to the United States and even uses the same
telephone code (1), one of the first real changes I notice on the drive between Rochester and
Toronto is that signs express distance in kilometers. Travelers from North America to Britain
can continue to speak English, but will notice that letterhead and business cards list the
British telephone code (44). The image of a different writing system, coinage standard, rule
38 On the types of semiotic material that can be involved, see, among others, Pierre Bourdieu,
Distinction: a social critique of the judgement of taste (London: Routledge, 1984 [1979]); Michèle
Lamont and Marcel Fournier, ed., Cultivating differences: symbolic boundaries and the making of
inequality (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992). See also Eviatar Zerubavel, "The language of
time: towards a semiotics of temporality," Sociological Quarterly 28 (1987): 343-356.
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of the road, or typewriter keyboard layout is the kind of thing that can be used as shorthand
in a movie or documentary to signify one's passage into another community. As the Stefan
Zweig quote at the beginning of the section shows, the past is also like a foreign country, and
an abandoned standards solution (the "chancery double" paper size in this case) can be a
mark of a different time in the same geographic place.
When two thought communities unify, the
erasing of such boundaries becomes a way of
symbolizing the union of the two units. Consider
how Barry Levinson's 1982 movie Diner signals
that the marriage between two characters is
troubled — by showing the young husband's
frustration over his new wife's inability to
understand the way he categorizes and alphabetizes his record collection. "Of the numerous
disparities that set Southern apart from Northern society, one was entirely man-made: a
difference of three inches between the predominant railroad gauge of the two sections," a
famous American historian tells us. When the railroad gauge in the American South was
finally changed to match the North's in 1886, it eliminated this symbolic distinction at the
same time as other Northern norms were being forcibly imposed on the South.39 The
preservation of the East German Ampelmann (the walk light figure shown in Image 5.3) in
unified Germany is an example where a similar regionalism was preserved, and
standardization aborted, after a public outcry. This was possible not least of all because,
unlike with track gauge, West and East German walk light figures can be considered
allovariants of a single focal point. The debate was about whether the difference between
them exceeded the permissible wiggle room of the normative specification.40
39 C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the new South 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1951), pp. 123-124.




For some people, familiarity (or even better, nonchalance) with other countries'
standards solutions may become a way of demonstrating sophistication and
cosmopolitanness. People often adopt standards solutions from other countries or groups
(consider how some Americans cross their sevens in the European way or spell "color" as
"colour") when those styles have more perceived prestige, or when they want to identify with
the groups that use them routinely. The choice of contrast sets and mundane coordination
solutions (such as bibliographic style, sort order, or the rule of the road) can also become a
proxy issue in a power struggle between two thought communities vying to extend their
influence. Because of the way mundane coordination is reified and backgrounded, such
strategic efforts to manage identity and affiliations are easy to notice but conveniently too
trivial to make into a focus of discussion.
5.5 Miscoordination
One of the best ways to understand social institutions is to study their breakdown,
and nothing shows the importance of coordinating contrast sets so well as those cases when
it fails. Looking at miscoordination to understand contrast sets is like studying suicide to
understand the nature of social bonds and community solidarity, or the breaching of social
norms to understand how those norms function in the first place.41 Mathematicians use a
somewhat similar strategy when they prove a theorem by showing that its negative could not
be true.
To understand how important the standardization of contrast sets is to social life,
imagine waking up to a world without the norms you are familiar with. You open the
newspaper weather report and find that it uses a new temperature scale; driving to work,
traffic flows sometimes on the right and sometimes on the left side; you open the index of a
book to find things in an unfamiliar alphabetical order, or maybe no particular order at all;
the clock above your desk uses a ten-hour metric face and your calculator works in base
eight; and you have to hunt for each letter on your computer keyboard since it uses a totally
41 Emile Durkheim, Suicide: a study in sociology (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press of Glencoe, 1951); Harold
Garfinkel, Studies in ethnomethodology (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967). 
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new kind of layout. In each case, our image of a particular domain no longer corresponds to
the reality we see out in the world. This correspondence makes social life possible and helps
us get through every single day. Every coordination norm makes possible something that we
are hard pressed to live without. The alphabet itself is a standardized contrast set, so it is not
just metaphoric to say that mastery of basic contrast sets is essential to anyone's cultural
"literacy."
"Nightmares of miscoordination" are a common theme in dreams, folktales, and
modern urban legends. Probably everyone has had a dream where they arrived naked (or in
their pyjamas) to work or to school. The sense of shame we feel comes from the terror of
losing our sense of socialization, so that we no longer fit in with the way everyone else
behaves. When it is our expectations of a contrast set that the external world does not fulfill,
the sense of terror may also come from a loss of synchronization between reality and our
mental map of a contrast set or its underlying domain, as well as from the feeling that all our
commitments to that contrast set were for naught. The following anecdote about not fitting
into the pattern, most likely apocryphal, appeared recently on an Internet mailing list:
I heard of one person who had perfect pitch. The trouble was, the family piano was tuned a half
a step low, so he learned them all wrong! And he couldn't "unlearn" them. He eventually gave
up music out of sheer frustration.42
Miscoordination happens not just in nightmares, but all the time, in real life. Even
small differences in contrast set norms lead to problems, such as mixing up the floor
numbers in cases where one is not sure whether the ground floor is numbered or not, or
getting confused about whether the calendar rows start with Sunday or Monday. Skilled
typists and pianists find it frustrating to use computer keyboards with a foreign layout or
pianos that are out of tune. Genealogists struggle to learn the handwriting norms of other
times and cultures. When we see that a movie got three stars from a reviewer, we do not
always know whether that means three out of four, or three out of five. The American
participants on the European group tours I lead often get the day and the month confused
42 Nancy Edelmann, letter to the Synesthesia List, 28 Jan. 2002. Archive access via
http://home.comcast.net/~sean.day/Synesthesia.htm (November 2004).
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when buying tickets, thus mistakenly spending money on a concert that will (say) take place
on September 8th but which they thought would be on August 9th. Although some of these
problems are minor, others are not: during the American invasion of Grenada in 1983, the
miscorrespondence between the map coordinates ued by those ordering and carrying out an
air strike led to eighteen needless casualties.43
Problems of miscoordination extend, of course, far beyond the world of contrast sets.
Differing coordination norms most often cause problems of cross-cultural adaptation for
visitors to a foreign country. This can mean anything from travelers not being able to use the
electrical appliances they have brought from home, to looking the wrong way while crossing
the street in a country which has an unfamiliar rule of the road, to the German army having
to adapt their trains to the wider Russian track gauge on the eastern front in World Wars I
and II.44 Life often puts us in situations where we share no common spoken language or
communication style with the people we meet. Despite using gestures, symbols, and other
means of getting the message across, we often interpret signs meant to convey a certain
message as meaning something entirely different. Thus early European explorers in the
Pacific repeatedly had trouble communicating with the local islanders, and in New Zealand
Captain James Cook first interpreted the Maori haka greeting as a "war dance."45 Other
problems have to do not with semantics or product standardization but simply with not
knowing the rules of the game. For example, visitors to Amsterdam frequently have difficulty
knowing which door one is supposed to enter or exit a public transportation conveyance
through, and are rarely able to read the Dutch-only signs that sometimes try to help.
We often use the term "Kafkaesque" to describe situations of cognitive
miscoordination because Franz Kafka was something of a specialist in writing fictional
accounts of such situations. In his Metamorphosis, when Gregor Samsa wakes up as a bug,
his parents not only can no longer understand what he says, but they do not know that he can
43 Monmonier, How to lie with maps, p. 45.
44 On Germans and the Russian track gauge see Kindleberger, "Standards as public, collective, and
private goods," p. 385.
45 J.C. Beaglehole, ed., The voyage of the Endeavour 1768-1771 (Cambridge: Hakluyt Society, 1955), p.
169.
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still hear and understand them. A typical situation in Kafka's stories and novels involves a
character whose expectations of others' behavior are confounded, or whose own view of a
situation is not taken into account by those the character comes into contact with. This also
shows that miscoordination plagues not necessarily just visitors to a foreign country, but
anyone dropped into an unfamiliar thought community of any size. Also, although we usually
think of miscoordination as a problem to be avoided, it can sometimes be a deliberate
strategy meant to exclude people from a particular thought community (see section 7.3).
In cases where a group of people know that a
norm exists, but for some reason the actual norm is
obscured, the entire thought community may lose
coordination with the norm but keep coordination with
each other. In these cases, miscoordination becomes a
social fact within the bounds of the thought
community. An everyday example is a choir which goes
out of tune with standard pitch, but stays in tune with
each other. This phenomenon also occurs in empty snow-covered parking lots, when people
attempt to replicate a parking pattern without the actual painted lines being visible to guide
them. Image 5.4 shows an example of the discrepancy that emerges when the snow melts and
the lines are visible again. The power of social facticity manifests itself on the afternoon when
the snow has melted: even though the guidelines may be visible again, parkers are still forced
into the discrepant pattern by the power of the rest of the group's misreenactment. This type
of collective miscoordination is most common in domains where people lack either internal
or external knowledge of the normative solution to a problem, but do know that a norm
exists. They attempt to coordinate their behavior, but cannot properly calibrate it to the
standard. Thus collective miscoordination would be less likely to happen in the domain of
letterform, where it quite easy for a literate person to see that their lower-case handwritten e
is veering dangerously close to looking like a c, because they have access to internal and
external images of the normal shape of both letters. The H.G. Wells story "The Country of the
Image 5.4 (037)
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Blind," in which the one person with normal sight feels deviant, lets us imagine the feeling of
someone in a situation of collective miscoordination who is familiar with the broader norm
but has no power to impose it.46
Although we try to avoid creating confusion in "real life," in the worlds of play and
recreation people are attracted to, seek out, and create framed-off experiences of
disorientation and miscoordination, and participate in thought communities which use
nonstandard contrast sets. Thus Douglas Hofstadter's drawings of ambiguous letterforms
amuse us because they draw our attention to the conventionality of our writing system and
lead us into an imaginary world where its rules do not apply.47 The game of hopscotch
partitions and labels territory and then "forces" us to respect its boundaries in a way that we
may forget after the game is over, while board games and card games create imaginary
mappings involving contrast sets such as color, shape, and number, or the four suits of
spades, clubs, diamonds, and hearts.48 Organized sports creates sets and labels such as
teams, leagues, divisions, periods, innings, end zones, and jersey numbers, which are not
"real" outside the frame of the game, although they certainly are real in their consequences
for the livelihood of the players and the emotions of their fans. (Scholars and enquiring
minds enjoy intellectual challenges to standardized contrast sets, so that a book like Fernand
Braudel's The Mediterranean appeals by making us see how the countries that we might
think of as belonging to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East also form a region of their own.)
Of course, the deliberate disruption of our contrast sets is just one example of the way
that we create framed-off experiences in which knowledge becomes worthless, social norms
do not apply, or expectations about the external world are confounded. Thus hedge mazes
and labyrinths remove our sense of orientation in a playful way,49 just as roller coasters
46 H.G. Wells, "The country of the blind," in The country of the blind and other stories, pp. 534-568
(London: T. Nelson & Sons, n.d.)
47 Douglas R. Hofstadter, "Meta-Font, metamathematics, and metaphysics: comments on Donald
Knuth's 'The concept of a Meta-Font,'" Visible Language 16 (1982): 309-338, esp. p. 331; Metamagical
themas: questing for the essence of mind and pattern (New York: Basic Books, 1985), pp. 243-244.
48 On the relationship between games and number see Thomas Crump, The anthropology of numbers
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 115-127.
49 See Passini, Wayfinding in architecture, pp. 13-14.
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remove the sense of control we have over speed and direction, and movies and literature take
us to places that do not really exist, like Oz or 221B Baker Street.
5.6 Commitment
Imagine that you have the plans for your new house all set, but have received
conflicting opinions about where to pour the concrete foundation. One person said, pour it
here; another said, maybe just a few feet further this way. It does not matter so much where
you choose to pour, but the pouring is an act of commitment, and once the concrete is set,
you will be stuck with that location. We can measure your commitment by the cost of what
you have already put into the project, and the cost of undoing it should you decide to choose
to commit to something different.
Commitment takes place when a concrete action institutionalizes an abstract choice.50
In the world of contrast sets, the abstract, sometimes arbitrary choice may be between
different designs for the same set, or between different sets which solve the same
coordination problem. Both individuals and entire societies can commit to a contrast set. If
an individual expects to use the same contrast set over and over, they may choose to invest
their time and energy in the choice of a single solution (by, for example, buying a metric
ruler, or learning the alphabet and the numerals). Whole societies, or people acting in their
name, make public commitments to particular contrast sets by, for example, posting metric
signs which use the Roman alphabet and the Arabic numerals. These commitments make a
culture's standard operating procedures into social facts, inscribe them into our external
worlds, and thus give them the means of perpetuating themselves.
Speaking very generally, we can say that some of these commitments are more
physical and practical, while others are more mental and cognitive. While they are generally
reversible, this is possible only at a cost which is a little like that of moving the foundation of
an already-occupied house. If the airport terminals are labeled by the letters A to F, they are
50 An alternative term for commitment is "entrenchment." See Paul Starr, "Social categories and claims
in the liberal state," Social research 59 (1992): 263-295, p. 264, where Starr credits the term to Nelson
Goodman.
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likely to stay that way. There is a mental cost to individuals of changing their thinking, and a
physical cost to both society and individuals of replacing every object that depends on a
particular standards solution with a new one.
We commit physically to standards solutions when we modify the world outside
ourselves in a way which is dependent on one solution. For example, the production of
typewriters, calculators, keyboards, and computer fonts shows our commitment to the letters
and numerals which we use to represent sounds and numbers. The location of courthouses,
the painting of police cars, and the placement of border control stations shows our
commitment to geographical boundaries. We become physically committed to the current
system of measuring longitude and latitude when globe manufacturers label the meridians
on a globe — a process which also, incidentally, shows our commitment to our alphanumeric
standards. The production of tuning forks which vibrate at 440 hertz shows a commitment to
the international pitch standard, while the production of pianos shows a commitment to the
7- and 12-tone musical scales and to our keyboard design conventions. Outside the world of
contrast sets, we become physically committed to driving on the right side of the road when
we make road signs and set them up on the right shoulder. Installing an electrical outlet or
buying an appliance is part of the way that we physically commit to our electrical plug shape
and electrical current standards, just as buying a three-ring binder commits you to the
American hole-punching standard for 8½-by-11 paper. 
Our cognitive commitment to a standard is, in contrast, intangible and interior. Of
course, cognitive commitment partly means just the time it takes to learn one contrast set
and not another. But we also allow contrast sets to form our patterns of thinking. Our mental
systems are malleable by nature. After enough experience with any conventional way of
partitioning a domain, we fundamentally conceptualize the world using its arbitrary units
and labels.51 We invest in a mental image of the domain. If, for example, we were raised in a
country that uses the Fahrenheit temperature scale, eighty-five degrees means something to
51 For a similar statement, see Wendy Nelson Espeland and Mitchell L. Stevens, "Commensuration as a
social process," Annual Review of Sociology 24 (1998): 313-343, pp. 329-330.
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us — a particular way we should dress, memories of New York City in the summer, an
interest in going to the beach. Similarly, it is my intuitive understanding of how much a
pound is that allows me to decide between a two- and a five-pound sack of potatoes even
before I see them in the supermarket produce section. People trained in the Roman alphabet
develop a sense of difference between (for example) the letters O and Q which is not
transferable to (say) the Arabic writing system. And not only do they invest vast amounts of
time in learning letters and numerals in order to read and count, they also use them as tools
in filing and ordering, grading, mathematical notation, and music. The facility with which we
navigate through indexes, type, tell time, and buy T-shirts shows how we automatically and
unthinkingly expect alphabetical order, the QWERTY keyboard, clockwise clockworks, small,
medium, large, and extra large. In Edward Tenner's terms, contrast sets are technologies
which shape the techniques of everyday living,52 by making us organize our behavior in the
terms they suggest.
Commitments of this type are deep and pervasive. Those people who build a
conventional contrast set into their minds by creating a lasting private image (such as a
number form, see section 2.12) or a private label system (such as a set of color labels for
pitches, see section 4.7), are allowing social conventions to influence some of their most
fundamental thinking processes. Similarly, those who grew up with a left-to-right writing
system tend to build into their minds a mapping between lower numbers and "leftness," and
higher numbers and "rightness," which influences their conceptual metaphors for arithmetic
and other linear topologies (those raised with a right-to-left system reverse the mapping).53
In anthropological linguistics, the longstanding debate over the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is a
52 Edward Tenner, Our own devices: the past and future of body technology (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 2003), esp. ch. 1.
53 See Stanislas Dehaene, Serge Bossini, and Pascal Giraux, "The mental representation of parity and
number magnitude," Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 122 (1993): 371-396, especially
experiment 7, which demonstrates the dependence of this mental representation on the culturally
conventional direction of writing that the subject was raised with. These findings are also summarized
briefly in Stanislas Dehaene, The number sense: how the mind creates mathematics (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 80-83. Also see Wim Gevers, Bert Reynvoet and Wim Fias, "The
mental representation of ordinal sequences is spatially organized," Cognition 87 (2003): B87-B95;
Ting Ting Chan and Benjamin Bergen, "Writing direction influences spatial cognition," unpublished
manuscript, University of Hawai'i.
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lexical analogue of these questions about the existence and permanence of our cognitive
commitment to social convention, and about whether there are "convention[s] that our
brains have come to expect."54
54 Dehaene, The number sense, p. 83.
§ 6 266
6 Justification and Change
This chapter discusses the beliefs which people come to hold about the contrast sets
that they use. It first lays out the difference between objective, subjective, and intersubjective
reality, then shows the systematic confusions that arise about which of these three categories
a particular contrast set belongs to. It then discusses the ways in which people justify and
legitimate the design of a contrast set, or the fact that it has been chosen as a coordination
solution. It describes the process of changing institutionalized contrast sets, and the people
who agitate for change. Finally it mentions how in certain contrast sets with a value gradient,
change takes place in an unplanned, emergent fashion which I call "creep" or "drift."
6.1 Objective, subjective, and intersubjective
For any contrast set, it is a typical and worthwhile scientific question to ask to what
extent it is constructed and to what extent it is discerned; to what extent it is under the
control of the human workshop and to what extent it is not. The week has seven days — is
this a fact of nature or a product of the workshop? 
Many debates about the nature of reality boil down to battles about placing them
towards one side or another of the spectrum between constructedness and discernedness
(see section 2.5). Nature-nurture debates, for example, are basically about whether things
should be considered as stemming from universal, objective aspects of human nature, or
from an individual's or group's subjective experience of their own time, place, and
circumstances. I have already mentioned how there is no single universal answer to this
question — the answer varies from contrast set to contrast set. I also discussed how we
sometimes lose sight, in the bipolarity of these debates, of the fact that there are gradations
and blends of universal and individual phenomena. Moreover, many of the "truths" of the
external world are, in whole or in part, intersubjective and sustained by social convention.
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There are, then, three different types of explanation that can be used: objective,
intersubjective, and subjective.1
 There is another related question that is also worth asking. Rather than trying to
determine the true origin of a given contrast set in the world, one can ask what people
generally believe about its origin — people who have not scientifically investigated its history.
This means investigating not just the truth, but also peoples' folk beliefs about the truth. The
answers can be sorted into the same three general types: one can believe that a contrast set is
of subjective, intersubjective, or objective origin.
It is extremely common for the true story of the history of a contrast set to lie mostly
on one of these three levels, while peoples' naive belief about the history of that same set lies
mostly on another level. 
The difference between the intersubjective and objective levels of explanation
parallels the distinction between contrast sets that are constructed and discerned. When one
imagines that U and V, F and F sharp, Monday and Tuesday, and Iran and Iraq are different
things because these differences are given to us by the natural world, this is an objective
explanation. We use the word "objective" to describe a reality that is difficult or impossible to
challenge, ignore, or reshape. In contrast, an intersubjective explanation would say that that
the boundaries between U and V, F and F sharp, Monday and Tuesday, and Iran and Iraq
may be influenced by natural considerations, but their final determination is a matter of
social convention and social fact.
The difference between the subjective and intersubjective levels of explanation is that
between the purely individual world and the shared social world. The contrast set that you
use to sort the books on your shelf, or the image of the calendar that you use to think about
time, are known only to you (even if their creation was influenced by society). In contrast, the
library call number or ISBN number of each book, or the fact that today is Monday and the
first day in November, are facts shared by and indeed agreed upon by all participating
1 For more detailed expositions of this division see Eviatar Zerubavel, Social mindscapes: an invitation
to cognitive sociology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 1-10; Peter L. Berger and
Thomas Luckmann, The social construction of reality (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966).
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members of society. Both subjective and intersubjective phenomena share in common that
their existence could someday be effaced because it is carried primarily in human minds. If
civilization were wiped out tomorrow, the system of ISBN numbers would go with it. (While
we do objectify intersubjective phenomena by making physical commitments to them, this
objectification is, relatively speaking, quite fragile.) But what makes intersubjective facts
different from subjective facts is that, while both are in our heads, intersubjective knowledge
is in all of our heads — or at least the heads of everyone within the thought community in
question.
The word "intersubjective," which was coined by Alfred Schutz, nicely captures how a
collective phenomenon — the combination and coordination of many, many peoples'
subjective beliefs — together comes to constitute something larger than each individual self.
It emphasizes the fact that the perpetuation of these phenomena depends on the tacit
coordination of many peoples' subjective reality. Contrast sets and coordination solutions
become standards, institutions, and social facts by acquiring an unstoppable momentum that
makes us forget that there was ever any other possible choice. They could have been
otherwise, but they are not — so we accept them the way they are. This acceptance is
predicated on the fact that lots of other people also accept the very same social fact. It is a
fragile acceptance, because if everyone else dropped the fact, we would probably have to, too.
As Schutz explains,
… the world of my daily life is by no means my private world but is from the outset an
intersubjective one, shared with my fellow-men … in brief, it is a world common to all of us.
The unique biographical situation in which I find myself within the world at any moment of my
existence is only to a very small extent of my own making. I find myself always within an
historically given world which, as a world of nature as well as a sociocultural world, had existed
before my birth and which will continue to exist after my death. This means that this world is
not only mine but also my fellow-men's environment; moreover, these fellow-men are
elements of my own situation, as I am of theirs.2 
6.2 Reification
The most common confusion between the subjective, intersubjective, and objective
levels of explanation is to imagine that an intersubjective phenomenon (for example, the
2 Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 1: 312. 
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letters of the alphabet) is actually of objective and natural origin. This is an understandable
and predictable confusion, since our commitment to some standards solutions is so deep that
it makes us forget they were ever designed and chosen by people. Sociologists call this
process of forgetting "reification."3 To reify a standardized contrast set is to imagine that it is
an irreversible fact of nature; to forget our own power, and responsibility, to create the facts
of the world around us; and to overlook how we perpetuate them only through a tacit,
collective, intersubjective agreement to build them into our minds and our man-made
landscapes.
It is terribly easy, for example, to imagine that our standards of length, temperature,
pitch, or even writing systems or electrical plugs are objective facts of the natural world.
From the child's point of view, a yard or a meter is as real as a mountain or a lake.4 Many
people simply carry this way of thinking into adulthood. (After all, when I revisit the school I
attended as a child, it is hard for me to get used to the renovations which have knocked down
walls and reshaped rooms which I once considered permanent.) By thinking this way, we
forget the human authorship of the world.5 We forget that our creations are "the product of
human ingenuity, human passion, and the choices of particular people in particular times
and places,"6 and that their perpetuation is not inevitable but involves an ongoing element of
choice, as well.
Reification also means that people forget how the status of a particular coordination
solution can vary from group to group, with some societies choosing one solution and others
another. Consider, for example, the old joke about the woman who encounters an immigrant
family at the beach — say, from Korea — and hears their four-year-old child speaking a
3 A good overview of reification, applied to the case of temporal contrast sets, is Eviatar Zerubavel, The
seven day circle: the history and meaning of the week (New York: Free Press, 1985), pp. 138-141. For a
classic treatment of the concept see Berger and Luckmann, The social construction of reality, pp. 82-
85.
4 "Thought rests on the proposition that the objects confronting the child in the external world are
permanent, so that they can be perceived of in terms that are constant … Life is a process of learning
that things are not what they seem to be." — Thomas Crump, The anthropology of numbers
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 16.
5 See Berger and Luckmann, The social construction of reality, p. 82.
6 Ken Alder, The measure of all things (New York: Free Press, 2002), p. 350.
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foreign language fluently. "What a genius!" she says. "Four years old and he already speaks
Korean." This joke shows how common it is for people to subscribe to a folk theory of the
world that says "Everyone else is just like me except where I've been told otherwise." In this
case, the mistaken belief that results is that Korean, for everyone, is a foreign language,
which it takes great effort and skill to learn.
I propose that the phenomenon of reification is one of the reasons why we often
background the fundamental coordination solutions that we live by. Reification can account
for the fact that contrast sets are often ignored in studies of the phenomena that surround
them, so that Max Weber's book on the sociology of western music says nothing about pitch
standardization,7 and the huge exhibit on the history of the telephone that I recently walked
through in the Deutsches Museum in Munich says nothing about phone numbers. It can also
account for the way in which we forget to mention other basic coordinative standards in
writing about a particular society at a particular time: thus, although we have many records
of the ancient world, none of the surviving authors thought fit to mention whether traffic in
ancient Rome (or any other classical city) conventionally kept to the left or the right,8 and I
read weeks' worth of newspaper coverage of the Iraq war in 2003 without once getting to
hear about what kind of language American troops used to communicate with Iraqi civilians.
In particular, Max Weber and the Roman historians may not have even considered that there
might be a worthwhile story to tell about pitch standardization or the rule of the road,
because they may have thought little or not at all about the fact that anyone could have ever
chosen a different solution to these mundane problems of everyday coordination.
If one analyzes the reasoning used in the world of scholarship, educated discourse,
and political debate, it is surprisingly common to see authors reify contrast sets that are
distinctly man-made, thus forgetting (or even refusing) to admit the human authorship of
these sets into the discussion at hand. I do not think it would be going too far to say that this
7 See Otis Dudley Duncan, Notes on social measurement: historical and critical (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 1984), p. 13.
8 See Peter Kincaid, The rule of the road: an international guide to history and practice (New York:
Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 12-14.
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reification sometimes leads people to overlook valid hypotheses or potentially reasonable
courses of action. For example, both the huge literature on learning to read, and the huge
experimental psychological literature which makes use of word recognition tasks, usually
make no reference to the conventionality of the alphabet. Indeed, it is only recently that
reading specialists have finally come to consider the quality of a writing system's
correspondence to spoken language as a factor in the prevalence of dyslexia. (Dyslexia
appears to be less common in cultures where that correspondence is close.9) To take another
example, the fact that countries already exist adds an extra hurdle to those who wish to
seriously question whether their existence as a single entity makes sense. Thus in the Iraq of
2003 and 2004 it is possible to discern three distinct cultural subgroupings; but when a
respected newspaper columnist recently brought up the question of whether Iraq made sense
as a single entity, the negative letters to the editor that resulted generally tabooed the idea of
change, rather than rationally rejecting the cost or consequences of change.10 Indeed, much
policy towards Yugoslavia in the early 1990s was devoted simply to trying to keep the country
from breaking up.11 The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
in Helsinki in 1975 declared that "the participating States regard as inviolable all one
another's frontiers," thus raising the human partitioning of a domain to the level of objective
and unchallengeable reality.12 Similarly, "powerful taboos have long prevented any serious
discussion of alternatives to the post-colonial state in Africa"; any consideration of boundary
changes, even if they would bring ethnic and political frontiers into closer correspondence,
9 Philip H. K. Seymour, Mikko Aro, and Jane M. Erskine, "Foundation literacy acquisition in European
orthographics," British Journal of Psychology 94,2 (2003): 143-174; Charles A. Perfetti, "The
psycholinguistics of spelling and reading," in Learning to spell: research, theory and practice across
languages, edited by Charles A. Perfetti, Laurence Rider, and Michel Fayol, pp. 21-38 (Mahwah, N.J.:
Lawrence Erlbaum, 1997). See also Wai Ting Siok, Charles A. Perfetti, Zhen Jin, and Li Hai Tan,
"Biological abnormality of impaired reading is constrained by culture," Nature 431 (2004): 71-76.
10 Leslie Gelb, "The three-state solution," New York Times, 25 November 2003, p. A27, and the
responses under "Must Iraq be whole to be free?", New York Times, 30 November 2003, Week In
Review, p. 8.
11 See Warren Zimmermann's Yugoslavia and its destroyers (New York: Times Books, 1996) for an
example of a diplomat deeply committed to the preservation of an existing contrast set. See also
Benjamin Schwarz, "The diversity myth: America's leading export," Atlantic Monthly, May 1995, p. 57.
12 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, "Final Act," Helsinki, 1 August 1975
http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/helfa75e.htm (November 2004). 
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amounts to "thinking the unthinkable."13 And the authors of a recent book on the optimal
size of countries felt a need to persuade readers that it makes sense to "consider a country's
borders subject to the same analysis as any other man-made institution."14
In describing his thoughts after his elementary-school mathematics students asked
him where numbers come from, Georges Ifrah reveals the typical mindset of someone who
has reified a fundamental contrast set:
Well, where do numbers come from, in fact? These familiar symbols seem so utterly obvious to
us that we have the quite mistaken impression that they sprang forth fully formed, as gods or
heroes are supposed to. The question was disconcerting. I confess I had never previously
wondered what the answer might be.
"They come … er … they come from the remotest past," I fumbled, barely masking my
ignorance. 
[…] The arithmetic books and the school manuals which were my working tools did not
even allude to the history of numbers … It was almost as if a conspiracy of obviousness aimed
to make a secret, or even worse, just to make us ignorant of one of the most fantastic and
fertile of human discoveries.15
"A conspiracy of obviousness" is a fine way to describe the way we reify and
background contrast sets. They are all around us, yet we rarely discuss them and even more
rarely acknowledge our authorship, responsibility, and power over them.
The term reification refers to the act of mistaking the social as natural, or in other
terms, mistaking the intersubjective world as objective. Note that it is, however, possible to
mistake the subjective world as either intersubjective or objective — in other words, to
mistake the individual as either social or natural. This happens on an everyday basis when
we overestimate other peoples' ability to read our handwriting, or when we get used to a
piano being out of tune. It also happens quite commonly with people who have unusual
mental images of a particular semantic domain. Thus both people with variant color vision,
and people with absolute pitch, initially tend to be surprised that the "normal" majority of
people do not partition and label the domains of color or pitch in the same way as they do.16
13 Christopher Clapham, "Rethinking African states," African Security Review 10, 3 (2001). 
14 Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore, The size of nations (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), p. 2. The
quote is actually from the book jacket.
15 Georges Ifrah, The universal history of numbers: from prehistory to the invention of the computer
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2000), pp. xvii-xviii.
16 Peter K. Kaiser and Robert M. Boynton, Human color vision (2nd ed. Washington: Optical Society of
America, 1996), p. 423; Ian Watson, "Pitch standardization and perfect pitch," unpublished term
paper, Department of Sociology, Rutgers University, 2000.
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6.3 Justifications
In any literate community with some tradition behind it there is a whole set of convictions and
rationalizations concerning speech and writing, against which the planner may turn out to be
powerless, unless he can turn them to account for his own purposes. However irrational they
may be, they generally turn out to bolster the status and convenience of those who have
invested effort in learning the social traditions.17
Contrast sets beget a whole range of explanations, justifications, and myths designed
to shore up and legitimate their role in society. In this respect, they are no different from
other norms, social facts, or choices between competing design options. Since, of all social
institutions, it is hardest to imagine changing those which are objectively grounded, these
justifications and legitimations generally aim at convincing people to see society's standard
operating procedures as natural and inevitable, or, at least, as objectively the best choice
among several competing solutions to a problem of choice or coordination. Note that while I
use the term "justification" here, the classic description of justifications in Berger and
Luckmann's The Social Construction of Reality uses the term "legitimation."18
The simple fact that a contrast set (or any other standards solution) was chosen to
solve a coordination problem tells us that it had at that moment some salience within the
domain of possible solutions.19 Justifications may (or may not) point to this salience to
explain the fitness of a particular standards solution. What is important and interesting
about standards justifications is actually not the question of whether or not they are true and
right, but simply the fact that they get used. Many justifications are irrational, misleading, or
tell less than the full truth. (Consider how Latin instructors might argue for continued
instruction in the language by emphasizing its intrinsic value, while never mentioning their
own interest in the existence of a market for their own services.20) Like myths, the efficacy of
a standards justification may lie more in its superficial plausibility than in its accurate
17 Einar Haugen, "Linguistics and language planning," In The ecology of language: essays by Einar
Haugen, pp. 159-190 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972 [1966]), p. 172.
18 Berger and Luckmann, The social construction of reality, pp. 85-118.
19 On salience, see Thomas Schelling, The strategy of conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1960), pp. 54-58, 92-94; Edna Ullmann-Margalit, The emergence of norms (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1977), pp. 83-84.
20 This example is based on a comment by Pierre Bourdieu, Language and symbolic power
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 57.
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reflection of the truth.21 And a deceptively marshalled justification is just as interesting as a
rock-solid one, since what interests us primarily here is the process of legitimating norms,
not which norm is truly the best. 
During my own research on standardization, I have sorted standards justifications
into five rough categories of my own devising. Each of these categories of justification
appeals to something different as the determiner of what stands out as superior within the
domain of possible solutions. This "something" may be nature, the supernatural, history,
conformity, or distinctiveness. I go into more detail below, and give examples of each type of
justification, focusing on contrast sets but also mentioning examples which involve
standards solutions that are not contrast sets.
One may invoke these appeals to justify the existence of a contrast set, the choice of a
contrast set, or a change in an existing contrast set. We justify an existing contrast set by
telling a narrative, a sort of origin myth, which explains how it came to become a social
norm. We justify the choice of a new standards solution by invoking one of the appeals to
show that it would be the best response to an as yet unresolved coordination problem. And
anyone who advocates changing an existing contrast set must also justify why their proposed
standards solution is better than the current one.
To those studying the individual history of any contrast set or coordination solution,
its justifications will seem intimately bound up with the unique history and circumstances of
the problem in question. But after reading many, many accounts of specific coordination
solutions, the justifications they present start to sound very familiar. The same patterns
repeat over and over so frequently that even their language becomes predictable. Those
deeply involved in the history of a single standards problem sometimes do not see the form
behind the instance. (The effect is similar to how every medical patient sees their own
symptoms as special and important, but doctors see a patient as just one more case of a
particular disease pattern.) That does not mean that justifications are hollow or false or that
21 On plausibility versus truth in the explanation of changing tastes, see Stanley Lieberson, A matter of
taste: how names, fashions, and culture change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. xiv-xv.
§ 6.3 275
one should use my typology to dissolve their meaning and force. It means only that they
recur. Knowing the five types listed in this section helps to place them in context.
The appeal to nature
To justify a standard through an appeal to nature means looking outside the social
world to some fact of nature which, at the least, narrows the field of possible solutions to a
standards problem, and, in some cases, actually suggests which exact solution we should
choose. Consider, for example, the use of the melting point of ice and boiling point of water
as anchor points for the calibration of the Réaumur and Celsius temperature scales,22 the
probably apocryphal tradition that the standard railway gauge of 4 feet 8½ inches "originally
represented the width of the hind end of a Norfolk mule used to pull coal wagons on wooden
rails,"23 and the historians of the alphabet who have tried to explain our choice of graphic
elements by saying that the stars in the night sky spell out the letters of the Hebrew alphabet,
or by invoking the fact that nature presents us with certain basic shapes (lines, crosses,
circles, and so on) which constrain our choice of meaningful designs.24 The grounding of the
length of the meter in a natural fact (the dimensions of the earth itself) is probably the best
known example of the appeal to nature. It is also a cautionary tale of how difficult it is to
entirely eliminate wiggle room and thus arbitrary choice from a naturally grounded
standard.25
Appeals to nature are particularly powerful and attractive justifications. They ground
our choice of a seemingly conventional, social fact in something that is external and thus
potentially impartial and nonpartisan. Natural solutions lack the sense of arbitrariness which
makes entirely conventional and random choices uncomfortable. Natural solutions are often
based on unchanging facts of nature (such as the boiling point of water at sea level), which
22 W.E. Knowles Middleton, A history of the thermometer and its use in meteorology (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1966).
23 Charles P. Kindleberger, "Standards as public, collective, and private goods," Kyklos 36 (1983): 377-
396, p. 384.
24 Johanna Drucker, The alphabetic labyrinth (London: Thames & Hudson, 1995), p. 192, 300; see also
pp. 208-213 on efforts to relate the alphabet to the human body.
25 See Alder, The measure of all things for a book-length treatment of this issue.
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are scientifically reproducible and thus easy to calibrate, and do not require the circulation of
physical standards like tuning forks or yardsticks. Other natural solutions are inspired by the
inescapable and everpresent facts of human biology, an example being the entire class of
"anthropometric measures," such as the cubit, which derive from the sizes of the parts of the
human body.26 Sometimes, an appeal to nature carries the message that a particular
coordination solution is in some way naturally, inescapably better than others. In many of
these cases the appeal to nature derives from (and encourages the further pursuit of)
scientific comparison of the merits of the different solutions to a problem. (In other cases,
such as the derivation of standard rail gauge from the hindquarters of a horse, the appeal to
nature simply brings in a fact from the outside world that makes it easier to choose a
solution.)
Indeed, many objective research-based comparisons of coordination solutions
presuppose that we value natural grounds for choosing the solution to a coordination
problem. Consider the effort to compare traffic accident statistics from different countries in
an effort to decide whether driving on the left or the right side of the road is safer,27 or to
study typists' speed or finger movements in order to determine whether it is easier to use a
Dvorak or a QWERTY keyboard. However, designing an experiment that distinguishes
natural superiority (pre-commitment superiority) from superiority based on habituation
(post-commitment superiority) can be very difficult. For example, how can we compare the
effectiveness of a familiar and an unfamiliar road sign, given that we are already used to one
of them, in a way which "does not simply describe the historical development of
conventions"?28 Is Venice really difficult to navigate around, or is it that German and
American visitors are just not used to such street plans? Is roman type really easier to read
26 Witold Kula, Measures and men (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986 [1970]), pp. 24-28.
27 See the review of J. J. Leeming's research by Kincaid, The rule of the road, pp. 25-27.
28 Johanna Drucker, The alphabetic labyrinth (London: Thames & Hudson, 1995), p. 301. For an
attempt to design exactly such a study see Robert W. Brainard, Richard J. Campbell, and Edwin H.
Elkin, "Design and interpretability of road signs," Journal of Applied Psychology 45 (1961): 130-136.
For a brief comment on the general problem of trying to distinguish between natural conditions and
norms, see Edwin Battistella, The logic of markedness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.
11.
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than sans-serif, or are we just more used to it? Do capital letters really make reading easier,
or are we just unfamiliar with reading all lower-case (see further section 4.6)? Are initial and
final letters in Arabic and Hebrew worth the bother? And what sort of test could we use to
compare the Clutsam and Jankó piano keyboards with the traditional layout?29
Despite these difficulties, it is quite often possible to come up with convincing
arguments for the natural superiority of one solution or another to a problem. The appeal to
nature is regularly cited in debates about standards change, such as in the claim that current
standard electrical plugs are better than the old light bulb sockets because they are safer,30
that the Pinyin writing system for Chinese is better than characters because it is easier to
learn, that 440 Hz is a better pitch standard than 439 Hz because 440 is not an unfactorable
prime number,31 or the idea that the current international paper size system is better than the
standard used in America because its 1:2 and 1:√2 size ratios are convenient and
mathematically elegant.32
The appeal to the supernatural
The appeal to the supernatural also finds justification for a standards solution outside
the social world, but assigns to God or a supernatural force the responsibility for having
chosen that solution over others. If we use Durkheim's equation of God and society, we can
read the appeal to the supernatural as an alternative way of expressing that standards are
social facts, and that social facts have (or should have) the power to determine individual
actions. The appeal to the supernatural has in common with the appeal to nature that it
justifies social choices by reference to external forces, tends to downplay the human
29 On piano keyboards see Edward Tenner, Our own devices: the past and future of body technology
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), pp. 173-178.
30 Fred E. H. Schroeder, "More 'small things forgotten': domestic electrical plugs and receptacles, 1881-
1931," in Technology and choice: readings from Technology and Culture, edited by Marcel C.
Lafollette and Jeffrey K. Stine, pp. 117-135 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
31 Llewellyn Southworth Lloyd, "Standard pitch," Grove's dictionary of music and musicians, 5th ed.
(1954), 6: 788-803, p. 789.
32 Markus Kuhn, "International standard paper sizes," http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/iso-
paper.html (November 2003).
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authorship of coordination solutions, and provides a way of ignoring, and thus coping with,
the arbitrariness of social norms.
The supernatural is often invoked to justify standards whose origin is lost in time. For
example, the Book of Genesis defends the origin of the 7-day week as part of God's original
plan for creating the world.33 Many societies with less highly developed historical and
archeological techniques than we have today have had mythological explanations of the
creations of their writing system by a supernatural force.34 Even in Western Europe as late as
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Daniel Defoe and John Wilkins credited God and
Adam, respectively, with the origin of writing.35 But the case of an Internet home page
offering a supernatural explanation of the international standard paper size system shows
that people are also capable of invoking supernatural explanations for standards solutions
with historically recoverable origins.36 One must also mention the case of the Burmese
dictator Ne Win, whose decisions to issue banknotes of 45 and 90 kyats (instead of, say, 50
and 100) and to change the rule of the road from keep-left to keep-right were apparently
motivated by a belief in the significance of the number 9 and the advice of a fortune-teller
respectively.37
33 Zerubavel, The seven day circle, pp. 6-7.
34 For an overview, see Florian Coulmas, The Blackwell encylopedia of writing systems (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1996), pp. 119-124. For individual cases, see William A. Smalley, Mother of writing: the
origin and development of a Hmong messianic script (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990);
David Dalby, "The indigenous scripts of West Africa and Surinam: their inspiration and design,"
African Language Studies 9 (1968): 156-197; Keith A. Basso and Ned Anderson, "A Western Apache
writing system: the symbols of Silas John," in Advances in the creation and revision of writing
systems, edited by Joshua Fishman, pp. 77-104 (The Hague: Mouton, 1977); Charles A Ferguson, "St.
Stefan of Perm and applied linguistics," in Language problems of developing nations, edited by
Joshua A. Fishman, Charles A. Ferguson, and Jyotirindra Das Gupta, pp. 253-265 (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1968), p. 260.
35 Denise Schmandt-Besserat, How writing came about (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), pp.
3-4; Drucker, The alphabetic labyrinth, p. 217. For twentieth-century examples, see Drucker, pp. 293-
294, 302-306.
36 Vernon Jenkins, "The postscript," http://homepage.virgin.net/vernon.jenkins/PS.htm (November
2003).
37 These justifications have been widely reported in the popular media, travel guidebooks, and on the
Internet (e.g., http://www.diacritica.com/degenerate/1/burma4.html;
http://www.geocities.com/glossograph/burma9407funnymoney.html;
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyat; all November 2004), but I have not found a source for either
reform which I consider authoritative.
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The appeal to history 
The appeal to history justifies continuing use of a standards solution on the grounds
that it is already in use. This appeal is a recognition of cultural inertia, the social facticity of
standards, and the power of our existing commitment to a standards solution: how society is
set up today influences how it will be set up tomorrow. 
For example, though it made sense as part of an overall program of decimalization,
the introduction of the Celsius temperature scale in France after the Revolution was resisted
by many people who were simply used to using the old Réaumur scale and did not want to
disrupt their mental sense of what, say, thirty degrees meant.38 Similarly, one of the reasons
for the failure of Chinese script reform in the twentieth century, despite support from Mao
and other Communist leaders and the obvious practical advantages of an alphabetic writing
system, was simply the huge commitment of Chinese culture to its long-entrenched, if
inefficient, character system.39 Consider as well that my instructor encouraged me to send a
copy of my proposal for the relabeling of the Rutgers campus bus routes (see section 4.3) to
the campus bus management. I did so, and they sent me a nice thank-you note, but changed
nothing. Maybe they disliked my design, but maybe it also had to do with the cost of making
new signs, reprogramming display boards, and reprinting maps. After all, nobody likes to
have to undo their cognitive or physical commitment to a standards solution or to have to
consider the time spent creating knowledge of that solution wasted. 
The appeal to history also furthers the interests of those who profit from the
continued use of those solutions. It is no surprise to see the American Zinc Association
weighing in against the idea of retiring the American penny (one-cent coin), which is 98
38 Middleton, A history of the thermometer and its use in meteorology, p. 121.
39 John DeFrancis, The Chinese language: fact and fantasy (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,
1984), pp. 247-259.
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percent zinc.40 The appeal to history is often invoked to argue against changing coordination
solutions. The message is: Don't change a thing. 
While the appeal to nature interests scholars who want to make systematic
comparisons of the fitness of different solutions, the appeal to history interests scholars who
are interested in understanding the persistence of coordination solutions as institutional
facts. For example, according to classical economic theory, the invisible hand of competition
and free markets should steer societies in the direction of the most efficient possible solution
to a coordination problem. The "institutional economics" school, on the other hand, would
suggest that physical and cognitive commitments to conventional coordination solutions
slow societies' ability to change over to solutions which are naturally more efficient. While
the appeal to nature means judging the fitness of competing coordination solution on first
principles, as if one were choosing for the first time, the appeal to history recognizes that the
decision whether to continue a coordination solution may depend on the current level of
commitment to it. This type of development, in which the probability of an event (such as the
adoption of a solution) is dependent on the outcome of the preceding event in a series, is
known as a Markov chain in mathematics. Combining this line of reasoning with a spatial
metaphor for the different solutions to a particular coordination problem, institutional
economists have proposed that the development of certain coordination problems is "path-
dependent," meaning that if the choice of a coordination solution arbitrarily "starts out" in a
particular "direction," it may have a very hard time "finding its way" to the solution which is
ultimately best on natural grounds.41
This is, essentially, a rediscovery of the idea of social facticity as well as a challenge to
the idea that markets are naturally efficient. These economists propose that the power of
40 "You can still do some good with a penny," letter to the editor from George Vary, Executive Director,
American Zinc Association, New York Times, 21 November 1995, p. A20. It is no surprise that
"Americans for Common Cents" (www.pennies.org), a pro-penny non-profit organization, is funded by
"mining and coin-manufacturing interests." See Larry Copeland, "Bill would make pennies obsolete,"
USA Today, 18 July 2001.
41 For this perspective put forth by an economist, see Brian Arthur, Increasing returns and path
dependence in the economy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); by a scholar of
standardization, see Samuel Krislov, How nations choose product standards and standards change
nations (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), pp. 213-214.
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continuity and inertia is so strong that we perpetuate coordination solutions that are not
actually not in everyone's interest. What gets chosen depends not on what is best but on what
has come before. Working from these arguments, many scholars would argue that the
invisible hand has no certain power to bring about good in the solution of a particular
coordination, and that injustice and inefficiency are the inevitable result of letting norms
develop without some kind of government intervention. They would treat this as a call for
collective action and planning. 
Other economists, however, hold to a libertarian view and reject the idea that
governments should assume the cost of change to a solution that appears superior. Even the
most virulent libertarian critics of path-dependency theories do seem willing to admit that a
coordination solution can persist despite the availability of a superior solution.42 The
difference seems to be that these critics believe that it is not the role of governments to
reduce the individual costs of changing coordination solutions by creating incentives for
individuals to change from one coordination solution to another: in other words, if incentives
for change that operate at the individual level do not exist, governments should not create
them artificially. (Pushed to its extreme, this line of argument might even say that not only
should governments not do this, no person or group of persons who acts on behalf of an
entire social group or thought community should ever take on such a role.) Institutional
economists, on the other hand, seem to have more confidence in governments' abilities to
judge whether the costs of trying to spur change in a community might be balanced by social
benefit over the long term, and are thus more willing to disregard the appeal to history and to
risk common resources to try to bring about common good. 
42 Stan J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, Winners, losers & Microsoft: competition and antitrust
in high technology (Oakland, Calif.: Independent Institute, 1999), pp. 51-56.
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The appeal to conformity 
Where the appeal to history reminds us that a coordination solution was in use in the
same place43 at a previous time, the appeal to conformity points out that the solution is in use
at the same time in another place.
The appeal to conformity is often invoked in cases of standards change. Cultures and
nations often have a strong incentive to harmonize their standards solutions with the people
who live around them. For example, decimalization of the British monetary system in the
early 1970s made it more similar to the monetary systems of other industrialized countries.
In the 1990s, European countries tried to coordinate their telephone dialing systems,
working towards a universal dialing lexicon in which (for example) "00" signals that a
country code will follow. The primary motivation behind Sweden's changing its rule of the
road from keep-left to keep-right in 1967 was to bring it in line with its neighbors Norway,
Finland, and Denmark, as well as the rest of mainland Europe.44 The appeal to conformity
shows up often in the history of writing systems — among many examples, Atatürk's
conversion of Turkish to the Roman script was closely connected to the desire to make
Turkey like the West. 
The appeal to conformity is a way of encouraging entire societies to join up with even
larger groups. The promotion of international standardization by organizations such as ISO
relies on the idea that the widest possible standards coordination will lower barriers to trade,
reduce the cognitive dissonance of travel, eliminate pointless design inconsistencies,
generate economies of scale, and thereby advance the public interest. Conformity brings
many benefits. There is naturally a strong incentive to use the same numerals, musical
tuning, alphabetical order, typewriter keyboard layout, library call number system, or clock
43 I say "the same place" to keep my language simple, but it would be more accurate to say "by the same
thought community or social group." The same applies to the section on distinctiveness.
44 Arne Dufwa, Stockholms tekniska historia: Trafik, broar, tunnelbanor, gator (Stockholm:
Kommittén för Stockholmsforskning, 1985), pp. 144-154; Peter Kincaid, The rule of the road: an
international guide to history and practice (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 159-162.
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face as everybody else does. We know this at the individual level and the appeal to conformity
tries to justify this at the level of an entire group or society.
The appeal to distinctiveness
Lest we think that there is any natural tendency to harmonize
standards solutions temporally or spatially, the appeal to
distinctiveness justifies a deliberate choice of standards solutions that
are different from the ones that other people use. This difference may
be across time, in which case it is the reverse of the appeal to history,
or across space, in which case it is the reverse of the appeal to
conformity. Thinking spatially, consider that since coordination
solutions can be a badge of identity for a country and since changing
solutions as you cross into a new country reinforces the experience of the border, having an
unusual and distinctive norm can be a way for some countries to maintain their separateness
and emphasize their distinctiveness to visitors and to their own citizens. This is one of the
reasons why France developed its own color TV standard,45 why Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam rest on different days of the week46 and number years differently, why the rules for
when to celebrate Easter avoid any coincidence with Passover,47 and why the closely related
Havasupai and Hualapai languages in Arizona use unnecessarily different orthographies.48
Consider also the American ice cream manufacturer that deliberately produces not "vanilla,"
"strawberry," and "chocolate" but flavors like "Phish Food," "Karamel Sutra," and "Cherry
Garcia."49 On an individual level, we are all familiar with teenage stylistic rebellion and
45 Rhonda J. Crane, The politics of international standards: France and the color TV war (Norwood,
N.J.: Ablex, 1979).
46 Zerubavel, The seven day circle, pp. 20-26.
47 Eviatar Zerubavel, "Easter and Passover: on calendars and group identity," American Sociological
Review 47 (1982): 284-289.
48 Rena Crook, Leanne Hinton, and Nancy Stenson, "Literacy and linguistics: the Havasupai writing
system," University Museum Studies 11 (1977): 1-16. For more similar examples, see Joshua Fishman,
"Introduction," in Advances in the creation and revision of writing systems, edited by Joshua
Fishman, pp. xi-xxviii (The Hague: Mouton, 1977), p. xiii.
49 See www.benjerry.com (November 2003).
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"antifashion."50 As Kai Erikson expresses it, "There are people in any society who appear to
'choose' a deviant style exactly because it offends an important value of the group."51 
Appeals to temporal distinctiveness are very common at points when entire cultures
want to leave the past behind. For example, when Mongolia tried to reinstitute its native
script (see Image 6.1) in 1992 — despite the fact that its top-to-bottom directionality and
poor fit with modern Mongolian phonology made this very impractical — an overwhelming
motivation was to symbolically reassert Mongolia's cultural independence, and to step out of
the shadow cast by the Soviet Union and the Cyrillic script.52 Similarly, the French
Revolutionary calendar symbolized not just a spatial break with the rest of Europe, but a
temporal break with the hated feudal past.53
6.4 The dilemma of arbitrariness
The final step in the choice of any coordination solution is often arbitrary, meaning
that it is not possible to find a justification for why to select one solution over another. Even a
coordination norm which is to a large extent naturally determined or inspired will usually
leave some wiggle room within which an arbitrary choice must be made. Arbitrary choices
cause many problems in the development of norms. Arbitrariness is attractive when we see it
as fair and impartial, but it is unattractive when it leaves us with too much choice and no way
of justifying what we eventually settle on.
We can say that when one selects with justification, one chooses, whereas when one
selects arbitrarily, one picks. (This terminological difference was introduced by Edna
Ullmann-Margalit.54) The difference between picking and choosing standards solutions is
akin to the problem presented by a box of chocolates from which you are invited to select. If
50 Lieberson, A matter of taste, p. 7, citing Fred Davis, Fashion, culture, and identity (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1992).
51 Kai Erikson, Wayward Puritans: a study in the sociology of deviance (New York: John Wiley, 1966),
p. 20.
52 Stephane Grivelet, "Reintroducing the Uighur-Mongolian script," Mongolian Studies 18 (1995): 50. 
53 Eviatar Zerubavel, "The French republican calendar: a case study in the sociology of time," American
Sociological Review 42 (1977): 868-877.
54 Ullmann-Margalit, The emergence of norms, p. 115; she credits the idea to Sidney Morgenbesser.
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the chocolates are all different, the issue is to choose the one you like the best; your
preference justifies your choice. If the chocolates are all the same, you have to pick one of
them (it doesn't matter which one). When one picks a solution, the act of solving the problem
is more important than the identity of the solution chosen.
For the designer of a contrast set or any other coordination norm, the hardest thing is
sometimes not to justify what you select, but to justify not selecting everything else.55
Arbitrariness is welcome when its message is that nothing you can do will be unfair or
biased. The problem comes when one gets to the actual process of picking a solution. With so
many attractive options, it is genuinely painful to have to pick just one.56 One wants to do so
randomly, but this turns out to be harder than it looks.
Regardless whether the issue is the selection of an order, a stand-in, an iconic
principle, a contrast set, or any other of several competing solutions to the same problem,
one can approach but never reach a fully random method. The philosophy of randomness
confirms this at length.57 To say that it is impossible to make a random selection means that
it is never possible to make a selection in a way that has no origin story to it. What varies is to
what extent the origin story is recoverable, and connected to the interests of those making
the choice. The weaker the connection, the more we consider the choice "random." We think
of rolling dice as a way of divorcing the process of selection from the interests of the person
doing it. The physical reasons why a pair of dice fall the way they do can be recounted and
can form an origin story for the actions which result, but the story will be irrelevant to the
hopes and fears the players in the game had about the way the dice might land. Maximizing
this kind of irrelevance is what gives arbitrary choice its sense of fairness, even though true
"fairness" is as unreachable as true "randomness."
55 Recall again Winfried Nöth's comment from Handbook of semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1990), p. x: "any selection … implies the rejection of all nonselected items."
56 For a semi-popular treatment of this theme at the individual level, see Barry Schwartz, The paradox
of choice: why more is less (New York: Ecco, 2004).
57 See Bruce Schneier, Applied cryptography (2nd ed., New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996), pp. 44-46,
421-428.
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One common way of maximizing this irrelevance is to pick, or to claim that a solution
was picked, through means which did not involve human intentionality. Think again of how
students are assigned to houses in the first Harry Potter book with the conveniently magical
assistance of the "Sorting Hat." Gym teachers resort to selection principles outside
themselves when they divide a class into teams by counting off by ones and twos, or select a
team captain by saying eenie-meenie-minie-moe (and not cheating by knowing how many
syllables they say and the number of people they are choosing between), thus losing track of
their own intentionality in the choice of how to execute a task. 
The problem with such strategies is that outside the make-believe world of games,
people are usually not proud of choosing a coordination solution for no particular reason. A
journalist reporting recently from Armenia heard a joke that "when the Georgians needed an
alphabet, they asked Mashtots [inventor of the Armenian alphabet], who took the macaroni
he was eating and threw it against the wall. The patterns it made became the Georgian
alphabet."58 Contrast sets serve as badges of identity in this joke, with Georgians ritually
denigrated as non-group members who use a norm whose origin story is no more noble than
the way the macaroni stuck in place. The implication is that Mashtots designed the Armenian
alphabet much more deliberately and carefully. This joke illustrates the value attached to
coming up with non-arbitrary origin stories which make a solution seem inevitable. The use
of supernatural justifications for the choice of a coordination solution has the same effect of
transferring intentionality away from human beings in cases where a rationale for choice is
not obviously apparent, but doing so in a way that masks the irrelevance and vulgarity of
arbitrary choice. Outside the world of coordination, a typical strategy for reducing the
arbitrariness of everyday design choices is the use of birthdays (a natural fact outside the
control of the person born) as the basis for assigning personal identification numbers in
Scandinavia, for choosing computer passwords and identification numbers, for deciding
which composer's music to play on classical radio stations on a particular day, or simply for
deciding when to hold a party or send someone greetings. Similarly, the conventionalization
58 Robert D. Kaplan, Eastward to Tartary (New York: Vintage, 2001), p. 312.
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of a stand-in mercifully removes the sense of responsibility from one's choice of an
exemplifier, by designating a particular hyponym which one may safely and reliably use, and
thus saving one from being left adrift with the burden of making an arbitrary choice.59
The problem of arbitrary selection becomes particularly poignant when we have an
opportunity to consciously choose a solution before we start to use it and physically commit
to it.60 Designing the new symbol for the euro, settling on 440 Hz as the anchor point for
standard pitch, or defining a new international border after a war are examples of reflection
and deliberate planning in the creation of contrast sets. Similarly, when cars came to Pitcairn
Island in 1965, the island government had to choose a rule of the road for the first time.61 In
such situations, designers are the authors of social facts. They change the external reality of
the world in a way they will probably will not be able to reverse, as it is easier to create
physical commitments in the environment than to remove them from it. While it would be
going too far to say that we only have one shot at each of these choices, it is true that they are
very difficult to reconsider, that they affect the daily life of many people, and that those
people will reify them and see them as unchangeable elements in their environment. One can
easily develop a sort of nostalgia for all of the "norms not selected." After all, a coordination
norm that has taken off and has a momentum of its own was once just a twinkle in the eye of
its designers. 
59 This explains why a professor of phonetics with whom I studied, whenever he asked a native speaker
of language x to say a sentence or two in the language just to give us an idea of how it sounded, would
ask the speaker to describe the process of cooking rice in their native language. "How to cook rice" is a
relatively neutral discourse topic, and the choice of any such topic is a way of avoiding the tongue-
tiedness that often results from the dilemma of arbitrary choice when people are asked to "say
something in their native language." Consider, as well, comedian John Cleese's ability to speak in
nonsense syllables that sound like English, but aren't. Has Cleese learned to make arbitrary choices on
the fly? Actually not. Asked how he learned to talk nonsense, Cleese confesses that although it may
appear spontaneous, one actually has to prepare and memorize the string of supposed nonsense
sounds. "Believe it or not," he says, "I simply wrote it … I can't make it up. It [only] sounds as if I'm
making it up." (John Cleese, interview with Terry Gross on National Public Radio, 1990,
http://www.npr.org/rundowns/rundown.php?prgId=13&prgDate=29-Jun-2001, October 2004.)
60 On continuing versus inventing coordination solutions see Ullmann-Margalit, The emergence of
norms, pp. 89-92.
61 Kincaid, The rule of the road, pp. 150-51.
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6.5 Change
Most adults, I think, have at some time had to cope with
a change in an everyday contrast set or labeling system. Not long
ago, for example, my home town's telephone area code was
changed. It takes a while to get used to: I still sometimes have to
remind myself to dial the new three-number sequence when
calling my parents, and I still have the old code written down in
a few places in my address book. Consider, as well, the other
contrast sets in which you may have experienced changes:
political boundaries, airport terminal numbers, computer
character sets, postal codes, coins and banknotes, street names, bus or tram numbers,
student grading systems, the categories in a bookstore or a music store, the ordering system
of your own bookshelf at home, library call number systems, writing systems, spelling rules,
the calendar, keyboard layouts, and measurement scales for wind, length, mass, and time.
Many cases of contrast set change are "big ticket" items which affect all of society, such as the
introduction of metric measurement. But other changes affect a contrast set used only by a
small group within society, such as a company which reorganizes its order numbering system
or renumbers its offices. Contrast sets are, of course, only one of many types of norms that
can change. Changing other coordinative standards such as electrical plug shape, railroad
gauge, or the rule of the road is quite similar.
The big puzzle of standards change is often why it fails to happen sooner. Some
norms truly do appear to be better solutions to a particular coordination problem than
others. Sometimes, one of these norms looks much better than the one we have in place right
now. Why, then, don't these better solutions take over smoothly and automatically from the
ones we have? If metric liters and degrees Celsius are so much better than gallons and
Fahrenheit, why is the U.S. still using its old system? If it would really be much more efficient
to replace the American dollar bill with a coin, why has every such effort failed? If the
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difficulty of Chinese characters really wastes years of schoolchildren's time and renders much
of China semiliterate, and if the Pinyin system would really be better,62 why has writing
reform failed there at the same time as it has succeeded in Vietnam?
And why is it that the entire world cannot agree on a single format for the size of
paper or the citation of dates? It probably does not matter whether we settle on citing
September 1, 2003 as 01-09-03, 09-01-03, or 03-09-01. But it is hard to argue that there is
any value whatsoever to our constantly having to guess what format someone is using in a
multicultural context. After all, we would think it absurd if half the world cited times with
minutes before hours, and the other half with hours before minutes. So why not change?
One of the best ways to answer this question of why change is so hard is to recall the
power of coordination solutions as social facts. Changing a coordination solution requires all
the people who re-enact it to revise their daily habits. It means changing, sooner or later, all
physical and cognitive commitments to the solution. It also means finding new justifications
and new methods of socialization for the new solution. The identification of solutions with
groups means that, for the group as a whole and for the individuals in it, to give up a
standards solution is like giving up your identity. And the phenomenon of reification means
that we often barely believe it is possible to change a solution because we forget that we have
the power to.
The result is that the standards solution that we have is that which we find easiest to
perpetuate. Any change must, for one reason or another, overcome this natural inertia — or
at least perturb it. Otherwise we will continue to use the solution which we have already been
using, even if better ones are available.
A scholarly history of the artificial language movement includes two quotations which
illustrate the point:
62 This argument is given in detail by John DeFrancis, The Chinese language: fact and fantasy
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984) and William C. Hannas, Asia's orthographic dilemma
(Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997).
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"The root criticism of any revived or artificial language, however well designed, is that the
immediate incentive which would make enough people learn and use one is lacking … We may
all wish that everyone would learn such a language. But these wishes, however strong they
might be, will never be strong enough to make enough people put enough time into learning an
artificial language as a speculative investment … It is sad, but it is so."63
As a leading Esperantist conceded, "Every Esperanto propagandist knows by experience that
outsiders hardly ever reject Esperanto for its linguistic defects, but mostly because it is of little
use due to small numbers of users."64
Similarly, a psychologist who recommended reversing the order of the components of
American phone numbers was told to go back to his ivory tower, not because he was wrong
but since "the system … was too big to make such a change, especially one that would in any
way affect subscribers."65 As Isaac Asimov said of English spelling reform, "I believe it is
absolutely sensible and is the way to go — except that no one ever will."66
It does not always happen this way. Sometimes people do have a direct individual
incentive to change standards. But usually they have an incentive to change only if they know
everyone else will change too. Nobody wants to be the first. The collective, social benefit to
changing standards is, in practice, blocked by the costs to individuals. To actually overcome
this natural resistance to change, there have to be factors which transform the situation of
social benefit and individual cost into one of both social and individual benefit.
One more strike against the idea that the best solutions should rise to the top is the
possibility that societies engage in a kind of conspicuous consumption of contrast sets. I have
not documented this (nor even looked for it), but it surely exists in the related areas of
fashion and taste.67 Human beings are not always efficiency maximizers (see section 4.6).
Paradoxically, the maintenance of a naturally somewhat inferior coordination solution might
actually be a positive for thought communities, because it shows that they are affluent
63 Large, The artificial language movement, p. 200, quoting I. A. Richards.
64 Large, p. 201.
65 Roger N. Shepard, "A funny thing happened on the way to the formulation: how I came to frame
mental laws in abstract spaces," in Psychologists defying the crowd: stories of those who battled the
establishment and won, edited by Robert J. Sternberg, pp. 215-237 (Washington: American
Psychological Association, 2003), p. 226.
66 This quote is from Isaac Asimov's introductory note to Dolton Edwards' "Meihem in ce Klasrum" in
Isaac Asimov presents the golden years of science fiction: fourth series, edited by Isaac Asimov and
Martin H. Greenberg, pp. 544-545 (New York: Bonanza Books, 1984).
67 See Lieberson, A matter of taste, pp. 21-22; the idea of conspicuous consumption originated with
Thorstein Veblen, The theory of the leisure class (New York: Macmillan, 1899).
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enough to be able to afford inefficiency and luxury. The prestige of Chinese character usage
in written language in Japan and South Korea, where transparent alternatives are readily
available but might be thought to take too little effort, may be a good example.68
Given how high the deck is stacked against contrast set change, what can be done to
make change easier to bring about? There is no simple recipe for making standards change
succeed, but it is possible to pick out several factors that have, or seem to have, some effect.
These factors have to do with the timing of the change, the nature of the thought community,
the way the change is marketed, and the nature of the coordination problem.
The timing of the change
Many changes in public contrast sets have been pushed through during or after
revolutions, when many other changes are taking place in society at the same time and a new
government may have the support or the vision to remake the rules of society. For example,
many, though by no means all, adoptions of the metric system have been associated with
revolutions.69 Argentina, after invading the Falkland Islands in 1982, changed the Falklands'
official language, currency, and the rule of the road.70 But many standards changes have
occurred at decidedly unrevolutionary times as well, and it would be wrong to think that
revolution is by any means a prerequisite for standards change. Even in the case of writing
systems, where there are ample examples of revolutionary change, Joshua Fishman is of the
opinion that overall there is "no justification" for considering " 'revolutionary success and
non-revolutionary failure' as the proper summation of experience with orthographic reform,"
citing among others Chinese and Romanian Latinization, Irish spelling reform, and the
phonetization of Hebrew words in Yiddish as reforms which have either succeeded
peacefully, or failed despite the support of revolutionary authorities.71 In some cases, such as
68 William C. Hannas implies the existence of such an effect in Asia's orthographic dilemma
(Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997), p. 74.
69 Alder, The measure of all things, pp. 325-341. 
70 An eyewitness account is Rudolf Krautschneider, Around the world for the feather of a penguin (Ustí
nad Orlicí: Magalhães-Cano, 1999), p. 40.
71 Fishman, "Introduction," pp. xvii-xix.
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Sweden's change in the rule of the road in 1967, or the pitch standardization convention of
1939 which settled on 440 Hz as an international norm, peace seems to have been more of a
prerequisite for change than upheaval.
Another timing factor is whether change in a coordination solution is "carried" or
"piggybacked" on the back of another technological change. In such cases the solution's
fortunes may rise and fall less on its own merits than on those of the new technology it is
built into. Coordination solutions such as the QWERTY keyboard, VHS video cassette
format, and Microsoft operating system may have "won" not because they were the best, but
because they were packaged with good products — that is, with better typewriters, VCRs, or
computers — whose advantages were so great that they made the question of what
coordination solutions they used irrelevant. In the same way, an interior redesign in a
building may provide a chance to change the labeling style for, say, floors, rooms, doors,
terminals, or check-in desks in a way that seems trivial, or an afterthought, compared to the
investment in the larger changes they are part of.
Similarly, some products have natural life cycles. When they wear out and need
replacement, it gives us a fine excuse to re-choose the coordination solutions that they use. A
bookstore that needs to buy new bookshelves might choose to rethink their shelving
categories at the same time. For many people in the 1980s and 1990s, needing to buy a new
telephone was a fine excuse to upgrade to a touch-tone keypad, allowing easier
communication with automated answering systems. Such change spreads incrementally
through society, and in such cases (since not everyone's phone wears out at the same time)
there may be a transition period where one solution is thought of as the "old" solution and
another as the "new." As well, those whose pulse-dial phones still worked could keep both
the old and new machines around, preserving compatibility with both dialing standards for a
time.
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The nature of the thought community
The incentive structure and the degree of central power in a thought community also
seems to be a factor in the success or failure of change. The hypothesis here is that normally,
no one in a community wants to change solutions unless they think everyone else will too.
(Game theorists would model this hypothesis by considering the observance of norms as a
coordination problem, but changing norms as a prisoner's dilemma type problem.) So, in
those cases where individual users of a solution do not each have an immediate individual
incentive to change, standards change usually requires collective action by a centralized body
that represents the entire group and has some practical or moral leverage over them. For
standards linked to a subculture, this often means an industry or professional association. In
the case of standards that affect many people, this usually means the government of a region
or country. For smaller groups, this means the leader of the group.
In these cases the transformation from social incentive to individual incentive is
accomplished by force. It is common (as in the case of the Swedish change in the rule of the
road72) for public opinion polls to actually show majority opposition to the change at the
same time as the government is carrying it out. These changes work because, as Edna
Ullmann-Margalit observes, fear may be a bigger motivator than projected gain.
Government-led change can make you think that everyone else is going to move to the new
system, and that you will suffer unless you switch too.73 Thus the major reason for the failure
of the U.S. Mint's introduction of a new one-dollar coin in 2000 (despite a marketing
campaign with projected costs of $40,000,000 involving Wal-Mart, Sam's Club, and
Cheerios cereal) was the fact that the U.S. Congress expressly forbid the Mint to withdraw
the one-dollar banknote at the same time, thus permitting the public an incentive to
maintain current habits — despite surveys that demonstrated the public's willingness to give
72 Kincaid, The rule of the road, pp. 159-160.
73 Ullmann-Margalit, The emergence of norms, p. 113.
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up their instinctive opposition to abandoning the banknote in return for the cost savings it
would bring.74 
One can understand why democratic governments are often reluctant to legislate
changes in the daily lives of their citizens. Change is difficult and expensive and no politician
wants to be blamed for it. Changing standards brings short-term costs and long-term
benefits, for which decision makers' time horizons may be too near. Change is even more
difficult in a country (or organization) with weak central power and a strong libertarian
tradition, like the United States (which marches out of step with the rest of the world on a
number of standards problems and has spectacularly failed at metrological and coinage
reforms). However, it is surely worth at least considering John F. Kennedy's statement that
"those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable."75
Meanwhile, societies with stronger central control, or whose leaders have created a
personality cult, sometimes seem to have an easier time changing coordination solutions. For
example, Turkmenbashi, the president-for-life of Turkmenistan, faced little resistance when
he appeared on television in 2002 to announce sweeping changes in the names of the months
and the days of the week,76 although I do not know if these have since succeeded in coming
into common use.
In smaller environments — those that involve subcultures and subgroups rather than
entire societies — change may be no less controversial, but perhaps easier to carry out. The
smaller the community, the more likely that the short-term costs and long-term benefits of
change will be realized by the same people, who can thus evaluate the worthwhileness of
change more easily.
74 "Public views on changing coin design," Report to Congressional Committees GAO-03-206
(Washington: United States General Accounting Office, 2002), pp. 18-22; Corinna Wu, "The buck
starts here," Science News, 1 April 2000; United States Public Law 105-124 (December 1, 1997), section
5; "U.S. Mint begins shipping new golden dollar coin to Federal Reserve banks," U.S. Mint press
release, 18 January 2000, http://www.usmint.gov/pressroom/index.cfm (February 2005); John Yang,
"Sacagawea's sad state," article posted at ABCNEWS.com, 4 April 2002,
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/DailyNews/dollar_coin020404.html (February 2004).
75 The Columbia World of Quotations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), #32398,
attributed to John F. Kennedy, 13 March 1962 (available at http://www.bartleby.com, February 2005).
76 BBC Monitoring International Reports, Turkmen TV first channel, Asgabat, Turkmenistan, 8 August
2002, 1600 GMT.
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In those cases where a few select people are in charge of actually re-enacting a
particular coordination solution, and the rest of the community simply passively consumes
it, the task of bringing about change is much simpler. Unless a change is so explosively
controversial as to incite a popular revolt, one need only convince those sectors of the user
community who actively make the decision of whether to use a particular contrast set or not.
Take, for example, the case of wind measurement in Iceland. Wind direction and speed is the
first thing mentioned in Icelandic weather reports, since the air temperature tends to vary
relatively little in Iceland, while the wind conditions are a very accurate predictor of one's
personal comfort out of doors. On June 1, 1999, the Icelandic weather service changed from
the Beaufort wind speed scale (a set of twelve sequentially numbered and quaintly named
speed categories) to the convention of measuring wind speed in meters per second.77 While
everyone who reads or watches a weather report needs to understand the terms in which
wind speed is stated, in actual fact, only the people who actually create the weather reports
actually control which terms will be used. The general public are only passive consumers of
this particular contrast set. Change, once accepted by the community of actual decision-
makers, can be extended to the public more or less by fiat. Public statements of resistance to
the change had little force.
Finally, marketing contrast set change to the appropriate sector of the thought
community involved is crucial. It is very important to have a strategy to get knowledge of a
proposed new coordination solution into the heads of the people who will actively re-enact it.
During the Danish currency reform of the late 1980s, for example, the government printed
free booklets explaining the change, including the details of a new standard of precision
whereby all amounts would be rounded off to the nearest quarter of a crown (see Image 6.3).
However, public relations are not enough to save an otherwise flawed plan (as the example of
the American dollar coin shows).
77 See Magnús Jónsson, "Vindstyrkur — vindhraði," Morgunblaðið (Reykjavík), 1 June 1999, and
"Vindstigin kvödd," http://www.vedur.is/annad/vedurhorn/beaufort.html (November 2003). For an
example of resistance to the change, see for example Pál Bergþórsson, "Sunnan sex," Morgunblaðið
(Reykjavík), 26 June 1999, Lesbók.
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Nature of the coordination problem
The resolution of some coordination problems
requires more commitment to the solution than the
resolution of others. The difficulty of changing a solution
depends, in turn, on the degree to which we are cognitively
and physically committed to it. For example, teachers and
students may be used to a particular grading system, but
grading systems generally involve fairly weak physical and
cognitive commitments. Changing a highway numbering system (as Poland did recently) or
an expressway exit numbering system (as Los Angeles did in the 1960s) is a bigger job, which
requires governments and mapmakers to undo physical commitments, and drivers to "learn
a new spatial language and reference system."78 And changing telephone numbers is harder
still: it requires undoing physical, software, and cognitive commitments made by all of
society (not just certain subcultures) in a way that also disturbs peoples' sense of identity and
threatens valuable mappings in the telephone number system. Not surprisingly, telephone
number changes in America over the past ten years have generated considerable public
controversy.79
The degree of plannability of the standards problem also affects the ease of change.
The more a coordination solution is under somebody's clear control, the more easily it can be
deliberately changed. Tram route numbers, coins and banknotes, the division of a book into
chapters, or a system of postal codes can fairly easily be changed by a tram company, official
mint, author, or post office. The coordination problems whose solutions seem to be most
resistant to change are those like timekeeping, spelling systems, metrology, and the lexicon,
78 Roger M. Downs and David Stea, Maps in minds: reflections on cognitive mapping (New York:
Harper & Row, 1977), pp. 254-255.
79 See, for example, Abby Goodnough, "Manhattan awash in area code angst," New York Times, 2
March 1997, p. 31; Sam Howe Verhovek, "Raised hackles over a phone plan," New York Times, 3
February 1996, p. 7; Roy Bahat, "Your call cannot be completed as dialed: big cities, small changes, and
the unexpected politics of area code reform," A.B. thesis, Harvard University, 1998.
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where there is rarely any administrative body with the legal authority and responsibility to
administer them. 
The degree of deviance and tolerance permitted in the solution of a coordination
problem also has an effect on the way change can take place. Coordination problems like
writing systems and standards of measurement do not require an absolutely uniform
solution from all members of society. Individual and idiosyncratic measurement or writing
styles can be tolerated as long as the people for whom they are intended understand their
meaning. (This contrasts with problems like the rule of the road, which require complete and
total uniformity.) Thus Halldór Laxness, Iceland's most famous twentieth-century author,
used his own idiosyncratic Icelandic spelling system. He got away with it because it more
accurately reflected spoken Icelandic, because his fame gave him a kind of market power, and
above all, because his orthography was not dramatically different from the standard and thus
did not hinder comprehension and the accomplishment of the coordination task.80
For coordination problems that tolerate imprecise or less than universal
coordination, change can establish a beachhead within a subculture, and spread slowly
throughout society rather than having to be decreed by fiat. American metrology is a good
example of beachhead-style change. A top-down, legislated approach to metricization in the
United States has repeatedly failed.81 But metric use in the scientific and military
communities has familiarized millions of Americans with metric measurements nevertheless
(not to mention soft-drink bottling and marijuana packaging; P. J. O'Rourke has said that
"drugs have taught an entire generation of American kids the metric system"82). One could
also imagine Laxness's spelling system spreading slowly throughout Icelandic society (it did
not). Beachhead-style change fits well with the process of technological obsolescence: we can
ease the process of change by buying the DVD player only when we see our once-brand-new
80 See Halldór Laxness, "Um stafsetningu," in Vettvangur dagsins: ritgerðir (2d ed., Reykjavík:
Helgafell, 1962), pp. 225-229.
81 See Charles F. Treat, A history of the metric system controversy in the United States (U.S. National
Bureau of Standards Special Publication 345-10, 1971).
82  The reputed source for this quote is the Vancouver Sun, 20 December 1991. I have not been able to
verify this, but according to Mr. O'Rourke (personal comunication, 12 March 2004) the quote is
authentic.
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VCR starting to wear out, and by having our children program the DVD while we program
that "old-fashioned" VCR that they don't understand.
6.6 The standards evangelists
There exists a necessary sort
of madness: to believe that precisely you
can change the world.
Madness that borders
on genius
and that is also the simplest
everyday wisdom …83
Recently I spent several hours browsing the web sites of organizations who want to
change our contrast sets. In Britain, for example, there is the Simplified Spelling Society
(www.spellingsociety.org), which advocates "planned change in English spelling for the
benefit of learners and users everywhere." The U.S. Metric Association
(lamar.colostate.edu/~hillger) wants the U.S. to convert to the international SI system of
measurement units. Supporters of metric time (zapatopi.net/metrictime.html) want to use
decimal units such as a ten-hour day, a hundred-minute hour, and a hundred-second
minute. Calendar reformers (personal.ecu.edu/mccartyr/calendar-reform.html) are
searching for another system of dividing the year into months and inserting intercalary days,
preferably one that might make the number of days in a month and the assignment of days of
the week more regular. Fans of the Dvorak keyboard layout
(www.cse.ogi.edu/~dylan/dvorak/DvorakIntl.html) offer instructions on how to convert
your computer from QWERTY. If you want to learn Esperanto, you might start at the website
of the Universala Esperanto-Asocio (www.uea.org).
I call the people who advocate changes like these standards evangelists. The religious
analogy is not facetious. Standards solutions are very much like religious rules about what to
eat or when to celebrate. They are conventional restrictions on the way we act, which are
shared by everyone in a group, and whose observance partly defines our membership within
that group. Standards evangelists want you to join with them in a new and unfamiliar set of
83 This poem is by Bernt Rosengren, quoted and translated from the Swedish by Sissela Bok in Alva
Myrdal: a daughter's memoir (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1991), p. 303.
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rituals. They need you to help construct a community of believers. They want to change the
fundamental regularities of your life, just like the brochure-bearing missionaries who knock
on your door.
The Internet is the standards evangelist's modern soapbox. It makes it easy to get the
message out, over and over and over, and it links kindred spirits across otherwise
unbridgeable distances. The same is true for religious denominations with far-flung
proselytizing efforts, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses (www.watchtower.org), the Mormons
(www.lds.org), and the Seventh-Day Adventists (www.adventist.org). Before the Internet,
standards evangelists were much more scattered and had much less visible press. 
It is common to hear the view that standards evangelists are "crack-pots, visionaries,
and fanatics"84 concerned with "trivia of interest only to cranks."85 As an informed and
skeptical observer who (with the exception of the Rutgers University campus bus labels) has
never been involved in any kind of standards evangelism, I will venture what I believe to be a
balanced opinion. The proposals of standards evangelists are certainly impractical. Some
standards evangelists are doubtless eccentrics. But most are not. (Andrew Large goes into
this issue in depth in his history of artificial languages.86) The majority of standards solutions
proposed on the web are well and sanely thought out, and present reasonable arguments
against existing solutions. And if standards change is just a matter for cranks, how is that
some standards change proposals become mainstreamed, so that governments and
associations support them, not just groups of hobbyists? (Indeed, this process of
mainstreaming is a fascinating topic on its own. Why, for example, did metricization fail to
win official support in America, while the peculiar campaign to eliminate apostrophes from
American placenames succeeded?87)
84 Quoted in J. Marshall Unger, Literacy and script reform in occupation Japan: reading between the
lines (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 61.
85 See DeFrancis, The Chinese language, p. 240.
86 Large, The artificial language movement, pp. 109-112.
87 See Thomas J. Gasque, "The apostrophe in U. S. placenames," in You name it: perspectives on
onomastic research, edited by Ritva Liisa Pitkänen and Kaija Mallat, pp. 195-205 (Helsinki: Finnish
Literature Society, 1997).
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My design advice to the most fervent standards evangelists is to pay just as much
attention to the process of implementing change as to the process of creating optimal
solutions. Much of the cranky perception of standards evangelism has to do with the fact
that, as the Esperanto case shows, the real problem is not to design a good system, but to get
everybody to use it. The best proposal for calendar reform is hopeless without a plan for its
acceptance. An impractical standards proposal seems pointless and its promoters' motives
doubtful.
I would also draw standards evangelists' attention to the way that their activities are
(consciously or unconsciously) perceived by the public. Standards evangelists have rejected
society's intersubjective compact, and want us to do so too. They want to abandon the
standard operating procedures and contrast sets that we organize life with. They want to
divert our attention from the business of everyday life, to the rules by which we go about that
business (an awfully annoying demand to those who are trying to get work done). They are,
exasperatingly, not just protesters, but seers and visionaries. They have been riding the same
train as the rest of us, and while they might be content to jump off it or derail it, what they
really want is to redesign the cars and couplings in mid-journey. We call people who opt out
of the intersubjective world "eccentric" at best and "insane" at worst. 
Many coordination problems admit of an infinite number of possible solutions. The
arbitrary choice of a solution is philosophically unsettling, and becomes more comfortable
only by invoking some outside force as the deciding factor. Our commitment to a particular
solution creates a veil which, so to speak, protects us from the incomprehensible flux of other
conceivable standards. Standards evangelists are "silence breakers" who want to lift this veil
and "try to make us see things we deliberately ignore";88 they want to remove the social
"lens"89 through which we filter the world, and to openly discuss matters that are usually
backgrounded. No wonder they are often perceived as a threat.
88 From the chapter "Breaking the silence" in Eviatar Zerubavel, The elephant in the room: the social
anatomy of silence and denial (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
89 Eviatar Zerubavel, The fine line: making distinctions in everyday life (New York: Free Press, 1991),
ch. 4.
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Another reason why standards evangelists have difficulty getting their proposals
taken seriously is that very often, people of special salience are the only ones who are
ceremonially "allowed" to choose a course of action on behalf of the entire society they
symbolically represent.90 Thus we speak of Elizabethan theater in England, the Josephine
reforms in eighteenth-century Austria, Hitler's Final Solution, and Stalinist architecture even
though these people may or may not actually have been the ones who decided to
institutionalize these particular norms. What is important is that they were in a ritually
prominent position in society at the time. A standards proposal made by Joe down the street
who works in his garage, or even by the learned Dr. Zamenhof of Warsaw (the inventor of
Esperanto), does not have the ring of having been "chosen" by the "right" kind of person.
Standards evangelists sometimes seem to forget that they do not possess the status — the
cultural or political "capital"91 — to be able to bear the torch for all society.
At the same time, we owe a debt to the standards evangelists. They are, first of all, the
people who are truly willing to tackle the task of finding the best possible solution to a
coordination problem. They ask questions such as whether we really do want to use capital
letters to specially mark the first letter of a noun or a sentence. When a community does
agree to change a solution, it can be a very positive thing. The Unicode character set
standard, progressively adopted by the computer industry since the early 1990s, is surely one
of the great advances in the history of literacy since the invention of movable type. And
furthermore, to dereify our standards, to see the conventionality of things that we always
thought natural, is an edifying process. It builds wisdom and perspective to see that it is
possible for things to be "other than they are," even if we ultimately live with the world as it
is. After all, the inability to imagine is just as handicapping as the refusal to accept reality.
Benjamin Franklin's proposals for English spelling reform clearly did not affect his ability to
communicate in standard orthography as a statesman and ambassador. Richard Feynman
had the good sense to give up on his alternative notation for trigonometric functions, but he
90 For a concise statement of this view see John B. Thompson, "Editor's introduction," in Language
and symbolic power, by Pierre Bourdieu, pp. 1-34 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 8.
91 Bourdieu, Language and symbolic power, pp. 194-196.
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did later invent a diagrammatic notation that became very widely accepted in quantum
physics.
Ultimately, those who laugh at standards evangelism reveal how much societies are
committed to their standard operating procedures. By re-opening the question of how
society should work, standards evangelists force us to confront the frequent arbitrariness of
our current solutions. The recognition that our standards could be changed and even
perhaps improved, and that we ourselves have the power to set new ones, is disturbing and
unsettling because it undermines both social harmony and our personal commitment to the
setup of the world. Knowledge of the possibility of change is shielded and protected in
society, first of all by the reification of standards solutions, secondly through their
trivialization and backgrounding as a field of study, and lastly by calling many of the people
who want to change them crazy. It is almost (but not quite) as if standards are inaccessible
mysteries guarded by a social priesthood.92 To someone deeply committed to standards
change, this shielding might seem sinister, intentional, and even conspiratorial. But in
another light it seems completely sensible that groups of people should guard so tightly the
rules of life that glue them together as a society.
6.7 Creep and drift
Creep or drift is a type of unplanned change which tends to happen when the
members of a target set have a value gradient, in terms of ease or prestige. Student grading is
an example of a standardized mapping which, once in place, tends to shift. The original
mapping between the labels and the part of the domain that they refer to starts to slide, so
that the same label by imperceptible steps comes to refer to a slightly different section of the
domain. Thus when grades "inflate," what once earned a C may now earn a B+.
Pitch standardization is an excellent example of drift. There is constant upward
pressure on pitch standards, primarily because music tuned higher than the prevailing
average tends to sound a little bit better to listeners. Orchestras and choirs have an incentive
92 Witold Kula comments on the sacral character of standards in Measures and men (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1986 [1970]), pp. 18, 79-81.
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to tune just slightly sharp. This, in turn, raises the prevailing pitch average and means that
ever higher tuning is required to get the same effect. Instead of A above middle C referring to
440 Hz, it may come to refer to 441, 442, or 443 Hz or even higher points in the domain.
Eventually, this starts to make impossible demands on singers' and instruments' upper
ranges, at which point pitch has to be collectively pulled back down again.93
Another example, one which shows a very clear prestige gradient, is in womens'
clothing sizes.94 It is in the public interest to have a maximally standardized system of
clothing sizes, particularly for mail order sellers and buyers. But at the moment, at least,
many societies attach value to being thin. Clothing manufacturers thus have an incentive to
undercut the standard. They can sell more clothes by offering women the reward of being
able to fit into clothing one size smaller than their previous "location" on the scale. If you
have usually worn a size 6, it makes you feel good to see that you fit in a size 4. Although the
feeling of prestige should be associated with a location within the domain of body size (being
thin), it has been effectively transferred to the target set that labels it, so that prestige is now
associated with being towards the small end of the linear topology of labels used to refer to
the domain of body size (the ability to say "I wear a size x"). The label becomes a proxy
indicator for the domain, and suffers from an inflationary effect which erodes its "value" over
time. (In the clothing industry, this type of standards drift is called "vanity sizing." As with
vanity license plates, vanity sizing allows people in situations where they must be just a
number at least the pleasure of having an attractive number.)
Put into game-theory terms, certain solutions tend to drift because the addition of a
value gradient converts a pure coordination norm into a prisoner's dilemma. There is an
incentive to conform to a contrast set that is a pure coordination norm. There is an incentive
to defect — just a little — from the conventional solution when one adds in the sense of value.
93 Mark Lindley, Klaus Wachsmann, J. J. K. Rhodes, and W. R. Thomas, "Pitch," in New Grove
Dictionary of Music and Musicians, 20: 779-786 (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 785; Lloyd, "Standard
pitch," p. 802. 
94 For a popular treatment of this particular type of drift see Alex Kuczynski, "One riddle fits all," New
York Times, 30 August 1998, section 9, pp. 1, 5. For a comprehensive and sociologically informed
reference on clothing size standardization see Susan Ashdown and Laura Cowie, "Sizing systems in the
apparel industry," http://www.human.cornell.edu/txa/faculty/SizingSystems (November 2003).
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Often one wants to defect just enough to gain an advantage, but not so much that it is
obviously noticeable. But, of course, if you see everyone else defecting, you will probably
want to too.95 If we imagine two orchestras as players in the game of pitch standardization,
and say that one orchestra is willing to defect and the other is honest but willing to follow
defections, we can model standards drift with the following payoff matrix in which the choice
is of what point in the domain of frequency the label "A above middle C" should refer to:
Defector

















It is always in the defecting orchestra's interest to raise pitch by 1 Hz, and then it is
always in the honest orchestra's interest to match the raise. In this case, as they move from
440 to 441 to 442 Hz, the utility of the solution becomes progressively less. Eventually the
players may run into trouble and decide to agree on a solution. This entire bother could be
avoided if the defecting orchestra had simply followed the norm from the beginning. 
Defecting from any contrast set labeling or mapping standard confounds our sense of
what a label can be expected to mean, and undermines hard-won coordinative compacts
about the relationship between labels and contrast set members. The people who deliberately
make labels drift thus take advantage of a social compact for their own profit, robbing value
from a social institution as they do so. Of course, such behavior is all too human, since labels
with a prestige gradient are a typical problem of the commons, in which the players in the
game have an individual incentive to defect from the socially ideal equilibrium and be a "free
rider" just so long as not everybody else is defecting as well. And in some cases, the damage is
less because the utility of each successive solution is the same; as the value of a label deflates
or its meaning dilutes, another label usually begins to take on the meaning that it once had.
95 Thomas Schelling calls these situations "self-displacing prophecies" in Micromotives and
macrobehavior, p. 118.
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Corresponding phenomena in the
lexicon have been known for a long time,
although linguists have not generally made
the link between linguistic and non-
linguistic coordination drift. The
development of euphemisms often involves
a process of standards drift, as does
semantic change along vectors such as reek-
stink-smell-odor-fragrance. Recently the term "euphemism treadmill" has been suggested for
this type of change.96 One can also see a similar process at work in the way we label the
urgency of discourse, as the picture shows. This piece of junk mail, received in August 2003,
offered me a credit card with a frequent flyer mile benefit. The credit card offer is disguised
as something more important, presumably in order to raise the chances that the recipient
will open it.97 The domain, then, is the importance or urgency of the message. The
appearance and packaging of a message is in part a sort of label or indicator of that degree of
urgency. Here the packaging of the message suggests more urgency than the message
actually possesses, and it raises the bar for other messages which are truly urgent.
In an imaginary world where pure and perfect coordination was valued above all else,
an omniscient and omnipotent contrast set designer would stamp out any cases of creep and
drift before they had any effect. In the world as it is, although deceptive credit card offers are
annoying, we seem to have no trouble managing a certain amount of drift, and euphemisms
can be a source of pleasure. However, designers should know that when things go too far, as
in the case of grading or pitch standards, someone may need to take deliberate action to
reestablish general agreement on the relationship between a contrast set and its labels.
96 Judith Neaman and Carole Silver, In other words: a thesaurus of euphemisms (London: Angus &
Robertson, 1991), pp. 9-13; Steven Pinker, "The game of the name," New York Times, 5 April 1994, p.
A21.
97 The envelope says on it "Important — Do Not Discard," includes a fake "Tracking Code," has a pattern
similar to a bank-check watermark on the back (not visible in this image), purports to be about "Bonus
Miles," and the design of the envelope (especially opening by means of "fold along perforation and




On the New York City subway one April day I overheard the following conversation
between a mother and her daughter, about seven years old:
Daughter: "It's really hot out today. I think it must be like 70!"
Mother: "I think it's probably in the fifties."
Daughter: "I remember when it was really really hot last summer."
Mother: "Yes, it was probably in the eighties or nineties then."
This conversation is a reminder that the Fahrenheit scale is not just a scientific tool
for recording temperature, but also a way of communicating our own experiences and
memories to other people. Put more abstractly, any conventional set of labels is an
intersubjective shorthand for sharing our thoughts with others. The little girl who I
overheard knew that she can use the Fahrenheit scale to label the weather, and she knew that
other people understand those labels too. However, she had not yet tuned her sense of
correspondence between the scale and reality as finely as adult Americans have. In the
conversation, her mother helped her to calibrate her sense of the meaning of the Fahrenheit
scale so that she could use this cognitive standard to join in a "thought community" to which
the rest of society already belongs.
Because looking right, telling time, alphabetical order, music notation, clothes sizing,
and the use of rulers are norms of cognition and behavior that children do not always pick up
automatically, society has many ways of teaching kids to observe them. Singing the alphabet
song is not just a way to learn the twenty-six letters of the English language but an excellent
way to figure out that H comes before T in the encyclopedia. Lessons on weights and
measures in elementary school, and on the metric system in science class, are part of every
American child's schooling. So are exercises in using our coinage standard by finding as
many ways as possible to make, say, sixty-five cents by combining nickels, dimes, and
quarters.
When socializing children to contrast sets it is very important to use nametags (see
section 3.4) to help learners learn to tell where they are "located" within a contrast set at a
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given moment. Just as it is important to know on a warm day that it is probably 70 or 80
degrees Fahrenheit and not 20 or 30, it is important to know that a slow-moving car is
probably not going 75 miles an hour, that you are a Canadian and not an American or a
Greenlander, that this room is your room and not your brother's or your sister's, that this
coin is worth 5 cents and that one is worth 10, that this is an A and that is a B, and that you
are in aisle 2 which is the produce section of the supermarket and the candy section is over
there in aisle 10.
In all of these cases the goal is for the child to learn to
see the different "views" associated with the different
positions in a domain as belonging to one member of a
particular contrast set created within that domain, and to
learn the label for that contrast set member as well. In other
words, children may, at any given time, have a relationship
with a particular instantiation of a domain — because they
are looking at it, thinking about it, located in it, and so forth.
We must teach them to know that that instantiation belongs with a particular member of a
contrast set that partitions that domain. Thus the teaching tool in Image 7.2 is designed to
help children recognize, for example, the varying shapes that can count as (for example) the
letter e or w.
Just as the environment we create for babies is full of things which develop basic
motor and perceptual skills and the ability to recognize the parts of living creatures, the
environment we create for somewhat older children (say three to eight) is full of things which
help children see things as examples of particular contrast set members. In an elementary
school classroom, you will usually find numerals, the alphabet (in order and in both lower
case, upper case, and eventually cursive forms), clocks, calendars, and maps (sometimes in
puzzle form), all of which are devices that allow children to locate themselves, or what they
are doing at the moment, within one of the divisions of some domain. Many of these displays
(such as clocks, calendars, alphabets, and lists) also suggest an image of a contrast set which
Image 7.1 (016)
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a child can use to help remember it. Thus the chart of all my classmates' birthdays that hung
on the wall in my kindergarten classroom helped me understand what it meant that mine
was in January, not December or February, just as the clock on the wall helped me
understand when to expect recess (at 10:30) and nap time (at 1:00). By being told "you are
here" within a given domain or contrast set, the child learns to be able to connect the
experience of being "here" with the image of a particular point within the contrast set. Think,
for comparison, of labels in zoos or botanical gardens, which tell us that this is an aardvark
and that was an elephant, just as a calendar on the wall tells us that this is January and it is
something else that was June. Most amazingly, because these images and contrast sets are
social facts shared by an entire thought community, our socialization allows us to read other
peoples' handwriting, look at other peoples' watches, interpret other peoples' thermometers,
type on library computer keyboards which we have never seen before, and use indexes and
alphabetized lists which we did not create.
7.1 Contrast sets and external cognition
One might imagine (as a sort of null hypothesis) that contrast sets, once learned, are
simply carried whole in the minds of their users, who can re-enact them and recreate them in
other minds without any help. It is, after all, true that literate people know the alphabet and
usually the alphabetical order by heart, and if they were stranded on a desert island with a
three-year-old, would probably be able to pass on the skill of writing without any outside
assistance. We are, however, rarely so self-sufficient. Knowledge of a contrast set resides in
many other places than in people's minds. Although we may carry the alphabet in our head,
when we need to know what date tomorrow is, when the fourth Thursday in November will
be this year, which note is a fifth up from A flat, or what the country code for Mexico is, we
rely on knowledge that resides in our pocket, on our wrist, on our bookshelves, in a computer
program, or at our side (in the head of a companion).
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Donald Norman describes this phenomenon by speaking of the difference between
"knowledge in the head" and "knowledge in the world."1 The terms "external cognition" and
"distributed cognition" have also been used to describe the way the knowledge put to use in a
particular context is spread over a memory larger than that of a single human being.2 Karl
Mannheim put forth a version of the idea of external cognition when he said: "Strictly
speaking it is incorrect to say that the single individual thinks. Rather it is more correct to
insist that he participates in thinking further what other men have thought before him."3 
 The designer of contrast sets — or of anything that depends on people's knowledge of
them — needs to have a realistic view of how much knowledge about them people will be able
to keep in their heads. If the amount of knowledge about a contrast set that people can be
expected to keep in their heads is less than the amount that they need to know in order to
make proper use of that contrast set, the designer should try to make up for the gap by
providing that knowledge at just the moment when people will need it. This is why there are
system maps on subway station walls, calendars on bank writing tables, keys and legends in
the front pages of an atlas, clocks in school hallways, latitude and longitude markings on
maps, time zone charts and area code listings in the back of the phone book, size labels on
clothing, and note names on the keys of pianos and xylophones meant for beginners. It is
also why keyboards are marked with the graphic symbol that each key produces (even though
skilled users know most of them by heart). Though we probably know our own house
number and the postman probably knows it too, we post it on the door so that the postman
can be double sure (and so that the package delivery service can find our house at all).
Americans receive not only a Social Security number, but a card with the number printed on
it, and most of use now have so many other identification numbers to remember that we
1 Donald A. Norman, The design of everyday things (New York: Doubleday, 1990), chapter 3
("Knowledge in the head and in the world," pp. 54-80).
2 Donald A. Norman, Things that make us smart (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1993), chapter 6
("Distributed cognition," pp. 139-153); Edwin Hutchins, Cognition in the wild (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1995), chapter 9 ("Cultural cognition," pp. 353-374); Mike Scaife and Yvonne Rogers, "External
cognition: how do graphical representations work?" International Journal of Human-Computer
Studies 45 (1996): 185-213.
3 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and utopia: an introduction to the sociology of knowledge (London:
Kegan Paul, 1936), p. 3.
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have to keep track of them on a sheet of paper. Russian envelopes have preprinted boxes
which ensure that the postal code is the top, not the bottom line of the recipient's address.
Vending machines usually tell us how much money we have put in even though we may be
keeping track at the same time. 
In other cases, knowledge is not provided at the point of need, but people are taught
to know that there is a place that they can go to find it. This is the function of reference
material, whose deliberate aim is to preserve the knowledge of a standard. The calendar in a
farmer's almanac and the periodic table of the elements in an encyclopedia are all examples
of printed material whose deliberate purpose is to pass on a particular contrast set. If we do
not know somebody's postal code, we can look it up on a chart or directory at the post office,
or now, on the Internet. Tuning forks and pitch pipes allow you to carry pitch standards in
your pocket, but you might not need them in Budapest where you can (or at least once could)
pick up the phone and listen to a standardized 440-Hz A above middle C by calling 117-1822.4
In other cases, knowledge of a contrast set resides incidentally in the world, and the
reality of the set is reinforced by our casual contact with these representations of it. Thus we
see alphabetical order in text and indexes and schoolroom alphabet charts. We see musical
contrast sets reproduced in sheet music and in the layout of the keys on musical instruments,
we see racial contrast sets perpetuated in tables and charts, and the calendar racks in stores
in December remind us that January 1 is the beginning of a new year. We see our postal code
listed on the mail we receive and others' codes on their return addresses. The elements of a
contrast set may also be reflected in the structure of organizations, so that the makeup of the
United States Senate ceremonially reflects the fact that the union consists of fifty states. 
Because the standardization of a contrast set makes that set intersubjectively real, we
can borrow the term "reality maintenance" from Berger and Luckmann to describe the
process by which such external devices reaffirm and perpetuate conventionalized contrast
sets and norms.5 Individuals simply cannot keep all this knowledge in their heads all of the
4 See András Török, Budapest: a critical guide (Boston: Zephyr Press, 1992), p. 14.
5 Berger and Luckmann, The social construction of reality, pp. 135-140.
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time, and designers cannot rely on their ability to apply it unaided. Some of it needs to reside
in the world.
For the designer who has managed to figure out how much information users can
keep in their heads and how much they will need to source from the external world, the key
design advice on the subject of external cognition is to make it as easy as possible for people
to get the knowledge that they need.
A well-known arena for such "knowledge planning" is
public transport, where there are many examples of
successes and blunders to report. Successfully taking a
public bus or tram involves using several contrast sets (bus
numbers, routes, stops, fare levels) that people are rarely
fully familiar with. Users' level of knowledge in the head may
range from virtually zero to a relatively detailed mental map
of the way the system works. The external knowledge that
people can resort to includes knowledge in other peoples'
heads (passers-by, bus drivers, acquaintances, fellow
passengers); knowledge in one's pocket (a printed schedule
or map or a guidebook); knowledge posted at each stop (stop
names, route numbers, timetables, and system maps); and knowledge on or in the bus itself
(route numbers, destination names, route maps and schedules). This knowledge that is out
in the world is pulled into the mind of the person actually taking the bus at the time when
they need to make their decisions. Of course, a good printed timetable can hold more
information than an outdoor sign — but only if riders have taken the trouble to get copies.
The designer's role is, then, to use the limited financial resources at their disposal to
do the best possible job of making this information available to the user at the time that they
need it. While it is difficult to provide general advice applicable to all situations, we can
pretty safely say that the New Jersey Transit bus sign illustrated in Image 7.3 is not a
successful external cognitive aid for bus riders looking for the knowledge of the system that
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they need. It does not tell us which buses stop there and where
they are going, there is no name to the stop, and since the sign
has not been well maintained it is difficult to be sure that it
really is a bus stop and that the bus stop is still in use. There
are some confusing numbers on the sign, and no clue how to
interpret them, which makes one wonder whether the sign is
even intended for the public.
In contrast, the Helsinki bus
stop sign in Image 7.4 is a better
collection of external knowledge. The
stop is named, route numbers are
listed, and destination names are given
in both Finnish and Swedish. Although
providing bus travelers with such extra
knowledge is surely expensive, it does seems to increase ridership.6 Public transport
designers should surely make an effort to provide such information up to the point where the
return on their investment starts to diminish. One of the reasons that visitors to an
unfamiliar city tend to prefer traveling by subway or tram over bus is that fixed-stop
transport systems like subways give the rider a sense of cognitive tranquility about whether
they are waiting in the right place; whether they are going in the right direction; where the
next stop will be; and how to backtrack if one overshoots. And subway travel is generally
preferable to tram, because as long as one is "within" the subway system one has the sense
that orientation information will always be accessible on maps and signposts, and if all else
fails, by asking other passengers or at the ticket window. In the subway system, more
knowledge resides in the world. Bus systems provide the least external knowledge and create




the greatest fear of being stranded, in hostile weather, with no knowledge of how the system
works, and no ability to backtrack along the route.
Another example of how not to provide information about a contrast set involves the
purchasing procedure for international standards. To take one example, the need for
standardized abbreviations for country names has grown over the past few years. There is an
existing and regularly updated standard (called ISO 3166) which specifies two-letter, three-
letter, and numerical labels for each country in the world. The two-letter abbreviations have
become particularly well-known since they came into general use as the last element in
Internet domain names. It quite commonly happens that people know the name of a country
but do not know the two-letter abbreviation.
If you go to the ISO web site (www.iso.org) to try to find an official copy of the list of
two-letter abbreviations, you may be in for a bit of a shock. Getting a copy costs — and costs
a lot. (The price in November 2003 was 148 Swiss francs.) Although the ISO secretariat
naturally needs to cover its costs, if the goal is to bring a standardized label set into general
use, it is unfortunate to have to impose high costs on those who are trying to learn the links
between contrast set and labels. For many years, casual users of the ISO 3166 standard had
to rely on various homespun or bootleg copies available on other organizations' web sites.
Recently, in what seems to be a compromise approach, ISO has posted an informal (but also
incomplete) version of the standard on its web site.
Both of these examples show that successful contrast set design involves much more
than just matching entities to labels. Just as important as the creation of a contrast set and
its institutionalization as a norm is the process of letting it reach the consciousness of its
users at just the time when they need to know about it.
7.2 Cultural differences in contrast sets
This section has to do with what happens to us when we venture beyond the safety
and familiarity of our own sociomental neighborhoods — for example, into a country with a
different writing system, telephone numbering plan, or system of shoe sizes. Within the
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thought communities that we are used to, we know how all the important contrast sets are
set up, and we know how to find more information about the things that we are a little foggy
on. When, however, we travel to an unfamiliar thought community — whether that be a new
country, city, school, company, bookstore, or church — we must cope with new and
confusing contrast sets. In a new cognitive neighborhood, we lose the sense of cognitive
tranquility that we have back home. We become strangers. We no longer carry in our heads
all the information we need to be a full-fledged "user" of the contrast sets we encounter. We
have to pull that information in from the outside world all over again.
This section follows in the long sociological tradition of studying the role and position
of the "stranger"7 to a thought community. (Scholars in the growing field of tourism studies
have also written about the cognitive repercussions of the tourist's strangerhood, although
not in as much depth as one might expect.8) The stranger differs from the child in already
having undergone primary socialization, and in being competent in their own social
neighborhood. But like the child, the stranger is just beginning to learn the standard
operating procedures of the new community in which they now find themselves.
In fact, because of the
phenomenon of reification, many
strangers have never thought of a
coordination problem as a "problem"
before their arrival in a community where it is resolved in a different way. An American on
their first overseas trip in, say, Russia, may never have even imagined that the long-distance
dialing prefix could be anything other than "1", that people really do write with the Cyrillic
alphabet, measure everything in meters and degrees Celsius, and use a different set of
7 Sociological works on the theme of the stranger include Alfred Schutz, "The stranger: an essay in
social psychology," in his Collected papers, 2: 91-108 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964); Pitirim A.
Sorokin, Social and cultural mobility (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press of Glencoe, 1959), pp. 508-521; Georg
Simmel, "The stranger," in his The sociology of Georg Simmel, pp. 402-408 (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press
of Glencoe, 1950); Mary Margaret Wood, The stranger: a study in social relationships (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1934).
8 For a brief review, see John Urry, The tourist gaze: leisure and travel in contemporary societies
(London: Sage Publications, 1990), pp. 1-15.
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standard paper sizes. The foreignness of a different culture's standards solutions often comes
as just as much of a shock as the fact that everyone around you really is speaking a different
language. Another surprising aspect of foreign travel is the realization that your own country
is seen by the locals as just another in the contrast set of "foreign" countries. Thus a Japanese
on their first trip out of the country might never have dialed the country code for Japan
before; it might never have occurred to them that telephone numbers are taxonomically
organized and that there is such a thing as an international dialing prefix which signals a
certain level within that taxonomy. The guidebook illustration in Image 7.5 tries to make that
clear.
But one does not have to be a traveler in a foreign country to experience the
kaleidoscopic variety of contrast sets and labels in the world. Almost any unfamiliar
environment, whether an entire culture or simply a new city or a new building, presents
visitors with a multitude of alphanumeric labeling systems: pier numbers in Seattle, house
numbers in Venice, Roman-numeral district numbers in Budapest, seat numbers in stadiums
or theaters, gate numbers at an airport, and store numbers on a shopping mall map. 
Quite often the stranger is already familiar with the way a contrast set is partitioned
and with the tools used to label it, but just needs to learn new values or labels for its
members. Thus most cultures use a seven-day week, but generally have different labels for
the days. One finds multi-floor buildings in many countries, but in some, the floor labeled "1"
is at ground level, while in others, it is one level above. Europeans name streets just like
Americans do, but the large-scale use of mapping in streetnaming (where the number or
alphabetical position of the street correspond to something about its geographical position)
is as unknown in Europe as it is common in the United States. 
In the case of scale units, the basic idea of measurement is the same, but the stranger
needs to learn the size of the basic unit. There are many countries which use money with a
major and minor division in a 100:1 ratio, but the exchange value of the major division
varies. The level of precision in a label set can vary, so that it might not occur to Europeans in
Britain or America to think that there might be a difference between shoe sizes 10 and 10½,
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as the same distinctions are expressed with whole integers in the continental shoe size
system. In some cases it is possible to tell from the form of a label that you are using a
particular system (41 is a quite ordinary shoe size in the European system but impossible in
the British system) but in others it is not (it is equally possible for the outside temperature to
be 25 degrees in either the Fahrenheit or Celsius scales, or for a price of $5.00 to be in
American or Australian dollars). Given enough time, the stranger will be able to build an new
image or internal understanding of, say, "what 25 degrees means" in the new system, but
they need not learn entirely new principles of partitioning in order to do so.
In other cases, the stranger does need to perform what Einar Haugen called a
semantic Umbau9 (remodeling) by figuring out completely new principles for partitioning a
domain. While the distinctions that any society makes may appear natural to them, these
conventional boundaries are often far from obvious to outsiders. Thus a label system that has
been carefully constructed and explained to foreigners will still be useless if it is based on
distinctions which visitors have never learned to make. Icelanders, Turks, and Poles are
respectively trained to consider the differences between p and þ, i and ı, and z with and
without a cross through it as significant, but few others share this sensitivity. A set of
recycling bins labeled for different types of reusable material (for example, the beautifully
designed ones on newer German railroad cars) will confuse strangers who are not used to
distinguishing between "trash" and "recyclables" to begin with when they put out the
garbage. An American making their first encounter with the Arabic script is unlikely to be
able to tell where one letter starts and another stops, and will initially find strange the
Japanese or Ethiopian scripts' focus on the syllable as a unit of analysis, not on single
phonemes. Japanese might find the Western focus on streets as an intermediate taxonomic
level for house numbering unfamiliar. The Dewey Decimal and Library of Congress systems
use entirely different labeling and partitioning styles to catalog books. Meanwhile, visitors to
9 Einar Haugen, "Linguistics and dialinguistics," in The ecology of language: essays by Einar Haugen,
pp. 299-306 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972 [1970]), p. 304. 
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Beijing do well to act as if there is only one China, whereas in Taipei it might be better to
consider that there are two.
There are, as well, a tremendous number of different ways to divide up the directional
circle around us.10 Many ship captains may think in terms of a 360-degree circle on the job.11
For Icelanders, the four compass directions are terms of everyday folk reference and lack any
technical flavor (Icelanders will routinely tell you that the potatoes are on the north side of
the table).12 Similarly, some Pacific islanders prefer to think in terms of seawards and
mountainwards ("there is a spot of mud on your seaward cheek").13 Americans, however,
seem to prefer relative direction references ("the potatoes are on the left as you come in")
and to consider absolute directional reference pedantic.
Many tourists do not realize that Florence has two separate house numbering
systems, one for residences, and the other for businesses. The residence numbers are listed
in red and the business numbers in black, but most tourists are not used to thinking about
the color of a house number as one of its salient signifying features nor do they automatically
think to categorize buildings as residential or commercial. 
Nor does it normally
occur to Americans to divide the
year into numbered weeks, as
Northern Europeans do on their
calendars and work schedules
(as Image 7.6 shows). I remember my confusion at a Swedish ferry schedule which listed two
sets of timings for "even" and "odd" weeks as if there was no question that the reader would
10 For a review of reference systems see Stephen C. Levinson, "Language and space," Annual Review of
Anthropology 25 (1996): 353-382. 
11 See Edwin Hutchins, Cognition in the wild (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995).
12 See further Einar Haugen, "The semantics of Icelandic orientation," in Cognitive anthropology,
edited by Stephen A. Tyler, pp. 330-342 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1969); Jonathan
Wylie and David Margolin, The ring of dancers: images of Faroese culture (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1981), chapter 2 ("A sense of place," pp. 13-45).
13 Kevin Lynch, The image of the city (Cambridge: Technology Press and Harvard University Press,
1960), p. 129. Also see, for example, Lesley Reader and Lucy Ridout, The rough guide to Bali and
Lombok (4th ed., London: Rough Guides, 2002), pp. 542-543.
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understand this distinction, and I still find it slightly exotic to see a Copenhagen department
store announce their extended Christmas hours as "extra opening hours in week 51."14 
These examples points up how the conventional partition of a domain depends on
rules of focusing and attending, which tell us which significant differences between
instantiations we should pay attention to.15 Rules of attending suggest which boundaries
might be a focus of partitioning, which attributes of contrast set members might be reflected
iconically in their labels, and, conversely, which differences between instantiations are
insignificant matters of allovariation. 
Sociomental variation from country to country and culture to culture is not only
inevitable but also exciting. Nevertheless, there are cases in which designers can and should
work against it. A fine example involves the international standardization of telephone
numbering. In European countries, you can always tell from the telephone number whether
it is a land line or a mobile phone. This is quite important, since calls to mobile numbers in
Europe cost considerably more.16 Unfortunately, there is, as of 2005, no consistency to these
labeling regularities. In Italy cellphones begin with 3, and landlines with 0; in France,
cellphones begin with 06, and landlines with 01 through 05. In Iceland, numbers which start
with 4 and 5 are land lines (which cost 1-2 crowns per minute to call from another land line)
while numbers that start with 6 and 8 are cell phone numbers (10-20 crowns per minute),
except for numbers that start with 800, which are free. (Then of course there are numbers
that start with 900, which are very expensive.) To make matters worse, inter-network access
charges are also becoming more common in European telephony, and unfortunately, there
are no certain rules for figuring out which network a given number belongs to, because
people are allowed to keep their old number when they change companies.
14 "Ekstra åbningstider i uge 51." Sign observed on the door of Magasin du Nord, Copenhagen,
December 2004.
15 On rules of focusing and attending see Zerubavel, Social mindscapes, chapter 3 (pp. 35-52).
16 To make phone calls in Europe in an informed way, Americans first have to familiarize themselves
with the idea that the phone numbering system can encode whether the telephone is a fixed or mobile
phone. The American numbering system does not make this distinction. In America (with the
exception of certain special numbers beginning for example with 800 or 900) the type of phone being
called has no effect on the per minute cost to the caller, and the extra cost of calls to mobile numbers is
borne by the called party.
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The result is a breakdown of the coordinative compact which used to exist between
telephone companies and users, allowing users to rely on their expectations of the
relationship between the form of the numbers they dial and the cost of the resulting phone
call. After all, in the old days of monopoly telephone service in America, a complete rate table
was printed in the back of the phone book. Recently, this increasingly opaque linkage has
captured the attention of European regulators and consumer groups; some have called for
stricter requirements that users be informed of the per-minute cost of each call.17 From a
historical and sociological point of view, it would be interesting to know how such a situation
developed. Why was this cognitive and semiotic impact of the changes in the telephone
industry initially overlooked? Did those responsible for numbering management have any
incentive to design meaningful and transparent labeling systems which newcomers to a
culture could learn to understand?
In focusing on the role of contrast sets in a stranger's encounter with a new culture, I
do not want to give the impression that they are the most important aspect of cross-cultural
adaptation. Learning how a new environment works is not just a semiotic task.18 It involves
much more than the learning of new ways to partition and label a domain. Looked at in the
broadest way, the stranger can lack an understanding of almost any social fact, including
almost anything about the way a new environment works that is not universally and naturally
determined, almost anything that requires being party to the type of coordinative
understandings discussed in chapter 5, and almost anything that requires sharing the
sociomental, intersubjective world of the locals. For example, they may not understand local
rules for tipping, greeting customs, politeness, edibility, or attention; they may not be
familiar with words, gestures, rites of passage, scripts, images, discourses, and frames of
reference; and they may not be able to distinguish between the sacred and the profane, the
17 International Telecommunications Users Group, "Beyond national numbering: an issues paper"
(2002), http://www.intug.net/views/beyond_national_numbering.html (March 2005).
18 See Jorge Frascara, User-centred graphic design: mass communications and social change
(London: Taylor and Francis, 1997), p. 37, on "the insufficiency of semiotics."
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clean and the unclean, the forbidden and the prohibited, the marked and the unmarked, the
default and the exceptional, or the private and the public.
Contrast sets do, however, occupy a prominent place in this larger landscape of cross-
cultural adaptation. For example, take the case of a passenger at a train station, which Paul
Arthur and Romedi Passini considered in detail in their book on wayfinding.19 The
passenger's goal is to get on the right train and arrive at their destination. This might include
such crucial steps as learning that the train leaves from platform 4a; figuring out which of
several series of numbered signs labels the platforms; and understanding the taxonomic
structure of the platform numbering system (4a and 4b are separate platforms in some
stations, but different ends of the same platform in others). Of course, other problems have
nothing to do with contrast sets, such as finding the elevator, knowing whether you need a
platform ticket, knowing how far in advance you need to be at the station, or trying to
understand the announcements on the public address system.
7.3 Resocialization, or not
"You know," I offered helpfully, "it would be really nice if there were some signs in English
pointing out some of the more interesting places. That way people could find them and make
their visit more interesting. Or maybe just some highway markers?"
"Signs?" said one of the optimistic pessimists. "We already have tourism signs, don't we?"
"Well, some," I conceded, "but they're in Estonian and Russian."
"But if we have signs," my dissenter continued, "that means tourists will find their own way
around the island."
Leave it to an Estonian to take all the practicality out of logic. "Well, yeah, that's the idea."
"But what about us guides?" said another woman. "We need work or we'll all starve!"
"We can't just let people go around and look at things!" said a horrified older man.
"Ah, signs are expensive and no one will look at them anyway," grumbled a true
pessimist.20
Sometimes, a cognitive designer has the ability to help — or hinder — a stranger from
learning to master the contrast sets that are in use in a new thought community. 
Consider the travel guidebook: it is a small, relatively inexpensive, portable
information tool which is accessible almost at will and can contain a lot of information. An
important part of any guidebook is usually a practical-information section which explains the
19 Paul Arthur and Romedi Passini, Wayfinding: people, signs, and architecture (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1992), pp. 3-4.
20 Douglas Wells, In search of the elusive Peace Corps moment: destination Estonia (Xlibris, 2001), pp.
141-142.
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cognitive world of the country it covers. This section is usually distinct from the sections of a
guidebook which describe particular places (towns, cities, national parks, etc.) and review
restaurants, hotels, and sightseeing in each place.
Among the contrast sets that the introductory section of a guidebook usually explains
are the telephone numbering system, time reckoning and temporal rhythms, the writing
system and other conventional symbols, standard measures for length, volume, weight,
temperature, and money, and naming, numbering, and addressing systems. For example, one
major series of guidebooks to Europe for Americans includes examples of how European
handwritten 1s, 4s, and 7s differ from American styles, and explains that Europeans refer to
Christmas 2003 as 25/12/03 and use "first floor" to refer to what Americans think of as the
second floor.21 Naturally, these sections also discuss many other coordinative norms, such as
what type of electrical plug one will need, what side of the road traffic drives on, and other
general aspects of cross-cultural adaptation.
Buying a guidebook is one of the many ways in which
strangers are willing to pay money to various "cognitive
intermediaries" for help in learning the contrast sets of an
unfamiliar culture.22 They thereby contract out to the world
for the competence they do not possess in their heads. They
willingly pay for language classes, tour guides, maps, guidebooks, brochures, or taxis from
the airport into town, just as a ship arriving in an unfamiliar harbor may pay (and even be
required) to take a local pilot on board. In my job as a tour guide, I give language lessons,
pass out coin strips (illustrated in Image 7.7), and explain metric measurements and the 24-
hour clock in order to introduce my American customers to the everyday European cognitive
world. There is also a class of specialized guidebooks (one series is called Culture Shock)
which do not cover restaurants and hotels, and focus on explaining the cultural peculiarities
21 See, for example, Rick Steves, Rick Steves' Italy 2003 (Emeryville, Ca.: Avalon Travel, 2002), p. 458.
22 Urry touches on this theme briefly in The tourist gaze, pp. 7-8.
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of a place, its contrast sets among them.23 There is also an entire business in converters —
tools which encapsulate within themselves the knowledge that takes us from one contrast set
to another. Examples of converters are dictionaries, phrasebooks, translators/interpreters,
the Windows Alt-Shift keyboard-map toggle button, currency conversion calculators, file
format converters, thermometers or yardsticks in both metric and standard, dual video
format recorders and playback devices, and reducing and enlarging functions on
photocopiers (or anything else designed to cope with multiple standard paper sizes).
These services can also sometimes be available for free. Signs, notices, information
boards, building directories, seating plans, and telephone books are all cases in which
someone else has gone to the trouble of anticipating strangers' need to know about a
partitioning or labeling system. One can usually ask friends, relatives, passersby, local
proprietors, the tourist information office, ushers (who have a good command of the way
seats in a theater are labeled), or salespeople (who are supposed to know the layout of a store
and the way, for example, clothing sizes work) for help.
Despite all of this knowledge in the world, many people do not bother to resocialize
themselves to a new community, but rather proceed with the faulty understanding of it that
they already have, thus "satisficing" rather than striving for the best possible sense of their
environment. This might mean not looking in the guidebook, not asking the tour guide or the
usher for extra help, not looking up that funny word in the dictionary, or not converting the
foreign currency to one that you know. These are all examples of "ignoring perfect knowledge
in the world for imperfect knowledge in the head."24 The reason is that very often we do not
23 A noteworthy example of this genre, and one especially attentive to contrast sets, is The Russian's
World, by Genevra Gerhart, first published in 1974. This book explains the most mundane features of
everyday Soviet life in uncommonly rich detail. Among the contrast sets and labels described and
illustrated in the 1974 edition are Russian street addresses, school class levels, school grading,
transliteration systems, road signs, chess notation, the Cyrillic alphabet, numeral orthography,
standards of measure, standards of time, and coinage. The book also discusses Russian naming, body
parts, tooth names, holidays, kinship terms, number names, and the use of the abacus. Genevra
Gerhart, The Russian's world: life and language (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974; 3rd
ed., Bloomington, Indiana: Slavica, 2001).
24 This phrase comes from the title of Wayne D. Gray and W.-t. Fu, "Ignoring perfect knowledge in-the-
world for imperfect knowledge in-the-head: Implications of rational analysis for interface design," CHI
Letters 3 (2001): 112-119.
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find it worth the investment and bother to gain a comprehensive or even partially
comprehensive knowledge of a new contrast set, and we just take the risk that we will be able
to muddle through with what we know already. This is why the resocializer of last resort is
learning the hard way, from our mistakes.
For many travelers, part of the fun is actually learning to accommodate to new
coordinative norms, but other strangers prefer to pay extra for a protected experience (such
as a guided tour or an international chain hotel) in which they are shielded from having to
learn how the telephone numbering or the local currency works. In the most extreme cases
tourists visit another country without ever leaving their own sociomental "neighborhood."
Conrad Hilton, founder of the hotel chain that bears his name, boasted that "each of our
hotels is a little America,"25 and at the Istanbul Hilton, Daniel Boorstin explains how guests
could effectively commute between their home country and the "real Turkey" by walking out
the front door.26 European tour guides working with American groups feel that they are
giving good service when they go to the trouble of translating heights, weights, and distances
into American terms, and not long ago I saw an advertisement in the New York Times by
Perillo Tours, an American tour operator, trumpeting that they were now including bacon
and eggs at all hotel breakfasts in Italy (a country where the natives are known for not
making much of their morning meal). 
There is, in fact, an entire class of people whose interest it is in that strangers not be
able to adapt to the cognitive coordination norms of an unfamiliar community. In the quote
at the beginning of the section, a local tour guide resists the provision of better tourist
information because it would reduce the need for her services. Not only tour guides but
touts, merchants in the marketplace, and even disreputable guidebooks all take advantage of
the stranger's lack of local knowledge to make money. For example, it is quite easy simply not
to correct an American at the Prague airport who misreads the price of a 190-crown
telephone card as 790 crowns; the American is liable to read European handwritten 1s as 7s,
25 Quoted in Daniel J. Boorstin, The image: a guide to pseudo-events in America (Revised edition, New
York: Atheneum, 1987), p. 98.
26 Boorstin, The image, pp. 97-99.
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and does not have their sense of value in Czech crowns calibrated sufficiently well to see that
790 crowns is a fairly high price for a telephone card. Tour guides, by misinforming their
clients about local price levels, can increase the likelihood of those clients making a purchase
from which the guide receives a commission. Touts can steer visitors to accommodations
that they might not have chosen given more complete knowledge of local geography or
prevailing costs. Typically, those practicing such deceptions are all smiles and make the
stranger feel as if they have succeeded in bridging the communication gap with the "locals,"
when in fact the tout knows more about the stranger's perspective than the stranger knows
about the tout's, and uses that difference to advantage. In a somewhat similar fashion, one
can contend that the major telephone companies in Europe (despite their feel-good
advertising campaigns) actually have a somewhat sinister interest in not harmonizing the
numbering for different types of phone services, because they profit if it is next to impossible
for users to minimize their expenditures.
My position is that those who have any design influence over such exploitative
knowledge differentials should try to eliminate them, even at the risk of having their tires
slashed by those whose financial interests this threatens. Over time, and over an entire
community, are the social and economic benefits of transparency and honesty, and of giving
strangers the opportunity to learn local norms, not far greater than the short-term spoils
from keeping them in the dark? The general acceptance of norms of behavior for stranger-
local interactions increases visitors' sense of cognitive tranquility and thus the likelihood that
they will repeat, or recommend, a given interaction. For example, the public provision of
resocialization information in tourist destinations, by means of signposting, informational
leaflets, and tourist offices, aims at helping strangers bridge the knowledge gap that touts
rely on. Although more often directed towards preventing physical rather than cognitive
assaults, certain communities maintain a special enforcement service, often referred to as the
tourist police, to make sure that strangers are not taken advantage of. Jamaica and Egypt are
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two countries which have such brigades.27 Similarly, most countries have some means of
ensuring that measuring devices used in the retail trade are properly calibrated. The
difficulty with these approaches is, of course, that the enforcers are not always around when
there is something to enforce.
However, in some cases, entire communities — not just individual touts —
deliberately try to preserve the distinction between the thought community of the stranger
and the thought community of a local, making it hard for visitors to penetrate through the
tourist "front" to the reality backstage.28 The Intourist guide in pre-1991 Russia who
energetically supervised the focus of her charges' attention, the red-striped Freedom Trail in
Boston or the signposted tourist "magistral" in downtown Ljubljana that visitors are
encouraged to follow, the tourist map which shows only selected parts of a town,29 or the
interior wayfinding signage that hides staff areas or other "backstage" elements of an
building are all examples of efforts to control the amount of knowledge and command over
an environment that visitors will acquire. Similarly, where dual-pricing standards exist (for
example, at museums in China and national parks in Costa Rica, which cost more for
foreigners than for locals), often only the higher price is posted; the lower price is available
only to those who are "in the know." 
When such barrier-building involves contrast sets, the goal is to deliberately make
their standardized aspects difficult to learn. For those trying to bring this about, all the
advice I give on the design of contrast sets may simply be turned inside out. Thus, when
designing a code or cipher, one wants to obscure the relationship between label and referent
so that only those with specific training can reconstruct it. Deliberately avoiding any
27 On Jamaica see "Jamaica takes steps to protect tourists," New York Times, 21 March 1999, travel
section, p. 3; on Egypt, see for example Harvard Student Agencies, Inc., Let's Go: Europe 1987 (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), p. 155.
28 On the general phenomenon of designing impenetrability see Norman, The design of everyday
things, pp. 203-206 ("Deliberately making things difficult"). On backstage and frontstage in tourism
see Dean MacCannell, The tourist: a new theory of the leisure class (New edition, Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1999 [1979]), chapter 5 ("Staged authenticity").
29 Rob Shields, "Political tourism: mapping memory and the future at Québec City," in Mapping
tourism, edited by Stephen P. Hanna and Vincent J. Del Casino Jr., pp. 1-27 (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 2003), p. 8.
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predictable mapping between source and target sets makes it more difficult to guess the
meaning of a set of labels by removing a user's "navigational ability" (see section 4.1) within
the set. One may also try to obscure category boundaries in a message — for example, by
running all the words of a sentence together without spaces. In certain steganographic
messages, such as the cipher in the Sherlock Holmes story "The Adventure of the Dancing
Men," the message creator hopes that no one but the intended recipient of the message will
know that its elements form a consciously designed contrast set, and thus that they will never
even get to the point of trying to decipher the way the the set labels its referents.
The designer can increase the likelihood that visitors will be able to understand
messages that involve contrast sets, and thus to participate in the locals' cognitive world, by
means of several different techniques. The most obvious strategy is simply to translate
messages which use a purely "local" contrast set into ones that use contrast sets that will be
understood by the stranger. Consider, for example, multilingual tourist brochures and
wayfinding signposts, cookbooks which give measurements in both metric and standard, and
French Internet cafes which set aside a section for users who prefer the QWERTY keyboard
layout. The drawback of this strategy is that works only if the designer understands the
cognitive world of the stranger. 
Other strategies try to use relatively more universal
understandings which require very little resocialization on the part
of the stranger. Often this means the effective creation of a
simplified "lingua franca" which is more likely to be understood
than purely local idioms. For example, linguistic strangers can
often understand an image even if they do not understand the text,
and in the twentieth century there has been a conscious effort to
define worldwide, iconic, pictorial standards for commonly
encountered messages. Although users must learn the conventional meaning of the pictures
just as they must learn to read text, in the case of images the relationship between form and
meaning is more motivated and easier to guess, as Image 7.8 shows. Conveying the message
Image 7.8 (042)
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"WALK" or "DON'T WALK" to a multicultural audience in pictures is also likely to be more
effective than doing so in text. Similarly, a common strategy in Japanese guidebooks is to
show pictures of destinations, not just text descriptions and labels like the street address.
This relieves Japanese travelers of the necessity of matching their location to their goal by
means of names and labels that use unfamiliar foreign writing systems, using instead a
cognitively more fundamental strategy where the actual "view" at one's location can be
matched to the view shown in the guidebook.
Labeling a set with contrasting colors (see further section 3.2) is another strategy
which works well for a stranger who does not command local alphanumeric symbols. As long
as they have normal color vision, someone who cannot read can still perceive and remember
the distinction between one public transport line and another if color is the bearer of the
semantic contrast. Indeed, this is one of the most common labeling devices for subways and
suburban trains (in, for example, New York, Moscow, London, Paris, Boston, Rome, and
Copenhagen). It is of course common (and desirable) to supplement color tagging with letter
tags (Rome, Copenhagen, New York), numbers (Paris, New York), or different names to each
line (Moscow, London), which allows users a choice of whichever labeling method is most
convenient. But the salience of color as a tagging system is perhaps evident in the way many
outsiders tend to refer to the New York subway lines by color, inviting correction from New
Yorkers who know that the system's letter and number tags actually reflect the crucial
distinctions between train destinations that a user needs to know.
Reducing the level of precision used in the formation of a contrast set can increase a
stranger's sense of cognitive tranquility by not forcing them to take account of distinctions
that they are not used to. Thus Icelandair's in-flight magazine simplifies the Icelandic writing
system by transcribing the letters þ and ð as th and d respectively, making the text less
jarring and more accessible for readers not familiar with Icelandic culture's standard focal
points of graphic form. Many guidebooks also choose not to bother including diacritical
marks in their rendering of foreign placenames and other proper nouns. In the Roman-script
world, the basic set of twenty-six letters running from A through Z constitutes a sort of lingua
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franca, whereas letters like Æ, Ð, Ħ, Ł, Ñ, and Ų reside in a second tier of specialized focal
points. Attempts to avoid misunderstanding by resorting to such a least common
denominator have the unfortunate side effect of reducing national pride. The very same
things that form your national identity may be hard to maintain in an international forum.
Sometimes strangers cannot grasp the
meaning of a set of strange symbols, but can
perceive the contrast between them. In such cases
designers can content themselves with having
made the contrast between members of a label set
clear, even if their referents remain obscure to
those who do not know the meaning of the labels.
Thus, when foreigners who go to the back of a restaurant in Estonia looking for the restroom
find two doors labeled with triangles, one pointing upward and the other downward (as in
Image 7.9), they may not be able to figure out which triangle means "men" and which means
"women." But, because it is not their first time in a restaurant, they can be pretty sure that
the binary topology of the distinction between the triangles corresponds to the binary
topology of the distinction between the sexes. If a person of the opposite sex comes out of
one door, the stranger can be fairly sure that they should go in the other. Although triangles
are the traditional labels for bathroom doors in Estonia, any other pair of definitely
contrasting symbols would work as well. (Note that the symbols in Image 7.9 are exceptional
in including a circle above the triangle; most Estonian bathroom doors are marked with
triangles only.) Similarly, many traffic lights now come with standardized "chirping" signals
to tell blind people when they can use the crosswalk. I have never paid enough attention to





8.1 Form, not content
Those who chronicle individual contrast sets rarely see their stories as instances of a
widespread social form. Not long ago, for example, I read an article in the newspaper called
"Hispanics Resist Racial Grouping by Census." It related the difficulties faced by many
United States residents of Latin American descent in fitting themselves into typical racial
categories, and the debates within the United States Census Bureau about whether to
eliminate the "some other race" category from their forms. The article never mentioned any
of the theoretical concepts developed by scholars of categorization — nor did it even suggest
that the question of where Hispanics fit in American racial categorizations might be
something that could be evaluated on anything other than its own particular terms!1
Although problems of contrast set creation surround us, it is commonplace to treat each one
as a separate issue. But we might gain something by encouraging people to see such
individual issues in the context of a larger social form.
The same problem occurs when the story involved is that of the status of contrast sets
rather than their internal makeup. Those who chronicle the standardization of a single
contrast set often miss interesting analogies and generalizations that they could make if they
saw their own case as just one instance of a social form or pattern. Those who chronicle the
history of a single standards problem may see the formal links between different solutions,
but miss the formal links between "their" standards problem and others.
For example, many scholars of writing systems have been able to see the common
thread in the variety of different human solutions to the problem of how to transmit verbal
messages. But they have not related the problem of the coordination of writing systems to,
for example, the problem of the coordination of temperature measurement. Specifically,
1 Rachel L. Swarns, "Hispanics resist racial grouping by census," New York Times, 24 October 2004.
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several respected scholars have proposed explicit theories of why it is difficult to change
writing systems without connecting these theories to the issue of why it is difficult to change
other coordinative norms. John DeFrancis came up with his "Law of the First Script," which
predicts that no one who is not passionately committed to writing system reform will be
interested in changing a script which is even minimally adequate, because the costs of change
are so high for something so cognitively fundamental.2 Denise Schmandt-Besserat, observing
that the form of our numerals has changed little since 700 B.C., says that: "Signs and
symbols have a pervasive endurance which makes them withstand time in a unique fashion
… After all, symbols are instituted for the purpose of communication, and any deviation in
their use would create miscommunication and confusion."3 Florian Coulmas, in discussing
the arguments used by opponents of spelling reform, cites "the historical depth of the literary
traditions which may be jeopardized … the value of the written form of the language as a
symbol of national identity; and … the cost of implementation."4 
None of these scholars brought in the general history of convention and
standardization to support these points. None of them used broader concepts such as "social
fact," "appeal to history," or "cognitive commitment." To be fair, it was not part of their
purpose to demonstrate that their conclusions might be generalizable to other standards
problems. But in fact they are. To recognize that is to see commonality in a huge range of
social phenomena which "behave" similarly, and which can be compared to each other in an
interesting and instructive way.
Even those scholars who are shooting for a high degree of abstraction and
generalization have often failed to see that the social form they have isolated has already
been described (often under another name) by another scholar who they simply have never
happened to come into contact with. Thus, for example, linguist J. R. Hurford proposes an
account of the standardization of numerical base, and works through a detailed simulation,
2 John DeFrancis, Nationalism and language reform in China (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1950), pp. 199-200.
3 Denise Schmandt-Besserat, How writing came about (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), p. 82.
4 Florian Coulmas, The Blackwell encyclopedia of writing systems (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 480.
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without any reference to broader theories of institutionalization or the emergence of norms.5
Economist Joshua Epstein developed a computational model of reification in an article
which never mentions the term "reification" or the sociological literature on it.6 Johanna
Drucker has given us an extremely detailed account of the justifications and legitimations
that people have used for their alphabets and writing systems without ever citing Peter
Berger and Thomas Luckmann's writing on the legitimizing of institutions.7 For my part, in
my first year of graduate school I wrote an entire term paper on standards of precision
without citing Grice,8 and I have surely committed similar sins of omission in this book too.
My intent is not to condemn or shame these scholars, but simply to point out how much
work we still have to do to link analytic literature on the same social forms in sociology,
anthropology, psychology, philosophy, linguistics, economics, and geography.
An attention-worthy linguist whose work does make these links is Rudi Keller, who
has related semiotics and language change to theories of convention and
institutionalization.9 Indeed, it is very gratifying to see that a change has come over
linguistics in the past few years. Orthodox, formalist, generative linguists were so concerned
with defining the extent of the innate human linguistic endowment that, when they saw
evidence of social facts or social conventionality in linguistics, they dismissed it as
uninteresting. But newer schools of linguistics find the conventional aspects of
communication worth studying — those that take advantage of the wiggle room within the
constraints of human nature.10 These new traditions, such as cognitive linguistics, have
5 James R. Hurford, Language and number: the emergence of a cognitive system (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1987), pp. 274-301.
6 Joshua Epstein, "Learning to be thoughtless: social norms and individual computation,"
Computational Economics 18 (2001): 9-24.
7 Johanna Drucker, The alphabetic labyrinth (London: Thames & Hudson, 1995).
8 I had even heard of Grice, but the formal similarity between classificatory precision and
conversational quality had not yet occurred to me. Very often, the difficulty is not that one has not
come into contact with another example of the form, but that it is hard to focus one's mind to perceive
formal similarities between disparate examples.
9 See Rudi Keller, On language change: the invisible hand in language (London: Routledge, 1994).
10 See for example Michael Tomasello, "Cognitive linguistics," in A companion to cognitive science,
edited by William Bechtel and George Graham, pp. 477-487 (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 478,
480.
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allowed the study of language to broaden its scope and to reapproach the other social
sciences, finding common ground that many linguists abandoned during the 1960s, 1970s,
and 1980s. (Scholars of convention such as David Lewis and Edna Ullmann-Margalit had, of
course, never stopped finding the conventional aspect of language interesting.)
In order to see each individual story of contrast set design and standardization as an
instance of a social form, one needs to have read a plain-language summary of the elements
of that social form. When I began to research the history of various individual standards and
conventions — both those that are contrast sets and those that are not — I found it very
frustrating that there was no concise summary of the theory of the topic. This book has been
my effort to lay out that theory in a way which can quickly give perspective and context to the
history of any contrast set, and, to some degree, to the history of any kind of cognitive
standard or convention.
Of course, a focus on social forms without reference to their contents can go too far.
Economist Peyton Young's deep concentration on theories of standards change and
institutionalization (rather than the historical facts of the particular cases he cited) perhaps
drew his critical eye away from a thorough historical review of a crucial piece of evidence for
his theory: the "fact" that Napoleon changed the rule of the road in Europe from keep-left to
keep-right, which appears to be a myth.11 When building a theory that covers many examples,
one must try as hard as possible not to lose sight of the many concrete instances that are
supposed to fit into the theory. Regrettably, the existing theoretical literature on both
categorization and standardization does not always do a good job of this; it is sometimes
incomplete, overly abstract, or hard to connect with the actual historical and practical facts
of each case. This is why I have done my best to stud my exposition with examples which
easily allow the reader to make the link between form and content, and pattern and instance.
11 H. Peyton Young, "The economics of convention," Journal of Economic Perspectives 10,2 (1996):
105-122; Individual strategy and social structure: an evolutionary theory of institutions (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 16-17, 98. For more details on the Napoleon story, see Ian
Watson, "The rule of the road, 1919-1986: a case study in standards change," unpublished M.A.
qualifying paper, Department of Sociology, Rutgers University, 1999.
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8.2 Cognitive design
The title of this book is misleading: the book is about contrast set design, not
cognitive design. As someone who has always disapproved of titles which overreach (like,
say, Foucault's The order of things) I have to confess to a great deal of guilt at having titled
this book Cognitive design, and must plead that it was not originally my idea. (I wanted to
call it Set design.) I also plead that, at least, contrast set design is a type of cognitive design.
In the next few paragraphs I want to explain briefly what this wider field of cognitive design
really is.
Some people surely think of "cognition" as something that humans do which is
completely determined by our biological inheritance. In fact, our cognitive life, though
sometimes dictated by natural factors, is sometimes conventional, shared, and social. So
cognition is designable (sometimes, at least). Social groups share mental structures. Groups
of people think in the same way. Sometimes these sociomental patterns are emergent and
unplannable, with little or no traceable origin. But sometimes our patterns of thought were
deliberately designed, and we can often point to specific people who shaped or created those
shared mental structures. We can call these people cognitive designers, and the work that
they do, cognitive design.
For some people, the word "design" calls up visual and tactile images such as chairs,
drinking glasses, doorknobs, homes and buildings, and landscaping. In fact, though, many
design choices, to a greater or a lesser extent, ask the designer to take into account the way
that users think, not just their physical needs. So design is cognitive (sometimes, at least).
Designers need to have realistic expectations of other peoples' mindsets.
Some designers have to consider how users think. Others have to create the terms in
which users will think. One can, in other words, "design with cognition in mind," and one can
also "design how cognition should work." Consider the difference between putting a list in
alphabetical order (because you expect other people to know it) and creating alphabetical
order to begin with. Consider also the difference between knowing that in a properly
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designed font, the point of a capital A should extend a little bit higher than the curve of a
capital O (which has to do with the way that humans perceive shape), and the task of creating
the basic shapes of the alphabet in the first place. Or, the difference between communicating
a single message to someone else, and communicating the terms in which such messages can
be phrased.
Forget, for a moment, the entire idea of contrast sets, labels, mappings, topologies,
and coordinative standardization, and consider all the phenomena and activities in which
cognition and design intersect. It is a very broad topic, probably unmanageably so. Any
communication across time and space can be called a kind of "cognitive design." Whenever
we create information for use at another time, in another place, or by another person, we
structure the ways in which another mind will think. Any time we design a situation which
involves human interaction, and build into that situation a requirement that someone else
must know something (how to read, or what day it is, for example) in order to participate in
the interaction, we are building expectations about other peoples' cognitive world into our
decisions. By deciding which things "one needs to know in order to behave as a functioning
member of one's society,"12 we shape the set of knowledge that people will have an incentive
to acquire.
Many of these design tasks do not involve contrast sets. For example, the interior
design and organization of homes involves both planning and shared understandings (within
a family or between a family and visitors). Why is it, after all, that I know that the cupboard
under the sink is a likely place to find the trash bin in many European and American
homes?13 The user interfaces of computer applications and the Internet have been a
tremendous focus of cognitive design recently, but we must not forget that decades ago, the
production of clock radios, ovens, thermostats, and even such relatively noninteractive
household technologies as garlic presses, deadbolt locks, and shoelaces already depended on
12 Ward Goodenough, quoted in Dorothy Holland and Naomi Quinn, ed., Cultural models in language
and thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 14.
13 There is a humorous description of the process of trying to understand the organization of somebody
else's kitchen in Tony Hawks, Round Ireland with a fridge (London: Ebury Press, 1998), p. 134.
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the ability to create a shared understanding between designer and user of how the thing
works.14 When you press the "close door" button in an elevator, a conventional agreement on
the meaning of your action between you and the designer of the machine is built into the
elevator's circuits. The way a book or document designer chooses to use layout, artwork, and
type styles sends a semiotic message which does not involve a consciously designed contrast
set. An important aspect of our shared mental life is the culturally conventional use of shared
schemas and models, which enumerate the related elements of a typical everyday life
situation — elements whose relation to each other is much more complicated than the simple
X and other Ys model that defines a contrast set.15 
Contrast sets are "things," static phenomena, knowledge of which must be tacitly
shared by many people in order for them to have any benefit. But one could also use the term
"cognitive design" to describe dynamic, sequenced understandings whose purpose is to be
communicated from one mind to another, rather than tacitly coordinated between two minds
acting in concert. Thus organizing your record collection in an order that you, your spouse,
or your customers can figure out later on means designing a static system which many people
can share and use together. But movie makers, writers of detective novels, and designers of
airport signage all must anticipate the passage of another mind through an unfamiliar
environment, and to try to guess what they will be thinking at every turn in the path. These
people, as well as rhetoricians and advertising designers, know how to strategically harness
the power of the series of understandings that their audience will pass through.16 Perhaps
one call this kind of work "cognitive design" too — or would that stretch the term too far?
14 See Donald A. Norman, The design of everyday things (New York: Doubleday, 1990); Willett
Kempton, "Two theories of home heat control," in Cultural models in language and thought, edited by
Dorothy Holland and Naomi Quinn, pp. 222-242 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). On
shoelaces, see Edward Tenner, Our own devices: the past and future of body technology (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), pp. xi-xii.
15 A good introduction to these phenomena is Roy D'Andrade, The development of cognitive
anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); see also Holland and Quinn, Cultural
models in language and thought.
16 For a brief discussion of the issue of designing sequences see Paul Mijksenaar, Visual function: an
introduction to information design (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1997), pp. 41-42.
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Clearly, there is much more to cognitive design than the creation of contrast sets, but
how broadly to define the term while still making it analytically useful is hard to say. Those
looking for a good starting point for reading and thinking about cognitive design beyond the
contrast set may want to look at a fine recent textbook called Interaction design.17
Meanwhile, I hope that my limited study of contrast set design has at least awakened your
awareness of our power as designers to shape the conventions that we carry in common in
our minds. 
8.3 The importance of contrast set design
Contrast sets are important and everpresent. They affect each and every day of our
lives, even if we rarely think of them as a thing in themselves. And it is collaboration
together, conscious or not, on contrast sets and other coordinative standards that makes us a
community and not just a collection of individuals. Standardized contrast sets are, indeed,
metaphors of civilization itself. Think of why Jack Goody titles a book about literacy The
domestication of the savage mind,18 or of how pianos and piano tuning have been used as a
literary metaphor for the extension of European culture to the furthest reaches of the British
Empire,19 or of Robinson Crusoe on his lonely island, notching a stick to keep track of the
days of the week.20
 I have tried, for once, to bring contrast sets out from the shadows behind the curtain
and to let them take a bow in the spotlight. Much of what I have written here only skims the
surface of what could be said about these specific social patterns and specific coordination
problems. Precision, stand-ins, private labels and images, justifications, standards change,
and evangelism are all phenomena about which much more could be written. Most of the
concrete coordination problems referenced in the text and the examples table lack adequate
17 Jennifer Preece, Yvonne Rogers, and Helen Sharp, Interaction design: beyond human-computer
interaction (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2002).
18 Jack Goody, The domestication of the savage mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
19 Daniel Mason, The piano tuner (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002). Consider also the 1993 movie
The Piano.
20 Eviatar Zerubavel, The seven day circle: the history and meaning of the week (New York: Free Press,
1985), pp. 3, 132.
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histories; a few which are in particular need are alphabetical order, paper sizes, Unicode and
computer character sets, bar coding, student grading, and the belief systems surrounding
political borders. Several scholarly lifetimes could be spent amplifying these topics into
articles or books.
As a reader, I hope you have come away from reading this study with the sense that
many contrast sets are under "our" control. We can design them. And we can understand
how they are designed. Of course, "good designers can produce successful artifacts without
explicit knowledge of the psychological theory that would justify why the design succeeds," as
one commentator puts it (noting that there were bridge builders long before there were civil
engineering curricula).21 But we can help educate more good designers by taking the time to
do a good job of explaining the principles of contrast set design, and relating them to more
general insights about social life and cognition, and we can improve peoples' quality of life by
spending time and money on consciously finding the best design solutions for particular
design problems.22
Good contrast set design will not save the world. But it can help people work together
better. We often trivialize contrast sets. But they deserve our attention and careful design. As
Willett Kempton observed, Americans' cognitive models of their home thermostats may
seem insignificant, until one considers the tens of billions of dollars that Americans spend on
home heating every year.23 The measurement of distance, the numbering of years, the
labeling of clothing sizes, the identification of musical pitches, and the representation of
number and sound with numerals and the letters of the alphabet are no less important.
Thinking about how we design the mundane details of everyday life can be far more valuable
than we imagine.
21 Alex Kirlik, "Everyday life environments," in A companion to cognitive science, edited by William
Bechtel and George Graham, pp. 702-712 (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 705-706.
22 For a list of some of the arguments for spending money on good design, see Herbert Spencer and
Linda Reynolds, Directional signing and labeling in libraries and museums: a review of current
theory and practice (London: Readability of Print Research Unit, Royal College of Art, 1977.), pp. 8-9.
23 Kempton, "Two theories of home heat control," pp. 238-239.
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List of Examples
This list tries to enumerate all of the different concrete standards problems that are
used as examples in the text of the book, as well as a few that are not. Its ideal goal, although
this has not always been achievable, is also to direct the reader to at least one good source of
information on the history of each standards problem. The standards problems listed may
involve partitioning (of several kinds), labeling (both with and without mapping principles),
the definition of a standard of precision, the creation of a topology for a contrast set, or the
definition of a starting point, anchor point, or direction. In some cases, a standards problem
involves several of these types of conventional choice together (such as partitioning and
labeling), and in some cases, several standards problems bundle together as consequences of
the same larger task.
Unfortunately, I have not been able to track down a worthwhile reference on the
history of each of the standards problems listed, and in many cases time constraints mean
that I have not fully tried to do so. Indeed, the task of finding one or two ideal, reliable, and
sophisticated reference works on a standards problem is particularly challenging and makes
for time-consuming research work. (Just imagine where you would start if you were looking
for a definitive history of star ratings for movies.) The search can be exciting, but it is simply
not always possible to find scholarly works on standards problem with enough sociological
sophistication to make them truly worth recommending. In some cases, I have listed a less
satisfying reference simply in order to try to give the reader some direction to pursue instead
of giving the impression that no one at all has thought about a particular standards problem.
Not included in this list are those standards problems which are not themselves
solved by the creation of a contrast set, but whose solutions are distributed in the world in a
way which gives rise to a contrast set (out of the collective domain of people or countries who
have each chosen a different solution; see section 5.3). These standards problems include the
rule of the road, television broadcasting encodings, electrical plug shapes and voltage
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standards, computer operating systems, ring-binder hole-punching standards, and railroad
gauge.
BASIC MEASUREMENT STANDARDS PROBLEMS
Unit of length
Type of problem: partitioning (single, repeatable unit span within a linear continuum)
Sample solutions: yard, verst, meter, furlong
Further reading: Alder, Ken. The measure of all things: the seven-year odyssey and hidden error that
transformed the world. New York: Free Press, 2002.
Strasser, Georg. "The toise, the yard and the metre — the struggle for a universal unit of length."
Surveying and mapping 35 (1975): 25-46.
Unit of mass
Type of problem: partitioning (single, repeatable unit span within a linear continuum)
Sample solutions: pound, gram, jin
Further reading:
Unit of temperature
Type of problem: partitioning (single, repeatable unit span within a linear continuum)
Sample solutions: 1 degree Fahrenheit, 1 degree Celsius
Further reading: Middleton, W.E. Knowles. A history of the thermometer and its use in meteorology.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966.
Zero point for temperature scales
Type of problem: anchor point
Sample solutions: absolute zero, freezing point of water
Further reading: Middleton, W.E. Knowles. A history of the thermometer and its use in meteorology.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966.
Direction for temperature scale
Type of problem: polar mapping
Sample solutions: {higher number : lower number} = {hotter : colder} or vice versa
Further reading: Middleton, W.E. Knowles. A history of the thermometer and its use in meteorology.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966.
Size of unit for standard divisions of a circle
Type of problem: partition (single, repeatable unit span defined relative to (i.e., as a fraction of) the
circle, and/or a set of focal points within the circle)
Sample solutions: 360 degrees, four compass directions
Further reading: Hutchins, Edwin. Cognition in the wild. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995.
Labeling system for the scale units or focal points formed out of the circle
Type of problem: labeling
Sample solutions: {1 ... 360}, {N, S, E, W}, {12:00 ... 6:00}, {forward, aft, port, starboard}
Further reading: Hutchins, Edwin. Cognition in the wild. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995.
TEMPORAL STANDARDS PROBLEMS
Creation of temporal units smaller than the day
Type of problem: partition (set of unit spans within a linear continuum which are organized
taxonomically so that smaller units partition larger units integrally)
Sample solutions: 1 hour = 1/24 of a day, 1 minute = 1/60 of an hour, 1 second = 1/60 of a minute
Further reading:
Length of a standard cycle of days
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Type of problem: partition (by lumping, that is, by choosing how many smaller units will combine to
make up a larger unit)
Sample solutions: seven, five, ten, etc.
Further reading: Zerubavel, Eviatar. The seven day circle: the history and meaning of the week. New
York: Free Press, 1985.
Labels for each member of the standard cycle of days
Type of problem: creation of labeling set
Sample solutions: {Monday ... Sunday}, {1...7}, etc.
Further reading: Zerubavel, Eviatar. The seven day circle: the history and meaning of the week. New
York: Free Press, 1985.
Linear topology for the cycle of days
Type of problem: topological (starting point)
Sample solutions: Sunday, Monday
Further reading: Zerubavel, Eviatar. The seven day circle: the history and meaning of the week. New
York: Free Press, 1985.
Deciding which day it is today
Type of problem: labeling (linkage between linear source set and repeating circular target set)
Note: this problem only needs to be solved once, as the linkage is predictable according to a
principle once the linear topology of days and the circular topology of the week are anchored at a
single point.
Sample solutions: any of the seven possible ways of linking the two sets; if the length of the week is x
days, there are x possible solutions
Further reading: Zerubavel, Eviatar. The seven day circle: the history and meaning of the week. New
York: Free Press, 1985. Pp. 130-138.
Dividing the year into months and labeling the months
Type of problem: partition and labeling (multiple units, which may be of different sizes, which jointly
partition the year)
Sample solutions: current or Napoleonic system
Further reading:
Numbering the sequence of years
Type of problem: labeling, anchor point 
Note: the specific issues are which labeling tool to use, how many series to have, and which year
should be the anchor point or year "1"
Sample solutions: systems using the birth of Jesus or Mohammed or the French revolution as a
starting point, or of numbering years in multiple series corresponding to the reign of a king or
other ruler
Further reading:
Choosing a day as the first day of the year
Type of problem: topological (choice of a single anchor point in a circular topology)
Sample solutions: January 1, March 25
Further reading: 
Location of prime meridian, scale unit for longitude measurement, and labeling system
for other meridians
Type of problem: partitioning, labeling, anchor point
Sample solutions: Greenwich meridian as prime meridian, 360 degrees of longitude, sexagesimal
degrees-minutes-seconds system of referring to longitude
Further reading: Zerubavel, Eviatar. "The standardization of time: a sociohistorical perspective."
American Journal of Sociology 88 (1982): 1-23.
Fixing of time zone boundaries
Type of problem: partition
Note: solving this problem also requires defining the identity of each time zone, i.e. the amount of
difference between the time in this zone and the time in other zones.
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Sample solutions: the system we have, or any other reasonable division of the earth's surface into
longitudinal zones
Further reading: Zerubavel, Eviatar. "The standardization of time: a sociohistorical perspective."
American Journal of Sociology 88 (1982): 1-23.
Standard way of referring to a particular day, month, and year
Type of problem: polar mapping for taxonomic levels
Note: successfully coordinating a solution to this problem means that sequences like 01-02-10 are
unambiguous
Sample solutions: 98-12-25, 12-25-98, 25-12-98




Type of problem: partition (multiple focal points within a single octave)
Sample solutions: five-tone, seven-tone, and twelve-tone scales
Further reading:
Tuning or pitch standard for any given musical temperament
Type of problem: this aspect of pitch standardization does not actually involve contrast set creation
although it is used as the input to the creation of a set of standard pitches by means of a standard
scale and temperament. However, the problem is formally similar to the choice of anchor points in
a domain, such as the prime meridian.
Sample solutions: 440 Hz, 439 Hz, 435 Hz, 415 Hz, etc.
Further reading: Lloyd, Llewellyn Southworth. "Standard pitch." In Grove's dictionary of music and
musicians, 6: 788-803. 5th ed, 1954.
Lindley, Mark, Klaus Wachsmann, J. J. K. Rhodes, and W. R. Thomas. "Pitch." In New Grove
Dictionary of Music and Musicians, 20: 779-786. London: Macmillan, 1980.
Haynes, Bruce, and Peter R. Cooke. "Pitch." In New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, edited
by Stanley Sadie, 19: 793-804. 2nd ed. London: Macmillan, 2001.
Labels for each standardized pitch
Type of problem: labeling 
Sample solutions: {A, B flat, B, C …}, musical staff notation, {I, II, III …}, {do, re, mi …}
Further reading: Lloyd, Llewellyn Southworth, and Richard Rastall. "Pitch nomenclature." In New
Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, edited by Stanley Sadie, 19: 804-807. 2nd ed. London:
Macmillan, 2001.
Musical notation (other aspects)
Type of problem: labeling 
Note: there are more standardized contrast sets involved in musical notation than simply labels for
standardized pitches. There are also graphical variables for different lengths of time that either a
pitch or silence is held, as well as symbols (the F-clef or G-clef symbols, for example) which
designate the precise pitches which the lines and intervals of a given musical staff are meant to
represent.
Further reading: Rastall, Richard, et al. "Notation." In New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians,
edited by Stanley Sadie, 18: 73-189. 2nd ed. London: Macmillan, 2001.
Gimm, Martin, et al. "Notation." In Die Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Sachteil, 7: 275-431. 2d
ed. Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1994-2003.
Rastall, Richard. The notation of western music: an introduction. London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1983.
Layout of piano keyboards and other instrument controls
Type of problem: topology for the set of standardized pitches. For pianos, this requires a polar mapping
between {high : low} and {left : right}.
Note: The advantage of layout standardization is to allow those who have learned on one piano to
also play on another. 
Sample solutions: For pianos, the currently standard layout, or the Clutsam or Jankó layouts. 
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Further reading: Tenner, Edward. Our own devices: the past and future of body technology. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003. Pp. 161-186.
PROBLEMS INVOLVING WRITING SYSTEMS
Creation of a set of labels for recording language
Type of problem: partition (creation of multiple focal points) 
Note: These focal points will be used as labels and must be easy to perceive visually
Sample solutions: Roman or Cyrillic alphabet, Korean hangul, Chinese characters, shorthand, Braille,
Morse code
Further reading: Daniels, Peter T., and William Bright, ed. The world's writing systems. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996.
Creation of an orthography, a system for relating symbols to sound
Type of problem: labeling (linkage between symbols (or combinations thereof) and a set of existing
phonetic or phonological entities in a language)
Sample solutions: The different values for the letters of the Roman alphabet in, for example, English,
Italian, and Mandarin pinyin are products of different orthography designs
Further reading: Daniels, Peter T., and William Bright, ed. The world's writing systems. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996.
Creation of a standard system of distinguishing and identifying spoken sounds
independent of any particular language and its orthography
Type of problem: partitioning and labeling
Note: the partitioning takes place in multiple different dimensions and any notation aims at
representing a given sound's position in several different dimensions simultaneously
Sample solutions: the International Phonetic Alphabet
Further reading: MacMahon, Michael K. C. "Phonetic notation." In The world's writing systems,
edited by Peter T. Daniels and William Bright, pp. 821-846. New York: Oxford University Press,
1996.
Sort order for graphic symbols used in a particular language
Type of problem: topological (creation of a linear topology)
Sample solutions: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZÆØÅ (Danish alphabetical order)
Further reading: David Diringer, The alphabet: a key to the history of mankind (3rd ed., London:
Hutchinson, 1968), 1: 169-170.
Davis, Mark, and Ken Whistler. "Unicode collation algorithm." Unicode Technical Standard #10,
version 4.0. http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr10/tr10-11.html (January 2005).
System of transliteration so that the product of one orthography can be represented by
an entirely different set of symbols
Type of problem: labeling
Sample solutions: the various standardized systems for representing Russian or other Cyrillic text in
the Roman alphabet
Further reading: Wellisch, Hans H. The conversion of scripts, its nature, history, and utilization. New
York: Wiley, 1978.
Development of a "base" to use in numerical notation
Type of problem: partition by lumping a certain number of fundamental units
Sample solutions: 2, 10, 12, 16, 20, etc.
Further reading: Ifrah, Georges. The universal history of numbers: from prehistory to the invention of
the computer. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2000.
Chrisomalis, Stephen. "The comparative history of numerical notation." Ph.D. dissertation, McGill
University, 2003.
Creation of a set of symbols for representing number
Type of problem: partition by creating multiple focal points in the domain of potential symbols
Sample solutions: Roman, "Arabic," modern Arabic, Hebrew, Mayan, Chinese, hexadecimal number
signs
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Further reading: Ifrah, Georges. The universal history of numbers: from prehistory to the invention of
the computer. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2000.
Chrisomalis, Stephen. "The comparative history of numerical notation." Ph.D. dissertation, McGill
University, 2003.
Assignment of number symbols to number concepts
Type of problem: labeling
Sample solutions: {zero through nine} = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}
Further reading: Ifrah, Georges. The universal history of numbers: from prehistory to the invention of
the computer. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2000.
Chrisomalis, Stephen. "The comparative history of numerical notation." Ph.D. dissertation, McGill
University, 2003.
Labeling position in a sequence
Type of problem: labeling
Sample solutions: numerals, letters, gānzhī symbols
Further reading: Crump, Thomas. The anthropology of numbers. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990. Pp. 83-87.
Layout of typewriter keyboards
Type of problem: topological (two-dimensional topology for a contrast set of letters, numbers, and
other symbols)
Sample solutions: Sholes and Dvorak layouts as well as standard layouts in many other countries
Further reading: Richard N. Current, The typewriter and the men who made it. Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1954, pp. 55-58.
Datacal Enterprises, "Use international overlays to create a bilingual keyboard,"
http://www.datacal.com/dce/international-overlays.htm (January 2005).
MORE COMPLEX STANDARDS PROBLEMS WITH BOTH A
PARTITIONING AND LABELING ASPECT
Partition of a geographical space into sovereign states
Type of problem: partitioning (by boundary in a two-dimensional domain)
Further reading: Alesina, Alberto, and Enrico Spolaore. The size of nations. Cambridge: MIT Press,
2003.
Creation of standardized labels for geographical areas (e.g. sovereign states)
Type of problem: labeling
Sample solutions: ISO 3166, American state abbreviations, Italian province abbreviations
Further reading:
Creation of a set of racial or ethnic categories for classifying people, and labeling those
categories
Type of problem: Partitioning (in a very large collective domain) and labeling
Sample solutions: Racial and ethnic classification systems used in the United States, the Soviet Union,
South Africa, and other societies which place a high premium on such categorization
Further reading: 
Promotion of standard written or spoken languages
Note: this is a marginal case, as the contrast set of standard languages cannot be designed in its
entirety and it is emergent
Type of problem: Partitioning (mostly by focal point in a multidimensional domain although one often
thought of in two dimensions)
Sample solutions: one written standard for Scandinavia or three
Further reading: 
Partition of a geographical space into voting districts
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Type of problem: partitioning (by boundary in a two-dimensional domain, but may also be thought of
as grouping entities in a collective domain)
Further reading: Monmonier, Mark. Bushmanders & bullwinkles: how politicians manipulate
electronic maps and census data to win elections. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
Creation of telephone code areas
Type of problem: partitioning (by boundary in a two-dimensional domain, but may also be thought of
as grouping entities in a collective domain)
Further reading: Bahat, Roy. "Your call cannot be completed as dialed: big cities, small changes, and
the unexpected politics of area code reform." A.B. thesis, Harvard University, 1998.
Labeling of telephone code areas
Type of problem: labeling
Sample solutions: 1=USA, 7=Russia, 86=China (country codes); 212=New York, 312=Chicago (city or
area codes)
Further reading: Bahat, Roy. "Your call cannot be completed as dialed: big cities, small changes, and
the unexpected politics of area code reform." A.B. thesis, Harvard University, 1998.
Creation of postal zones and a labeling system for them
Type of problem: partitioning and labeling
Sample solutions: American "zip code" system, Canadian or British postal codes
Further reading: Conrad, R. "Designing postal codes for public use." Ergonomics 10 (1967): 233-238.
Choice of a set of entities with which to refer to the different parts of a city
Type of problem: partitioning
Sample solutions: streets (European style), blocks (Japanese style), wards (Venetian style)
Further reading:
Identifying streets
Type of problem: labeling
Further reading: Tarpley, Fred. "Street names as signposts of world cultures." In Namenforschung: ein
internationales Handbuch zur Onomastik, edited by Ernst Eichler et al., pp. 1481-1499. Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter, 1995-1996.
Dividing a parking lot into sections and labeling the sections and the spaces within them
Type of problem: partitioning and labeling
Further reading: 
Identifying and classifying books
Type of problem: partitioning and labeling
Sample solutions: Dewey, Library of Congress, and idiosyncratic classification systems, along with
devices such as Cutter numbers to give each book a unique label; the ISBN system of labeling
published books
Further reading:
Creation of a set of symbols to serve as proofreading marks, and assignment of those
symbols to particular proofreading messages
Type of problem: partitioning (creation of multiple focal points in the domain of graphic symbols);
labeling and assigning those to proofreading concepts
Sample solutions: various systems in current use
Further reading: Aicher, Otl, and Martin Krampen. Zeichensysteme der visuellen Kommunikation:
Handbuch für Designer, Architekten, Planer, Organisatoren. Stuttgart: Alexander Koch, 1977. P.
21.
Creation of contrast sets used in games
Type of problem: partitioning, labeling
Sample solutions: Contrast sets used in Monopoly, hopscotch, card games, checkers, spectator sports




A set of standard clothing sizes
Type of problem: partitioning, labeling (creation and labeling of optimally precise multiple focal points
within each apparel domain (shoes, shirts, etc.) and a way of labeling them)
Sample solutions: the British, American, and European shoe sizing systems
Further reading: Ashdown, Susan, and Laura Cowie. "Sizing systems in the apparel industry."
http://www.human.cornell.edu/txa/faculty/SizingSystems (November 2003).
A set of standard paper sizes
Type of problem: partitioning, labeling (creation and labeling of multiple focal points)
Note: fixed sizes are essential so that xerox copies, folders, mail slots, notebooks, and paper all fit
with one another, and the different sizes also can take on a symbolic identity (e.g. "legal size")
Sample solutions: ISO 216 metric system (A4, etc.); U.S. system (8½ by 11, etc.)
Further reading: Kuhn, Markus. "International standard paper sizes."
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/iso-paper.html (November 2003).
A set of monetary units and a set of standard denominations for coins and bills
Type of problem: partition
Note: this problem involves the creation of a basic unit; the creation of multiple focal points within
a linear domain based on it; and a lower limit of monetary precision is also part of the solution to
the problem, so that users of the currency can avoid arguments about whether small amounts
matter.
Sample solutions: basic units such as one euro or one cent; standard multiples of 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, and 50
cents and 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, and 500 euros, or 45 and 90 Burmese kyats under Ne Win,
or pre-decimal British system; convention of rounding to the nearest 5 euro cents in Finland
Further reading:
Measuring student performance
Type of problem: partitioning, labeling
Sample solutions: A-F, 1-10, 0-100, 1-5, etc.
Further reading: Durm, Mark W. "An A is not an A is not an A: A history of grading." Educational
Forum 57 (1993): 294–297.
Measuring wind strength
Type of problem: partitioning, labeling
Sample solutions: Beaufort scale, meters per second, knots
Further reading: Huler, Scott. Defining the wind: the Beaufort scales, and how a nineteenth-century
admiral turned science into poetry. New York: Crown, 2004.
Creation of altitude categories for relief maps, class breaks for choropleth maps, or any
other series of discrete steps within a continuum of measurement which aids in the
display of information
Type of problem: partitioning (usually by boundary) and labeling
Sample solutions: Varying precision and number of breaks and the varying labels that can be assigned
to each resulting category
Further reading: Imhof, Eduard. Cartographic relief presentation. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1982
[1965]. Pp. 113-126 (partitioning), 295-324 (labeling).
Monmonier, Mark. How to lie with maps. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
Monmonier, Mark. Maps, distortion, and meaning. (Resource Paper 75-4.) Washington: Association
of American Geographers, 1977. 
Creation of Likert scales
Type of problem: partitioning (by creating a limited number of focal points in a linear domain) and
labeling
Sample solutions: {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} = {strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree}
Further reading: 
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Measuring and identifying the quality of movies, hotels, restaurants, or other consumer
products
Type of problem: partitioning (by creating a scale) and labeling
Sample solutions: star systems with various degrees of precision, Consumer Reports product labeling
system
Further reading: 
Deciding which points in the radio spectrum will be set aside for broadcasting and
labeling those points
Type of problem: Partitioning (by focal point) and labeling
Further reading: 
SIMPLE LABELING PROBLEMS
Creation of standardized labels for stations, airports, or other points within a transport
system
Type of problem: labeling
Sample solutions: IATA airport coding system
Further reading: International Air Transport Association. "IATA coding systems."
http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/coding (January 2005).
English, Dave. "Airport ABCs: an explanation of airport identifier codes." Air Line Pilot, December
1994. Available at http://www.skygod.com/asstd/abc.html (January 2005).
For a free-access database of the codes, see "Mapping.com's List Of Worldwide Airport Codes,"
http://www.mapping.com/airportcodes.html (January 2005).
Identifying houses
Type of problem: labeling
Further reading: Pronteau, Jeanne. Les numérotages des maisons de Paris du XVe siècle à nos jours.
Paris: Ville de Paris, Commission des Travaux Historiques, 1966.
Tantner, Anton. "Galerie der Hausnummern."
http://homepage.univie.ac.at/anton.tantner/hausnummern/index.html (January 2005).
Identifying transport routes
Type of problem: labeling
Sample solutions: colors, numerals, letters, names
Further reading: 
Identifying people
Type of problem: labeling
Sample solutions: American Social Security numbers; numbers for specific groups such as students,
sports players, participants in a foot race
Further reading: Clarke, Roger. "Human identification in information systems: management
challenges and public policy issues." Information Technology & People 7,4 (December 1994): 6-37.
Available at http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/HumanID.html (March 2004).
Identifying retail products
Type of problem: labeling
Sample solutions: UCC/EAN numbers and bar codes
Further reading:
Identifying carbon copies of a form
Type of problem: labeling
Sample solutions: white is merchant's copy, yellow is customer's copy
Further reading:
Notation for the events in games such as chess or baseball
Type of problem: labeling
Sample solutions: Any of the various chess notations or baseball scoring systems in use
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Further reading: Dickson, Paul. The joy of keeping score: how scoring the game has influenced and
enhanced the history of baseball. New York: Walker, 1996.
Nametags for electrical wiring
Type of problem: labeling
Sample solutions: {red, black} in America, {blue, brown, yellow-green} in Europe
Further reading: 
Identifying the floors of buildings
Type of problem: labeling (by principle) and topological (choice of direction)
Sample solutions: letters, numbers, {lower number : higher number} = {down : up}
Further reading: Arthur, Paul, and Romedi Passini. Wayfinding: people, signs, and architecture. New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1992. Pp. 193-195.
Spencer, Herbert, and Linda Reynolds. Directional signing and labeling in libraries and museums: a
review of current theory and practice. London: Readability of Print Research Unit, Royal College
of Art, 1977. Pp. 22-23.
Identifying rooms in buildings
Type of problem: labeling
Sample solutions: The solution may use different labeling tools and may or may not involve mapping
and a taxonomic hierarchy
Further reading: Arthur, Paul, and Romedi Passini. Wayfinding: people, signs, and architecture. New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1992. Pp. 195-197.
Graphical variables in general
Type of problem: labeling
Sample solutions: labels for categories of town size, quality labels for consumer products
Further reading: Bertin, Jacques. Semiology of graphics. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1983 [1968].
Identifying the parts of books and documents, such as pages, chapters, and sections
Type of problem: labeling
Sample solutions: Arabic numerals, Roman numerals, taxonomically organized (e.g. 1.1) or not
Further reading: Nash, Walter. Designs in prose: a study of compositional problems and methods.
London: Longman, 1980.
Waller, Robert. "Numbering systems in text." In The psychology of written communication: selected
readings, edited by James Hartley, pp. 145-153. London: Kogan Page, 1980.
Identifying footnotes or endnotes in a book
Type of problem: labeling
Note: in the case of endnotes, the communication of the note's context or place in a taxonomic
hierarchy (i.e., the chapter or page number of the referring sentence) is also important.
Sample solutions: {1, 2, 3 ...}, {*, †, ‡, §}, etc.
Further reading:
PURELY TOPOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
Arrangement of a stick shift
Type of problem: topological (creation of a two-dimensional topology for a contrast set with a basically
linear topology)
Sample solutions: the solutions chosen by different car manufacturers
Further reading:
Addressing of envelopes
Type of problem: topological (polar mapping between taxonomy levels and the set {first : last})
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2.1 001 Author's photograph, Reykjavík, December 2003.
2.2 027 Author's drawing.
2.3 050 Author's photograph, Shizuoka, Japan, October 1999.
2.4 076 Photograph by Loren Everly, Oahu, Hawaii, 1999. Used by permission.
2.5 054 Author's photograph, Reykjavík, 2002.
2.6 077 Author's photograph, Berlin, 2002.
2.7 008 Author's drawing.
2.8 060 Hubert B. Herring, "Mind over muscle," New York Times, 19 November 1995,
section 4, page 2. Used by permission.
2.9 049 Hugendubel bookstore bag, Berlin, Germany, 2002. (*)
2.10 017 Mark Monmonier, Maps, distortion, and meaning (Washington: Association of
American Geographers, 1977), p. 26. Used by permission.
2.11 007 John Laver, Principles of phonetics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994), p. 75. (*)
2.12 006 Beat Glauser, The Scottish-English linguistic border: lexical aspects (Bern:
Francke Verlag, 1974), p. 134. (*)
2.13 040 Author's drawing.
2.14 075 Diagrams drawn by a former classmate of the author, 2004.
3.1 029 Photograph by Brent Hurd, Reykjavík, 24 October 2003. Used by permission.
3.2 030 Advertisement in Morgunblaðið (Reykjavík), 18 December 2002. (*)
3.3 063 Product code key for rolls used in the Hagkaup supermarket chain in Iceland,
March 2004.
3.4 069 Author's photograph, 2004.
3.5 019 "Køreplan fra 28. maj 1989" (Schedule starting 28 May 1989), S-Tog,
Copenhagen, Denmark. (*)
3.6 031 Product label from IKEA, Elizabeth, New Jersey, U.S.A., late 1990s.
3.7 032 Kronen Zeitung (Vienna), 26 October 2002, p. 13. (*)
3.8 055 Photograph by Gail Groth, Venice, Italy, circa 2000. (*)
3.9 022 Kojin ryoko New York '97-98 (Tokyo: Shobunsha, 1997). (*)
3.10 021 Author's photograph, Helsinki, 1992.
3.11 059 From the Sky Mall catalog, www.skymall.com, February 2004. (*)
3.12 034 Author's photo, Stockholm, 1992.
3.13 033 Author's photo, Stockholm, 1992.
3.14 064 http://134.102.55.200/haupt/erika (March 2004). (*)
4.1 079 Author's drawing.
4.2 035 Author's photograph, Sydney, Australia, August 2001.
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4.3 028 Original design by Bureau Mijksenaar, Amsterdam, Netherlands, courtesy of
Martijn Geerdes. Used by permission.
4.4 070 http://half.ebay.com/help/index.cfm?helpsection=ebay_stars.cfm (February
2004). (*)
4.5 066 "Møntreformen og hvordan den udmønter sig." Leaflet issued by Danmarks
Nationalbank, circa 1989. (*)
4.6 062 Ingi Joensen, Ferðakort. Tórshavn: Samferðsluskrivstovan, April 1986. (*)
4.7 013 Charles Virolleaud, Le palais royal d'Ugarit, II: textes en cunéiformes
alphabétiques des archives est, ouest, et centrales (Mission de Ras Shamra,
tome VII, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1957), planche 1. (*)
4.8 012 Author's drawing from data in Charles Virolleaud, Le palais royal d'Ugarit, II:
textes en cunéiformes alphabétiques des archives est, ouest, et centrales
(Mission de Ras Shamra, tome VII, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1957), pp. 199,
and M. O'Connor, "The alphabet as a technology," in The world's writing
systems, edited by Peter T. Daniels and William Bright, pp. 787-794 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 789.
4.9 026 Author's photograph, January 2004.
4.10 002 Author's photograph of the book spines of Lore Marr-Bieger, Nordkroatien (1.
Auflage, Erlangen: Michael Müller Verlag, 2001) and Jonathan Bousfield, The
rough guide to Croatia (London: Rough Guides, 2000).
4.11 071 First page of the 2004 Rochester, N.Y., telephone book. (*)
4.12 072 Author's photograph, Tallinn, Estonia, August 2004.
4.13 048 Author's photograph, Sky Tower, Auckland, N.Z., August 2001.
4.14 009 Author's drawing.
5.1 010 Advertisement in the New York Times, January 3, 1997, p. A15. (*)
5.2 078 The sticker off an apple purchased in the supermarket by the author.
5.3 074 Photograph by Rick Steves, Berlin. Used by permission.
5.4 037 Author's drawing.
6.1 039 Eugene A. Nida, ed., The Book of a Thousand Tongues (London: United Bible
Societies, 1972), p. 302. (*)
6.2 080 Telecom Denmark, "New telephone numbers in Denmark from 16 May 1989."
(*)
6.3 065 "Møntreformen og hvordan den udmønter sig." Leaflet issued by Danmarks
Nationalbank, circa 1989. (*)
6.4 036 Solicitation received in the mail in August 2003.
7.1 016 Marianne Frostig, "Visual perception, integrative functions and academic
learning," Journal of Learning Disabilities 5 (1972): 1-15. (*)
7.2 068 Free map distributed by HT and DSB, Copenhagen, 1987. Designer cited as "DSB
Reklamekontor 87.06-105/Roussell." (*)
7.3 038 Author's photograph, George Street, New Brunswick, N.J., March 1999.
7.4 020 Author's photograph, Helsinki, 1992.
7.5 023 Kojin ryoko New York '97-98 (Tokyo: Shobunsha, 1997). (*)
7.6 041 Author's photograph of an appointment calendar owned by a Dutch
acquaintance, New Jersey, circa 1999.
7.7 015 Author's photograph, January 2004.
7.8 042 Author's photograph, Viking Line ferry (Stockholm-Helsinki), 1992.
7.9 044 Photograph by Sonja Groset, Tallinn, Estonia, 2002. Used by permission.
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